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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
Besides, somebody had to be the first.  6 hulls, with 6 propulsion systems, barely qualifies as prototyping.

The equivalent, historically, would be the first hulls with screws, the first steam turbine hulls, the first diesel hulls, the first gas turbine hulls.  The Type 45s were the first electric hulls. 

A savvy engineer would have expected them to break down in unexpected ways.

A silly politician would have expected them to work perfectly and put them into service after their progenitors were crapped out and were unavailable for backup.

Note that all those other modifications came within the context of an expanding and experimental navy that wasn't overly concerned about the fact that many ships used different technologies and logistics required particular care and attention.

After all, once you have made the mental leap from having to keep spare masts on board to needing a spare governor for your boiler, everything else looks like detail.

 
Chris Pook said:
A savvy engineer would have expected them to break down in unexpected ways.
This is why going for extremely innovative warships is almost always a bad idea—way too much opportunity for things to go wrong.  Zumwalt-class destroyers, I am looking at you.
 
Here's a bit of info on the WR-21 engines; as you can see it adds a lot of infrastructure to the GT, so when they talk about the intercooler problems this is how it all fits together.  If it had worked as designed, the fuel savings would have been significant, but life has a way of not following the paper plans;

WR 21 paper

As well, here is an overview of the updates to the type 45 wrt the propulsion system.

defense news story

They did all kinds of innovative things on the ship, but the main engines underperforming really bit them on the arse with an all electric propulsion system.  We black out all the time, but you have a few minutes of grace when with the engines directly driving the shaft.  Sometimes it's best to let someone else with deeper pockets innovate, so we'll benefit from their experience.

 
Uzlu said:
This is why going for extremely innovative warships is almost always a bad idea—way too much opportunity for things to go wrong.  Zumwalt-class destroyers, I am looking at you.

I don't think there is anything wrong with going for extremely innovative warships, or anything else for that matter.  Just don't plan your primary Course of Action around them.  Build them while you can rely on the stuff you know works as you sort out the kinks in the new kit.  If they work as advertised.  Brilliant.  Bonus.  If they only achieve 80% of the pamphlet you are still ahead of the game.
 
Navy_Pete said:
...
an all electric propulsion system.  We black out all the time,...

Another place and time: I learned the value of Loc-Tite at sea.

I sold a fish processing line to a ship (a 600 footer, WW2 vintage steam turbine that had been converted).  The plant had its own MCC (Motor Control Centre) and had a combination of electro-mechanical controls and a PLC.

It operated fine alongside but after she had been at sea a few weeks she started acting up.  We started getting illogical logics.  Weird shutdowns that couldn't be traced and didn't make sense.

We limped through the season and brought her back into dock and went over her completely.  Plant worked fine alongside. 

Next season went to sea and the problems started up again but this time immediately.

Eventually it was discovered that vibrations were rattling all the connections loose.  The problems were solved by going round every connection and hand tightening it.  That fix lasted a couple of weeks before having to do it all over again.

Eventually the problem was solved by the judicious application of loc-tite to every screw on every terminal. Blue, as I recall.
 
Chris Pook said:
Eventually the problem was solved by the judicious application of loc-tite to every screw on every terminal. Blue, as I recall.

I think loctite, belzone metal filler, and the fiberglass wrap are sailor alternatives to duct tape, and should almost be issued as part of your kit.
 
Chris Pook said:
Eventually the problem was solved by the judicious application of loc-tite to every screw on every terminal. Blue, as I recall.

Blue? Pshawww!  That was your problem
For the bi-weekly revisits....Go red, or go home!

#KnowYourLoctite  :nod:
 
Chris Pook said:
Another place and time: I learned the value of Loc-Tite at sea.
Blue? Pshawww!  That was your problem. For the bi-weekly revisits....Go red, or go home!
Hell, I never would have guessed that Chris Pook was a sailor.....  :whistle:
 
Journeyman said:
Hell, I never would have guessed that Chris Pook was a sailor.....  :whistle:

Wannabes come in all shapes and sizes...  ;D
 
TimneyTime said:
I hope so, because those are pretty slick looking ships.

Smart people can bungle things up a lot worse than stupid people sometimes, because stupid people aren't smart enough to build something that's so overly complicated that it can be bungled up that badly.  Stupid people can also get involved later on, and/or restrict the original design based on cost.  I haven't really looked around, but I'm guessing that the type 45's undersized engines had a cost reassessment, and the result was smaller engines.  I'm pretty sure really smart people also worked on the type 45, as well.

