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Understood.
New Helicopter announcement tomorrow
- Thread starter Scoobie Newbie
- Start date
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Just a question here.
I too was under the impression that, at least at one stage of the competition, the requirement was to be able to dismount the ASW suite to allow the helicopter to assume other roles.
Does anybody know if that is what was finalized in this buy? If so how many ASW suites were bought? One for each helicopter or some lesser number? Like the Coyote perhaps? -203 platforms bought, 32 full-up systems installed, about 80 reduced capability systems of which many were dismounted and put into storage.
What other roles could the helo be used for if the ASW suite were removed? Surface Search, Boarding Parties, Cross-Decking supplies? ----- Troop lift?
If not troop lift then do we need to buy a third airframe for the JSS or would we have to choose between CH148 and CH149? Would either of those be a better choice to also supply a National Domestic airlift capability that would work with domestic land forces during both civil and military emergencies?
These are the questions that have prompted the speculation on the CH148 Cyclone and its capabilities in supporting Land Forces. At teast they are the questions that come to my mind.
Cheers
I too was under the impression that, at least at one stage of the competition, the requirement was to be able to dismount the ASW suite to allow the helicopter to assume other roles.
Does anybody know if that is what was finalized in this buy? If so how many ASW suites were bought? One for each helicopter or some lesser number? Like the Coyote perhaps? -203 platforms bought, 32 full-up systems installed, about 80 reduced capability systems of which many were dismounted and put into storage.
What other roles could the helo be used for if the ASW suite were removed? Surface Search, Boarding Parties, Cross-Decking supplies? ----- Troop lift?
If not troop lift then do we need to buy a third airframe for the JSS or would we have to choose between CH148 and CH149? Would either of those be a better choice to also supply a National Domestic airlift capability that would work with domestic land forces during both civil and military emergencies?
These are the questions that have prompted the speculation on the CH148 Cyclone and its capabilities in supporting Land Forces. At teast they are the questions that come to my mind.
Cheers
- Reaction score
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All 28 will have the ASW suite, ASW is our bread and butter and what we practice the most of so having a Cyclone without it would be pretty useless to us. For dismounting it, I'm not sure, some of the ASW stuff is mounted to the airframe like the sonobuoy tubes and the sonar that we dip. You could probably remove the consoles but in most cases it's probably easier to make 2 trips than spend hours removing and reinstalling the stuff. Boarding parties, vessel identification and most of the other jobs we do can be done with the ASW stuff on board. Also, the ASW suite also contains a radar, very convenient and necessary to find that little piece of grey metal in the middle of the ocean so removing the consoles probably wouldn't be a good idea.
For the JSS, we would just need to buy a few more CH148s or CH149s, my guess would be the CH148 since it'll be shipborne with folding rotor and tail as well as the haul down/bear trap system already in place. Just get some without the ASW stuff. A ramp would be nice for troop lift, but not a necessity. During civil or military emergencies, all military assets are avail but for most day to day stuff it's the Griffon that does that.
For the Domestic question, I'd say the Cormorant would be more suited to the job, it doesn't have a ton of electronics to remove and it's got a ramp. The CH148 is for supporting the navy and that's what it's designed to do so there are other more capable aircraft out there that were designed with troop transport in mind, the Cormorant being one of them. The Griffon and Cormorant don't support the navy and the Cyclone isn't expected to support the army, unfortunately these questions come up in a unified military since everyone wants to play with the new toy.
In short, what the Sea King does now is what the Cyclone will do for the next 20 or so years.
Cheers
For the JSS, we would just need to buy a few more CH148s or CH149s, my guess would be the CH148 since it'll be shipborne with folding rotor and tail as well as the haul down/bear trap system already in place. Just get some without the ASW stuff. A ramp would be nice for troop lift, but not a necessity. During civil or military emergencies, all military assets are avail but for most day to day stuff it's the Griffon that does that.
For the Domestic question, I'd say the Cormorant would be more suited to the job, it doesn't have a ton of electronics to remove and it's got a ramp. The CH148 is for supporting the navy and that's what it's designed to do so there are other more capable aircraft out there that were designed with troop transport in mind, the Cormorant being one of them. The Griffon and Cormorant don't support the navy and the Cyclone isn't expected to support the army, unfortunately these questions come up in a unified military since everyone wants to play with the new toy.
In short, what the Sea King does now is what the Cyclone will do for the next 20 or so years.
Cheers
Y
Yard Ape
Guest
http://globeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20040726.wxchoppers26/BNStory/National/
By DANIEL LEBLANC
From Monday's Globe and Mail
Ottawa â †The federal government concealed the fact last week that it was forced to buy Sikorsky helicopters to replace its fleet of Sea Kings after the only other competitor in the $5-billion race had been previously disqualified on technical grounds, sources say.
Instead of saying that the contract had been awarded to the only company that was still standing, government officials made it seem as if the contract had been a two-way race to the end.
The revelation that Team Cormorant was quietly thrown out of the competition earlier this year is the latest twist in the ongoing saga that is now expected to be played out before the courts.
A government official said information about Team Cormorant's disqualification was not made public last week because the government thinks it will be a pivotal point if Team Cormorant decides to launch a lawsuit over the outcome.
Defence Minister Bill Graham, in announcing the decision to buy 28 helicopters from U.S.-based Sikorsky, said on Friday that it "represents the right helicopter for the Canadian Forces at the best price for Canadians."
