Mortars: 51 mm, 60 mm, 81 mm, 120 mm & more

[Journeyman]

Hopefully some'll write a book about it some day! 

cough  Old Sweat  cough    ;D

 

[GnyHwy]

Hey Clint,

It sounds as if:

A) you didn't need the mortars
B) that you probably could have found space somewhere in the back of each gun-det's 10 tonner for the C16
C) that your sense of when the 81s were "required" in support of coal face operations and the sense of a LAV Platoon Leader might be at variance.

But that business of prioritizing (item C) is why the Bns have always had their own integral fire support.

I'm just going to address item C quickly. As I have been away, and have missed much of the conversation.  I will re-quote myself to bring clarity. 

If a need was identified, and the numbers demanded of the Arty Regt had been bigger, a mortar platoon dedicated to the forward Cbt Tms could have been deployed as well.

I was suggesting that if someone had saw value in deploying forward mortar troops, that the Arty could have filled that role.  It would have taken additional positions on top of the already manned 777s, but could have been done.  I don't believe a need was identified, and the though was that the 777s could do it.  To cover all plt activities with 81s would require spreading them out over hell's half acre. Even the 777s had difficulty covering the AO, which brought birth to the requirement for rockets.

As far as a LAV Platoon Leader needing fire support, when he did need it, he asked for guns, not mortars, and we were quite happy to give it to him.  Having done a few patrols, and always knowing where my guns and tubes were, it didn't take me long to disregard the tubes from my contingency plan; mostly due to the fact they were hardly ever in range. 

That all said, I can't think of any time that a TIC didn't get the fire support it needed.  It may have taken time because of clearance issues, but those same clearance issues would have been present regardless of calibre of gun or mortar barrel.

Perhaps the scenario in my head is different than others.  I am thinking of dispersed operations while some may be thinking a bit more conventional.  When a plt leaves their coy defensive, it takes about 5-10 minutes of driving and they are out of the range of the the 81s.  Unless we plan on scattering dozens of tubes all over the place, they will not prove very effective for stab ops.
 

 

[vonGarvin]

Without getting into OPSEC, I can raise a flag labelled "BS" on that last post.

I was the BG Plans Officer for a rotation.  At one point, an operation was being planned that was outside the bubble of protection offered by the M777s.  The need for indirect fire support was identified, and proposals were made to move the guns into range.  "Can't do it" was the answer.  "What about moving up with mortars?"  Nope, we don't have the people.  (Of course, it was made worse by the effects of HLTA). 

The plan was allowed to go forward because the attached Brit unit brought along their mortars, which had enough fire support for the operation (in conjunction with other assets)


OK....carry on.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Without getting into OPSEC, I can raise a flag labelled "BS" on that last post.

I was the BG Plans Officer for a rotation.  At one point, an operation was being planned that was outside the bubble of protection offered by the M777s.  The need for indirect fire support was identified, and proposals were made to move the guns into range.  "Can't do it" was the answer.  "What about moving up with mortars?"  Nope, we don't have the people.  (Of course, it was made worse by the effects of HLTA). 

The plan was allowed to go forward because the attached Brit unit brought along their mortars, which had enough fire support for the operation (in conjunction with other assets)


OK....carry on.

And the scariest thing is that I get the impression the gunner in question carried on with no adverse career impact. Sigh...

 

[GnyHwy]

Without getting into OPSEC, I can raise a flag labelled "BS" on that last post.

I hardly see how my post was BS, and can see plenty more of it in your post.  Since the guns and mortars are owned by the BG Comd (regardless of cap badge),  it would have been his decision to make.  An Arty Comd advising a BG Comd does not say "can't do it", he advises against it, and it still the BG Comd's decision.

If manning shortage was an issue, then changing the cap badge of 50 nonexistent soldiers doesn't change anything.  As I stated, a few times now, if it was thought that the mortars were meant to be manned continuously in forward offensive positions, then more soldiers are required; the cap badge is irrelevant to me in this conversation.  Bottomline, the BG Comd owns the mortars and guns, and the command relationship and tactical task dictates that.

