New Royal Marines Commando Uniform

[Kirkhill]

Many thanks

 

[blacktriangle]

Still thinking about this - your point is well taken.  The great threat to Naval operations is area denial. 

One supposition is to accept that the area is denied and then figure out how to replicate the island hopping campaigns of 1943-45, or the North Atlantic campaign, in the 21st century.

The alternate supposition, is to deny the enemy the ability to deny the area.  In other words get there first with a light footprint.

I think that's what both the USMC and RM are preparing for. They recognize that their likely adversaries tend to hold the home court advantage. They will have to be ready to dislodge & destroy enemy weapons/sensors in order to position their own, in support of their respective fleets.

If nothing else, it provides a renewed raison d'etre for these organizations as opposed to just continuing to serve as fitter, tougher, & poorer second armies.  ;D

 

[a_majoor]

Just a bit sideways to the discussion, but the Marine plans for truck and robot mounted missiles could fill a gap in our own artillery park. What can reach out and touch a far distant ship can also be made bad for the health of a BM-30 Smerch MLRS battery or similar deep targets on land.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think that's what both the USMC and RM are preparing for. They recognize that their likely adversaries tend to hold the home court advantage. They will have to be ready to dislodge & destroy enemy weapons/sensors in order to position their own, in support of their respective fleets.

If nothing else, it provides a renewed raison d'etre for these organizations as opposed to just continuing to serve as fitter, tougher, & poorer second armies.  ;D

The difference is that USMC doctrine, since WW2, has been about the 'direct approach'.

The British? Not so much....

 

[FJAG]

Just a bit sideways to the discussion, but the Marine plans for truck and robot mounted missiles could fill a gap in our own artillery park. What can reach out and touch a far distant ship can also be made bad for the health of a BM-30 Smerch MLRS battery or similar deep targets on land.

Not to get too cynical or sarcastic but a muzzle loading 12 pounder would "fill a gap in our own artillery park".

:sarcasm:

 

[Kirkhill]

The difference is that USMC doctrine, since WW2, has been about the 'direct approach'.

The British? Not so much....

Which is why I think the lean is towards denying the opportunity to deny by establishing new choke points - kind of like laying minefields and covering them but without the mines.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Which is why I think the lean is towards denying the opportunity to deny by establishing new choke points - kind of like laying minefields and covering them but without the mines.

I'm guessing that it has something to do with the US re-roling the USMC into an area denial force to be deployed against China's hegemonic tendencies these days, especially in the South China Sea.

Like a good 'little Brother', the British are now tagging along.

 

[ArmyRick]

Interested in this thread. Going to follow. Anyone else see this transformation of the Royal Marines as pretty radical?

 

[Infanteer]

Anyone else see this transformation of the Royal Marines as pretty radical?

It is radical - I've seen some of the more substantive documentation on this at work.  They are moving away from a conventional disposition and will be completely reconfigured in terms of force generation output at the end of it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Interested in this thread. Going to follow. Anyone else see this transformation of the Royal Marines as pretty radical?

I just re-read John Durnford-Slater's book: Commando (he was a Gunner, and the 'first' Commando). It's really a return to the original Commando role: a fast moving surgical strike force, and moving away from an attempt to be a more conventional, but amphibious, Army Brigade, which was necessary during the Cold War. Northern Ireland and the subsequent conflicts in Central Asia saw them lumped in with the rest of the Army units on various rotations as the capacity was clearly needed in the Infantry side of the equation.

The original Army Commando Troop was, for example, a 60 man unit with a Captain 'Troop Commander' and two sections of 30 men, each commanded by a Lt, which was specifically designed to fit into, and be deployed together in, two landing craft. Some of the original roles they were assigned by the Royal Navy included capturing and occupying small, strategic, but thinly defended islands in contested parts of various maritime environments, similar to the situation in the South China Sea.