Even at a thorough technical briefing that day, senior bureaucrats did not tell journalists that the contract was awarded to the only bidder still in the running.
"It gave the impression that there were two companies, and that we went for the cheapest," the government source said yesterday.
There is growing bitterness between Team Cormorant and the government over the process. A senior government official yesterday dismissed a report that there was only a 1-per-cent price difference (about $50-million) between the winning bid of Sikorsky and the disqualified bid of Team Cormorant.
The government is arguing that the difference was more in the range of 15 per cent, meaning that Team Cormorant's bid was about $750-million higher.
The fact that Team Cormorant was disqualified in recent months is surprising because the federal government adopted a complicated process two years ago to prevent such an outcome. In 2002, the government created a "prequalification" phase under which the competing helicopters would have to meet specific technical requirements before entering the final leg of the competition, which would be settled solely on the issue of price.
Team Cormorant and Sikorsky met the requirements of the prequalification process, but Team Cormorant was, nonetheless, disqualified from the competition later. The reason for Team Cormorant's disqualification is unclear, as government and industry officials remain coy about recent events.
It is a stunning twist for a company that won the first competition to replace the Sea Kings in the early 1990s under the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney. That contract was cancelled by then-prime-minister Jean Chrétien in 1993, but Team Cormorant later won a smaller competition to produce search-and-rescue helicopters for the Canadian Forces.
"It's an incredible outcome after Cormorant won in 1992, won in 1998, prequalified in 2003, to be told that their bid is not acceptable in 2004," an industry source said.
The government now expects that its decision to exclude Team Cormorant from the competition will be at the centre of a lawsuit from AgustaWestland, the Anglo-Italian consortium that builds the aircraft.
Team Cormorant has long alleged that the process to replace the Sea Kings was rigged in favour of other competitors, and has vowed to take the matter before the courts if it lost the contract.
Team Cormorant has three legal options: the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, the Federal Court and the Ontario Superior Court.
The CITT, an administrative tribunal, provides the quickest way ahead for Team Cormorant, which could challenge its disqualification as well as Sikorsky's qualification. If Team Cormorant wins its case, the CITT could order the retendering of the contract or call on the government to offer financial compensation to Team Cormorant.
Second, the Federal Court could provide a judicial review of the process, and it could eventually send the contract back to the government for retendering.
Finally, Team Cormorant could argue before the Ontario Superior Court that Sikorsky did not meet the government's requirements and did not deserve the contract. If Team Cormorant was successful, the Ontario Superior Court could order the government to offer financial compensation to Team Cormorant.
In addition, the Auditor-General is expected to review the contract and determine whether the federal government adopted the best strategy to replace the Sea Kings.
By DANIEL LEBLANC
From Monday's Globe and Mail
Ottawa â †The federal government concealed the fact last week that it was forced to buy Sikorsky helicopters to replace its fleet of Sea Kings after the only other competitor in the $5-billion race had been previously disqualified on technical grounds, sources say.
Instead of saying that the contract had been awarded to the only company that was still standing, government officials made it seem as if the contract had been a two-way race to the end.
The revelation that Team Cormorant was quietly thrown out of the competition earlier this year is the latest twist in the ongoing saga that is now expected to be played out before the courts.
A government official said information about Team Cormorant's disqualification was not made public last week because the government thinks it will be a pivotal point if Team Cormorant decides to launch a lawsuit over the outcome.
Defence Minister Bill Graham, in announcing the decision to buy 28 helicopters from U.S.-based Sikorsky, said on Friday that it "represents the right helicopter for the Canadian Forces at the best price for Canadians."
Even at a thorough technical briefing that day, senior bureaucrats did not tell journalists that the contract was awarded to the only bidder still in the running.
"It gave the impression that there were two companies, and that we went for the cheapest," the government source said yesterday.
There is growing bitterness between Team Cormorant and the government over the process. A senior government official yesterday dismissed a report that there was only a 1-per-cent price difference (about $50-million) between the winning bid of Sikorsky and the disqualified bid of Team Cormorant.
The government is arguing that the difference was more in the range of 15 per cent, meaning that Team Cormorant's bid was about $750-million higher.
The fact that Team Cormorant was disqualified in recent months is surprising because the federal government adopted a complicated process two years ago to prevent such an outcome. In 2002, the government created a "prequalification" phase under which the competing helicopters would have to meet specific technical requirements before entering the final leg of the competition, which would be settled solely on the issue of price.
Team Cormorant and Sikorsky met the requirements of the prequalification process, but Team Cormorant was, nonetheless, disqualified from the competition later. The reason for Team Cormorant's disqualification is unclear, as government and industry officials remain coy about recent events.
It is a stunning twist for a company that won the first competition to replace the Sea Kings in the early 1990s under the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney. That contract was cancelled by then-prime-minister Jean Chrétien in 1993, but Team Cormorant later won a smaller competition to produce search-and-rescue helicopters for the Canadian Forces.
"It's an incredible outcome after Cormorant won in 1992, won in 1998, prequalified in 2003, to be told that their bid is not acceptable in 2004," an industry source said.
The government now expects that its decision to exclude Team Cormorant from the competition will be at the centre of a lawsuit from AgustaWestland, the Anglo-Italian consortium that builds the aircraft.