Hypothetically though, if the tubes were a traditional Infantry mortar plt, by moving them, wouldn't he have left someone else without fire?  You can't cover everywhere, and you would be hard pressed for 81s to cover a Cbt Tm Op, let alone a BG one.

Since what you had mentioned seems to have been a joint effort, then the fire support and risk was settled at that level, and I'm certain that the BG Comd had a hand in it.  If it was a matter of tactical task, and the TF was retaining the guns for whatever reason, then that is a coordination effort that needed to be worked out ahead of time.

And the scariest thing is that I get the impression the gunner in question carried on with no adverse career impact. Sigh...

I do not know the details, but would find that hard to believe.  Refusing to fight is not a good thing for anyone's career. 

 

[McG]

If manning shortage was an issue, then changing the cap badge of 50 nonexistent soldiers doesn't change anything.  As I stated, a few times now, if it was thought that the mortars were meant to be manned continuously in forward offensive positions, then more soldiers are required; the cap badge is irrelevant to me in this conversation. 

Which brings us back to my earlier observation:

Had PYs moved to Arty & Engr along with the responsibilities of mortar & pioneer, then this discussion would not be happening today.

Instead, we took those PYs out of the field force.

 

[Kirkhill]

Had the decision not been made to emphasise Rifles (by decreeing that all 10 LAV III seats would be filled) over capabilities (by decreeing that Mortars, ATGWs and Pnrs would all go the way of the Dodo) we would not be having this discussion.

As I have noted elsewhere other Armies do not consider it necessary to fill all the seats in the back.  When they run short of manpower they make sure to deploy all their vehicles and fill the turrets.

One more time:

ASLAV Gibs = 0
USMC LAV Gibs = 3 or 4
Danish CCVs and Piranha Gibs = 6
US Cavalry Bradley Gibs = 2
US Infantry Bradley Gibs = 3 to 6

You could field an effective Mounted Infantry/Mounted Rifle/Dragoon force following the USMC model with 6 arrses per LAV and 4 LAVs per Platoon and assign additional PYs to man the Mors and Pnrs.

Disregard the AT requirement.  That could be managed in two ways, one or both, hang a pair of TOW-RFs on the outside of the Delco Turrets, or supply each vehicle with a Javelin CLU for the dismount Tm.

MG Platoon / DFS Platoon seems surplus to requirement when you have a 25mm, a 7.62mm coax, and a 7.62mm pintle mount on each of more than 40 vehicles.  Especially true if they are also toting more than 80 TOW-RFs ready to fire.

Mors on the other hand have no replacement.  Neither do Pnrs or Recce.

 

[ArmyRick]

WTF??? Dude, please follow this thread.

1. 81mm Mortars were available on an operation in A-Stan and denied for manning reasons (note the technoviking words)
2. There is a shortage of personal, END STORY.

I have no idea how going on about seating arrangements and capacity in different armoured vehicles FITS into this conversation? Please break out the puppets and explain it to me, in squads, if there is a point to it?

We need 81mm manned and 155mm manned AND not by the same people. Either some one has to increase arty or infantry positions and we will be able to do so.

It would also probably mean creating mortar batteries or mortar platoons...depending on who would get them..

In this discussion, do not care about seating capacity of the LAVIII or any other vehicle....

 

[Kirkhill]

WTF??? Dude, please follow this thread.

1. 81mm Mortars were available on an operation in A-Stan and denied for manning reasons (note the technoviking words)
2. There is a shortage of personal, END STORY.

I have no idea how going on about seating arrangements and capacity in different armoured vehicles FITS into this conversation? Please break out the puppets and explain it to me, in squads, if there is a point to it?

We need 81mm manned and 155mm manned AND not by the same people. Either some one has to increase arty or infantry positions and we will be able to do so.

It would also probably mean creating mortar batteries or mortar platoons...depending on who would get them..

In this discussion, do not care about seating capacity of the LAVIII or any other vehicle....