It remains to be seen if they will keep their artillery, engineer and logistics units, all provided by the Army and manned by soldiers who pass the All Arms Commando Course. For some bizarre reason, the Daily Express seems to sum it up pretty well:

Royal Marines to embrace original WW2 commando role as they relaunch with new weapons

THE ROYAL Marines are to undergo a complete rebrand, with a new maritime role and fresh combat uniform as it embraces the future by returning to its Second World War roots.

It comes as commanders of the 350-year-old Corps seek to end the blurring with Army counterparts and adopt a more "commando raid" approach, with smaller units using hi-tech kit. Future Commando Force plans will see the green berets provide more direct support to Special Forces and be based onboard pre-positioned motherships, ready to strike in areas such as the Mediterranean and the Gulf. Other moves include the wider integration of autonomous platforms, such as remote controlled vessels and drones, while, at the tactical level, they are to be issued with a new digitally-enhanced camouflage combat uniform which will be distinctive to them.

Though only some Royal Marines now have access to the superior Colt C7 rifle, the move will see it rolled out to all members and mark the Corp’s ditching of the standard-issue SA-80.

As part of the push to return to its maritime role, discussions are currently underway to change officers' rankings to match those of the Royal Navy, rather than British Army, though this is still under review.

What has been decided, however, is that they will retain their iconic green beret and cap badge.

“The scale and ambition of our transformation is significant. Nothing is off-limits and we aspire to be at the cutting edge of defence,” said Royal Marines Commandant General Major General Matt Holmes.

Senior sources confirmed that the new “force distribution” policy was inspired by recent US Marine Corps guidance.

Ironically, however, it will mark the green berets’ return to their original “commando” roots.

Currently the regiment uses concentrated force to pit its strength against an enemy’s weakness.

It comes as commanders of the 350-year-old Corps seek to end the blurring with Army counterparts and adopt a more "commando raid" approach, with smaller units using hi-tech kit. Future Commando Force plans will see the green berets provide more direct support to Special Forces and be based onboard pre-positioned motherships, ready to strike in areas such as the Mediterranean and the Gulf. Other moves include the wider integration of autonomous platforms, such as remote controlled vessels and drones, while, at the tactical level, they are to be issued with a new digitally-enhanced camouflage combat uniform which will be distinctive to them.

Under the new plans, to be phased in over three years, it will adopt a more “special operations” approach by using more and smaller units, complimented by technology such as the use of remote controlled boats to set up a decoy while another unit speeds ashore with a remote-operated UAV to help identify their targets.

As part of this the basic Royal Marines unit, a Troop, will be reduced from 30 commandos to 16.

The regiment currently operates one specialist maritime unit, 42 Commando, which is deployed in small groups in areas such as the Gulf and mounts maritime interdiction operations against piracy and to protect shipping from potential Iranian attacks in the Strait of Hormuz.

But now Maj-Gen Holmes wants the entire 3 Commando Brigade - the Royal Marines' main fighting arm -  to become a special operations force, similar to its USMC counterpart.

It means more Royal Marines are to be based on new Littoral Strike ships - announced by former defence secretary Gavin Williamson - and placed on high readiness in areas of tension to mount rescue operations and assaults.

The Ministry of Defence has already dedicated £35m to developing two new vessels,  one to be based East of Suez and the other covering the Mediterranean, which are to be rolled out in five years.

Each will contain a company - or strike force - of 120 commandos and up to six helicopters, possibly three “heavy lift” Chinooks, a Wildcat and two Apache gunships. 

In the meantime a new amphibious task force, headed by Commodore James Parkin, has just been launched.

Until the Littoral Strike ships arrive, it will operate from the amphibious assault ships HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, as well as the fleet's Bay class landing ships.

There are still several challenges to work out, sources say. 

These include securing communications in a hostile environment, especially at long range; resupplying troops on the ground, possibly using the experimental Malloy Aeronautics delivery drone (currently already undergoing U.S. trials); developing ship-to-shore connectors to cross a water gap and overcoming enemy action faced by an insertion team on a 150 nautical mile at a fast 60 knots.                                 

Maj-Gen Holmes said that the future operational environment will demand more persistent forward deployment resulting in “constant competition”’ from potential adversaries from the Arctic to the Middle East, and rapid response to crises.

