Modest Proposal from an Immodest Source - MLI

[quadrapiper]

On the interoperability/joint note, would there be something to be said for formalizing some sort of capability (even just as a set of SOPs) to transport and land  (relatively) small parties of Army personnel via RCN platforms, whether the final approach is RHIB- or helicopter-borne? Not thinking opposed landings so much as relief or the like.

 

[Monsoon]

On the interoperability/joint note, would there be something to be said for formalizing some sort of capability (even just as a set of SOPs) to transport and land  (relatively) small parties of Army personnel via RCN platforms, whether the final approach is RHIB- or helicopter-borne? Not thinking opposed landings so much as relief or the like.

There is actually, within the RCN's Warfare Centre, a "keeper of the amphibious capability" who does exactly that. I would argue that Fabius' comment that there isn't much cross-training between the RCN and the CA for landings isn't strictly true: a couple of trial runs were conducted a few years back and the lessons learned captured. Unopposed landings ain't rocket scientology, and as a matter of course the Army would probably prefer to fly into secured area as readily as be transported by ship; it just isn't something that needs to be trained for constantly. And, as he pointed out, we don't have the physical plant to do opposed landings with any credibility. Until opposed landings becomes something that Canada envisions doing unilaterally (where we wouldn't be able to rely on our allies to provide the platforms), it probably isn't going to happen.

Littoral ops are another story, and are indeed getting a fair amount of strat-level attention within the RCN. That being said, littoral ops can be done with existing platforms (the direction the US took in trying to design a Littoral Combat Ship unique to the purpose was arguably a failure); what's missing is a concrete CONOPS.

 

[Pat in Halifax]

There's a thread on here somewhere about that. The vessel was USS Gunston Hall with landings done in Virginia I believe. There was a good size RCN TG attached too.
Other than that, I have no other info though I was on one of the frigates; STJ or HAL. I am sure some on here both in blue and green must have been part of that.

 

[winnipegoo7]

Kirkhill,

I've sailed with the Danes. Their crews weren't large enough for them to conduct exercises 24 hours a day like Canadian ship can.

When asked how they could possibly go to war like that, they said that the war plan was to double the ship's crew to enable 24 hour operations.

Just my 2 cents.

 

[Kirkhill]

Kirkhill,

I've sailed with the Danes. Their crews weren't large enough for them to conduct exercises 24 hours a day like Canadian ship can.

When asked how they could possibly go to war like that, they said that the war plan was to double the ship's crew to enable 24 hour operations.

Just my 2 cents.

Thanks for that.

 

[a_majoor]

If we want/need Infantry to hit the beaches, then we either need to get real amphibious warfare ships (like an LPD), or a helicopter carriers like the Hyūga that can ferry the troops and equipment ashore.

That would kind of eat any savings from any of the other changes.

OTOH, given we are in the business of going places, this is probably an option that should be looked at anyway.

 

[Kirkhill]

A couple of further comments:

I take the point about the disadvantages of light crews but the net tendency does seem to be towards smaller core crews with additional personnel, and weapons, embarked when and if necessary, to suit the mission.


Frigates        Crew  Pax
F125       110 80
T26               118 72
Nansen       120 26
FREMM       108 37
Absalon       100 200
Huitfeldt       101 64

Patrol Vessels
Svalbard         48 75
AOPS         45 40
Holland         54 40
Thetis         47 54
BAM                 35 35
Protector         35 14
Clyde         36 22
Rasmussen 18 25

I believe the same logic is applied throughout the fleets.

With respect to the opposed landing scenario:

I guess I am of the opinion that even without amphibious breaching kit light infantry (marine, RCN or Army) can still offer Canadian citizens overseas and their friends and allies, valuable support and assistance. 

A heliborne force embarked on ships is considerably more flexible than an airborne force that has to be landed by fixed wing assets or even by parachute.

1.  The embarked force has staying power that the airborne force doesn't have.  It can exist as an uncommitted threat for an extended period of time.

2.  The embarked heliborne force can threaten a larger geographical area than the air landed force although not as much as the parachute force.
    The larger potential area of operations means that it is more likely possible to find a secure landing site that could be occupied unopposed, potentially even landing strips that could support Hercs if not C17s.