Team Cormorant has long alleged that the process to replace the Sea Kings was rigged in favour of other competitors, and has vowed to take the matter before the courts if it lost the contract.
Team Cormorant has three legal options: the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, the Federal Court and the Ontario Superior Court.
The CITT, an administrative tribunal, provides the quickest way ahead for Team Cormorant, which could challenge its disqualification as well as Sikorsky's qualification. If Team Cormorant wins its case, the CITT could order the retendering of the contract or call on the government to offer financial compensation to Team Cormorant.
Second, the Federal Court could provide a judicial review of the process, and it could eventually send the contract back to the government for retendering.
Finally, Team Cormorant could argue before the Ontario Superior Court that Sikorsky did not meet the government's requirements and did not deserve the contract. If Team Cormorant was successful, the Ontario Superior Court could order the government to offer financial compensation to Team Cormorant.
In addition, the Auditor-General is expected to review the contract and determine whether the federal government adopted the best strategy to replace the Sea Kings.
A
ags281
Guest
What a gong show.
Who would have thought that a simple order for a few helicopters could be screwed up so badly so many times. :
Who would have thought that a simple order for a few helicopters could be screwed up so badly so many times. :
Scratch_043
Sr. Member
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kinda makes your head spin :-\
Brad Sallows
Army.ca Legend
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Kinda makes me wonder how much taxpayer money and how many potential fuselages on the tarmac have been lost to uphold the image of a campaign promise.
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it's not fair to compare the h92 to the griffon. the main problem with the griffon is that it is underpowered, that is not the case with the h92. its engines are increased from the s92 civvy version of the helo and if their is one thing sikorsky knows what to do it is build martime helos, nevermind just military helos period. look at their track record blackhawk/seahawk, seaking, the jolly greens of the vietnam era, and also the most powerful helo out there the super stallion.
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Personally I think the H92 will be a success and I lok forward to seeing it being intergrated in the fleet.
Y
Yard Ape
Guest
One problem of the Griffon was that it replaced two airframes with two different roles. If the Cyclone is the best helicopter for the maritime roll, then maybe it is not bad that we did not go Cormorant.
Jarnhamar
Army.ca Myth
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It would be SO nice for JUST ONCE, the army were to say "Hey we need a new one of these" and then a few companies put in a bid, one was chosen, they made the equipment and we got it.
That simple.
No waiting 10 years for the contract to start followed by 10 years to make it. No companies crying over loosing the contract, no accusations, no loosing millions and millions on stupid canceled contract fees. No rumors of political favorites.
Just once i'd like to have faith in whoever buys stuf for the Canadian Forces and be professionally proud of something we get.
Can't we cut the bullshit just once?
That simple.
No waiting 10 years for the contract to start followed by 10 years to make it. No companies crying over loosing the contract, no accusations, no loosing millions and millions on stupid canceled contract fees. No rumors of political favorites.
Just once i'd like to have faith in whoever buys stuf for the Canadian Forces and be professionally proud of something we get.
Can't we cut the bullshit just once?
- Reaction score
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Another take:
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34
The Maritime Helicopter Project
(Source: Canadian Department of National Defence; issued July 23, 2004)
There is no question that the Canadian Forces (CF) needs a new maritime helicopter suitable for the operational demands of the 21st century. The CH-124 Sea King has been in service since the 1960s and, despite the many upgrades and meticulous maintenance it has received throughout its service life, today it is obsolete and increasingly expensive to maintain. To meet current and future defense requirements, Canada clearly needs a maritime helicopter capable not only of the myriad operations possible in today's global environment, but also of integrating smoothly into the Navy's fleet of modern, highly interoperable patrol frigates.
Until that helicopter can be identified and acquired, the Sea King will continue to perform in a wide range of important roles wherever Her Majesty's Canadian ships are deployed.
A helicopter extends the offensive reach and defensive perimeter of a warship to about 175 km (more than 100 nautical miles) on the surface of the sea, and adds hundreds of meters of altitude as well. It also contributes:
--A significantly enhanced ability to detect and destroy submarines;
--An enhanced ability to observe and identify marine traffic, and to provide close security for boarding parties;
--A faster, longer-range, and more versatile search-and-rescue or surveillance capability; and
--The vital ability to transport anything, from people to parts, quickly and safely.
The Maritime Helicopter Project
In 1999, once the Statement of Operational Requirements (SOR) was approved, development of the specifications began, led by the Maritime Helicopter Project Management Office. During this phase of a procurement project, the military needs set out in the SOR are described in the technical language of industry, so potential suppliers can make a fully informed decision on whether to bid on the contract, and so government contract authorities can establish the criteria required to evaluate the bids. The early draft specifications produced by the Maritime Helicopter Project Management Office were circulated widely, not only to stakeholders in the Air Force, but also to industry, producing hundreds of hours of consultations and thousands of observations.
Commentators both inside and outside the Canadian Forces observed that the early specifications were so robust that it was questionable whether any helicopter on the market could meet the standard. But the aim of the process is to collect and analyze such feedback and to achieve a balance between what the industry can deliver and what the military wants and needs. Before any changes were made as the specifications went through various drafts, concurrence was sought from the Air Force. To ensure that the specifications remained consistent with the SOR, they were evaluated twice by a credible, independent, non-profit engineering firm in the United States and, although the specifications passed through many levels of departmental approval, the leaders of the original military analysis team say that they remain consistent with their findings.
