Modest Proposal from an Immodest Source - MLI

[Kirkhill]

Currently the RCN operates the following fleet of “capital” ships (very broadly defined):

4x SSK (complement of 48 for a total of 192, displacing 2400 tons with a range of 19,000 km)
2x AOR (complement of 365 for a total of 730, displacing 24,000 tons with a range of 14,000 km)
3x DDH (complement of 280 for a total of 840, displacing 5100 tons with a range of 8,300 km)
12x FFH (complement of 225 for a total of 2700, displacing 5000 tons with a range of 17,600 km)
12x MCDV (complement of 31 for a total of 372, displacing 1000 tons with a range of 9,200 km)

Total Hulls = 33
Total Tonnage = 145,000
Total Sea Berths = 4835
Total Crew = 4835 (including air dets)
Free Berths = 0
Total Medium Helicopter Landing Spots = 17
Total Medium Helicopter Berths = 24

Alternate Fleet Composition:

4x SSK (complement of 48 for a total of 192, displacing 2400 tons with a range of 19,000 km)
4x JLSS (complement of 150 for a total of 600, displacing 28,000 tons with a range of 18,000 km) (HNLMS  Karel Doorman)
4x CLS (complement of 100 for a total of 400, displacing 6300 tons with a range of 17,000 km) (HDMS Absalon)
8x AAD (complement of 101 for a total of 808, displacing 6600 tons with a range of 17,000 km) (HDMS Iver Huitfeldt)
16x OPV (Complement of 57 for a total of 912, displacing 3700 tons with a range of 9,200 km) (HNLMS Holland)
8x AOPS (complement of 45 for a total of 360, displacing 5900 tons with a range of 12,500 km) (new design)

Total Hulls = 44
Total Tonnage = 305,000
Total Sea Berths = 5624
Total Crew = 3272 (excluding air dets)
Free Berths = 2352 (~4000 austere)
Total Medium Helicopter Landing Spots = 40
Total Medium Helicopter Berths = 60

Total Crew Requirements (Current)    = 4835 (including air dets)
Total Crew Requirements (Projected) = 3272 (including air dets)
Crewing difference                                = 1563
Air Det allowance for existing vessels = 400
Recovered PYs                                        = 1163

Proposal:
Allocate the recovered PYs to a Marine Light Infantry regiment of 2 battalions.
This would increase the infantry available to government by approximately 25% while maintaining the number of sea going trades.
The MLI would be available for boarding parties, anti-piracy patrols, NEO , raiding and conventional Light Infantry taskings.

Note: In my opinion the Holland class OPV is at least as capable a platform as the old St-Laurent class DDEs that sailed the North Atlantic for some 30 years.

 

[Monsoon]

Why would the Navy need eight area air defence destroyers if it only has eight of every other kind of task group combattant (including supply vessels) to shield? Why would we replace our twelve frigates with four older and less capable frigates? I expect you reckon that much of what the frigates do now can be replaced by a well-armed OPV, but that's not going to be the case with a crew of 57, which will pretty much limit the ship to one-shift, day time only evolutions: no 24-hour boarding ops from that platform.

And more to the point: where does the underlying assumption that CF operations are limited by the number of infantry battalions available come from?

 

[SeR]

Is there even a need for "Marine Light Infantry" in Canada? With all the financial cuts the military is experiencing at this time, I'm pretty sure the last thing that they will do is invest in a trade they don't really need.

 

[PuckChaser]

Is there even a need for "Marine Light Infantry" in Canada? With all the financial cuts the military is experiencing at this time, I'm pretty sure the last thing that they will do is invest in a trade they don't really need.

Considering if it was something we actually needed, you could easily train existing Infantry to accomplish that mission, quite easily I'd expect.

