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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
Colin P said:
Also let Davie do 1 JSS light that we can use till the JSS are in service and then it can be used to cover off long refits or support long range deployments.

They're already doing that.
 
Colin P said:
thanks for clarifying it was not clear if the Liberals were honouring that

Yeah, they took a week to review the deal and proceeded with it, as it was going to cost them money no matter what.
 
Honestly if we want to build an industry and get capabilities quickly, I would toss money at Davie's other proposal that they offered the government, yes its adding more to the over all project but it would increase the other all ship building capacity of the country. Heck maybe say hey Davie want to build us a Mistral?
 
That would drive up a lot of costs, but I suspect a that they be happy with a final fitting out and building the landing crafts
 
MilEME09 said:
Honestly if we want to build an industry and get capabilities quickly, I would toss money at Davie's other proposal that they offered the government

Ships that we don't necessarily need, that don't necessarily meet our needs.
 
One place where Davie's might come in handy is if they have Offshore Support Ships for use as Environmental Response Ships and Tugs for the Coast Guard for the East and West Coasts. 

To escort tankers to and from the pipeline terminals at Prince Rupert, Kitimat, Vancouver and Saint John.  Not to mention Come-by-Chance.

 
Pipelines?  In today's Canada?
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/?s=heartbreak

Mark
Ottawa
 
Well they won't be to the US.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-kerry-secretary-of-state-canada-1.3483311
 
jmt18325 said:
We're not going to get those things for less money by building elsewhere though, and are probably going to get them from the same place no matter where the hull happens to be built.  At least by building them here, we ensure not only that the money for the construction and materials stays here, but that we have the capability to repair the ships in the future.  The economic opportunity that is lost by building offshore is huge, even if there is some money to be saved.  I used to be in favour of building offshore, but, someone made me see the light in regard to lost economic opportunity. 

I wanted to come back to this point.  The more I thought about it, based on my own personal experiences, the more I believe that that is an incorrect statement.

Background:  I used to work for a European company selling equipment into Canada and the US.  There were three different business models in effect.  The two principle models were "The Market Company" and "The Distributor Model".  In the market company case we talked directly to the end user.  In the distributor model we talked to intermediaries who talked to the end user.  The third model, in the case of really big clients was direct sales from the parent company.

The difference in the route could be as much as a 50% cost reduction.  Typically every intermediary will see something in the order of a 25% margin.  Even if we only gave the distributor a 10% discount the distributor would tack a "what the market will bear" addition on to it.  We did it internally as well.

A piece of equipment that we sold we would buy from the division of the company charged with the particular market segment the customer was involved in.  The division would buy it from the factory.  And then overhead costs would be charged internally.

The Best/Worst personal case I had came very early in my career.  I was responsible for a system that had been sold to a company in the interior of BC.  The location was sufficiently remote, the equipment was sufficiently complex and, as I have noted, the equipment was European so the client wanted to keep an enhanced packet of spares on hand.

One piece of equipment that was identified as critical was a valve for controlling the steam supply.  The client asked for price and delivery on a spare.  After waiting for a month I got an answer to relay to the client.  $10,000 and 3 months.

Now the valve was critical and stainless steel but it was only a 2" valve. So I went looking for the rationale.  I called up the factory in Sweden.  They said they got the valve from a distributor in Sweden.  That distributor got the valve from a European distributor in Brussels.  The Brussels distributor got the valve from its parent in the US.  The US distributor got the valve from the US parent of the company that manufactured the valve.  The valve was actually manufactured in Canada.  I was working in Scarborough.  The valve was manufactured in Mississauga.  The base valve was an off the shelf item with the standard ASME flanges replaced by DIN metric flanges.  The customer eventually bought the valve from the primary vendor in Mississauga for $1100. 

The $10,000 valve became a $1100 valve.

(In fairness the valve had physically been transported, and crossed borders, every step of the way which added to the markups as freight, insurance and taxes were also added).

On another front:

I once spent a year living with a client, learning his problems, learning how he wanted to solve his problems, preparing solutions, revising solutions and offering him a package of pumps and valves.

One day I was informed the project was going ahead, using my solution, but the client was going to buy the package from another supplier.  I asked which of my competitors the client would be using.  He informed me he would be using my pumps and valves as well as my solution. He just wouldn't be buying it from me. 

