S.M.A. said:
At any point before or during the 1940 campaign, did the French ever consider attacking the Siegfried Line? With the aim of playing havoc in the German rear areas (and logistical lines of the Panzers) if they breached it?
I just have the impression that the Siegfried Line wasn't as extensively fortified as the Maginot Line. But then again, when US forces crossed it later in the war, they did have overwhelming armoured, artillery and air support on their side.
The French attempted a half hearted assault on the siegfried line although a much larger assault (40 divisions) had been planned to assist the poles, essentially re-enacting the opening phases of world war 1, but in reverse. At the time, the large bulk of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe were engaged in the east, so any sort of allied offense would have, likely, led to great success (and there is endless first hand accounts from german army generals at the time expressing grave concerns about this).
To me, the factors that most dont take into account when looking at the invasion of France are the morale/will of the allied nations to be in a war and the fact that the poor performance of the British and French in 1940, more than the strength of the German army, led to the fall of france.
Morale-wise, the French and British nations were not prepared for a war. They had spent the period of 1918-1938 trying to forget world war 1 and neither population had any appetite for another conflict of that magnitude. The Germans, on the other hand, had spent the inter-war periods rejecting that they had been defeated, and though the population wasn't thrilled at the idea of another war, they were more apt to back one. This lack of national morale amongst the British and French was significant, particularly once the German sweep through the Ardennes was complete and they had captured Abbeville and the positions N of the Somme River. In WW1, the French and British armies, though largely defeated, were able to muster the strength to stop the Germans in the battle of the Marne and essentially save the republic (though German logistical problems cannot be discounted). In WW2, the sort of national will demonstrated at the Marne (and Verdun) simply didn't exist, which led the french army, which by all accounts should have been able to hold the Germans N of the Somme, to simply evaporate.
When the Germans invaded in 1940 all military logic indicated that the Germans would be stopped. They had 157 divisions, largely horse drawn and contrary to popular belief very poorly equipped (and more often than believed poorly trained- The bulk of the German army was made up of hastily assembled recruits only trained after 1933-1935. Though some units had combat experience in Spain, largely the German army was in much worse shape than the one that crossed the border in 1914). The Germans had a total of 2439 tanks (mostly Pz Mk 1 and Pz Mk 2, which were no better than slightly armoured machine gun nests) and only 10% of the force was mobilized. Even up to 40% of the German army was 40 years old and up, indicating that they weren't the "uber-menschen" often portrayed in the west, but a hastily assembled, poorly equipped, rag tag bunch.
The French and the British, on the other hand were largely mechanized and way better armed. Their plan to meet the German attack in Belgium made sense, even though French and Belgian intelligence as early as 1937 indicated that an attack across the Ardennes was possible. Even after the attack across the Ardennes the French army still outmatched the German army on paper- it was the breakdown in the armies morale (not the case in 1914) and the lack of national will, more than the Germans, which caused France to fall.