 

[Pat in Halifax]

I started this as the first response and while composing it, three responses came in!
I was going to leave this one alone as there is another thread in here where people chose their 'dream' Navy. I am going to guess that you are of Scandinavian ancestry (and that is NOT an insult) based on the origins of the platforms listed. I must say, it is an intersting read as it actually meets the Navy's requirements as laid out in CFDS (Canada First Defence Strategy) which is the document being referred to for the basis of operational requirements for AOPS, JSS and CSC. I also find it necessary to say (and yes, I am familiar with the experiments by the USN, French Navy, Royal Navy to name a few) the initial ideas for crew reduction have been a little heavy handed. As an example, the USN conducted an experiment with one of their Flt II ABs. The normal crew complement of Flt I was about 360. They dropped it to 230 and were fine...until about day 6 or 7. After about 15 months, they ended up with a crew number of 336 (I think that was it-It was between 335-340 anyway). They also lost some second line maintenance capability which you may say gets done via an ISSC alongside. That is great until you lose all 4 (for example) generators 1000 miles from the closest land (This has happened with at least 2 Halifax class that I am aware of). You must maintain that capability-If you don't need it, that's great but when you do....
I have often thought about the OPV idea for the Navy too as many of our operations centre around environmental/sovereignty/fisheries/drug interdiction patrols almost within the littoral environment. I even thought "Why not build 25 more of those CCG Hero class PVs and throw a 25 mm RWS on their fo'c'sle". I can only assume that there is a strategic reason for this not being done.
I think we should have more submarines though and I suspect that our next submarine procurement in 15-20 years may indeed focus on this.
Finally, what the hell (pardon my language) do we need Marine Light Infantry Regiments for? We used to have a Landing Party with the premise that we may have to secure a jetty at a hostile location before bringing the ship alongside, but it was determined that in the Navy's current mandate, this eventuality was highly unlikely.
It is obvious you put some thought into this and there are some very good ideas. Unfortunately, the 'grown ups' will not hear of it. I remember years ago after the second or third stall of JSS, we had (then) CMS on board (I think it was STJ) briefing the Chiefs and POs. He said that the PM and PD Teams were going back to the drawing board and should have a preliminary JSS design in 18-20 months (This was 2005 by the way). The Cox'n proclaimed that in that room at that time, he had the required corporate knowledge and that if we kept the coffee coming and locked the door, we would provide a design exactly tailored to the Navy's needs by 0700 the next day. I still wonder why the CMS didn't take him up on his offer!
I will be interested to see who else may chime in here as I KNOW there are some on this site working on these projects.

Pat

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks to all of you.
More reaction than I expected.

I am going to guess that you are of Scandinavian ancestry (and that is NOT an insult) based on the origins of the platforms listed

.
Pat

Pat:
You are not the first to speculate on my ancestry.  Many others have, much to the disadvantage of my mother.  ;D
To be clear, I am Scots-English with known ties to Holland and Flanders and likely ties to Danes, Vikings and other assorted northerners.

The only thing that ties me to my choices is a parsimony common to Scots and Dutch.  The reason that these vessels figure in my calculations is:
a) They do things differently to the RN and the USN
b) They are in the water (exceptions Karel Doormann – step-sisters Rotterdam and Johan de Witt are in the water - and the AOPS)
c) They have publicly published prices that suggest the capital cost of the entire fleet (exclusive of submarines) is on the order of 10 BCAD or about 1/3 of the total project budget to recapitalize the RCN’s surface fleet.  That should leave about 20 BCAD for project management, infrastructure, training aids and In Service Support.

Why would we replace our twelve frigates with four older and less capable frigates?

HT

Hamiltongs:
I assume that you think that the Karel Doormans I refer to are the older generation of Dutch Frigates. If so you are mistaken. If not then I am.
The Karel Doorman I am referring to is the latest iteration of the Rotterdam-Bay Class ships from Damen.

The frigate replacements I am considering are the Danish vessels Absalon, the frigate with a cargo deck, and the Iver Huitfeldt, the same frigate but with twice the engines and minus the cargo deck and fitted for anti-air warfare.  12 Halifax for 4 Absalons and 8 Iver Huitfeldts.

Why would the Navy need eight area air defence destroyers if it only has eight of every other kind of task group combattant (including supply vessels) to shield?

HT

My thinking is that the AOPS (and probably the subs) will be staying at home in near Canadian waters.  As will the majority of the OPV fleet.  I was reckoning on 4 distant water task groups of which 2 would be at sea at any one time.  Normally only one would be on expedition.

A distant water task group would comprise: a Karel Doorman JLSS, acting as AOR; an Absalon CLS,made up by yours truly – Command Logistics Ship; a pair of Iver Huitfeldts for AAW and 4 OPVs for screening and littoral warfare. 

