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North Korea (Superthread)

More details about the execution of Kim Jong Un's uncle last month: seems Jang became dogfood....literally.

:o

Jang's execution bodes ill for China

Straits Times link

(Reuters) THE execution of Jang Song Thaek, the No. 2 man in North Korea, took Beijing by surprise and will adversely affect bilateral relations.

Beijing's displeasure is expressed through the publication of a detailed account of Jang's brutal execution in Wen Wei Po, its official mouthpiece, in Hong Kong, on Dec 12.

According to the report, unlike previous executions of political prisoners which were carried out by firing squads with machine guns, Jang was stripped naked and thrown into a cage, along with his five closest aides. Then 120 hounds, starved for three days, were allowed to prey on them until they were completely eaten up. This is called "quan jue", or execution by dogs.

The report said the entire process lasted for an hour, with Mr Kim Jong Un, the supreme leader in North Korea, supervising it along with 300 senior officials.
 
Bah.  Evil western propaganda.  Obviously, this is clear sign of the blessed, benevolent leader's great love of animals.
 
North Korea is a tourist's paradise:

547848_10151869572736232_598926204_n.jpg
 
Colin P said:
A very strong message to the rest of them to play ball his way.

He needs to remember that this may come back to literally bite him.....
 
What does one expect from a dictator ? He made a public example out of his uncle and his cronies.Anyone associated with his uncle is dead or in a labor camp.It sure is a step up from a rash of automobile accidents that killed a number of high ranking officials.
 
Colin P said:
A very strong message to the rest of them to play ball his way.

5 a side with baskets ?

http://www.ctvnews.ca/sports/a-great-idea-for-the-world-dennis-rodman-angrily-defends-trip-to-north-korea-1.1627113
 
An update on the idea of the collapse of the DPRK. This could be seen as a followup (but nowhere near as detailed or nuanced) to Robert Kaplan's article When North Korea Falls:

http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/the-complex-calculus-north-korean-collapse-9683

The Complex Calculus of a North Korean Collapse
Share on emailShare on twitterShare on facebookShare on digg| More Sharing ServicesMore [1]
Doug Bandow [2]
|
January 9, 2014

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains a sui generis communist monarchy [3] wrapped in mystery, prone to sporadic brinkmanship and violent spasms. The young leader’s surprise execution of his uncle suggests regime instability, which might spark new international provocations for domestic political purposes.

The latest events have rekindled predictions of a possible North Korean collapse. The greatest danger is that the US would get drawn into the resulting chaos and conflict. Warned [4] the Rand Corporation’s Bruce W. Bennett: “Inadequately prepared, the ROK and the United States could suffer many serious consequences, including a failed or aborted intervention, a destabilization of the region, and possibly broader warfare.”

The Korean peninsula became a U.S. security concern when the US and Soviet Union divided the former Japanese colony after Tokyo’s World War II surrender. Two competing and hostile states emerged, leading to the Korean War. The Truman administration intervened to prevent the DPRK from conquering the South; U.S. troops remained.

Today, however, the Republic of Korea possesses roughly 80 times the North’s GDP and more than twice the latter’s population. Seoul could do whatever it takes to defend itself. The DPRK retains sizeable armed forces but lacks advanced weaponry, combined arms training, adequate human capital, and quality industrial infrastructure. Neither the People’s Republic of China nor Russia would back a North Korean attack. Even Kim probably recognizes that the North would lose.

More likely is a North Korean collapse. Bennett has argued that “There is a reasonable probability that North Korean totalitarianism will end in the foreseeable future.” Columnist Steven Metz recently contended [5]: “The question is not whether the Kim dynasty will fail but when.” Three years ago analyst John Guardiano said the North would “inevitably [6]” implode.

Of course, the Kim dynasty has outlived the Soviet Union by more than two decades. The DPRK may continue to surprise the West with its resilience.

Nevertheless, the system is under increasing stress. Metz observed: “The execution could be a sign that the cohesion of the North Korean elite is crumbling. If so, it is the beginning of the end for the parasitic Kim dynasty.” Jang’s elimination suggests weakness [7], not strength. Jang’s relatives are being imprisoned at home and recalled from abroad; his wife, Kim’s aunt by blood, has disappeared from public view.

