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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
Such a move may not appear logical to us, but other views have other logic and the 21st Century seems destined for interesting times and the ships we build now will see a good chunk of this new century and all that goes with it. Also with our current procurement process and recruitment you may not have that many aircraft to support arctic operations as you would like.
 
That's fast, although I suspect they used parts meant for the 3 rd ship in the series.

https://www.nsnews.com/news/coast-guard-ship-back-in-action-after-hitting-breakwater-1.23793489
 
https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/government-of-canada-awards-contract-for-acquisition-of-four-naval-large-tugs-806906347.html
 
Not really bad maths.

First of all, the Firebrand and Firebird were always fire fighting vessels more than tugs, and in fact did precious little in terms of tug work. They really were only used as such exceptionally at night or on week end when the Glens were not available. So if you get four replacement tugs - each with firefighting capability - and create a rotation so one is always available in each home port, then there is no loss there.

As for having four large tugs vs. five, well we had three on the East coast because we had 12 major surface warships, to the West coast's 8. The West coast managed with two for eight ships. And that's what we are going to have on the East coast after the next round of replacement hulls (probably 8 type 26 East and 7 West - if we follow the RCN's or CAF's biased eastern view of the world, though the reverse would make more sense in today's world). The HDW are expected to require no tugs. Moreover, the new tugs are expected to be much more powerful and maneuverable than the Glen's based on the specs in the tender.

In any event, if you have a sufficient availability of smaller tugs, and with the Ville class you do, then it should not be a problem.

BTW, I am glad Ocean Industries got the contract: They are a totally unsubsidized international success story with their tugs, both in building them and operating them (they provide tug services in many places both in the St-Lawrence river system and internationally to the US and the Caribbean's.
 
I'm not a professional, but would dare to think that the 3-2 tugs per E-W coast might be related too to the coastline n. miles and square n.miles  to be serviced. Am I wrong?
 
JMCanada said:
I'm not a professional, but would dare to think that the 3-2 tugs per E-W coast might be related too to the coastline n. miles and square n.miles  to be serviced. Am I wrong?

Not really, tugs are used occasionally outside the harbour usually for the odd tow of a target or to deliver a ship to Pictou or such for refit. All CO's are encouraged to use tugs if available. I would imagine when AOPS finally are accepted they will make heavy use of tugs at least initially. We don't need a large number of tugs because we don't have a large fleet.
 
This is great news, that project has been on the book for a decade or two in various forms.  Glad to see Group Ocean won it; they are a pretty impressive company and expect as long as we stick with our initial requirements this should roll out pretty smoothly.
 
OFSV #1 is back on track and completing sea trials, I have heard they grabbed all the bits they needed to fix her from #3 which will delay them a bit but not by much. https://www.facebook.com/sean.potter.547/posts/10155780813766741
 
Is that icebreaker in image supposed to be for Seaspan new builds after the Diefenbreaker (whose design I think is largely done)?

Vard explores concepts for Canadian Coast Guard future fleet

Vancouver, B.C., based Vard Marine, Inc [ https://vardmarine.com/ ]. reports that the Canadian Coast Guard has awarded it an engineering services contract to explore concepts for the Coast Guard’s future fleet renewal program.

Vard says that the work scope is aligned with the company’s core competencies in tailored, fit for purpose, multi-mission ship design. It includes parametric concept design, feasibility studies and operational analysis, system design studies, trade-off analysis, and cost modeling. The work is intended to explore requirements for multiple future fleet ship types and could stretch over several years.

The contract continues a relationship between the Canadian Coast Guard and Vard Marine that began with Vard Marine designed patrol and science vessels built in the mid 1980’s and carrying on with the development of the designs for the Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel and the Polar Icebreaker.

CCG-VARD-designs_web.jpg

https://www.marinelog.com/news/vard-explores-concepts-for-canadian-coast-guard-future-fleet/

Will Seaspan have any capacity to build more icebreakers at same time as it--if ever--gets around to building these CCG never never land vessels promised in 2013 by Conservatives to be built after the Diefenbreaker:

Just Announced New Canadian Coast Guard Vessels Overpriced by Factor of Five
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2013/10/09/mark-collin-just-announced-new-canadian-coast-guard-vessels-overpriced-by-factor-of-five/

Vard Marine is subsidiary of VARD AS, owned by Fincantieri:

VARD, together with its subsidiaries, is one of the major global designers and shipbuilders of specialized vessels. Headquartered in Norway and with 9,000 employees, VARD operates nine strategically located shipbuilding facilities, including five in Norway, two in Romania, one in Brazil and one in Vietnam...
http://www.vard.com/about/Pages/default.aspx

And note the sensible way Norway has main VARD build ships for its coast guard:

Vard inks NOK 5bn deal for 3 Norwegian coast guard vessels

Norwegian shipbuilder and designer Vard has signed a new contract for the construction of three coast guard vessels for the Norwegian Coast Guard.