In 2000, the government announced that DND would proceed with the maritime helicopter procurement. In 2001, the procurement strategy was announced: the airframe and mission system would be contracted separately, and each contract would include long-term maintenance services. The all-up cost of the project was estimated at $2.9 billion, and the winning bid would be the one evaluated â Å“lowest cost compliant.â ? In the words of Alan Williams, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) and the senior government official responsible for the Maritime Helicopter Project: â Å“Our approach is to specify exactly what we require and to select the company that meets our requirements and presents the lowest-cost solution for the full 20-year life cycle of the helicopter.â ? This approach will ensure that the needs of the Canadian Forces are met and the interests of the Canadian taxpayer are protected.
In December 2002, in an effort to expedite the procurement, the government announced that the helicopter would be acquired by means of a single contract for the airframe and mission systems, comprising the procurement of 28 fully integrated maritime helicopters, a simulation and training suite, integrated logistics support, and a 20-year in-service support contract. With inflation factored in, the new project cost was set at $3.2 billion, not including the long-term maintenance contract.
A Letter of Interest issued to industry in December 2002 produced replies from three companies: AgustaWestland (formerly EH Industries), offering the Cormorant helicopter with a Boeing mission system; Sikorsky, offering the H-92 helicopter with a mission system from General Dynamics Canada; and Lockheed Martin Canada, offering the Eurocopter NH 90 basic helicopter with a Lockheed Martin mission system.
In March 2003, the Maritime Helicopter Project Management Office began pre-qualification screening of the three bidding consortiums. This is a new process that allows potential bidders to determine whether their proposed equipment complies with the technical specifications demanded for the Maritime Helicopter Project: it ensures that suppliers are fully aware of the requirements, and gives them an opportunity to correct deficiencies before the formal Request for Proposals (RFP) is issued.
On December 17th, 2003, the Government announced the results of the pre-qualification process and the issue of the RFP. AgustaWestland and Sikorsky were deemed compliant and thus eligible to submit bids in response to the RFP. The deadline for submissions was May 14th, 2003, followed by the formal evaluation of the two bids.
Having received the submissions, the Project Team evaluated a number of important elements such as price, the responses to the Statements of Work (SOW) for both the MH acquisition and long term In-Service Support, delivery, contract terms and conditions, and Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs). The Project Team also evaluated specific plans such as the Project Management Plan, the System Engineering Management Plan and the In-Service Support Management Plan.
The evaluation was based on proposals meeting mandatory requirements and achieving minimum passing marks on the rated requirements established in the evaluation plan. The selection process identified the bidder who submitted a technically compliant bid, at the lowest price with acceptable delivery, terms and conditions and Industrial Regional Benefits.
After a thorough examination of every aspect of the submissions, the bid by Sikorsky represented the lowest cost for the airframe, mission systems, associated logistics and 20-year in-service support, and was declared the winner.
Benefits for all Canadians
As part of its winning bid, Sikorsky has committed to undertaking more than $4.5 billion in industrial activity across Canada. The direct benefit of this activity for Canadians will continue long after the delivery of the last helicopter, with work on the helicopter project continuing over the next 20 years. Sikorsky has committed to partner with 170 firms, both large and small, and from our Aboriginal business community, with most regions of the country being home to significant portions of the project activity.
Sikorsky's commitment includes more than $1 billion in Atlantic Canada â †an unequivocal acknowledgment of the expertise of individuals and firms in the aerospace industry across the Atlantic region. Sikorsky's bid also involves major activity in the West, totaling more than $390 million and involving innovative companies across the region â †from Vancouver to the established industry in Manitoba. As well, Canada's traditional aerospace centers in Ontario and Quebec will host significant portions of the project, including more than $2 billion in Ontario and $955 million in Quebec.
The procurement strategy encouraged bidders to include and involve Aboriginal businesses in their proposals. Sikorsky's bid is very reflective of the Government of Canada's restated commitment to developing business and training opportunities for our Aboriginal people. Work on the Maritime Helicopter Project is a great example of action in this regard, with Sikorsky committing to partner with Aboriginal businesses on upward of $37 million of activity.
Equally significant is Sikorsky's commitment to involve Canadian small business in work on the helicopters. Indeed, its winning bid includes fully $685 million in industrial activity to be undertaken in our small businesses. This is indicative of the innovative skills and processes that exist in not only our larger enterprises, but in the small businesses that are at the heart of Canada's economy.
Canadian efforts on this project will involve innovative companies and talented individuals from British Columbia to Newfoundland and Labrador. These industrial partnerships will mean that Canadians will participate in innovative work on a variety of initiatives, including advanced mission systems, electronics, software development, and sophisticated components that are integral to the helicopter's design and function. Canadians will also work on components of the helicopter's airframe and engine.
Importantly, Sikorsky's work on the Maritime Helicopter Project represents a lasting opportunity for Canada. Firms and individuals across the country will participate in the long-term support of these helicopters. Canadians will be fully involved in areas such as the maintenance and repair of the helicopters and their mission systems, and the provision of simulation and training services. Equally important are the relationships that Canadian companies will establish within the international aerospace and defense industry. In the coming years, Sikorsky will continue to work with Industry Canada to develop these opportunities for Canadian industry, and to follow through on its commitment to delivering industrial and regional benefits to Canada. Canadian involvement in this project will position our industry to access future opportunities, and for participation in other significant projects like the MHP in the years ahead.