Apparently, the division that sold the pumps and valves to my company in Canada also sold the same equipment to distributors in the States.  One of the Stateside distributors got a deeper discount (40%) than we, a "sister" company, did.  We got 25%.  That Stateside distributor then sold them to a BC distributor who sold them to a distributor where I was working who sold them to the client.  And they still managed to sell them to the end user cheaper than I could supply them.  Now the guy that got the sale hadn't had to put in the year of leg work, and didn't have to cover my salary, and the salaries of all the other people that supported me in finding the solution, so his costs were lower. But that didn't matter to the client.  He got the best solution (IMHO) at the best price.  And I went on to find my next "paying" customer.

The purpose of the parables is to demonstrate that the market is a weird and wonderful place.  Typically, the fewer the distributors there are between the factory and the end user then the lower the price.  And I sense/believe that that typically is where Canadian defence contractors find themselves - adding their 25% to a long chain that already sees the US paying $600 for a hammer.

But, as the other story shows, you can't take anything for granted.  Every deal has a life of its own and logic is not high on the programme.
 
jmt18325 said:
Ships that we don't necessarily need, that don't necessarily meet our needs.

Sounds like the model of every purchase we've ever made for the CAF, besides the C-17, M777 and Chinooks....
 
Sorry for continuing the hijack, but a third parable came to mind.

I was project manager for a plant on a job that had a 20 MCAD budget.  We identified the process requirements.  We sourced vendors.  We identified infrastructure requirements and sourced those vendors.  We generated a refined budget and started negotiating final deals, where we adjusted our needs/wants to fit the available budget.

As the project progressed contracts were signed and more and more of the budget was committed.  Ultimately I was left with a diminished budget, but still a healthy one.

In the interim the plant identified an urgent need (a UOR in your terms I guess) for a piece of kit.  That kit was purchased for $250,000, installed and made operational.  And the project continued.

As the project continued, and equipment was sized it became apparent that the traffic flow wouldn't work without a second piece of kit, just like the one we had just bought for $250,000.

Now I was bundling process equipment so as to create large packages attractive to vendors.  When you are negotiating large numbers then percentage points take on a whole different meaning.  Vendors will regularly leave a negotiation cushion, along with a contingency, along with their highest possible margin, in their original offer.  Depending on the size of the project the sum of all those component can result in a lot of flexibility.  Particularly if the vendors are in a meaningful competition.

My plan was to tell the vendors that I had a budget of 6 MCAD for a package of systems and spares.  This included the stuff that I had to have and the stuff that I would like to have.  I wasn't particularly fussed about the exact nature of the solution.  The budget solution was just that, a budget solution.  I was willing to hear alternate solutions that would achieve the same things.  The job would go to the vendor that gave me a plant with the most capabilities within my budget.

One of the pieces of equipment in my 6 MCAD package was another $250,000 piece just like the one we had just bought.  One of the vendors came up with a similar piece from an equally reputable source, with a long track record, at a list price of $60,000.  Not $250,000 but $60,000.  We agreed to accept that solution.

The next issue was negotiating the final price of the contract.  The $60,000 piece of kit, supplied within the 6 MCAD job represented 1% of the total budget.  The negotiation resulted in the price being driven down by more than 1%.  In essence we got that capability, which had just cost us $250,000 as a stand-alone UOR, for free when buried within the context of a larger project.

Pricing jobs is a fraught experience.
 
jmt18325 said:
Ships that we don't necessarily need, that don't necessarily meet our needs.

pray tell what is our needs?
1950's We don't need a large combat force, oh hello Korea
1950's We don't need interceptors, missiles will rule
1990's- You don't need any heavy weapons in Bosnia
mid 90's- Tanks are dead, ASW is dead
year 2000-We won't be in Combat anytime soon, certainly not Central Asia
2012- COIN is the way of the future, other than places like Ukraine, Syria
2016- peacekeeping/peace making/piracy, etc etc

The lesson is that we really are not good at predicting the future, the UK, Australia, Egypt, several European countries all consider Amphibs important. We border 3 oceans and have significant coastline. I can see lot's of arguments for them.   
 
Build a platform.  Stick stuff on it.  Adjust stuff to suit the occasion.  And then if you have time and money and the need is obvious then you can make a specialized unit for the next generation.

That is the history of virtually every weapons system we have out there.