“The new littoral strike force will be active, not just ready," he said.

“I need agile, robust commandos able to operate an array of systems to win the fight, if necessary, in a denied (hostile) environment.”

A Royal Marines spokesperson said: “The Royal Marines are a distinct but integral part of the Royal Navy and work is ongoing to reinforce their role as an effective maritime fighting force.

“The Future Commando Force will harness cutting edge technology to be an effective maritime infantry force using innovative, potent, elite fighting capability. They are and will remain a distinct but integral part of the Naval Service.

“There are no plans to change anything that denotes the strong history and identity of the Royal Marines, including the Green Beret.”

https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1199250/Royal-Marines-news-rebrand-elite-force

 

[FJAG]

... Maj-Gen Holmes said that the future operational environment will demand more persistent forward deployment resulting in “constant competition”’ from potential adversaries from the Arctic to the Middle East, and rapid response to crises.

“The new littoral strike force will be active, not just ready," he said.

“I need agile, robust commandos able to operate an array of systems to win the fight, if necessary, in a denied (hostile) environment.” ...

It is radical - I've seen some of the more substantive documentation on this at work.  They are moving away from a conventional disposition and will be completely reconfigured in terms of force generation output at the end of it.

I'm trying desperately to stay off my usual hobby horse on this but do wonder about the size of the force.

Currently (if Wikipedia can be believed) the RM have 7,760 Regulars and 750 Reservists. Assuming then that the force will work out of two littoral strike ships (and that the current amphibious task force will be replaced by those ships) then the "active" force at any one time is 240 Marines. One certainly doesn't need an establishment of 8,510 folks to force generate 240 deployed continuously albeit there will be a fairly heavy training load to keep up the very specialized skills needed here.

Just as important, this concept is highly equipment dependant meaning in order to ramp up the operational force in an emergency, one would need additional littoral ships which probably take much longer to generate then a new Marine. In other words there does not seem to be a need for a large stand-by/replacement component of Marines (either Regular or Reserve).

Also makes me wonder if the SBS will be ramped up a bit more to increase the Tier 1 capabilities of what is now becoming an overall naval littoral special forces arm.

The whole concept has a lot of sense behind it especially if the two current amphibious assault ships (and the three Bay-class landing ships) go into "reserve" and become more of an "on-call" tool to insert conventional Army follow-on forces for those limited scenarios where such a force might be useful and/or needed.

:cheers:

 

[Kirkhill]

...As modern weapon systems can hit ships hundreds of miles out from an objective, just getting to the fight is now a problem in itself. ...

A persistent forward presence based on ships seeks to offer global access and “pose greater dilemmas to our adversaries,” General Holmes says.

Two Littoral Response Groups (LRG), each of a few hundred commandos and supporting elements, will deploy on roughly six-month cycles to respond to crises ranging from humanitarian disaster to conventional warfare. 

It is envisaged one LRG will be permanently east of Suez, with the Royal Navy facility in Bahrain acting as a staging post.

The second Group will focus on Nato’s northern flank, working closely with Norwegian amphibious forces, and the Mediterranean.

The three Bay-Class Landing Ship Dock Auxiliary ships, crewed by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, will be the likely hosts, initially at least, with additional medical and aviation facilities developed in the near future.

...

Colonel Mark Totten, Programme Director of the Future Commando Force, said the programme had two main drivers.

The first is the increased conventional threat posed by technically sophisticated weapons, particularly when matched with artificial intelligence.

Advances in defensive systems mean it is now easier to find, identify and engage military forces with much greater lethality and at much greater range. These so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities (known as A2AD in military jargon) will make it much harder to get into an area of operations, let alone operate in comparative safety once there. As theatre-entry troops, Commando forces need to address this threat.

....

The second driver for the Future Commando Force is the more aggressive use of difficult to identify military forces, combined with economic and diplomatic activity and disinformation: commonly referred to as sub-threshold (of war), hybrid or ‘grey zone’ activities. 

