The MiniTAT (Tactical Armament Turret) was not a weapon, it was an anchor. Had anybody put one on my Kiowa in a real war situation, I'd have pickled it (accidentally) over the nearest lake.
Stowed, it hung just inboard of the left-hand skid about an inch or so above the ground - not good on soft ground during sloppy seasons or winter. Deployed, it hung a couple of feet below the skids along the hel's centreline. This caused most guys to fly about ten feet higher than normal in order to avoid snagging it on fences, shrubbery, and livestock - not good, when the tactical situation required one to follow every little fold in the ground (our minimum tactical altitude was "skids clear of ground). The thought of sustaining an engine failure at low altitude with gun deployed was not comforting either, but this did not happen until shortly before the Kiowa's unfortunate demise. I can't remember the details, but the gun ripped off with no harm done to the crew.
The standard 7.62 mm Minigun on this mount was de-rated to two rates of fire - 750 and 1500 RPM. It was fired in the fixed forward position by the trigger on the pilot's cyclic or by a pantograph sight and trigger unit mounted to the observer's door post (left hand side), in which mode it was fully flexible. The observer, however, usually had a lap and both hands full of maps, CEOIs, codes, stab or regular binos, aides-memoire, and other clutter (while navigating, talking on two radios, and watching out for hazards). By the time that he was able to recognize that his hel was under fire, determine where it was coming from, drop whatever he was holding, grab the trigger unit, and get the gun into action the pilot would already have done a 180 and headed back to cover - ten feet too high.
The site was a plastic disc with faint soap-bubble-rainbow-like coloured rings. It was not designed for accuracy, and neither was the MiniTAT. Rounds would spew everywhere. We would set out runs with standard target balloons at the start of a week-long range practice and never have to replace any. Most would survive the entire week.
The MiniTAT with full 1100 round ammo load (five standard belts linked and contained in a long box across the back seat) brought the Kiowa up to max gross weight, plus or minus a few rounds, with full fuel and crew of two. This was significant in an already underpowered machine. Certain engines seemed to develop less power than they should (manifested by running hot) despite the best efforts of our techs. I had one of those one hot July day in Pet and could not pick up into a hover with a heavier observer and full fuel. Needless to say, agility - an important factor in one's survival and effectiveness - suffered tremendously.
"Effective" range officially was 1200 m. but really more like a few feet. Tactical bounds were often a couple of k or more, which negated the option of fire and movement. Not even having the range to reach one's No 2 when moving, let alone somebody engaging him from his front, is useless at best.
The value of a 7.62 mm MG on a thin aluminum-and-Plexiglas machine operating on a mechanized battlefield against masses of heavy armour with stuff up to 125 mm was zero, and, as stated, the additional weight made one a better target.
The long flexible ammo guide to the flexible gun was not ammo friendly and frequently caused stoppages.
While I miss the Kiowa and its role, I do not miss the MiniTAT.
There was, however, one area where I thought it useful - northern Norway. There are only a couple of roads running the length of a narrow country that the Russians would have had to try and jam four or five divisions down. These wound along fjords and valleys and through restrictive passes. Off-road movement for much of the year was dicfficult at best because the ground was rocky, boggy, of covered in deep snow, often all three at once, and weather was highly unpredictable and variable. Ski patrols were common along the parallel valleys, for recce, OP, and FAC purposes. Determining friend from foe was relatively simple - direction of movement was obvious from the ski and pole marks (ski tracks themselves were very easy to find), and webbing contrasted nicely against white cam for confirmation, and had distinctive patterns. It was the only time where I outgunned my enemy, didn't have to worry about flying a little higher, and got a slight performance boost from the colder air. And, on the first exercise that I was there for, there were lots of enemy helicopters that I could jump out and yell "BOO!!" at.
The gun itself is good; the problems were solely with the mount and its application to an unsuitable platform.
Regardless of that, its only useful application in a tac hel environment is as a close-in defensive weapon and I do not really see any great advantage over the C6, which is simple and reliable and for the most part uses standard parts. The Minigun is only useful if one is going to emply it at its higher rates of fire, with the attendant greater appetite and consequent weight penalty.
Prior to Afghanistan, I was opposed to attempting to mount an offensive gun on a utility helicopter such as the CH146 with its lack of survivability features. I believe firmly that the weight penalty outweighs the tactical value of a gun regardless of practicably-mountable calibre, although I would of course do my best to keep an open mind. In a shoot-out between an armoured vehicle able to adopt a hull-down and concealed position and an unarmoured hel having to be fully exposed in order to fire, with both armed with cannon of similar or identical calibre, the ground-based vehicle clearly has the advantage. Missiles such as Hellfire, or some of the newer 2.75 in rocket versions, are the only way to go. Our current situation changes that - something around 25 mm and fully stabilized would be most worthwhile. Even .50 cal would be okay - but one definitely needs to be able to stay well out of 7.62 mm and RPG range.