Rick: PYs are not the End of the Story they are at the beginning of the story.

Agreed.  There is a shortage of personnel. Therefore the old models based on larger numbers of personnel do not work.  The old models are broken and need to be fixed.

Check in with TV and Michael O'Leary to see how that effort has gone to date.

PYs are decided by the Politicians of the Day and their not going to be hiring any more bodies any time soon.

They have decided to hire 118,000 people to defend Canada.
Half of them are Regs (65,000 = 55%), a quarter are Part-timers (25,000 = 21%) and the final quarter are Civilians (28,000 = 24%).

Of the 118,000 total PYs 1/3 of them are held back, by NDHQ decision for Command, Support and Joint roles while 2/3 or 78,100 are made available for Operations.

Of the Operational PYs 1/4 (9656 or 24%) go to the Navy, 1/4 go to the Air Force (10013 or 25%) and fully 1/2 goes to the Army (20231 or 51%).  Keep in mind these numbers include Regs, Civilians and Part-Timers.

Also, keep in mind that these numbers are heavily influenced, if not completely driven, not by a needs assessment, but by Politics - National, Provincial and Inter-Service.

Given the hand dealt the Cmd CA now has spread the wealth amongst Command and Support, Engineers, Arty, Armour, and Infantry.

Infantry then decides how to spend its share of the wealth.

Along the way decisions like Numbers of Brigades, Battalions, Coys, Platoons and Sections are made.  Other decisions made are what weapons and vehicles, the type and number, and, most critically how many bodies are going to be assigned to each task.

I am arguing that a critical decision was made back in the early days of Afghanistan, when the Infantry Branch was still discussing how to employ and man LAVs (check out articles in Ducimus) when it was decreed from on high that the answer was to fill the LAVs with 10 men. 

I am further arguing that that decision, together with decisions on the numbers of LAVs per Battalion and numbers of LAV Battalions to be fielded drove the PY shortages that resulted in the elimination of various critical capabilities.  Some, as I suggest above, can be remedied without massive influxes of PYs.  Others need to be addressed.

There are 27 Rifle Sections in a Rifle Battalion of 3 Coys of 3 Pls each.

The LAV holds 10 people and the strong suggestion from the Pre-Kandahar days meant that the LAV section would be 10 strong. But I see from the Army website that the "doctrinal" section is already down by 2 to 8 men.

That concept seems to have been reinforced by the CCV submission that only called for and ability to carry 3 crew and "a minimum of 5" GIBs. Not 7.

Even with 8 man sections it seems there are still not enough PYs available to man even a small mortar platoon.

So I present you this option:  Reduce each Rifle Section from 8 to 7 and free up 27 PYs that can be allocated to form a small Mortar Platoon (UK Para).  Further reduce each Rifle Section from 7 to 6 to free up another 27 PYs to be allocated either to create a full size Mortar Platoon (Canada 1982), or to be allocated to additional capabilities like Pioneers.

That then leaves you with a 6 man section.

That, in turn, leaves open the question of can you fight a 6 man section effectively.

My argument is based on this:

The TAPV is designed to carry 6 Men and thus could be manned as a "Section Carrier" by a reduced section.

The LAV series of vehicles, and most of the other IFVs, cannot carry a turret and a full 8 man section in PPE.  Other armies have come to terms with this, the Danes being one, by reducing the size of their sections, across the board, to 6 men.  They will fight their 6 men sections to the best of their ability and develop doctrine accordingly.

In our Grizzlies, we dismounted 6 GIBs.
The USMC in their LAVs used to dismount 6 GIBs when they tried to use the LAVs as assault vehicles.  They now use the LAVs to carry 3 crew and 3 GIBs and they are used in Recce and Screening roles.
The Aussies decided to put no GIBs in the back but instead carry a small section of 7 in a separate Bison with every Troop.  And I think they have removed even that.