I assumed that a 3700 tonne hull could also accommodate a sonar or a VDS if the need switched to ASW.  I also assumed the use of StanFlex weapons systems to permit the conversion of platforms to suit threat changes.

The rationale for the task group is that it could split into two elements: a forward element comprising the CLS, an AAW ship and a pair of OPVs; a rear element of the JLSS, an AAW ship and a pair of OPVs.

Thus the 8 AAWs.

I expect you reckon that much of what the frigates do now can be replaced by a well-armed OPV, but that's not going to be the case with a crew of 57, which will pretty much limit the ship to one-shift, day time only evolutions: no 24-hour boarding ops from that platform.

HT

One of the distinctions of all the vessels described is that like the RN’s T45s and the AOPS they all have a capacity to carry troops or Mounties.

The Holland OPVs carry 40 OGDs each. The Huitfeldts carry 64 OGDs.  The Absalons carry 70.  The Doormans carry 150.  Together the Task Group would carry 4x40 + 2x64 + 1x70 + 1x150 for a total of 508 additional personnel.  Those could be soldiers, airmen, sailors or Mounties.

I also find it necessary to say (and yes, I am familiar with the experiments by the USN, French Navy, Royal Navy to name a few) the initial ideas for crew reduction have been a little heavy handed. As an example, the USN conducted an experiment with one of their Flt II ABs. The normal crew complement of Flt I was about 360. They dropped it to 230 and were fine...until about day 6 or 7. After about 15 months, they ended up with a crew number of 336 (I think that was it-It was between 335-340 anyway). They also lost some second line maintenance capability which you may say gets done via an ISSC alongside. That is great until you lose all 4 (for example) generators 1000 miles from the closest land (This has happened with at least 2 Halifax class that I am aware of). You must maintain that capability-If you don't need it, that's great but when you do....

Pat:
I take your point about large crews but I would counter with two points:
a) Would you rather have more people in one hull or would you rather sail in company?
b) The Danes and the Dutch are already sailing operationally with “light” crews and many of the new designs out of France seem to be equally light.

I have often thought about the OPV idea for the Navy too as many of our operations centre around environmental/sovereignty/fisheries/drug interdiction patrols almost within the littoral environment. I even thought "Why not build 25 more of those CCG Hero class PVs and throw a 25 mm RWS on their fo'c'sle". I can only assume that there is a strategic reason for this not being done.

The reason I opted for the larger Hollands is because I reckoned they would be more suitable for expeditionary work, they could more easily accommodate an ASW capability, they could support a medium to medium heavy helicopter and they could accommodate an additional body of personnel

I think we should have more submarines though and I suspect that our next submarine procurement in 15-20 years may indeed focus on this.

No argument.
I intentionally left the subs out of the discussion because they are not in the current budget plans.

And now to the crux of the matter:

Finally, what the hell (pardon my language) do we need Marine Light Infantry Regiments for? We used to have a Landing Party with the premise that we may have to secure a jetty at a hostile location before bringing the ship alongside, but it was determined that in the Navy's current mandate, this eventuality was highly unlikely.

And more to the point: where does the underlying assumption that CF operations are limited by the number of infantry battalions available come from?

Is there even a need for "Marine Light Infantry" in Canada?

With all the financial cuts the military is experiencing at this time, I'm pretty sure the last thing that they will do is invest in a trade they don't really need.

Considering if it was something we actually needed, you could easily train existing Infantry to accomplish that mission, quite easily I'd expect.

Is there a need for Marine Light Infantry?

Short form: No.

On the other hand there is a need for Light Infantry in particular and Infantry in general.  Finding an additional 1200 PYs would increase the Infantry branch by some 25% (4800 to 6000).

The RCN presents an opportunity to “do more with less”.  The merchant world as well as other navies are demonstrating that.  For the CF at large it presents an “opportunity”.

Could infanteers be trained to operate from ships? Yes.  But then you would have passengers and not sailors when things went pear shaped.

I also wanted to keep the PYs within the RCN and not transfer them to the Army to avoid that battle.

I am betting that people who enjoy being at sea, and I don’t think all infanteers enjoy sea duty, and that people that sign up for boarding parties, could be convinced to take on some extra training to handle “infantry” tasks on the high seas and in the littorals. Essentially becoming Marines.  Sailors first. Infanteers second.