This area between declared warfare and state competition is a sophisticated and complex operating environment. It is important for political decision makers to have a broad range of military options to complement actions by the intelligence agencies and special forces. The Future Commando Force is billed as a possible high-end conventional contribution to this demand.

The Royal Marines hope the Future Commando Force will also break the “get ready to be ready” model of force generation.

Colonel Totten says Commando forces cannot just “wait for something to happen” before deploying. The aim is to get troops forward where they’re needed, working alongside partner nations.

“We can provide more problem sets to an adversary as a crisis builds,” he says.

He eschews the suggestion such a posture would, in itself, be a provocative act.

The forward deployed Littoral Response Groups, numbering in the low hundreds of Royal Marines and supporting elements, would fit into an already existing network of forward defence presence, he says.


“It would not be introducing a totally new dynamic, which could be escalatory.

“It means an adversary has to track something more than it does today. It’s very easy to track a Task Group deploying from Devonport.”

A persistent presence forward provides an additional surveillance problem for any would-be enemy, he says. It would also focus attention in a way talk of preparing forces in the UK might not. ...

How many bodies do you need to maintain a deployment of 200 to 400 troops on a continuous basis in two locations and still allow them a family life?  As well as manning Fleet Protection, and Special Forces (SBS, SFSG), as well as being trained and instructing?  It seems to me that you will eat up 5 to 6000 bodies pretty quickly.  But they will be deployable bodies - not bodies that the government will have to request from parliament.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Currently (if Wikipedia can be believed) the RM have 7,760 Regulars and 750 Reservists.

The full 3 Cdo Bde probably probably has that many troops, which includes the SBS and combat support units like an Arty Regt, an Engr Regt, a Log Regt, plus a hockey sock full of atts and dets staffed by RM, Army, RN Air Force and RNAS personnel.

The 'Royal Marine Infantry' element in 3 Cdo Bde currently centres on three Commandos (Four Five, Four Two, and Fourty), which are usually manned and organized similar to Army Infantry Battalions: Three Rifle Coys, Combat Support Coy, Admin Coy and HQ Coy. Four Seven is an amphibious raiding group, and Four Three is all RM too and looks after the Nukes at Faslane (they used to be called 'Commachio Group') https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-fighting-arms/royal-marines

Also, IIRC that they don't need to wait for new ships as I think they already have the Albion, and some others, they can be 'adrfit' upon to launch the concept.

 

[Kirkhill]

The full 3 Cdo Bde probably probably has that many troops, which includes the SBS and combat support units like an Arty Regt, an Engr Regt, a Log Regt, plus a hockey sock full of atts and dets staffed by RM, Army, RN Air Force and RNAS personnel.

The 'Royal Marine Infantry' element in 3 Cdo Bde currently centres on three Commandos (Four Five, Four Two, and Fourty), which are usually manned and organized similar to Army Infantry Battalions: Three Rifle Coys, Combat Support Coy, Admin Coy and HQ Coy. Four Seven is an amphibious raiding group, and Four Three is all RM too and looks after the Nukes at Faslane (they used to be called 'Commachio Group') https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-fighting-arms/royal-marines

Also, IIRC that they don't need to wait for new ships as I think they already have the Albion, and some others, they can be 'adrfit' upon to launch the concept.

In addition to Albion and Bulwark, the "full-service solution", they also have the "austere" solution of the 3 Bay class LSDAs available to them.  I gather they are going to launch with the "Austere" solution - presumably to see how much can be done with the bare minimum.  It is easier to identify critical capability gaps when you are missing things you need than if you are choosing not to use things you have.

 

[Infanteer]

I'm trying desperately to stay off my usual hobby horse on this but do wonder about the size of the force.

Currently (if Wikipedia can be believed) the RM have 7,760 Regulars and 750 Reservists. Assuming then that the force will work out of two littoral strike ships (and that the current amphibious task force will be replaced by those ships) then the "active" force at any one time is 240 Marines. One certainly doesn't need an establishment of 8,510 folks to force generate 240 deployed continuously albeit there will be a fairly heavy training load to keep up the very specialized skills needed here.

