Has anyone ever done a comprehensive study to see if we are obtaining the cost benefits that a manufacturer's 3rd and 4th line maintenance system was supposed to bring. I've read a few CRS reviews and Auditor General's reports that seem to indicate we are being badly served by these systems.
Personally, I dislike any logistics or maintenance system that we don't own and can't deploy.
I am also interested if a study was ever done.
However, I could care less if we are being served well by these service contracts. It doesn't matter.
How strictly they are adhered to in the march to save a few pennies will cost the CAF. In personnel and operational readiness.
We have personnel who have left home and their family's from six months to a year training to be able to fix equipment and solve problems down to the component level. Then they get posted.
If they are posted to 1rst line field unit, they tag equipment and send it in. No problem.
2nd and 3rd line,
Because of these service contracts we are not allowed to open the equipment. The high level of skill that has just been provided you is slowly fading. That doesn't mean nothing is being done. There is always slack to pull. There is always an endless supply of equipment that needs work/ inspection.
Meanwhile you have the upper CoC in front of everybody saying that your trade will no longer be necessary because all your trade does is swap cards and your trade will be entirely replaced by 4th line service contracts.
God help us if we ever get in to a shooting conflict. I'm sure relying on civilians to do our repairs and trouble shoot during war/ pandemic/ famine etc. etc. will do us well *Sarcasm (Just look at BGRS during covid).
It is the intimate knowledge of knowing how the equipment works inside and out that lets us "cowboy" when we need to.
And now when sh** does hit the fan (as it frequently does). The upper CoC has done their absolute best through action and inaction to:
Have the signalers only be capable of pushing buttons and possibly changing a box (if they haven't been told they aren't allowed to do that). Why isn't being explained to them. They can not tell you why they are doing what they are doing. Just that they are doing it. (I know this does not apply to all signalers).
Logical thinking process and a reasonable level of how things work needs to be taught at the school. Shifting the responsibility to the units with "You'll never use this" or "You'll learn it at the unit" doesn't work.
What happens when the signalers get to the field and all of a sudden are expected to be experts?
Often there is failures though no fault of their own. Because they haven't seen a particular configuration of equipment.
The only way to fix this is spending time in a classroom and backed up by field training. I imagine this would help with morale (doing training and getting good instead of busy work or having to prepare a day in advance for something that was known about months earlier).
The sig techs who are supposed to have intimate component knowledge of the equipment are picking up the slack from a lack of signaler personnel.
What does this all this add up to? Disgruntled signalers. Disgruntled techs. Loss of professional identity and esprit de corps. Reduced capacity to respond communications problems. Reduced operational readiness.
Indirect costs of CAF personnel are roughly double those of the public service (health care costs, early pension costs, military training costs...) If we accept the assumption that public service personnel are more expensive than contracted personnel, then a model that grows CAF personnel or public service personnel in 2nd / 3rd / 4th line positions would be cost prohibitive - and, since the overall number of CAF personnel is limited, would detract from the "pointy end" of the CAF (unless we come up with better tools to optimize both the full and part-time components of the CAF).
How many "urgent" CAF requirements are driven by units unwilling to plan ahead, and dropping demands at the last minute? How many delays are driven by incomplete work and lack of follow-up?
SIDEBAR: I recently read an AAR type document where there were multiple complaints about equipment and infrastructure. When the staff ('3 and '4 for equipment and Engr for infra) dug deep into the problems, they discovered that the whiners had never submitted UCRs for equipment or requests for infra to be fixed - they never bothered to figure out the process to request change or improvement. How many CAF problems are driven by lazy leadership, unwilling to do the work?
How many urgent requirements by units unwilling to plan ahead. At least 80%. I would just laugh and do my best.
I believe that 4th line refers to being sent to a civilian company for repair. Not the level.
But yes, the CAF 3rd line should be capable to do EVERY repair 4th line does. I'm not saying we should do it ALL the time. But at least some of the time. Schematics, tools, time, and will-power to open equipment must be available. Yes! This is not the most economical way to do it! It is the only way to do it if we wish to maintain skilled personnel and be ready for conflict.
How many actually understand how the process works or how to fill it out? First UCR I ever did took awhile for me to get done because the CAF UCR instructions are read as a what the form is and when to use it, not how to fill out the form, and no one around knew either had to make a few phone calls.
You can easily spend at half a day at it.
It will probably go straight to Ottawa. I still do them. I want to believe.
If we are to change mindset to that model, we'll have to made SCAN seminars mandatory (which I'm sure everyone will love) and/or institute the US-style "up or out". I'm not a big fan of "up or out" since some people are really good at their job and should stay there.
Also, I'd feel sorry for anyone (recruiters, especially) trying to explain the change to the public. I can already imagine people saying "the military will send you to war, then fire you." Hell, they do it now.
Lateral promotions?
Time for coffee!