Any future political battle could turn even more violent. A breakdown of one-man rule in what Bennett called a “failing state” risks a political free-for-all. The North has never tried power-sharing, or any kind of collective leadership. Concluded Bennett: “The division of the North into factions would likely precipitate civil war, as at least some of the factions will seek primacy and eventual control of all of North Korea.” Moreover, the regime or even one faction could strike outward to rally internal support.

Metz posited “widespread, protracted internal conflict that could make even the Syrian civil war pale by comparison.” The resulting hardship could exceed that resulting from the 1990s famine, which killed a half million or more North Koreans. We should not expect a peaceful, German-style resolution.

Although most people presume reunification would follow a North Korean collapse, Bennett warned that “China could take political control of much of the North, likely in cooperation with one or more North Korean factions. A failure to achieve Korean unification in these circumstances could doom Korea to division for at least many more decades.”

What should Washington do? Guardiano advocated unilateral American intervention: “sooner or later, the U.S. military is going to have to deal with North Korea. And, when we do, we likely will have to occupy and rebuild the country just as we have done in Iraq and are now doing in Afghanistan.”

Seoul might not approve of the Pentagon turning the North into an American colony. More likely, the South would lead any Western military effort. Argued Bennett, the ROK could “decide to intervene in such a crisis with U.S. assistance and seek Korean unification.”

However, the PRC also would be tempted to act militarily—to prevent mass refugee flows into China’s border provinces, safeguard Chinese economic interests, and ensure friendly political control in Pyongyang. Beijing’s incentive to act would be even stronger if U.S. forces entered as well.

Military intervention would be no cakewalk. The Kim dynasty has taught the population that Americans and their South Korean puppets are the enemy; North Koreans might offer little warmer welcome to the PRC. The DPRK military or individual units could fight conventionally or resort to guerrilla combat. Worse would be a clash between allied and Chinese forces. Worried Bennett: “The forces of both sides would have significant incentives to advance rapidly into the North, leading to a risk of accidental combat between them. In the zeal of the moment, the inevitable accidents could escalate into major combat between the ROK and U.S. forces and the Chinese forces.”

In short, a North Korean implosion could be an explosion as well, with catastrophic consequences radiating outward across the region. Concerned governments should begin pondering likely contingencies.

South Korea has the most to do. It should adopt reunification legislation, since under its constitution North Koreans currently are considered ROK nationals, which would complicate the treatment of anyone who might warrant punishment or even questioning. Now would be a good time to consider such questions as property ownership, status of foreign (i.e., Chinese) contracts, treatment of human rights criminals, amnesty provisions, and more. The right answers might help ease concerns among more responsible Northern elites over possible reunification.

However, consultations should not stop in Seoul. Metz proposed “multinational discussions to assess the short-term and long-term challenges of a North Korean collapse,” though the quieter the better since “doing so openly will inflame the Kim regime’s expansive paranoia and increase the chances of disastrous miscalculation.” So far, China has been reluctant to enter talks regarding its ally, but relations between the two states have frayed. The execution of Jang, a friend of Beijing, introduced new tensions in the relationship.

Desirable would be regional cooperation, including providing forces for reconstruction duties. Bennett figured that between 260,000 and 400,000 troops might be necessary to “stabilize” the North. One option would be a multinational force dominated by the ROK and China but including troops from other Asian nations (though not Japan, for reasons of history).

The U.S. should limit its role. Humanitarian aid should primarily come from multinational agencies and the North’s neighbors, especially South Korea, China, and Japan, which have the most at stake.

America should reject any direct military role. In no case should the US be involved in occupying and pacifying the North. Bennett argued that “the ROK will have insufficient forces, even with significant U.S. participation, to fully handle the various challenges of North Korean collapse.” Obviously Seoul needs to take more seriously the possibility and consequences of a North Korean collapse. The U.S. could provide logistical aid for any South Korean military move, though by now Seoul should be able to support its own forces.

Washington also might consider limited operations to secure nuclear materials and other WMDs. However, even this mission would be complicated: China is closer to many facilities, such the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and might quickly occupy them. Moreover, the ROK might decide that reunification was a convenient opportunity to augment their own military capabilities. While such actions would be undesirable, they still would deny WMD access to non-state actors, Washington’s most important objective.