The Future
Sikorsky will be awarded two separate, but interrelated contracts.
The first contract will be for the delivery of 28 fully integrated maritime helicopters, a simulation and training suite, integrated logistic support and ship modifications. The second contract will be for the 20-year in-service support of the helicopters. The contract should be finalized and signed this fall.
Delivery of the first helicopter is required to be no later than 48 months from contract award with the remaining helicopters to be delivered at a rate of one per month. Built into the procurement contract is a series of bonuses for early delivery and penalties for late delivery that make it very much in the company's best interest to deliver the helicopters as quickly as possible.
The Maritime Helicopter Project has faced its share of challenges, but the Government of Canada and the Department of National Defence are confident that it will result in an unrivalled helicopter at the forefront of modern technology.
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34
The Maritime Helicopter Project
(Source: Canadian Department of National Defence; issued July 23, 2004)
There is no question that the Canadian Forces (CF) needs a new maritime helicopter suitable for the operational demands of the 21st century. The CH-124 Sea King has been in service since the 1960s and, despite the many upgrades and meticulous maintenance it has received throughout its service life, today it is obsolete and increasingly expensive to maintain. To meet current and future defense requirements, Canada clearly needs a maritime helicopter capable not only of the myriad operations possible in today's global environment, but also of integrating smoothly into the Navy's fleet of modern, highly interoperable patrol frigates.
Until that helicopter can be identified and acquired, the Sea King will continue to perform in a wide range of important roles wherever Her Majesty's Canadian ships are deployed.
A helicopter extends the offensive reach and defensive perimeter of a warship to about 175 km (more than 100 nautical miles) on the surface of the sea, and adds hundreds of meters of altitude as well. It also contributes:
--A significantly enhanced ability to detect and destroy submarines;
--An enhanced ability to observe and identify marine traffic, and to provide close security for boarding parties;
--A faster, longer-range, and more versatile search-and-rescue or surveillance capability; and
--The vital ability to transport anything, from people to parts, quickly and safely.
The Maritime Helicopter Project
In 1999, once the Statement of Operational Requirements (SOR) was approved, development of the specifications began, led by the Maritime Helicopter Project Management Office. During this phase of a procurement project, the military needs set out in the SOR are described in the technical language of industry, so potential suppliers can make a fully informed decision on whether to bid on the contract, and so government contract authorities can establish the criteria required to evaluate the bids. The early draft specifications produced by the Maritime Helicopter Project Management Office were circulated widely, not only to stakeholders in the Air Force, but also to industry, producing hundreds of hours of consultations and thousands of observations.
Commentators both inside and outside the Canadian Forces observed that the early specifications were so robust that it was questionable whether any helicopter on the market could meet the standard. But the aim of the process is to collect and analyze such feedback and to achieve a balance between what the industry can deliver and what the military wants and needs. Before any changes were made as the specifications went through various drafts, concurrence was sought from the Air Force. To ensure that the specifications remained consistent with the SOR, they were evaluated twice by a credible, independent, non-profit engineering firm in the United States and, although the specifications passed through many levels of departmental approval, the leaders of the original military analysis team say that they remain consistent with their findings.
In 2000, the government announced that DND would proceed with the maritime helicopter procurement. In 2001, the procurement strategy was announced: the airframe and mission system would be contracted separately, and each contract would include long-term maintenance services. The all-up cost of the project was estimated at $2.9 billion, and the winning bid would be the one evaluated â Å“lowest cost compliant.â ? In the words of Alan Williams, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) and the senior government official responsible for the Maritime Helicopter Project: â Å“Our approach is to specify exactly what we require and to select the company that meets our requirements and presents the lowest-cost solution for the full 20-year life cycle of the helicopter.â ? This approach will ensure that the needs of the Canadian Forces are met and the interests of the Canadian taxpayer are protected.
In December 2002, in an effort to expedite the procurement, the government announced that the helicopter would be acquired by means of a single contract for the airframe and mission systems, comprising the procurement of 28 fully integrated maritime helicopters, a simulation and training suite, integrated logistics support, and a 20-year in-service support contract. With inflation factored in, the new project cost was set at $3.2 billion, not including the long-term maintenance contract.
A Letter of Interest issued to industry in December 2002 produced replies from three companies: AgustaWestland (formerly EH Industries), offering the Cormorant helicopter with a Boeing mission system; Sikorsky, offering the H-92 helicopter with a mission system from General Dynamics Canada; and Lockheed Martin Canada, offering the Eurocopter NH 90 basic helicopter with a Lockheed Martin mission system.
In March 2003, the Maritime Helicopter Project Management Office began pre-qualification screening of the three bidding consortiums. This is a new process that allows potential bidders to determine whether their proposed equipment complies with the technical specifications demanded for the Maritime Helicopter Project: it ensures that suppliers are fully aware of the requirements, and gives them an opportunity to correct deficiencies before the formal Request for Proposals (RFP) is issued.
On December 17th, 2003, the Government announced the results of the pre-qualification process and the issue of the RFP. AgustaWestland and Sikorsky were deemed compliant and thus eligible to submit bids in response to the RFP. The deadline for submissions was May 14th, 2003, followed by the formal evaluation of the two bids.