As informed, the value of the contract exceeds NOK 5 billion, equal to about USD 617 million.

The Norwegian government had originally announced plans for the construction of three new coast guard vessels in September 2016. Following review of offers from three competing yards, Vard Langsten was selected to continue negotiations in October 2017. The investments were approved by the country’s parliament at the beginning of June 2018, with the final negotiations having been completed and finalized in the following weeks.

Deliveries of the three vessels are scheduled from Vard Langsten in Norway in Q1 2022, Q1 2023 and Q1 2024, respectively. The hulls will be built at Vard Tulcea in Romania [emphasis added].

To be built to replace the aging Nordkapp-class coast guard vessels, the new ships are developed for worldwide operations in all weather and sea conditions, both inshore and offshore. Specially designed to withstand operations in demanding arctic areas, the new coast guard vessels will have an ice-strengthened hull and ice-class notation. With a length of 136 meters and a beam of 22 meters, the vessels feature strong ocean-going [emphasis added] capacities for long-distance transits, search-and-rescue operations, surveillance, and oil recovery.

Vard, a subsidiary of Fincantieri, has based its offer on the reference design developed by LMG Marin on behalf of Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency (NDMA).

Commenting on the recently signed contract, Mette Sørfonden, Director General of NDMA, said: “Due to national security interests, the Norwegian government decided that the competition should be restricted to Norwegian yards only [with shipyards in Romania]. Vard Group with its Vard Langsten yard was the provider that overall satisfied the defined requirements for solution and the navy and the coast guard’s needs in the best manner.”

Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency (NDMA) / Forsvarsmateriell (FMA) is an agency directly subordinate to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence and its main task is to develop and modernize the Norwegian armed forces.

https://navaltoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2017-04-03-js-0225-t5900516e-m800-x0qrvjq39-320x214.jpg
https://navaltoday.com/2018/06/25/vard-inks-nok-5bn-deal-for-3-norwegian-coast-guard-vessels/

Mark
Ottawa
 
In post above ( https://milnet.ca/forums/threads/90990/post-1571415.html#msg1571415 ) ship at top left might be Medium Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessel and one at top right an Offshore Patrol Vessel--in 2013 Conservative gov't said CCG to get up to 5 of each ( https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2013/10/vancouver-shipyards-build-medium-endurance-multi-tasked-vessels-offshore-patrol-vessels-canadian-coast-guard.html ) to be built some distant day by Seaspan--pix of current ones built late 1960s:

1) Multi-tasked:

dfo-photo-37-multimedia.jpg


2) Offshore Patrol:

dfo-photo-641-multimedia.jpg


Our governments really seem to have little interest in effectively carrying out core federal responsibilities--i.e, CAF, CCG, RCMP.

Mark
Ottawa
 
On the other hand CCG helicopters can be got (effectively sole-sourced), under Conservatives, from Bell Helicopters in Montreal in by our standards warp speed and with almost no political or media fall-out:

Canadian Coast Guard’s New Medium-Lift Helos Sole-Sourced to Bell Helicopter Canada
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2015/04/11/mark-collins-canadian-coast-guards-new-medium-lift-helos-sole-sourced-to-bell-canada/

Bell Rung: All 15 Canadian Coast Guard Light Helos Delivered
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2016/03/14/mark-collins-bell-rung-all-15-canadian-coast-guard-light-helos-delivered/

But boy it sure helps when you have (US-owned) company actually making the dang things and selling them around the world at a profit. Rather than, one way or another, paying the shipbuilding companies to build the shipyards actually necessary for the work they've been promised. And getting the vessels some sunny never never land day. At least bloody very late.

FUBAR.

Mark
Ottawa

 
I didn't know if I should put this in this thread or in the Canadian Politics forum (seeing as there is an election coming  ;) ):

This went totally unnoticed in the English Canadian press yesterday (probably because the end of steel and aluminum tariff was greater news), but minister Garneau was in Quebec City and announced that Davie has been retained by the G. of C. for a contract for two new ferries of about 130 meters  in length, under a program where a sole bidder that qualifies can be selected. Any other potential bidder (watch out for Irving!!!) who believes it could bid on the work now has 15 days to make its case - otherwise, the government negotiates the details of the contract with the sole bidder. (I believe this was the rule used by the Conservatives to acquire the C-17's)

The two ferries to be replaced are the MV Madeleine and MV Holiday Island, both operating in the Gulf of St-Lawrence from P.E.I.