Most importantly, the US should ease China’s fears about America’s role in a reunified Korea. Although troops along the Yalu might seem minor compared to air and sea forces in the Asia-Pacific, the former would be a potent symbol and resurrect memories from the Korean War. Beijing would see less need for a buffer state if there were no U.S. ground forces against which to buffer. (China also might see a united democratic Korea as a threatening draw for millions of ethnic Koreans in the former’s border provinces; only the ROK could address this concern.)

Kim Jong-un celebrated Jang’s execution as demonstrating national unity. More likely, however, the regime’s foundation is cracking. Still, the North could surprise its adversaries and survive for years or decades more.

But the North’s neighbors should prepare for “what if?” Washington’s most important role would be to limit expectations as to what the US would do. Ultimately, Pyongyang is a South Korean and Asian rather than an American responsibility.

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, including Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire (Xulon).

Image [8]: U.S. Army Flickr.

More by
Doug Bandow [2]
Topics: Failed States [9]
Regions: North Korea [10].
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Source URL (retrieved on Jan 10, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-complex-calculus-north-korean-collapse-9683
Links:
[1] http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=250&username=nationalinterest
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/doug-bandow
[3] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17046941
[4] http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf
[5] http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13450/strategic-horizons-when-north-korea-collapses-u-s-must-be-ready
[6] http://spectator.org/articles/38529/more-guns-less-butter
[7] http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-fall-jang-song-taek-9539
[8] http://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/761432440/sizes/m/in/photolist-2ahxkw-6pCgsU-4Qzooh-4QvcH8-iBbVY8-74dZDT-5d6wSv-aDAHHy-d7Nrbf-4q8BNJ-4jiLK3-a6e66Z-ayX7rJ-4tg37w-a6Tksr-9eBB9o-edwQRT-75TtKu-fh5WDj-a63Q4n-5daRBS-d267oh-awWXBb-8DpjFd-cZKcim/
[9] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security/failed-states
[10] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia/northeast-asia/north-korea

 
I think author/scolar, Cato Institute fellow Doug Bandow has taken leave of his senses in the article posted above

He quotes a source who says that “sooner or later, the U.S. military is going to have to deal with North Korea. And, when we do, we likely will have to occupy and rebuild the country just as we have done in Iraq and are now doing in Afghanistan.” With what, for heavens' sake, in what century can the US assemble enough forces to take on a million man nuclear tipped army with an unhappy, even fatally angry China just across the border? It is utter, complete, total madness - a recipe for US suicide. And he's suggesting the US has "rebuilt" Iraq and Afghanistan? In what universe is he living?

Reunification, under South Korean leadership, is the only acceptable outcome, and that cannot, will not happen until the US withdraws from the Asian mainland.

US intervention is a juvenile military wet dream.
 
The only possible hope is that the North Korean army lacks the logistical abilities to supply its million man army. I strongly doubt that however given the distances involved in that area and the fact that they will have the ability to choose the time of any strike. Realistically, I think the only military option would be nuclear in facing the North Koreans in a determined fight. I'm pretty sure that the fallout from this, both political and radiological, would make this option prohibitive.

ERC is right (as usual), US military intervention would be a disaster and probably result in nothing more then the loss of the 2nd US ID. The US just needs to keep enough forces there for deterrence purposes and wait for North Korean to implode under its own inertia.
 
jeffb said:
ERC is right (as usual), US military intervention would be a disaster and probably result in nothing more then the loss of the 2nd US ID. The US just needs to keep enough forces there for deterrence purposes and wait for North Korean to implode under its own inertia.

The way I (probably too simply) see it, it's a Catch-22:
  • US can't/won't leave SK in case NK (possibly backed by China) invades SK
  • China wants a buffer to the US in the Korean peninsula, therefore supporting NK through thick and thin
  • NK, with China's support, will continue to threaten SK and ensuring US support in SK

From the latest purge, I can see China's support wavering a bit, but I can't see China letting NK implode (as much as we all wish it would).
 
I continue to maintain that China wants a unified Korea under South Korean control and management. South Korea is enormously valuable to China as an investor and customer; North Korea is valuable, primarily, as a tool to keep America and Japan off balance.