Having received the submissions, the Project Team evaluated a number of important elements such as price, the responses to the Statements of Work (SOW) for both the MH acquisition and long term In-Service Support, delivery, contract terms and conditions, and Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs). The Project Team also evaluated specific plans such as the Project Management Plan, the System Engineering Management Plan and the In-Service Support Management Plan.
The evaluation was based on proposals meeting mandatory requirements and achieving minimum passing marks on the rated requirements established in the evaluation plan. The selection process identified the bidder who submitted a technically compliant bid, at the lowest price with acceptable delivery, terms and conditions and Industrial Regional Benefits.
After a thorough examination of every aspect of the submissions, the bid by Sikorsky represented the lowest cost for the airframe, mission systems, associated logistics and 20-year in-service support, and was declared the winner.
Benefits for all Canadians
As part of its winning bid, Sikorsky has committed to undertaking more than $4.5 billion in industrial activity across Canada. The direct benefit of this activity for Canadians will continue long after the delivery of the last helicopter, with work on the helicopter project continuing over the next 20 years. Sikorsky has committed to partner with 170 firms, both large and small, and from our Aboriginal business community, with most regions of the country being home to significant portions of the project activity.
Sikorsky's commitment includes more than $1 billion in Atlantic Canada â †an unequivocal acknowledgment of the expertise of individuals and firms in the aerospace industry across the Atlantic region. Sikorsky's bid also involves major activity in the West, totaling more than $390 million and involving innovative companies across the region â †from Vancouver to the established industry in Manitoba. As well, Canada's traditional aerospace centers in Ontario and Quebec will host significant portions of the project, including more than $2 billion in Ontario and $955 million in Quebec.
The procurement strategy encouraged bidders to include and involve Aboriginal businesses in their proposals. Sikorsky's bid is very reflective of the Government of Canada's restated commitment to developing business and training opportunities for our Aboriginal people. Work on the Maritime Helicopter Project is a great example of action in this regard, with Sikorsky committing to partner with Aboriginal businesses on upward of $37 million of activity.
Equally significant is Sikorsky's commitment to involve Canadian small business in work on the helicopters. Indeed, its winning bid includes fully $685 million in industrial activity to be undertaken in our small businesses. This is indicative of the innovative skills and processes that exist in not only our larger enterprises, but in the small businesses that are at the heart of Canada's economy.
Canadian efforts on this project will involve innovative companies and talented individuals from British Columbia to Newfoundland and Labrador. These industrial partnerships will mean that Canadians will participate in innovative work on a variety of initiatives, including advanced mission systems, electronics, software development, and sophisticated components that are integral to the helicopter's design and function. Canadians will also work on components of the helicopter's airframe and engine.
Importantly, Sikorsky's work on the Maritime Helicopter Project represents a lasting opportunity for Canada. Firms and individuals across the country will participate in the long-term support of these helicopters. Canadians will be fully involved in areas such as the maintenance and repair of the helicopters and their mission systems, and the provision of simulation and training services. Equally important are the relationships that Canadian companies will establish within the international aerospace and defense industry. In the coming years, Sikorsky will continue to work with Industry Canada to develop these opportunities for Canadian industry, and to follow through on its commitment to delivering industrial and regional benefits to Canada. Canadian involvement in this project will position our industry to access future opportunities, and for participation in other significant projects like the MHP in the years ahead.
The Future
Sikorsky will be awarded two separate, but interrelated contracts.
The first contract will be for the delivery of 28 fully integrated maritime helicopters, a simulation and training suite, integrated logistic support and ship modifications. The second contract will be for the 20-year in-service support of the helicopters. The contract should be finalized and signed this fall.
Delivery of the first helicopter is required to be no later than 48 months from contract award with the remaining helicopters to be delivered at a rate of one per month. Built into the procurement contract is a series of bonuses for early delivery and penalties for late delivery that make it very much in the company's best interest to deliver the helicopters as quickly as possible.
The Maritime Helicopter Project has faced its share of challenges, but the Government of Canada and the Department of National Defence are confident that it will result in an unrivalled helicopter at the forefront of modern technology.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 210
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20040902/SEAKING02/TPNational/Canada
Rival in copter deal takes Ottawa to court
By DANIEL LEBLANC
Thursday, September 2, 2004 - Page A5
OTTAWA -- Ottawa's $5-billion helicopter contract landed in court yesterday when the losing company launched legal action that raised new allegations over the government's handling of the drawn-out process.
Team Cormorant took the matter before the Federal Court of Canada in a bid to stop the government from awarding the contract to Sikorsky, which was announced as the winner on July 23. In addition, Team Cormorant argued that it should either be given the contract to replace the 40-year-old Sea Kings, or that the whole process should be retendered.
By launching a court proceeding, Team Cormorant delivered on months of threats of legal action against the government if it lost the coveted helicopter contract. In its 18-page submission, Team Cormorant alleged that the government "committed serious errors" in the evaluation of the two bids, "favouring Sikorsky and discriminating against" Team Cormorant.
Team Cormorant said that the federal government's "fairness monitor," who was hired earlier this year to vet the process, worked from 1999 to 2001 as a lobbyist for Sikorsky's main partner in the helicopter contract, Ottawa-based General Dynamics Canada.
Team Cormorant said that with the hiring of retired bureaucrat André Dumas, the government chose a "fairness monitor so closely associated with the Sikorsky bid . . . that his selection could not help but raise a reasonable apprehension of bias."