??? The British are exceptionally good at building overly complicated feats of engineering, but normally they work out, and can be pretty elegant (in a kind of Rube Goldberg machine kind of way).

The generators were undersized in that the main engine had significant reliabiliy/power output issues, so they were running way more load than what had been expected. It's the difference between the 'concept of operations' and reality, and happens to the best of us (especially when you are spitballing that 10-15 years out from it actually hitting the water).

If it had worked though, they would have looked like geniuses, as the fuel savings would have been huge (or increased range/operating capability, depending how you ant tot look at it).  They went big and bold, but when you can go through 50k litres a day at sea, 10-20% is really significant. Compound that over 30 years and the reduced operating costs savings are enormous. Some things look great on paper, work great on lab tests, and fall apart in the field. Complex problems have complex solutions and complex risk assessments. Warships are complex (probably only surpassed by subs and space ships) so sometimes you have multiple small unlikely risks compound into a big problem, and they are sorting it out.

In any case, still a massive mischaracterization to say we're getting a type 45 main propulsion system. Also, the brits are really pushing to have the upcoming type 31 to be a really flexible design that they can easily adapt for export, so don't underestimate the pressures to keep the type 26 and the export variants as solid performers using proven technologies, and do as little innovation as practicable on the major systems. The 45s have some really cool features, and will be great if they sort out the bugs, but they really need a win with the type 26, as building and exporting the type 31s is part of their own shipbuilding strategy for the UK.
 
Here i am posting the open part of a longer article about the Irving family, published in France, is NB a feudal province more than a liberal one?
For your consideration, as far as the NSS is linked to them.

https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2019/04/DENEAULT/59710  (french)
https://mondediplo.com/2019/04/13canada  (english)
 
This situation is a shameful reflection on both the Harper and Trudeau government's, and on the monstrosity that is the shipbuilding "strategy":

Coast guard struggling to help with rescues, Arctic resupply due to old fleet

'Many ships will not remain operational until their replacements arrive,' internal documents say

Reduced search-and-rescue coverage, ferry-service disruptions, cancelled resupply runs to Arctic and coastal communities and nearly $2 million in lost navigational buoys.

Those are among the real safety, social and commercial impacts that communities across the country are starting to feel as the Canadian Coast Guard's fleet gets older, according to new documents obtained by The Canadian Press.

And the problems are expected to get worse: the documents warn that more than a third of the coast guard's 26 large vessels have exceeded their expected lifespans, and many won't survive until replacements arrive.

"Vessels are at increasing risk of unrecoverable failure," reads one PowerPoint presentation prepared by coast guard officials last summer and marked "secret." "Many ships will not remain operational until their replacements arrive."

Obtained through the access-to-information law, the documents underline the stakes facing the federal government and various communities if Canada does not have a capable coast guard fleet.

They come amid questions about how and when the government will replace the coast guard's existing vessels. Only five new coast guard ships are currently included in the government's multibillion-dollar national shipbuilding plan.

The PowerPoint presentation is particularly frank in its assessment of what it describes as the "early impacts of an older fleet coupled with increasing demand" that are already visible.

"Over the past four years, lengthening repair periods and unplanned outages have temporarily reduced coverage in all four offshore search-and-rescue areas in Atlantic Canada," reads one section.

'Repair and maintenance issues'

The coast guard has also lost nearly $2 million in navigational buoys in recent years "because they could not be removed due to ship availability and ice conditions," the presentation adds.

Ferry services have been interrupted — specifically Marine Atlantic's operations serving Newfoundland — and commercial ships have been left waiting for days for icebreakers "at significant costs to industry."

Canada has also failed in recent years to meet its obligations under the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization for fisheries conservation and protection "due to repair and maintenance issues," the presentation says.

And the resupply of Arctic and coastal communities have been delayed or cancelled — a problem that continued even after the presentation was prepared, as residents of three communities in the Northwest Territories can attest from last fall.

"I don't know why they couldn't have arranged an icebreaker," John Holland, senior administrative officer for the hamlet of Paulatuk, told The Canadian Press in October after one scheduled sea lift was cancelled.