My points are these:

There are no more PYs
Critical capabilities need to be recreated within the existing PYs
The primary source of PYs can come from the Rifle Sections
Vehicles can be used to offset PYs
Other armies offer examples as to how smaller sections in vehicles might be employed.

You want mortars?  Find the PYs. 
You want 10 man sections?  You're not going to get mortars.

You want to increase the effectiveness of the number of troops at all levels?  Give them an engine.

With respect to the mortars in particular here's another thought.  Kevin Boland offers that the 120 should be LAV mounted and the 81s returned to the Infantry. 

How about you ditch the 81s completely, you add M224 60s to the Infantry Coys and you not only mount arty 120s in LAVs to support the Medium/Heavy Force but you also supply the arty with Wiesel 120s to support the Light Force?

That assumes of course that Arty can come up with its own PYs to man them. 

If not, then its back to the Infantry and reducing the size of the Rifle Section.

All of this stuff is inter-related.  You can't just say "I need more".

Offered with the greatest of respect.

 

[GnyHwy]

Another issue that I believe relates to this is what I will call the cookie cutter or optimized BG.  We the Army are rigid with our creation of a BG, and in the name of simplicity, resort to the multiple of 3 rule for the ORBAT.  Two different Ops will never be the same, and even the same OP will change year to year, and season to season, yet we send the same ORBAT all the time.  By that logic, one would have to assume that the Ops in Aghan did not evolve at all from 06.  We all know that is not true.

While the multiple of three rule is a good starting template, it should have the potential to adapt and be altered, and that is a capability, not a piece of equipment; and that capability needs to reside very high up the food chain.  Our Army is already based on a modular system, increasing numbers of the BG from within the Bde or borrowing from other Bdes should be attainable.

Does anyone else see a reason to have a cookie cutter BG, other than administrative simplicity?  Or, is administrative simplicity reason enough to not adapt to change?

Every DLCD pub you will ever read will likely mention adapt to change, and increased flexibility numerous times throughout the pub.  At what level of the CoC does that not apply?

 

[ArmyRick]

GnyHwy, well said, points inbound!

 

[KevinB]

Gny - Great points - but since every Roto is Roto0 the CF never evolves in that respect... 

Kirkhill's point are actually 100% bang on.  Its all about PY's and how the branch and then element chooses to employ them.
  Canadians, like Americans enjoy creature comforts and bloated staff's, in fact Canada seems to be going to the gold in terms of bloated staff Olympics.  With the advances in Comms one would think its easier to do more with less in the terms of a staff, but it goes in reverse.

I would suggest with todays tech most staff duties NEED to get done with a lot less - so more bayonets (or tubes, tracks etc) can be deployed.  I'm also not sold on the homogeneous blob that the Infantry is becoming.
   
  In the 80's we were told the 120mm was a Artillery mortar (I never understood that  but I guess we had some staff paper that had 120's on it that where assigned to some fiction Artillery segment).  I would suggest the 120 is lighter and easier deployed than a 105mm C1 howitzer - yes I know like the C16 v. 60mm the 120 cannot do everything a 105 can, but by my math one can delpoy about 66% more 120's than 105's for the same gun line PY's - with about 500% more ordnance one the ground / person on the line (and yes a larger logistical burden to support the added weight of fire - but if combined with Precision munitions - the 120mm looks very very favorable).
  In fact one could use a 120 mortar det with 4 pers using 1 Hummer type vehicles in the 'Light Role' or 1x V-150's for  operations like Afghan/Somalia etc (light deployed with motorized light armor) and integral LAV Mortar vehicle for the LAV formations, with the 'excess' PY's used to get more tubes or flesh out the "A Ech".

Honeslty I think rolling the reserve Arty units to LAV120's would actually make viable units out of most of them (who currently can man a 2 tube battery).  Of course this would then require a deployable reserve structure.

Regardless of my drift in the above - Canada has some tough choices that need to be made before any of the Mortar options can be looked at with any sucess.
 

 

[Infanteer]

Like the EFSS that the Marines field.