South Korea has a large and capable army. The US Army's contribution to South Korea's defence is modest; it's a tripwire. The USAF and USN are much, Much, MUCH more important, but they can still support SK from island bases.

If the US withdrew from Korea - leaving large air and naval forces in the region, but not on the Asian mainland - then I believe China would, quickly, orchestrate the demise of the DPRK and the rapid reunification of Korea with its capital and political system in Seoul.
 
Well I managed to miss the part about the US intervention since later in the article (and what drew my attention) the author also says:

America should reject any direct military role. In no case should the US be involved in occupying and pacifying the North. Bennett argued that “the ROK will have insufficient forces, even with significant U.S. participation, to fully handle the various challenges of North Korean collapse.” Obviously Seoul needs to take more seriously the possibility and consequences of a North Korean collapse. The U.S. could provide logistical aid for any South Korean military move, though by now Seoul should be able to support its own forces.

Washington also might consider limited operations to secure nuclear materials and other WMDs. However, even this mission would be complicated: China is closer to many facilities, such the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and might quickly occupy them. Moreover, the ROK might decide that reunification was a convenient opportunity to augment their own military capabilities. While such actions would be undesirable, they still would deny WMD access to non-state actors, Washington’s most important objective.

I wonder if the article was mishandled in the editorial process, since advocating both positions cancells out?
 
Thucydides said:
Well I managed to miss the part about the US intervention since later in the article (and what drew my attention) the author also says:

I wonder if the article was mishandled in the editorial process, since advocating both positions cancells out?


I fairness to Mr. Bandow, he was providing background and was quoting writer/analyst/blogger John Guardiano who made the comments to which I took exception. Mr Bandow actually ended up sharing some of my views, but not until after he had set up a completely ridiculous, cloud coo-coo land straw man argument.
 
I suspect that rather than an implosion, you either see a gradually collapse with Kim become a ruler of a city state with each Province doing their own thing while nominally bowing to the Capital or Kim will start feeling loss of control, killing many senior people, who them feel they have nothing left to lose and a tragic accident wipes out the whole family, whereupon a "Congress takes on the heavy burden of running the country in the Spirit of the Great Leader" and in the back power is divvyed up, people disappear and a new order similar to China and/or Myammer appears. The West and China uses this as an excuse to normalize relations and quiet lucrative trade deals are inked.
 
Seems Seoul was ready to strike the North in retaliation for DPRK's shelling of an ROK-held island in 2010.

Defense News

Gates Says US Prevented South Korea Airstrike on North

SEOUL — South Korea declined to comment Wednesday on revelations that the United States talked it down from launching a retaliatory airstrike on North Korea in 2010.

The claims were made in the newly published memoir of former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in which he also describes former South Korean president Roh Moo-Hyun as “probably a little bit crazy.”

The 2010 incident followed the North’s surprise shelling of a South Korean border island in November of that year.

The attack triggered what Gates labeled a “very dangerous crisis,” with the South Korean government of then-President Lee Myung-Bak initially insisting on a robust military response.

“South Korea’s original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery,” Gates wrote in his memoir
.

“We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously,” he added.

Over the next few days, Gates said he, US President Barack Obama and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had numerous telephone calls with their South Korean counterparts in an effort to calm things down.

(...)
 
The sad story of Kim's Uncle Jang continues to provide more and more grisly details: "Dear Leader" had the WHOLE FAMILY of his Uncle Jang executed as well (the aunt is the one Kim Jong Un has a blood relation to, so he essentially had all her in-laws executed).

Voice of Russia

The whole family of one of North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un's uncles, Jang Song Thaek, has been executed on Un's order reports South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, with reference to multiple sources. Jang Song Thaek himself, once a high-ranking official, was executed earlier.

A source claiming to be aware of the situation in North Korea says that the entire family, including babies, was executed.


According to data in the agencies' possession, in December, Jang Song Thaek's elder sister and her husband Jon Yong-Jin, who was North Korea's Ambassador to Cuba and Jang Song Thaek's nephew Jang Yong Chol, Ambassador to Malaysia, and Jang Yong Chol's two sons, both aged about 20, were recalled to Pyongyang and executed.

Jang Song Thaek also had two brothers, but both had earlier died from illness, perhaps explaining why the families of Mr. Jang's sisters, including their little grandchildren, also became victims.

(...)
 
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