The coast guard has a long history of being overlooked and ignored in political Ottawa, which is one of the key factors in the age of the agency's fleet, said Rob Huebert, an expert on the Arctic at the University of Calgary.

The presentation underscores the impact of such neglect, he said — namely, real safety concerns, in the case of search-and-rescue services and lost navigational buoys, and northern communities cut off from supplies.

"We have talked in the past about an older coast guard fleet and that there are problems [but] we can't get into details because the details are never presented," Huebert said. "This is the actual reality. This is what is happening."

Delivery dates uncertain

Asked about the documents this week, Fisheries Minister Jonathan Wilkinson said in a statement the fleet "remains reliable" and the federal government "takes the renewal of the coast guard fleet seriously."

Ottawa recently bought three second-hand icebreakers to pick up some of the slack, he noted, while the multibillion-dollar national shipbuilding plan includes money for one icebreaker and four science ships for the coast guard.

"We will continue to look at solutions so that Canadians can continue to receive the services they need," Wilkinson added.

Yet exactly when Seaspan Shipyards in Vancouver will deliver the five ships included in the national shipbuilding plan remains uncertain, let alone when the government will decide how and when to replace the rest of the fleet.

Seaspan was supposed to deliver the first of three fisheries-science vessels in early 2017 before problems were found with the ship's welding. It then crashed into a breakwater last month while returning from its first test run at sea.

Government officials say they still anticipate receiving that science ship this summer, and that the other two will follow over the next year or so. Even if that happens, there is no firm schedule for the new heavy icebreaker and other science vessel to arrive.

Seaspan has also been tapped to build two new supply ships for the navy, the first of which won't be delivered until at least 2023.

Meanwhile, Seaspan and its Quebec-based rival Davie have been engaged in a fierce behind-the-scenes battle over the contracts for 10 other coast guard ships that were promised to the Vancouver yard in 2013.

Seaspan has all but warned that its survival is contingent on building those ships, which were initially estimated to cost $3.3 billion
[emphasis added--see "Just Announced New Canadian Coast Guard Vessels Overpriced by Factor of Five" https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2013/10/09/mark-collin-just-announced-new-canadian-coast-guard-vessels-overpriced-by-factor-of-five/ ] .

Davie, however, has pointed out that Seaspan won't be able to start work on the ships for years and wants the government to shift the business to Davie.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/coast-guard-arctic-resupply-1.5088605

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
This situation is a shameful reflection on both the Harper and Trudeau government's, and on the monstrosity that is the shipbuilding "strategy":

Mark
Ottawa

Sorry.....how many ships did Chretien and Martin build? 
 
Kingston Class were first launched 1996, Chreatin was PM as of 1993, likley the PC started the process and the Libs get credit for it.


Same with the 500 Class in the CCG, launched about the time Chreatin took over, Chreatin was in power for the purchase of the Victoria Class subs, a good idea really badly done.
 
According to Wikipedia:

...
In 2006, the Government of Canada under Prime Minister Stephen Harper promised to continue the Mid Shore Patrol Vessel Project initiated by the government of former Prime Minister Paul Martin...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hero-class_patrol_vessel

Those vessels were not part of the shipbuilding "strategy" and are the only new fairly sizeable vessels built in Canada actually to be in service with CCG or RCN since 2006. Thirteen years.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Swampbuggy said:
Well...didn’t Martin launch the original JSS project, only to have Harper cancel it?

The AOR replacement saga is painful to look over. Started as just a regular AOR replacement that then morphed into the ALSC Frankenstein monstrosity which was thankfully killed by the Conservatives for a reset. So we are now getting a reduced capability AOR (2 kingposts vice 4) for more money.  ::)
 
FSTO said:
The AOR replacement saga is painful to look over. Started as just a regular AOR replacement that then morphed into the ALSC Frankenstein monstrosity which was thankfully killed by the Conservatives for a reset. So we are now getting a reduced capability AOR (2 kingposts vice 4) for more money.  ::)

Out of curiosity, would you be opposed to 2 ASTERIX class with 4 posts and also 2 PROTECTEUR class, were FFS to keep supplying the warm bodies?
 
Swampbuggy said:
Out of curiosity, would you be opposed to 2 ASTERIX class with 4 posts and also 2 PROTECTEUR class, were FFS to keep supplying the warm bodies?

Nope, we can do it if we also fix the recruiting system (getting people through the door, thru basic and thru QL3)
 
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