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/xml/news/2008/10/marine_mortarsystem_100308w/100408mc_efss_800.JPG

As for tough decisions, the Army has already made them by pretty much eliminating the mortar from our Army.  Don't worry, the grenade launcher/howitzer/CAS/alien death ray will be their to provide that support....

 

[KevinB]

To me it was not a tough choice - just a stupid one...
  In the same manner I think HLTA on a combat mission is retarded.

I don't see how you can have an (effective) Infantry Battalion without some sort of organic fire support.  As at the end of the day the guns are not the Bn asset and often find themselves doing other things.

Of course I'm also the guy that wants to create a seperate Calvary branch to run the LAV's and have all Light Infantry forces that can jimp in back of a LAV if needed.

 

[Kirkhill]

....

Of course I'm also the guy that wants to create a seperate Calvary branch to run the LAV's and have all Light Infantry forces that can jimp in back of a LAV if needed.

Freudian slip Kevin?  I think Calvary is where they send guys like you and I that propose those types of solutions to get crucified.  ;D

 

[KevinB]

LOL -- it looked weird when I wrote it, but I never thought of it again, but rather ironic as you put it...

 

[Petard]

Gny - Great points - but since every Roto is Roto0 the CF never evolves in that respect... 

Kirkhill's point are actually 100% bang on.  Its all about PY's and how the branch and then element chooses to employ them.
    In the 80's we were told the 120mm was a Artillery mortar (I never understood that  but I guess we had some staff paper that had 120's on it that where assigned to some fiction Artillery segment).  I would suggest the 120 is lighter and easier deployed than a 105mm C1 howitzer - yes I know like the C16 v. 60mm the 120 cannot do everything a 105 can, but by my math one can deploy about 66% more 120's than 105's for the same gun line PY's - with about 500% more ordnance one the ground / person on the line (and yes a larger logistical burden to support the added weight of fire - but if combined with Precision munitions - the 120mm looks very very favorable).
  In fact one could use a 120 mortar det with 4 pers using 1 Hummer type vehicles in the 'Light Role' or 1x V-150's for  operations like Afghan/Somalia etc (light deployed with motorized light armor) and integral LAV Mortar vehicle for the LAV formations, with the 'excess' PY's used to get more tubes or flesh out the "A Ech".

Honestly I think rolling the reserve Arty units to LAV120's would actually make viable units out of most of them (who currently can man a 2 tube battery).  Of course this would then require a deployable reserve structure.

Regardless of my drift in the above - Canada has some tough choices that need to be made before any of the Mortar options can be looked at with any success.

In late 2008, and until about late 2010, I took part in Act Thrust Advisory Groups(*) discussions on firepower deficiencies. These deficiencies within a BG being defined by the field force and DLCD.  Not surprisingly, others did bring forward some of the points you (and others like Kirkhill) have just mentioned.

From that study, it did appear that there was a noticeable lack of capability to deliver non lethal effects for the main manoeuvre force (the assumption being there would be times when part of the BG fire power would be reduced, primarily because its biggest source - guns and/or tanks- would be tasked away to be massed, to support another formation, whatever; there would be times when the fire power would be more limited).  Another component that was found deficient, for both lethal and non lethal fire support, was for CLP's supporting a BG spread out in complex terrain.  Some of the COA's looked somewhat like what has been suggested here (traditional mortar Pl within a Bn), and some were divergent, such as mounting various types of rockets on Light armoured or support veh's, but in the end the consensus was an indirect fire weapon system should be looked at. The payload to cover the different effects required, and the range required, favoured a 120mm weapon. How that kind of capability would be implemented was left to project staff. In the end, as was mentioned earlier, as the project advanced through the PRICIE stage(**), it lost traction all together, and effectively was binned when it was shelved for further study later.

Some tough choices have been made very recently, and they certainly affect P Res Artillery units, but not for the sound reasons Kev mentioned, or necessarily to deal with the defeciencies the TAG were exploring.