Mr. Dumas could not be reached, and federal officials had no immediate response to Team Cormorant's legal action.
In its submission, Team Cormorant alleged the government ignored clear breaches of mandatory requirements in Sikorsky's bid. In particular, Team Cormorant said, 100 pages of documents were missing from Sikorsky's official bid, which normally would have called for its immediate disqualification.
"Instead, [government] officials instructed the evaluators to rescue the Sikorsky bid by having reference to Sikorsky's electronic data," the court document alleged.
Team Cormorant said it did not benefit from the same consideration, which led to its own disqualification in the late stages of the competition.
"At the same time, [government] officials took the diametrically opposite position and refused to allow the evaluators to have reference to their examination of [Team Cormorant's] electronic data," the company said.
Team Cormorant is also alleging that the government and Sikorsky are both aware that the winning helicopter, the H-92, cannot be delivered within the mandatory four-year period. Instead, Team Cormorant said, a delay in the production of a key piece of electronic equipment will add at least two more years to the delivery of the first Sikorsky helicopter.
"Sikorsky knows that it cannot deliver the first H-92 for at least six years and possibly much longer. Sikorsky deliberately misrepresented its ability and intention to meet the delivery deadline in the certification filed with its bid," Team Cormorant alleged.
Sikorsky has always rejected claims that it cannot deliver its aircraft, which has never been produced for a military client, on time.
"We have built probably more aircraft than all the other helicopter manufacturers put together, so this is business as usual for us," Sikorsky's Lloyd Noseworthy said last month.
After years of delay, Ottawa said last month that the massive contract to replace the Canadian Forces' fleet of Sea Kings had been awarded to Sikorsky.
The replacement of the Sea Kings had been on hold since 1993, when then-prime minister Jean Chrétien tore up a deal that would have awarded the contract to Team Cormorant. Team Cormorant is accusing the government of acting in a manner that is "biased, unfair and contrary to the rules" ever since the cancellation of the first deal.
Rival in copter deal takes Ottawa to court
By DANIEL LEBLANC
Thursday, September 2, 2004 - Page A5
OTTAWA -- Ottawa's $5-billion helicopter contract landed in court yesterday when the losing company launched legal action that raised new allegations over the government's handling of the drawn-out process.
Team Cormorant took the matter before the Federal Court of Canada in a bid to stop the government from awarding the contract to Sikorsky, which was announced as the winner on July 23. In addition, Team Cormorant argued that it should either be given the contract to replace the 40-year-old Sea Kings, or that the whole process should be retendered.
By launching a court proceeding, Team Cormorant delivered on months of threats of legal action against the government if it lost the coveted helicopter contract. In its 18-page submission, Team Cormorant alleged that the government "committed serious errors" in the evaluation of the two bids, "favouring Sikorsky and discriminating against" Team Cormorant.
Team Cormorant said that the federal government's "fairness monitor," who was hired earlier this year to vet the process, worked from 1999 to 2001 as a lobbyist for Sikorsky's main partner in the helicopter contract, Ottawa-based General Dynamics Canada.
Team Cormorant said that with the hiring of retired bureaucrat André Dumas, the government chose a "fairness monitor so closely associated with the Sikorsky bid . . . that his selection could not help but raise a reasonable apprehension of bias."
Mr. Dumas could not be reached, and federal officials had no immediate response to Team Cormorant's legal action.
In its submission, Team Cormorant alleged the government ignored clear breaches of mandatory requirements in Sikorsky's bid. In particular, Team Cormorant said, 100 pages of documents were missing from Sikorsky's official bid, which normally would have called for its immediate disqualification.
"Instead, [government] officials instructed the evaluators to rescue the Sikorsky bid by having reference to Sikorsky's electronic data," the court document alleged.
Team Cormorant said it did not benefit from the same consideration, which led to its own disqualification in the late stages of the competition.
"At the same time, [government] officials took the diametrically opposite position and refused to allow the evaluators to have reference to their examination of [Team Cormorant's] electronic data," the company said.
Team Cormorant is also alleging that the government and Sikorsky are both aware that the winning helicopter, the H-92, cannot be delivered within the mandatory four-year period. Instead, Team Cormorant said, a delay in the production of a key piece of electronic equipment will add at least two more years to the delivery of the first Sikorsky helicopter.
"Sikorsky knows that it cannot deliver the first H-92 for at least six years and possibly much longer. Sikorsky deliberately misrepresented its ability and intention to meet the delivery deadline in the certification filed with its bid," Team Cormorant alleged.
Sikorsky has always rejected claims that it cannot deliver its aircraft, which has never been produced for a military client, on time.
"We have built probably more aircraft than all the other helicopter manufacturers put together, so this is business as usual for us," Sikorsky's Lloyd Noseworthy said last month.
After years of delay, Ottawa said last month that the massive contract to replace the Canadian Forces' fleet of Sea Kings had been awarded to Sikorsky.
The replacement of the Sea Kings had been on hold since 1993, when then-prime minister Jean Chrétien tore up a deal that would have awarded the contract to Team Cormorant. Team Cormorant is accusing the government of acting in a manner that is "biased, unfair and contrary to the rules" ever since the cancellation of the first deal.
