Naval Missile Thread

[dimsum]

The article makes it sound like it was Range Control that terminated the flight. Perhaps they all have the kit but only the Americans have the codes and transmitters to terminate.

So…the Americans can take control of our missiles?

(Mandatory tinfoil hat gif)

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I mean the statement is nebulous. Range control terminating the flight could just as easily mean ordering the ship to activate the flight termination systems. I mean, I guess it could be there, but I was aboard OTT for the Harpoon strike test off Point Mague back in 2018, and no one mentioned a flight termination system being installed on the exercise missiles. I suppose it could have been there and I didn't know, I just really feel like given my role there, I would likely have known about it.

I’ve never been on the range for a Harpoon shoot- only sea sparrow- so I never got to see what the preps were either for that type of shoot. Even though it wasn’t my job to care, we were often tasked with filming the launches from the unengaged side, so you better believe that I wanted to understand Range Safety.

 

[Rudburg]

So…the Americans can take control of our missiles?

(Mandatory tinfoil hat gif)

 

[Underway]

Australian Defence Minister just finished a speech talking about increasing the number of missile launchers in the RAN fleet to 880. The way that he said it indicated that he was talking about the Mk41 VLS. The breakdown appears to be as follows:

Hobart class 3 x 48 = 144
Hunter class 6 x 32 = 192
GPF (general purpose frigate or tier 2 combatant) class 11 x 32 = 352
LOCSV (large optionally crewed surface vessel) 6 x 32 = 192
Total = 880

Basically They are stating that the next war will be a missile one and that missile technology has reduced the strategic safety geography Australia has.

 

[Lumber]

The Role of Drone Technology in the Evolution of Naval Warfare Tactics​

As military planners continue to adapt to new technologies, drone systems have emerged as a significant influence on naval warfare. The recent integration of drones—both aerial and underwater—into military strategies around the world has shown that they can augment traditional systems without fully replacing them. This is particularly true for anti-ship missile (ASM) systems, which will likely retain their relevance but be employed in new ways alongside drones to maximize their effectiveness. Recent conflicts, including the use of drones in naval operations during the Russo-Ukrainian War, highlight the practical, near-term changes that could shape future warfare tactics on the seas.

The first notable shift due to drone integration is an enhancement in target acquisition and surveillance for ASMs. Traditionally, acquiring a lock on fast-moving and distant enemy ships required advanced radar systems and, often, aerial reconnaissance support. Drones equipped with long-range sensors and data-link capabilities, however, can provide real-time, persistent surveillance that tracks ship movements over large distances. During the conflict in Ukraine, for instance, drones proved their capability to pinpoint and monitor enemy positions, offering continuous coverage without risking manned assets. In a naval context, drones could perform a similar role by scouting beyond the immediate horizon, providing surface ships and submarines with precise targeting data, which allows ASMs to be launched from greater standoff distances with improved accuracy.

Second, drones can act as electronic warfare assets that help degrade or disrupt enemy defense systems. Anti-ship missiles face the constant challenge of penetrating sophisticated enemy defenses, including radar-guided anti-air systems, electronic countermeasures, and interceptor missiles. Small, expendable drones can be deployed to simulate incoming missiles or launch electronic attacks to confuse and overwhelm the enemy’s detection systems, thereby increasing the likelihood of ASMs reaching their targets. The utilization of drone swarms to create a ‘fog’ of targets has already proven effective in recent skirmishes, where drones have evaded or confused defense systems due to their sheer numbers and irregular flight patterns. This tactic could be implemented in the near term to support ASM launches by reducing the enemy’s ability to detect or prioritize threats.

Another significant impact of drones on anti-ship missile tactics lies in the possibility of cost-effective force multiplication. Drones can supplement smaller fleets or less sophisticated platforms with ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and targeting capabilities, bringing parity against a superior force. Countries with limited naval resources can thus employ drones as affordable assets to detect, track, and even guide ASMs fired from remote or less advanced ships, effectively increasing their reach and lethality. This approach can extend to countries seeking to optimize their resources by enhancing the potency of their existing ASM platforms without needing a complete overhaul of their fleets.

In conclusion, while drones will not eliminate the need for anti-ship missiles, they are poised to alter the way ASMs are deployed in naval warfare, offering an opportunity for enhanced efficiency, accuracy, and adaptability. By enabling extended targeting, providing electronic warfare support, and creating affordable force multipliers, drones represent a practical way to leverage existing missile systems to their full potential. For military planners, the integration of drones in these supportive roles offers a strategic, cost-effective means of enhancing ASM efficacy, paving the way for more flexible and resilient naval tactics in an evolving technological landscape. The extent of these changes will depend on the willingness of naval forces to integrate drones in tactical planning and operational training, but their potential to shape future naval engagements is undeniable.