Two weeks ago a directive was issued that 81mm mortars would be redistributed. Basically every Reg F Regt would be losing about 2-4 81mm mortars, every P Res Arty unit would end up getting 2 to 4 81mm's (if they don't have any already). Last fall, a directive was issued explaining more detailed C3 inspections and speed limits (amongst other things), and it also mentioned that eventually it will be withdrawn from service, due to sustainability issues. The order to redistribute the 81's is lacking a lot of detail, and context, but does not leave much time to get the answers since the whole distribution plan is to be completed by this Oct. That P Res units are supposed to be capable of force generating gun dets for Reg F Regt's, and I would say the training delta between deploying a mortar and a gun are too wide, doesn't seem to of been factored in this 81mm mortar plan. That this is to be done with no mention of training, ammunition, or other support plans, makes me wonder what the hell is going on here.

I really doubt this plan to redistribute the mortars is intended to address some of the issues pointed out in this thread. It is almost certainly linked to the C3 being withdrawn from service and little else. That they want to do it so quickly makes me wonder if the C3 sustainability issues are far worse now,. 

I don't know that information because anything I knew about this from my time in DLR has become stale it seems. What I do know is that in a very short time virtually all P Res units will only have mortar capability and nothing else. The only exception will be units in LFAA, who will have the LG1 in order to FG for tasks with RCAS, and a few C3's will be kept functional for units tasked with firing gun salutes at national saluting bases (typically Ottawa and the Provincial capitals).
My take on why this happened is my opinion, it has not been explained in the order, but I doubt it had anything to do with solving the problem the TAG was looking at. What impact this will have on CA, well, I suppose that is open to debate too.

* A Thrust Advisory Group is mostly made up representatives from the R & D resources available to the CF, how it functions is explained in general at link below
www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/pdf/2001/P0102-eng.pdf

** PRICIE stands for: Personnel (PY, manning priorities, training, trade management), Research and development, Infrastructure, Concepts and doctrine, Information technology, and Equipment (equipping and support plans)

 

[daftandbarmy]

Thrust Advisory Group... sounds like an association of porn movie directors.  ;D

Do you know if anyone's looked at the Commando 21 orbat as a possible option? I assume it's too expensive in both weapons and manpower, or something like that. Maybe there's someone on here that saw the RM use it in AFG who can comment on its effectiveness:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commando_21

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509029

 

[KevinB]

I keep forgetting the C3 'replaced' the C1. 

Were are all the 81's coming to give PRes Arty units?  Last time I looked Ontario had 30th (Ottawa) 7th(Moronto), 11th (Guelph and somewhere else), 56Fd (with three different locations), and 49th(SSM), most of which could actually field a Troop(-) for a Ex.  And I think the other areas where equally as FUBAR.

I remember years ago that even a M109 conversion course was deemed too training intensive, and the non gun routine was the same for units.  The mortar has a whole different criteria to it, and pretty much everything is different. 
  I guess it's a blessing that the C3 will need to be withdrawn, to force 1 standard, but...
The 81mm is NOT a 105mm replacement - I could live with the units getting towed 120's (if we figured the LAV-120 was not a viable option) but the 81mm is truly an Infantry mortar it does not have the range for engagment that the 105mm did.

Sigh...

 

[Petard]

You can add the 42nd in Pembroke to LFCA (formerly 1 AD, and L & R Scot before that). Overall I would say your guesstimate on turn out is about right, although at the start of the training cycle last year many did field a bit more than Tp (~4 guns)

The C3 is eliminating itself quickly, and it might not matter how many Tps turn out. To give an example, 11th Fd had a C3 damaged last spring, and rather than have it repaired, it was cannibalized for parts instead, and their over all unit strength was permanently reduced by one gun

With this mortar distribution plan, 56 Fd will get only 2 mortars; with the 3 different sub locations it'll be interesting to see how this will work once the C3's are gone entirely. 56 Fd has a fairly large number of Tps with tour experience, and it was not unusual to have a turn out of 60 or more for an Ex, that's very unlikely to continue now

Maybe after the ARE changes come out we'll see what direction this is headed.