The early men of war were converted merchant ships, whether it was cogs or east indiamen. 
The early fighters were canvas bags of sticks and string that carried men with pistols and mortar bombs.
The corvettes were civilian pattern whaling boats with stuff stuck on them, just like the civilian yachts pressed into service.
And the Apache, like the Viper, evolved from the Cobra which started out life as the Huey Gunship.

Other examples would be Dakotas and Hercs and Chinooks and Sea Kings, or even  Lockheed Electras, DeHavilland Comets and Boeing 737s.

 
I agree we have a plan.

We have a plan to build 15 hulls with stuff in them for 20 billion dollars.

Nobody has said that we have a plan to put all the stuff we want into those hulls for 20 billion dollars.  Nor has anybody put forward a plan for how we would employ those stuffed hulls once we got them.
 
As I understand, the hulls are a direct replacement for those we have (not counting the AOPS).  We'll employ them the same way, I'd think.

The jobs created by the industry are worth as much as the ships themselves when it comes to the interest of the country.
 
Two qualifiers there:  You understand.  You think.

Neither one of those are in the contracts that haven't been written yet.
 
Frankly I don't care or hold my breath for any white paper or plan, the reality is that for most of our history, we have been sending expeditionary forces overseas. The C-17's, C-130J and even the Chinooks all support that reality. For the navy only the JSS truly  supports that history, the rest of the navy is there to ensure the army, it's equipment and supplies get there safely (and they have done that well). Before we could specialize on ASW because of the US doing the other tasks.
It is quite plausible that the US may retract it's global role either with a protectionist POTUS or to manage it's debt or a combo of both. I will argue that the RCN needs to readjust to more expanded role with a robust ASW, decent AAD and some Amphib ability. Canada may very well find itself in a conflict supporting other nations other than the US. A perfect example would be a Falkland type conflict, armed intervention into a Sri Lankan conflict, supporting a Aceh type disaster. One things Amphibs will do is give us an ability to gain international brownie points with our allies by transporting their troops, say taking Brits or Italians to Libya. Even if Canada is not in a combat role, our C-17's and amphibs would allows us to be significant contributors to a wide range of missions, including the ones we have yet to realize.
 
More on Davie's unsolicited proposal. They're working the media now, and no matter what the facts are these optics certainly don't look good for our current strategy. Is Davie's proposal really out to lunch?

Interesting to read about the cost-plus percentage approach. I respond to government RFPs quite often, and they're nearly always a mess (most RFPs are) but I agree with Alex Vicefield, it makes absolutely no sense to make it attractive to a contractor for a project to cost more.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/davie-shipyard-boss-canada-shipbuilding-plan-bizarre-1.3494460

The boss of Canada's largest shipyard says a $36-billion national shipbuilding plan is becoming an "international embarrassment" with a "bizarre" costing regime and "exorbitant" prices, despite producing no ships to date.

"It's been five years and the two shipyards haven't built a single ship," said Alex Vicefield, CEO of Inocea, a global shipping conglomerate that owns Quebec's Davie shipyard.

"All we hear are delays and cost overruns which are so high, they are turning the Canadian shipbuilding industry into an international embarrassment."

Davie shipyard makes unsolicited bid to build for coast guard
Harper government rejects offer to save $500M on new icebreaker
Davie was stung last week by the Liberal government's apparent rejection of its offer to provide ships more quickly, and at much lower cost, than projected under the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, or NSPS. That plan was designed by the previous Conservative government and has been endorsed by the Liberals.

Alex Vicefield 20121119
Alex Vicefield, CEO of Inocea, a global shipping conglomerate that owns Quebec's Davie shipyard, calls Canada's national shipbuilding strategy 'bizarre' and designed to create 'exorbitant' costs. (Jacques Boissinot/Canadian Press)

In comments provided to CBC News from his headquarters in Monaco, Vicefield said that, "Having spent my career in the international marine industry, I have experienced government procurement throughout many different countries, both developed and emerging, but never have I witnessed a country so willing to spend money unnecessarily. It's almost as if money is no object."

Vicefield cited the procurement strategy of awarding cost-plus contracts, which guarantee a profit margin, rather than fixed-price contracts, which he said are the norm internationally.

Of the cost-plus approach, he said, "Under that system, profits are calculated as a percentage of the costs incurred. This provides no incentive for shipyards to reduce costs when possible."