The reference below is to the Journal de Quebec, it's in French sorry - but you can always use Google translate.

https://www.journaldequebec.com/2019/05/17/ottawa-confie-la-construction-de-deux-traversiers-au-chantier-davie
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
I didn't know if I should put this in this thread or in the Canadian Politics forum (seeing as there is an election coming  ;) ):

This went totally unnoticed in the English Canadian press yesterday (probably because the end of steel and aluminum tariff was greater news), but minister Garneau was in Quebec City and announced that Davie has been retained by the G. of C. for a contract for two new ferries of about 130 meters  in length, under a program where a sole bidder that qualifies can be selected. Any other potential bidder (watch out for Irving!!!) who believes it could bid on the work now has 15 days to make its case - otherwise, the government negotiates the details of the contract with the sole bidder. (I believe this was the rule used by the Conservatives to acquire the C-17's)

The two ferries to be replaced are the MV Madeleine and MV Holiday Island, both operating in the Gulf of St-Lawrence from P.E.I.

The reference below is to the Journal de Quebec, it's in French sorry - but you can always use Google translate.

https://www.journaldequebec.com/2019/05/17/ottawa-confie-la-construction-de-deux-traversiers-au-chantier-davie

Oh the hypocrisy of it all. We are open and fair, unless it actually has to get done. But if the previous government goes sole source its evil and bad but if we do it we are doing it for the good of the country. Next government comes in and they rinse and repeat!

 
The very crafty and often pernicious Prof. Michael Byers actually does know his stuff pretty well (esp. on Arctic) and makes pretty good sense here:

Mark Norman has been vindicated – but the navy-procurement crisis ticks on

Michael Byers holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia.

The truth about Vice-Admiral Mark Norman is finally coming out, with his breach-of-trust charge over allegedly leaking cabinet secrets to affect the leasing of a supply ship having been stayed. His trial has been spiked; the focus is now on Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who reportedly initiated the request for an RCMP investigation in 2015, a highly unusual ask that he denies making. He also publicly predicted a trial, even before any charges were laid.

But this affair is about more than injustice and allegations of political interference. At its root, it is about a procurement system that left the Royal Canadian Navy unable to operate freely overseas – and that problem remains nearly as acute now as it was before.

A strong navy needs supply ships to enable warships to undertake long deployments without stopping in foreign ports or relying on allies. During an armed conflict, a supply ship can be the difference between victory and defeat. But Canada’s Navy lost both its supply ships in 2015 after a fire on one and serious corrosion on the other. All of a sudden, it could no longer form a task force – an independently deployable group of warships – despite this ability being central to its function as a blue-water navy, that is to say, a force that can operate across the deep and open oceans.

The Navy had foreseen a need for new supply ships before that, however. In 2004, it persuaded Paul Martin’s Liberal government to initiate a procurement process. But the projected costs quickly exceeded the assigned budget, and Stephen Harper’s Conservative government halted the process before restarting it one year later and then rolling it into the 2011 National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). By 2015, it was apparent that the NSS was broken, and that the new supply ships would take a decade or more to arrive.

Enter Vice-Adm. Norman, appointed as commander of the Navy in 2013, who saw a solution to the intractable process: converting a second-hand container ship into a refuelling vessel.

However, this idea put the entire NSS at risk, and with it, entire careers. The NSS has grown into a complex institution with procedures, committees, personnel slots and budget lines involving three different government departments, and a workaround threatened overturning the cart. The conversion would also imperil decades of profits at Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax and Seaspan Shipyards in Vancouver. In 2011, the two companies had been selected to build all of Canada’s large ships because Davie Shipbuilding in Lévis, Que., was under creditor protection at the time. But by 2015, Davie was back, with the facilities, workforce and experience needed to build large ships. It even had a container ship, the MV Asterix, ready for conversion.

Mr. Harper understood that urgent measures were needed. So he gave Vice-Adm. Norman the authority to deal directly with Davie and get the job done. It was an unusual move that sidelined the rest of the bureaucracy, but the prime minister had Vice-Adm. Norman’s back – that is, until he was no longer prime minister.