The number I've seen is over 400, when you count all supporting elements.  So, with some basic math (spitballing say, 450 all in) you need 900 deployed, 900 getting ready, and 900 on reset.  We're at 2700 now.  Plus, the backbone/LOB for all the force generating units - 30 Cdo (Cbt Sp), 40 Cdo, 42 Cdo, 45 Cdo, 43 Cdo Gp (security), 47 Cdo Gp (connectors), 29 Cdo RA (guns), 24 Cdo RE (engineers), and the CLR (loggies) - as well as 3 Cdo Bde HQ and the entire training system and garrison structure the RM has in place, and you likely get to 7,760 bodies pretty fast.

 

[FJAG]

The number I've seen is over 400, when you count all supporting elements.  So, with some basic math (spitballing say, 450 all in) you need 900 deployed, 900 getting ready, and 900 on reset.  We're at 2700 now.  Plus, the backbone/LOB for all the force generating units - 30 Cdo (Cbt Sp), 40 Cdo, 42 Cdo, 45 Cdo, 43 Cdo Gp (security), 47 Cdo Gp (connectors), 29 Cdo RA (guns), 24 Cdo RE (engineers), and the CLR (loggies) - as well as 3 Cdo Bde HQ and the entire training system and garrison structure the RM has in place, and you likely get to 7,760 bodies pretty fast.

Not to argue math overly much here but I read the article as saying:

Each will contain a company - or strike force - of 120 commandos and up to six helicopters, possibly three “heavy lift” Chinooks, a Wildcat and two Apache gunships.

That means two groups of 120 "Marines" each deployed at any one time. Helicopters would be a Navy resource.

It strikes me that one needs two Commandos for this (one east; one west with three line companies [instead of two close combat and two stand off companies] for the rotations of one deployed, one readying and one on reset plus command/log staff)

I would presume fleet protection continues as before.

Are guns still needed at all? Probably a lot less engineers if, like Special Forces, engineering/weapons/comms and medical skills are built into the company structure.

I'm sure that given a little bit of bureaucratic math, the Marines leadership will find a way to build this force using the full existing establishment but it strikes me that having 7,760 regulars and 850 reservists to keep 240 Marines deployed and to provide fleet protection is a tad bloaty.

I've been thinking this thing over a bit since my earlier post on this and am wondering whether or not there really is a need for a littoral Marine commando force at all. If this organization is turning more into a Tier 2 special operations force then the question is, is there really a need for a specialized maritime force, or should there be one UK Special Operations Command with both Tier 1 SAS/SBS and Tier 2 Ranger-like components within which there would be an element of teams with maritime/littoral training but which could be used on more generalized special operations.

The littoral ships may be needed but do the strike troops really need to be a whole separate Marine organization? If not, that would leave the official Marines only responsible for fleet protection which would not be a special operations tasking at all. I mean really: when since WW2 is the last time the Marines acted as "Marines" or "Commandos"? If memory serves me right, 3 Cdo Bde assaulted by helicopter in Suez and it's initial landing in the Falklands was made up of one Commando and two para battalions who basically conducted a light infantry fight after the initial (mostly unopposed) landing. Does one really need a specialized arm for that or would a few light infantry battalions proficient in air assault be more versatile?

op:

 

[Kirkhill]

FJAG

I think you are missing the point.  The issue is not the names or even the skill sets.  The issue is that the Press notices the deployment of soldiers.  The Press is oblivious to the deployment of Special Forces, the day to day activities of the deployed Navy and Air Force, and Intelligence activities.  All of which contribute on a daily basis to the security of the realm.

The deployment of soldiers is noteworthy because they are rarely deployed.  They are rarely used. That indicates to the general public that they are not "necessary".  They are "discretionary" -  like grants to the arts.

And if they were used regularly then they wouldn't be available to use rarely and so would be useless as an insurance policy.

The UK government is looking for ways to meet Little Green Men without making it to the front page of The Times.