'Perverse incentives'

That critique jives with an analysis commissioned by the Harper government, delivered to the Trudeau government last November by PricewaterhouseCoopers and obtained by CBC News.

It found that "the regime provides perverse incentives for industry to increase costs … if the profit percentage is fixed, increased costs result in increased profits."

The analysis, first reported by The Canadian Press, called this process "detrimental to the global competitiveness of Canada's defence industry."

Vicefield agreed, in even blunter terms.

"Anywhere else in the world, if someone wants a ship built, you do a design and you go out to all capable shipyards to quote it and provide delivery schedules and so on. Under the NSPS it seems to be the opposite. That's bizarre."

The icebreaker gap

Even so, Vicefield said he supports the intent of the shipbuilding program — to re-equip the navy and the coast guard with ships built in Canada. His objection is that it is not set up to meet those goals.

Announced in June 2010 and billed as the largest procurement in Canada's history, the shipbuilding program awarded the right to build a fleet of warships to the Irving shipyard in Halifax, with non-combat ships, including a polar icebreaker, to be built in North Vancouver by Seaspan.

hi-ice-breaker-20121023
The new icebreaker — dubbed the Diefenbaker by the Harper government — was originally priced in 2008 at $720 million. However, since construction has been delayed for at least 10 years, it is expected to cost closer to $2 billion.

The Davie yard was in bankruptcy when those two yards were chosen, but is now solvent and remains the biggest yard in Canada. Taking advantage of delays in getting Seaspan's yard ready to begin work, Davie has already muscled in on the program, winning an order to provide an interim naval supply ship by refitting a discounted commercial vessel. That ensures some 1,100 jobs at its own yard on the south shore of the St. Lawrence across from Quebec City.

More recently, Davie offered to adapt a series of existing ships available at steep discounts because of the slowdown in the oil industry, including a three-year-old icebreaker sitting idle after Royal Dutch Shell cancelled a costly Arctic project.

Davie has also offered to begin work immediately on a new polar icebreaker, priced at less than $800 million, to fill a "capacity gap" until Seaspan produces its own icebreaker.

That vessel already has a name — it was dubbed the "Diefenbaker" by the Harper government — but it will not begin to exist until the late 2020s, because Seaspan must first build two supply ships. By then, after inflation, the Diefenbaker is expected to cost about $2 billion — more than twice as much as Davie's offer.

'Unsolicited bid'

Even so, Minister of Public Services and Procurement Judy Foote, visiting Seaspan on Friday, said the government would not respond to an "unsolicited bid" from Davie and is committed to the existing procurement strategy.

The Edison Chouest Aiviq
Davie has offered to refit a series of existing ships which are available at steep discounts because of the slowdown in the oil industry, including a three-year-old icebreaker. The Edison Chouest Aiviq is currently sitting idle in Seattle after Royal Dutch Shell cancelled a costly Arctic project. (ChouestVideo/YouTube)

Vicefield told CBC News he's not taking that as a final rejection, because the government could still choose to solicit such bids. He expects it will, because of an embarrassing "capacity gap" looming now as Canada's only large icebreaker, the Louis St-Laurent, reaches the end of its long life.

Now almost 50 years old, "the Louis," as it is known, has undergone numerous refits and will soon return to Davie for another, but the ship is rusting and due to be decommissioned in the next few years. If Seaspan cannot provide a new icebreaker until 2027 or later, there will be a 10-year gap in Canada's ability to assert sovereignty in the Arctic.

The 2010 voyage of the Louis St-Laurent
Vicefield said filling that gap is not an attack on the national shipbuilding strategy, but an addition to it.

"We are merely trying to provide a solution to a known sovereignty problem that is coming with the certainty of tomorrow's sunrise.… This is even more important in light of Russia's stated goal of fielding 11 nuclear and conventionally powered Arctic icebreakers by 2020. Canada may even face a situation where China has a greater capability in our North than we do."

Davie's local MP, Conservative Steven Blaney (Lévis-Bellechasse) agrees.

"We need icebreakers," said Blaney, calling the Davie plan "very interesting for the taxpayer.… These are additional ships, complementary to the NSPS, which I endorse."

He said the minister was wrong to reject Davie's proposal.

"I find it beyond belief, inconceivable, to brush aside such a proposal.… Are we rich enough not to seize that opportunity?"
 
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