3.  The embarked heliborne force can retire more easily than the airborne force and especially the parachute force.

4.  The embarked force can be supplied with a more extensive arms locker for flexibility and greater weight of ammunition and supplies for endurance in  the field

5.  The naval force gives the embarked force a secure base of operations

6.  The naval force supplies a refuge or sanctuary that would act as the first stage in a civil evacuation conveyor

7.  The naval force supplies a relief base for humanitarian efforts.

None of the above require the transport of main battle tanks or even 17 tonne TAPVs.

After the embarked force has secured a foothold ashore (assuming a two hour flying radius for a CH-148 that could be anywhere up to 400 km inland) then the force on the ground could be resupplied, or even reinforced, by air drop or possibly air landing.

Its all about maximum flexibility with what is available as opposed to assuming that every operation must be prepared for every eventuality.  Scharnhorst was wrong when he said every soldier should carry an axe in case he needs to knock down a door. 

As long as we are not being pressed by external forces to react to their agenda then we get to choose where, when and how we wish to intervene and with what strength.


Edit: to add flying radius duration.

 

[chowchow1]

In regards to the ships, I really cant say anything since I have no idea what any of the mentioned data really means.

As an NCO who has served 11 years in the infantry, I can touch on the Marine Light Infantry force mentioned.

We have 9 infantry battalions, and that is all we need. However, what is to say we cant transform two of these battalions into marine units? We have three light units, which have been very focused lately on arctic operations, and airborne/mountain ops, which is the sort of things that light units should be all about in Canada!

Do we need 6 mechanized battalions? Maybe not, when there aer things they could be better used for. If we were to re-designate two of these units as Marine, and send 1 or 2 PPCLI, and 2 RCR to their respective coasts, then there is the manning right there. Of course this would totally mess with the Brigades.

These units would still be able to function as infantry, much like the Royal Marines do.

My prefered option would be to use some of the reserve units that are stationed in Halifax and Victoria and try to specialize them in establishing beach heads and marine operations.

I really dont see the government coming up with the money to stand up a new unit. Although considering how large our coastline is, it is pretty strange that we dont have Marines.

 

[Danjanou]

…..My prefered option would be to use some of the reserve units that are stationed in Halifax and Victoria and try to specialize them in establishing beach heads and marine operations..

If we do go down this road, this does sound like a reasonable proposal, and not just two cities, St John's and/or Vancouver could be added as well and perhaps some inland ports ( Montreal or Toronto). Presuming  an average Militia Bn could  field a company, then 2-4 "Marine" units of company + (150-200) strength may be a idea or at least a test bed for something larger including as suggested a rerolled regular Lt Inf Bn or two.  Basic infantry skills with emphasis on amphibious operations and other skill sets like boarding parties, and/or dockyard defence added in as continuation training.

Back in the middle 1980's the 1st Bn RNFLDR had more or less become a defacto "Marine" unit as I recall. It seemed outside of the mandatory 1-2 Winter Warfare exercises a  year just about every other FTX involved us playing with the local Naval reserve and getting wet on various parts of the South shore coast in little rubber boats. Just another way to get to work really, but I think someone on the BOR had reading too much regimental history about service about ships of the Provincial marine in Lakes Eire and Huron during the War of 1812.


Oh yeah JM before you wander in here, I'm not speaking from experience. I was not on the raid that seized the USS Tigress and USS Scorpion.  8)

 

[chowchow1]

Back in the middle 1980's the 1st Bn RNFLDR had more or less become a defacto "Marine" unit as I recall. It seemed outside of the mandatory 1-2 Winter Warfare exercises a  year just about every other FTX involved us playing with the local Naval reserve and getting wet on various parts of the South shore coast in little rubber boats. Just another way to get to work really, but I think someone on the BOR had reading too much regimental history about service about ships of the Provincial marine in Lakes Eire and Huron during the War of 1812.

I have to say, it is pretty strange how little joint training we do. The concept of 'one mission, one team' would hold a lot more weight if we actually did some tri-force exercises! Obviously this would take A LOT of planning, but now that the war is over, this is the sort of stuff we should look at to keep people interested. Being in the Para-Coy I have had the fortune of working with the airforce on a number of occassions, and have been on a few of their bases, and it is always interesting to see how the other guys work.

 

[dapaterson]

As always: What is the capability gap we want these Reserve units to fill?  And if this is a core military capability for the CF to maintain, why are we vesting it in a part-time organization with terms of service that preclude its operational employment? 

 

[Kirkhill]

As always: What is the capability gap we want these Reserve units to fill?  And if this is a core military capability for the CF to maintain, why are we vesting it in a part-time organization with terms of service that preclude its operational employment?

I agree that if this is a core military capability for the CF then it should be vested in the Regs.

What is this?

In my mind this is basic "infantry" skills. 

The issue for me is that not all infantry employment has to include carting around 20 tonne vehicles to carry your gear.    The Regs have to be able to deploy off the back of a 3000 tonne Patrol Vessel by CH-148, or by RHIB, as easily as they work with LAVs.  Primarily this means working with what they can carry, perhaps supplemented by light carriers like Quads and Snowmobiles.

The Reserves have to be able to do exactly the same as the Regs but with a little less proficiency. 

Ultimately this comes down to the value to the state of the single armed soldier with black caddies and how does that individual get where the government needs it.

 

[Danjanou]

I have to say, it is pretty strange how little joint training we do. The concept of 'one mission, one team' would hold a lot more weight if we actually did some tri-force exercises! Obviously this would take A LOT of planning, but now that the war is over, this is the sort of stuff we should look at to keep people interested. Being in the Para-Coy I have had the fortune of working with the airforce on a number of occassions, and have been on a few of their bases, and it is always interesting to see how the other guys work.

To be honest it was mainly an ad hoc informal arrangement (which usually seem to work out better go figure ). Being an "Army" unit lodged on what was basically a "Navy"(and Comms) centric station (CFS ST John's was (is?) part of MarCom then, and physically located across the street from the local Stone Frigate helped out. Also the personality of the respective CO's willing to think outside the box and support each other. HMCS Cabot had a ship  and needed reasons to go sailing. We needed another way to get to work. We also worked out other deals providing small arms and other assorted training for them and other units in the area. Good practice of our instructors too.

When I first arrived there the relation between the Naval Station Comd and the "Molitia" units he was forced to play landlord for was toxic at best.  His successor changed things for the better. Us acting as OPFOR a couple of years in a row for the annual Base Defence Ex couldn't hurt. Apparently losing ( as in notionally blowed up real good) the tank storage farm south of the city, the naval dock , and the antenna farm near the airport  a major NATO comms between North America and Europe during the Cold War within hours of each other does not look good on one's PER. Following this up having your whole BDF wiped out as an afterthought while they were sitting around drinking coffee in the mess and HQ buildings. We soon started training the Reg BDF in the finer points the next year and things like access to facilities etc improved. 8)

As always: What is the capability gap we want these Reserve units to fill?  And if this is a core military capability for the CF to maintain, why are we vesting it in a part-time organization with terms of service that preclude its operational employment?

In an ideal world yes. However do we  have the money and numbers to set up or convert a Regular Bn? I aps don't see "Marine" or amphib etc ops etc as a core skill. As Kirkhill notes  core infantry skills are a reasonably well trained proficient troopie in black cadillac's. Mech, Airbourne, Airmobile, Marine, Mountain trained etc. are just different ways to get to work.

 

[Infanteer]

I'm putting this here as it is the only real place it fits.

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Carrier_Hendrix_FINAL.pdf

Interesting piece on the future direction of naval warfare.  Although it is talking about capabilities that are beyond the scope of the RCN, the general gist of "more surface stand-off capability means smaller, more "concealable" ships with something better than jets" is interesting.  There are numerous "Brown Water vs. Blue Water vs. White Water (Arctic - did I just make that up?)" topics that this paper touches upon that are probably worth discussing.

FWIW, should the RCN look to small surface ships that can fire missiles, launch SSMs or put ashore small raiding parties?  This all has the trappings of the French Jeune Ecole of the 19th century, but maybe technology is making this approach more feasible today?

 

[Kirkhill]

At the risk of being accused of unabashed racking up of milpoints - and of repeating myself - I am going to transfer my comments on the Arctic Sovereignty Submarine thread to this one.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/96172/post-1235182.html#msg1235182

Ships are mobile islands that allow a nation to create sovereign havens where the government of the day sees fit.

It doesn't matter the size of the ship or the size of the crew it is still sovereign territory.  Those islands are agents of influence for the government both at home and abroad.  Not all of those islands need to be in high threat environments all the time.  Often vessels are required in places like the Horn of Africa, the Straits of Malacca and the Caribbean where risks are not much more elevated than they would be in Canada's EEZ. 



Jackie Fisher described the Army as just another projectile to be launched by the Navy.

With that in mind I compiled the following list of projectiles available to Canada, either in the current inventory or at reasonable cost, that can be launched from vessels in the 2000 to 6000 tonne displacement range.  In other words affordable vessels, not Big Honking Ships, although they would be nice.  That range includes River, Rasmussen and Holland class OPVs as well as Absolons and Endurance class support ships.  It also includes FREMMs, MEKOs, Huitfeldts, Nansens, 7 Provinces and many similar vessels.

The List:

Air Assets

CH-147  13 tonnes
CH-149  11 tonnes
CH-148    8 tonnes
CH-146    4 tonnes
MQ-8C    2 tonnes
MQ-8B    1 tonne
ScanEagle  18 kg

Harpoon ER  700 kg
SM2              700 kg
ESSM            300 kg
Hellfire            50 kg
Griffin              20 kg
APKWS II        20 kg

76mm                5 kg
57mm                2 kg
35mm                1 kg
25mm              500 g
20mm              100 g
12.7mm            50 g
7.62mm            10 g

Sea Assets

LCVP MkV(c)  16 tonnes
Strb90H        15 tonnes
LCP                  7 tonnes

ISE Theseus    9 tonnes
RMMV                7 tonnes
ISE Arctic Exp    2 tonnes
Mk48 ADCAP    2 tonnes
CAPTOR            1 tonne
Mk46 Torp        230 kg
Seaspider ATT  ----

Land Assets

Soldiers            100 kg

Vehicles......

In addition the islands carry surveillance gear (as do many of the projectiles)

Dutch OPVs contribute to their Recognized Maritime Picture with the Thales IM-400 Mast with an AESA 3D Volume Search Radar, a Surface Search Radar,  and EO Surveillance, tracking and fire control system.  Sonars are ubiquitous.

More islands equals a more comprehensive picture and more havens and more launch points.  The minimum requirement is a deck on which a CH-147 can land and refuel and a hull capable of launching a 10 to 20 tonne vessel over the side or off the stern.

Not all islands need to have all the projectiles all the time.  All islands should travel in company and be appropriately equipped for the threat.

I am a fan of minimal crewing - ...... (Edit - to eliminate a weak digression that did nothing to serve the argument - Thanks OGBD )


....Today I would argue that there is even less call for large complements (than in earlier days).

A large vessel with a small crew of twenty or so can supply a mobile sovereign haven on which a CH-147 can light and which can man the onboard sensors.

A similar sized weapons det (Absolon uses about 20 to 25 and the Rheinmetall shorebased Skyshield system uses even fewer) supplies self defence.

20 for an Air det to launch and recover the host of helos and UAVs

20 for a deck det to launch and recover sea assets and handle RAS duties.

20 to supply "hotel" services.

Beyond that the complement becomes "projectiles".

I would argue that a large fleet of "value-priced" hulls that require minimal manning and that can be up-gunned and up-manned as national circumstances demand is both more cost effective and useful and than a small fleet of tailored vessels crammed to the gunwales with every available AB the RCN is permitted to hire.

Those hulls could either be large OPVs that can be upgunned for higher intensity conflicts and/or Frigates that can be degunned for lower intensity "constabulary" work.

One other point - not all projectiles have to have lethal effect to be effective agents of influence.  Survey work, logistics, humanitarian assistance and maintaining free passage - as well as maintaining law and order - all serve to establish a nation's rights and ability to operate freely broadly.

An additional comment would be that not all vessels have to be manned and not all weapons under command need to be on board.  Unmanned semi-submersibles acting as "floating arsenals/magazines" sailing in company are a viable option.  That would leave the manned surface vessels primarily operating as tenders commanding and supporting all of the unmanned vessels and aircraft sailing in company.

 

[a_majoor]

Being in one of those transitional periods in history is always interesting (in the Chinese sense).

When the Romans finally cleared the Med of all their enemies the transitioned their fleet from the large galleys (like the quinquereme or "five") to small Liburnians (generally with single banks of oars) which were better suited for anti piracy operations and coastal patrols. Thousands of years later, the British finally settled the Napolionic wars and discovered their "Ships of the Line" were no longer very useful for supressing the slave trade, coastal patrols and other duties the RN needed to undertake. The fleet transitioned to Frigates through the mid century before "new" technology like ironclad construction, steam propulsion and rifled cannons began to make an impact. Today, with the Cold war over, the need for mighty fighting platforms like CVN's has drastically diminished, although like Ships of the Line they still hold a magical attraction to many people.

Canada has an interesting conundrum: we have very long coastlines (which suggest we should have a lot of ships), but also sail in some of the roughest seas in the world (which suggests we need large ships) and also project forces around the world (which also is done better with large ships). Add the need to patrol and operate in the arctic (which need specialized ships) and our Naval planners have a very intricate balancing act, especially given the budget and resources they have to operate with.

Even suggesting out of the box solutions is only a partial measure; we still have to absorb the R&D costs without much hope of defraying the costs through sales to foreign navies (few navies have similar needs, except perhaps Australia). What to do?

Edit to add: An interesting read and still rather relavent today: http://www.scribd.com/doc/30892578/Alternative-Submarines

 

[Stoker]

Perhaps a significant number of cheaply built coastal patrol ships to patrol the coastline and if they find something then larger more capable ships take over bases out of Halifax and Esquimalt. The other force would be a mixed frigate and AOR combination to take care of overseas commitments, alternate one coast per year. Build HF wave surface radar installations along the coast in conjunction with unmanned drones.  The coastline would be well protected and a capable force for overseas. The Coastal patrol boats could be crewed by reservists, while the others regular force.

 

[Kirkhill]

Chief - I'm right with right up until the last sentence.

I think the Coastal Force needs to be a reg force entity as well (or perhaps even Coast Guard, as suggested by OGBD?).  In peace time those ships could be "undergunned and undermanned" with reservists picking up the slack when and if an appropriate crisis level is achieved and identified by the government of the day.

I believe that given current manning practices (using the latest in unmanned enginerooms for example) even large patrol ships could be manned by tight crews in local waters.  That would leave more of the existing bodies available for what I would characterize as JUSTIFIABLE overmanning for ships in distant waters and ships sailing in harms way.

 

[Stoker]

Chief - I'm right with right up until the last sentence.

I think the Coastal Force needs to be a reg force entity as well (or perhaps even Coast Guard, as suggested by OGBD?).  In peace time those ships could be "undergunned and undermanned" with reservists picking up the slack when and if an appropriate crisis level is achieved and identified by the government of the day.

I believe that given current manning practices (using the latest in unmanned enginerooms for example) even large patrol ships could be manned by tight crews in local waters.  That would leave more of the existing bodies available for what I would characterize as JUSTIFIABLE overmanning for ships in distant waters and ships sailing in harms way.

To use the Coast Guard as a force similar to the US Coast Guard if I assume that's what you mean will be a big shift for the Coast Guard that exists now. Perhaps a mixed reg/res crewing model can work as what the AOPs are and the rest of the Navy are moving towards. Small crews can be done, but the capability that you won't have and what the navy will accept is two different things. I would love to see the reserves in a regular operational role as they have proven they are capable of doing.

 

[Kirkhill]

I yield to the man with experience.... No worries here if you think the reserves can maintain a stable manning level.

And I take your point on the Coast Guard vis a vis an armed service.  I guess I was reckoning that much of the patrol work does NOT require armed intervention beyond a small arms equipped team (perhaps with a helicopter in overwatch - manned or unmanned).  That would mean that an RCN or RCMP team could launch from a Coast Guard platform without putting an unarmed platform at risk.  With a common platform and the STANFLEX model then unarmed Coast Guard patrol ships (with a leavening of RCN manned armed vessels) could be armed and manned by RCN reservists if the threat level increased.

As an aside -

On the Look Cool front, and outside the box, there is this 2010 concept from DCNS - a 3000 ton - submersible frigate with a crew of 27.

39 knot transit speed on the surface and divable with AIP

http://en.dcnsgroup.com/innovation-technology/smx-25/
http://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/smx-25-dcns-devoile-son-concept-de-sous-marin-de-surface
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMX-25

Large ship, small crew, rapid transit for long coast lines and stealth...... Of course there are drawbacks: the source for one. ;D