B
Brock
Guest
The MHP has been so screwed up for so long by both the military and the Government, we deserve what we get. At this point buying the H-92 is retarded because we already use the EH-101--aka the CH-149. Didn't we introduce the Griffon to reduce tactical helicoper costs by reducing the number of helicopter types. That reason was always BS, as the Griffon fleet not only costs more than the old fleet, but is less capable. However, in this case substantial savings would be achieved by procuring a naval Cormorant. Personally, at this point the Cormorant was the only choice, because we bought it for SAR and the Cormorant better meets Canadian requirements and more importantly it is a proven helicopter.
With that said, the simple fact that Canada excluded the NH-90 during the pre-tender process highlights the problems. The NH-90 is possibly the best medium sized helicopter in the military market. The Canadian military and defence bureaucrats set the bar so high, the best value helicopter was excluded. The process was never fair and that will continue to be the case until the Canadian military procurement system is overhauled. Why would a purpose built naval helicopter externally smaller than the Sea King and the H-92 and EH-101, but with more than sufficient internal cabin space and payload be excluded....because it did not meet our navy's requirements, why? The requirements were too stringent. The NH-90 has been chosen 11 countries including France, Germany, Great Britain--for their SAS, the Netherlands, Italy, Australia--who operate in similar conditions to our North Atlantic, Oman, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and others. The only problem with the NH-90 is the cabin height which is like 1.68 m, but this has been resolved with a simple already modification to meet Swedish military requirements of a cabin height of 1.8 m--the same cabin height as the H-92. The folded dimensions of the NH-90 are smaller than the Sea King while achieving a larger and more functional internal cabin with dual sliding cargo doors and/or rear ramp; the cabin is only slightly smaller than the H-92 which is slightly smaller than the EH-101. This is a key issue with the MHP requirements wanted the MHP to be capable of conducting boardings with the full internal ASW/ASvW mission suite--which no other navy does. Why would we do this when the mission suite can be rolled off in less than an hour--also a requirement?
Anyway, there are many more issues that could be discussed, but we yet get the Cormorant--if they win the case, but Canada is more likely to be fined for breaking its own best value buying rules.
With that said, the simple fact that Canada excluded the NH-90 during the pre-tender process highlights the problems. The NH-90 is possibly the best medium sized helicopter in the military market. The Canadian military and defence bureaucrats set the bar so high, the best value helicopter was excluded. The process was never fair and that will continue to be the case until the Canadian military procurement system is overhauled. Why would a purpose built naval helicopter externally smaller than the Sea King and the H-92 and EH-101, but with more than sufficient internal cabin space and payload be excluded....because it did not meet our navy's requirements, why? The requirements were too stringent. The NH-90 has been chosen 11 countries including France, Germany, Great Britain--for their SAS, the Netherlands, Italy, Australia--who operate in similar conditions to our North Atlantic, Oman, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and others. The only problem with the NH-90 is the cabin height which is like 1.68 m, but this has been resolved with a simple already modification to meet Swedish military requirements of a cabin height of 1.8 m--the same cabin height as the H-92. The folded dimensions of the NH-90 are smaller than the Sea King while achieving a larger and more functional internal cabin with dual sliding cargo doors and/or rear ramp; the cabin is only slightly smaller than the H-92 which is slightly smaller than the EH-101. This is a key issue with the MHP requirements wanted the MHP to be capable of conducting boardings with the full internal ASW/ASvW mission suite--which no other navy does. Why would we do this when the mission suite can be rolled off in less than an hour--also a requirement?
Anyway, there are many more issues that could be discussed, but we yet get the Cormorant--if they win the case, but Canada is more likely to be fined for breaking its own best value buying rules.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 410
I doubt very much that the helicopter failed any test except the "Govt. doesn't want it" one.
The CF has a long history of buying crap at twice the cost of what any other company would pay.
I, personally, can't see any reason for this unless there are kickbacks flying back and forth. (I have no proof of this, mind you. Just an opinion)
The MGS for the Armoured Corps has FAILED every test it took. We're still getting the thing.
Going back further
-The Iltis (a great veh until we got hold of the design and "Canadianized it"
-The LSVW (Underpowered and squeaky ceramic brakes)
-The UNBREAKABLE plastic magazines for the C7 rifle (brakeable!!!)
-The MLVW (Not nearly as tough as what it replaced)
I'm sure the list goes on...Feel free to make it longer.
The CF has a long history of buying crap at twice the cost of what any other company would pay.
I, personally, can't see any reason for this unless there are kickbacks flying back and forth. (I have no proof of this, mind you. Just an opinion)
The MGS for the Armoured Corps has FAILED every test it took. We're still getting the thing.
Going back further
-The Iltis (a great veh until we got hold of the design and "Canadianized it"
-The LSVW (Underpowered and squeaky ceramic brakes)
-The UNBREAKABLE plastic magazines for the C7 rifle (brakeable!!!)
-The MLVW (Not nearly as tough as what it replaced)
I'm sure the list goes on...Feel free to make it longer.
- Reaction score
- 1
- Points
- 430
Personally I am glad we got the H92. The maker is right across the border in the event of any problems. They also happen to be on of the longest manufacturers of helicopters in the world, so I think they know what they are doing. Also an endorsement from someone who will be flying them:
http://army.ca/forums/threads/17798.75.html
So if Inch says they are good to go that works for me.
http://army.ca/forums/threads/17798.75.html
So if Inch says they are good to go that works for me.