With respect to the training – the army has the ability to run the courses for light troops, even if they were supplied by the RCN. 

It is precisely because of the financial situation that I took a look to see what was possible if minima were assumed as opposed to optima.

And now, over to you..... :warstory:

 

[SeR]

On the other hand there is a need for Light Infantry in particular and Infantry in general.

Is this just an assumption or do you actually know for a fact that the CF really needs more infantry. What I've heard is that it is far from being "in demand" at this point in time.

 

[Kirkhill]

My understanding is that the infantry is having difficulty manning its current 9 battalions and that there is continual discussion about the benefits of reducing to 6 battalions.  And that is assuming the authorized strength and before considering retention.

 

[PuckChaser]

I am betting that people who enjoy being at sea, and I don’t think all infanteers enjoy sea duty, and that people that sign up for boarding parties, could be convinced to take on some extra training to handle “infantry” tasks on the high seas and in the littorals. Essentially becoming Marines.  Sailors first. Infanteers second.

With respect to the training – the army has the ability to run the courses for light troops, even if they were supplied by the RCN. 

You're still not justifying the need for the RCN to have its own infantry, other than it would be cool. Yes, the CF in a perfect world needs more infantry pers, but they are needed in Battalions, not posted to ships. The army has enough of a backlog conducting its training, with budgets being slashed, without tossing in a marginally useful trade. You already have sailors first, "infanteer" second pers, thats your boarding party. If they're not up to tasks, then perhaps their training needs to be revisited, not just make a new trade.

 

[SeR]

My understanding is that the infantry is having difficulty manning its current 9 battalions and that there is continual discussion about the benefits of reducing to 6 battalions.  And that is assuming the authorized strength and before considering retention.

If that's the case, then how would it help to add two more battalions and put them with the Navy?

 

[Infanteer]

Don't get so hung up on the infantry bit - does this proposal better fit the RCN's roles and missions?  One respondant has looked at that so far.

 

[McG]

The use of any freed PYs is really a seperate discussion if they are invested into another existing capability or used to create something new.  The question here is the structure of the fleet and meeting the CFDS.

 

[Kirkhill]

You're still not justifying the need for the RCN to have its own infantry, other than it would be cool. Yes, the CF in a perfect world needs more infantry pers, but they are needed in Battalions, not posted to ships. The army has enough of a backlog conducting its training, with budgets being slashed, without tossing in a marginally useful trade. You already have sailors first, "infanteer" second pers, thats your boarding party. If they're not up to tasks, then perhaps their training needs to be revisited, not just make a new trade.

Its not so much a matter of the cool factor.  Its more a matter of coming at the issue from two sides.  How many hulls can we put in the water with the available dollars and how many sailors do we need to crew them.

My proposal suggests that more hulls than we currently have can be put in the water with fewer crew than we currently employ.

Is this the right mix of hulls and capabilities?  I don't know.

Are the crewing assumptions correct?  I don't know.

I believe that we you can do things differently than the way you are.  In my opinion that is evidenced by the fact that other navies are doing things differently.


I also know that there are manning limits on the CF and all Services and in that environment that which Peter doesn't use Paul will.    That is the principal reason for the MLI suggestion.  I didn't want to get into a discussion about reducing the size of the RCN.  I guess I screwed the pooch on that one.

 

[Monsoon]

Its not so much a matter of the cool factor.  Its more a matter of coming at the issue from two sides.  How many hulls can we put in the water with the available dollars and how many sailors do we need to crew them.

"Naval output" isn't measured in tonnes or any other unit of hulls-in-the-water; it's about what the various complementary hulls do to operate in concert.

My proposal suggests that more hulls than we currently have can be put in the water with fewer crew than we currently employ.

Is this the right mix of hulls and capabilities?  I don't know.

I would suggest "no". Your model jettisons the balanced task group concept in exchange for (1) a lot of light infantry transport with supporting elements, (2) some domestic patrol capability, and (3) a couple of submarines, for some reason.

I believe that we you can do things differently than the way you are.  In my opinion that is evidenced by the fact that other navies are doing things differently.