The littoral ships are an extension of Cyprus and Diego Garcia.  They are sovereign bases. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

Does one really need a specialized arm for that or would a few light infantry battalions proficient in air assault be more versatile?

op:

If you expect them to fight and win, independent from a main force, while surrounded, you'll need specially selected and trained Infantry and support arms.

3 Cdo Bde has a really effective program for that, which they've delivered in more or less the same format since WW2. It's called 'The Commando Course.' Pass rate: about 50%.

The Parachute Regiment/ Airborne Forces has a simjlar program, with roots in WW2 selection processes, designed for the unique needs of Airborne Operations. It's called 'Pre-Parachute Selection', or P Company. Pass rate: about 30%.

Officer and other leaders would need additional selection and preparation.

Having said that, cycling other Infantry/ support units through that course, and other selection and preparation, prior to being 'certified' for deployment on these types of missions might not be a bad idea. As long as you could only take volunteers.

I guarantee though, if you try to put a bog standard line Infantry unit, and other support arms and services, into the breach without such preparation, you'll get what you got in the Falklands War (where the Guards units, and some others, were basically useless ... oops, did I say that out loud? ).

 

[Infanteer]

Not to argue math overly much here but I read the article as saying:

The article is missing a lot.  I'm looking at a source document right now.  These are not companies in the conventional sense, and the amount of CS and CSS bolted on is (a) not insignificant and (b) not described in the article.

 

[FJAG]

FJAG

I think you are missing the point.  The issue is not the names or even the skill sets.  The issue is that the Press notices the deployment of soldiers.  The Press is oblivious to the deployment of Special Forces, the day to day activities of the deployed Navy and Air Force, and Intelligence activities.  All of which contribute on a daily basis to the security of the realm.

The deployment of soldiers is noteworthy because they are rarely deployed.  They are rarely used. That indicates to the general public that they are not "necessary".  They are "discretionary" -  like grants to the arts.

And if they were used regularly then they wouldn't be available to use rarely and so would be useless as an insurance policy.

The UK government is looking for ways to meet Little Green Men without making it to the front page of The Times.

The littoral ships are an extension of Cyprus and Diego Garcia.  They are sovereign bases.

I'm just looking at this from a pure force structure point of view. I clearly recognize the "political"/"press" aspects.

If you expect them to fight and win, independent from a main force, while surrounded, you'll need specially selected and trained Infantry and support arms.

3 Cdo Bde has a really effective program for that, which they've delivered in more or less the same format since WW2. It's called 'The Commando Course.' Pass rate: about 50%.

The Parachute Regiment/ Airborne Forces has a simjlar program, with roots in WW2 selection processes, designed for the unique needs of Airborne Operations. It's called 'Pre-Parachute Selection', or P Company. Pass rate: about 30%.

Officer and other leaders would need additional selection and preparation.

Having said that, cycling other Infantry/ support units through that course, and other selection and preparation, prior to being 'certified' for deployment on these types of missions might not be a bad idea. As long as you could only take volunteers.

I guarantee though, if you try to put a bog standard line Infantry unit, and other support arms and services, into the breach without such preparation, you'll get what you got in the Falklands War (where the Guards units, and some others, were basically useless ... oops, did I say that out loud? ).

You're right, absolutely right about the training and conditioning and I see the paras or some specialized air-assault battalion or two as fitting that bill without the additional administrative/training etc overhead that the Marines drag along behind them. (maybe 16 Air Assault Bde [as per EIS complete with 2 RGR] could become that Tier 2 force/Special Operations Command)

For that matter 43 Marine Commando Fleet Protection Group's tasks could probably be incorporated as an component of the Royal Navy Police so eliminating all need for the Royal Marines.

Seems like I've just turned into a Dominic Cummings 

The article is missing a lot.  I'm looking at a source document right now.  These are not companies in the conventional sense, and the amount of CS and CSS bolted on is (a) not insignificant and (b) not described in the article.

One should never trust what one reads in the newspapers as being 100% accurate (or 53% accurate)

:cheers: