I agree with you and others on the need for a gun in the short range role. Nothing seems to beat the gun for accuracy and speed of response in the Direct Fire role in the 1- 5 km range. As well as the ability to get off multiple observed rounds and adjust rapidly.
I would question point a direct fire missile like the 5km LOSAT/CKEM or even the 4km TOW on the same platform as the 10-15km EFOGM though. To me it makes more sense to group the EFOGM type of missile with 120mm mortars or 105mm guns (current generation). They all operate out to 15 km or so and the EFOGM gives both a precision kill capability to the Arty as well as a real time recce/taget verification capability as the gunner can see the target he is hitting.
Similarly the notion of marrying the Polyphem 60km Fibre Optic Missile with the MRLS/GMRLS or even Long Range 155mm/Naval Gunfire makes sense.
I take it as a given that all arms will be operating various UAVs.
The question is what to do with direct fire missiles and a related question is what about missiles like the Hellfire/Brimstone that can be used in both Direct Fire Fire&Forget mode as well as Designated and Self Targeting modes.
I would suggest that the Gun/CKEM-LOSAT-TOW combination is the Short range 1-5 km vehicle mounted solution, thickened by Javelin/ALAAWS man-portable systems.
The next layer of cover would be 105mm C3s /120mm AMOS-type mortars /EFOGM at 10-15 km.
The next bound back is the 105mm Denel - 155mm / Brimstone / MRLS at 30-40 km
Behind that is Naval Gunfire / Polyphem / GMRLS at 60-70 km.
The 8 km Hellfire presents me with a bit of a problem because its range is intermediate between my short range band and my medium range band. Also it is capable of both direct and indirect fire. So who to use it?
I am going to suggest that we have a good basis for both fighting and understanding the short-range battle. That is the infantry/armoured model that is virtually unchanged since the introduction of the SS-11 into the Canadian mechanized brigade group. It is the direct-fire, close combat fight. And I will stipulate right here, right now, that when lots of metal is flying around the battlefield and you have no place to hide a lot of solid metal between me and all that flying metal would be a comforting thing. Tracks can carry a greater weight of protective metal than wheels. Tracks, protective metal, a gun - sounds like a tank.
Thing is, infanteers trying to get to the same place the tank is shooting at would probably like the same amount of metal surrounding them that surrounds the tankers. That protection is more important to them and their ability to conduct operations than a gun/gun crew/ammunition taking up space. I am a real fan of the Elgins converted RAMS for an APC. It supplied the infantry with the exact same protection and mobility as the tanks it accompanied. It had no other role other than to transport troops.
If we are going to have 70 tonne tanks then supply the infantry with 70 tonne armoured trucks on tracks.
I stipulate all of the above. But lets move on from there.
It seems to me that it is in the area of fire support that the CF is most deficient. Not just in terms of number of tubes but in terms of types of ammunition for the tubes, in terms of types of launchers, in terms of types of platforms (man-portable, towed, wheeled, tracked, naval, helo, fast air), in terms of experience working with them and in terms of a comprehensive doctrine that encompasses not just what is currently available and what is "on the drawing-boards". The Canadian artillery doesn't seem to have changed much in practice since WWII and maybe even WWI. My sense is that the Arty is perceived solely as a method of dumping large quantities of HE over large areas and creating large holes in the ground. From where I sit it is actually in terms of fire support, Arty's principal function, that the Revolution in Military Affairs has its most effect. Perversely this increasing effectiveness is seen in decreasing numbers of gunners and airmen as one gun/one aircraft is capable of doing more with one round than ever before, with fewer operators, fewer maintainers and fewer truck drivers.
But it seems that few of the combat arms types here, both Arty and Inf/Armd are looking at how Future Arty can be exploited and how it might shape the battlefield in the future. I believe, at least in the CF, that is because of lack of exposure to Arty in training and lack of attention to that most war-like of arms. If you don't think the Government likes tanks because of their war-like aura what must it think of the Guns and DPICMs and Flechettes, not to mention Gas and Nukes? The Government has only reluctantly supplied WWII capabilities in this field.
I believe that Arty, and the Air Force, can do a lot more in terms of offering fire support than most folks here seem to credit. I believe that those capabilities that are being exploited by the Yanks and the Brits, amongst others are the reason that they are comfortable reducing - not eliminating - the numbers of tanks that they field. Effectively they feel that Arty can make the battlefield a safer place for Own Forces to operate.
Because of increased ranges and increased precision it also means that one battery can supply fire support over a much larger area. I believe that wheels are better suited than tracks to dominate large areas due to speed and low wear and tear. This is especially true in relatively low intensity environments like the current situation in Iraq. The pattern of employment of the Stryker Battalions seems to support that view. They are effective in Mosul on standing patrols and they have been rapidly redeployed to Najaf, Samarra, Fallujah and back numerous times, relocating hundreds of kilometers a night.
LAVs and improved arty support will give the CF a significant set of deployable capabilities that are useful nationally and to our allies.
As an aside, if gunners were viewed as infanteers that serve guns and included in the combat arms mix rather than being relegated to combat support, it would give the CF another 3 or 4 deployable units.
To conclude, I am not saying we should do without tanks. I would like you to have tanks, and for that matter heavy, tracked APCs. We can debate from here to kingdom come how many tanks are needed and/or are affordable. That's a separate discussion. I am saying that LAVs, with an appropriate RANGE of fire support capabilities mounted on various platforms including MMEVs can safely cover many tasks that previously require a tank crew to stand in an open field and slug it out toe-to-toe with an opposing tank, relying on their skills and those of the engineering that designed and built their tank at least cost.
Can we all at least agree that at least this maxim is outdated? "The best anti-tank weapon is another tank".