Doing "what" differently? No one inside the Navy is going to suggest that we don't have as much room for process improvement and general transformation as any other element/branch, but the form of transformation you propose is to have us stop doing the various things that navies do in exchange for becoming a very expensive light infantry transport service to enable unopposed marine landings.*

I also know that there are manning limits on the CF and all Services and in that environment that which Peter doesn't use Paul will.    That is the principal reason for the MLI suggestion.  I didn't want to get into a discussion about reducing the size of the RCN.  I guess I screwed the pooch on that one.

No one is going to be blind to what's actually going on when you go looking for efficiencies in the RCN to support a significant increase in the size of Infantry branch, even if we go to the pretence of calling them the RCN's units. The Navy has leaned forward pretty significantly to reduce shipboard manning (some would say too far forward), but some of the platforms you mention are comically undermanned. I don't blame you for that - those are the boiler-plate crew sizes for those classes of ship - but it's worth considering that perhaps the enthusiasm to "do things differently" may have got the better of our Scandinavian friends, who's governments have a notably phlegmatic attitude towards defence spending. Maybe that sort of crewing can support ops for a couple of weeks, but I sure wouldn't want to be on that 57-man frigate at the tail end of a six-month deployment.


* Why "unopposed"? Because I don't see any allowance in your model for naval shore bombardment or offensive air support.

 

[Kirkhill]

To flesh out the discussion on capabilities

Current Naval Task Group:

3x Halifax FFH
1x SMART-S
1x SQS-510
1x CH-124/CH-148
8X HARPOON
1X 57mm

1x Iroquois DDH
1X LW-08
1X DA-08
2X SQS-510
2X CH-124/CH-148
29X Mk41 VLS Cells (Standard SM2)
1x 76mm

1x Protecteur AOR
3x CH-124/CH-148
14,000 tons fuel
400 tons aviation fuel
1000 tons dry cargo
1250 tons ammunition

Alternate Naval Task Group:

4x Holland OPV
1x Thales Integrated Sensor and Communications Systems mast module
Sea Master 400 APAR
Sea Watcher 100 APAR
Gatekeeper EO/IR
1x NH-90/CH-148
1x 76mm

2x Iver Huitfeldt FFG
1x SMART-L
1x APAR
1x Atlas ASO-94 Hull Mounted Sonar
1x AW101/CH-148
32x Mk41 VLS Cells (Standard SM2)
16x HARPOON
2x 76mm

1x Absalon CLS
1x SMART-S
1x Atlas ASO-94 Hull Mounted Sonar
2x AW101/CH-148
16x HARPOON
1x Mk45 5”

1x Karel Doorman JLSS
1x Thales Integrated Sensor and Communications Systems mast module
Sea Master 400 APAR
Sea Watcher 100 APAR
Gatekeeper EO/IR
1x 1060 m2 Hangar for 6x NH-90/CH-148 (2x CH-147)
1x 2500m2 Flight Deck for 2x CH-147
8000 m3 of fuel
1000 m3 of aviation fuel
450 m3 of potable water
400 tonnes of ammunition
        1x Role 3 Hospital
        125 Pax
        1x 2350 m2 RoRo space for 2000x L-M of Vehicle Transport (5000 Tons)

I won't attempt to make a comment on the qualitative capabilities of the two task groups but quantitatively the capabilities appear to be in at least the same ball park if not weighted in favour of the Alternative Task Group.

With respect to crewing:

Are there not a variety of options available for crewing?
For DomOps and Near Waters light crews.
For Extended Operations some alternatives currently employed
      Swapping entire crews by air (USN LCS)
      3 Divisions with 2 onboard at any one time (NoCGV Svalbard)
      Using some/all of the additional cabins for additional watches

With respect to weaponry:

Using the Danish Stanflex model SR76s can be upgraded to Mk45 5"s for expedition or down graded to 25-35mm for DomOps
Equally the sonar suites can be enhanced by adding a Towed Array module.

I don't envision Canada ever doing forcible entry anywhere at anytime.  We just don't have the budget or the political will for it.

I do see Canada needing to create sanctuaries and forward operating bases, either for NEOs or to support ongoing security operations.
     

 

[Kirkhill]

Some links:

Holland Brochure PDF
Damen OPV Brochure PDF
Holland OPV video

Iver Huitfeldt
Iver Huitfeldt

Absolon
Absolon

Karel Doorman
Karel Doorman
Karel Doorman

Thales Integrated Mast for Doorman and Hollands

 

[jollyjacktar]

Speaking as a (mostly) Tanker Wanker, while the Dutch JSS is interesting, I'm not too keen on it's liquid cargo capacity.  I prefer the idea of a proper replenishment ship which will have the capacity to do it right.  If you try to do too much, you might end up doing not enough at the end of the day.

If we'd not been burned so deeply over the Upholders we might have snapped up a Bay Class when they were being sold for a give away price.  That way we could do it proper there as well.  We do need the lift capability that an Amphibian brings to the table if nothing else for at least humanitarian missions such as Haiti or New Orleans.

Your proposal is interesting nevertheless, Kirkhill.

 

[Kirkhill]

Just looking again at this concept  and noticing that you can crew two AEGIR 18s (57 PYs) for less than one Dutch JLSS Crew (150 PYs).  Maybe, rather than 4 JLSS the solution is some a pair of JLSS and 3 AEGIRs.

Also, with respect to paying for these extra hulls, rather than creating an MLI, or transferring out the PYs from the Navy to the Army the better plan is to convert operating costs (salaries) into capital costs (hulls) and ops and maintenance (fuel and service).

I found this 1998 study by a USCG team evaluating European design practices with particular reference to manning practices and cost control processes.  It looked pretty interesting to me.  It also seemed to have particular relevance to the AOPS contract award discussion.

Design phases:

Feasibility - Navy
Concept - Navy

Decide what is possible and affordable

Hire competent, experienced yard

Preliminary Design - Yard
Contract Design - Yard

Decide what is buildable and affordable

Award Construction Contract

Detailed Design - Yard

Build

 

[Kirkhill]

And to turn this back closer to the original thought there is this:

Coastal Riverine Force

In keeping with the Naval Landing Parties that Pat referred to, this draws the Navy in closer to the shore and perhaps allows the Army to focus on dryland work. 

Again, I am not presuming to know what is the best use of dollars and people available.  I am tabling some notions on how those limited resources might be used.

Ultimately my aim is to better understand the options that might be supplied to the government within the resource envelope available.  A key driver in my outlook is my ongoing belief that all conflict demands person to person interaction, not weapon to object.  Weapon to object is a support function and benefits from technology.  Technology means that fewer people can monitor more objects over larger areas and control more weapons.

What technology can't do is replace the individual in direct contact with another individual.  And I am firmly of the opinion that our nation's influence is directly proportional to the number of those individuals that we can field.  Consequently I am looking at means of using the available resources to free up people from "support" roles to "interactive" roles.

 

[Fabius]

        The modest proposal is I think a good point of departure for a discussion of what Canada needs and wants the RCN to do.  As was already indicated the configuration of the fleet in the proposal more closely aligns the RCN to what the CFDS has stated the requirements are.  I am honestly not very confident that the current plans Canada has for revitalising the RCN in terms of hulls will actually create a well balanced fleet adaptable to the array of missions we will likely see in the next 40 years.

The international trend seems to be to be placing a significant amount of importance to the ability to operate in the littoral regions. This littoral capability is important I believe for Canada. If we are to play a significant role in responding to natural disasters such as Katrina, Haiti, the Tsunami in Japan, piracy in internationally critical sea lanes, naval embargoes etc as well as the more familiar Cold War mission sets like ASW, Sea Denial I think the RCN will need a fleet more in line with what Kirkhill has proposed than what we seem to be drifting towards.

The original concept for the JSS is looking like it is becoming more and more strictly an AOR and that it will not offer the amphibious capability that we will actually require.  I do not think Canada has a requirement for an actual opposed landing capability but we definitely need something more robust than what we currently have.  The ability to carry and land large equipment, vehicles and personnel over a beach and provide the C2 for the whole operation is definitely of value.  Haiti is a perfect example of how valuable such a capability could be.

Interestingly the Army is I think getting better at conducting routine exercises with the RCAF so as to ensure that both elements know each others capabilities and requirements.  I do not see the same level of cooperation between the Army and the RCN although I think that is due to the fact that with the current capabilities of the RCN there is not much scope for cooperation, ie naval gun fire support, amphibious landing, airmobile ops etc etc.