Mr. Trudeau became a particularly easy mark for senior civil servants, especially given their propensity to always try and take advantage of new governments. It might not have been too hard to wind Mr. Trudeau up about Vice-Adm. Norman’s dealings with Davie, which included allegedly “leaking” cabinet information concerning the new government’s doubts about the deal Mr. Harper had struck on MV Asterix.

We don’t know whether Mr. Trudeau’s behaviour amounted to political interference in the justice system. What we do know for the moment, though, is that Vice-Adm. Norman’s legal fight against the breach-of-trust charge came at a heavy handicap. Someone told the media that the RCMP were searching Vice-Adm. Norman’s home in 2017. The Department of National Defence refused Vice-Adm. Norman’s request for government assistance on legal fees, even though doing so is normal practice. Thousands of documents were withheld, some of which would have revealed what a former Conservative cabinet minister later confirmed: that Vice-Adm. Norman was reporting directly to Mr. Harper.

Chief of the Defence Staff General Jonathan Vance was particularly unhelpful, suspending and then replacing Vice-Adm, Norman while publicly expressing a lack of confidence in him. He must go: At best, he failed to protect Vice-Adm. Norman, and at worst, he set him up.

But none of that deals with the actual problem at the core of this affair: The Navy has only one supply ship, the one that Vice-Adm. Norman secured. And this country’s geography demands supply ships on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, as well as a third ship to stand in during maintenance and refits.

Seaspan will not be able to deliver new supply ships any time soon, even though it recently rearranged its construction schedule so as to start one but not both of the vessels before several Coast Guard builds. The firm ran into serious problems with the first ship built under the NSS, a Coast Guard fisheries science vessel, including faulty welds that had to be redone last year, and a damaging collision with a breakwater during a Seaspan-conducted trial earlier this year.

Fortunately, no full construction contract for the new supply ships has yet been signed. There is still time to cancel the planned second ship at Seaspan and to have Davie refit another container ship instead.

But this assumes rational decision-making, unaffected by interests and bureaucracy. Yes, Vice-Adm. Norman was vindicated – but don’t expect this government to change course.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-mark-norman-has-been-vindicated-but-the-navy-procurement-crisis/

Mark
Ottawa
 
Cancel and get another conversion ship?  Yeah, super good idea, then when they reach the end of their life in 15 years we can go back to square one, and lose the hundreds of millions we've already spent on JSS with nothing to show for it.

It was called the shipbuilding STRATEGY because it was intended to build a STRATEGIC ABILITY TO BUILD SHIPS IN CANADA in modern facilities. The first few years was redoing the shipyards from scratch to world class facilities.  And guess what, it takes a long time to get actual experience when you do things, and a lot of these activities (like test and trials) they are only doing for the first time now.

It was always going to be a long lead to get set up, but if we can stop being a bunch of shortsighted whinging idiots and stick tot he plan maybe it'll turn out okay. Nothing wrong with checking it out and making sure it still makes sense, but torpedoing it without a fundamental understanding of what it was supposed to do is dumb.  The whole thing is bound up in masses of red tape (none of which applied to the Asterix project) that add complications, delays and expenses, so if you want to fundamentally change it, quit messing around with bespoke ships, value proposition, massive oversight etc and get into a straight commercial relationship.  Our contracts are rubbish, and it's because the people that draft them never actually work on projects or have any accountability for ships actually showing up, so they play silly games to meet some random ancilliary department deliverable that has nothing to do with DND or CCG having capable vessels in a reasonable time at a good value for the taxpayers.

Would love to pile on the shipyards, but from where I sat most of the problems are caused by Canada.  Aside from DND, PSPC and CCG, there are all kinds of fingers in the pie, and central agencies like to occasionally run around popping everyone's balloons. 
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
I am not a big fan of professor Byers, but must admit that this opinion piece of his is bang on.

I almost agree with everything.  At least his analysis of what happened.

As for a second conversion, I don't think we need it yet.  Just getting back from a NATO showed me once again that we have plenty of access to allied AOR's in the Med and North Sea.  As well as plenty of access to good ports to refuel and restore.  There's no emergency.

Asterix is going to do the job until we get the new capability.
 
Underway said:
I almost agree with everything.  At least his analysis of what happened.

As for a second conversion, I don't think we need it yet.  Just getting back from a NATO showed me once again that we have plenty of access to allied AOR's in the Med and North Sea.  As well as plenty of access to good ports to refuel and restore.  There's no emergency.

Asterix is going to do the job until we get the new capability.
Probably why Asterix seems to be plying most of her trade in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
 
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