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Here's the link to it. http://www.canada.com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/news/opinion/story.html?id=cc5a2273-90bb-4918-8d49-bd3f567b9a7d
Any reactions to this?
Lost in Afghanistan
As Canada prepares to move its forces to the troubled Kandahar region, it must consider whether it's making an impact on the war-torn nation
Colin Kenny
Citizen Special
Friday, June 10, 2005
Canada's military presence in Afghanistan is based on sound premises. Unfortunately, that doesn't automatically mean what our troops are doing there -- and will do there -- will have much of an effect on Afghanistan's future, or the future of the world.
The original invasion of Afghanistan was a response to the al-Qaeda-led attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the fanatical Taliban, a cruel and despotic regime providing al-Qaeda sanctuary. Afghanistan was a hotbed for terrorist training, and Canada's commitment to fighting terrorism made our participation a no-brainer.
Threats to the security of Canadians are best fought as far away from Canada's borders as possible. Afghanistan represents a case study of trying to eradicate a threat before it arrives on our doorstep.
There are 700 Canadian troops in Kabul, the now relatively peaceful capital, down from the 2,000 that participated in the first rotation of Canada's NATO mission, and fewer than the 1,250 that will be in more-volatile Kandahar by February (250 will move in August).
This is our largest overseas deployment by far right now. If we are going to be there, we should be performing as effectively as possible. Are we? Will we? Is there really any chance of being effective, of transforming this society into anything resembling a peaceful democracy?
I visited Kabul recently as part of an attempt by the Senate committee on national security and defence to get a handle on some of these questions.
We spent $115.9 million on in-theatre operations in Afghanistan last fiscal year. Because Canada is moving on to a new mission, one might argue that there is no point in dwelling on how well it has fulfilled its latest one. But given the commitment of scarce Canadian resources, Canadians should be assured that we will be getting bang for our buck as we move forward.
The current commitment clearly has more tail than teeth. Because of the need to maintain our base at Camp Julien, provide security for it, and man a rapid-reaction force for NATO's personnel across Kabul, we get a limited product for our 700-person deployment.
The main components of that are: a reconnaissance squadron supporting a nearby German Provincial Reconstruction Team; a group of 14 personnel evaluating British, American and French efforts to train the Afghan Army; and some intelligence gathering.
That isn't much for such a large commitment of money and people, especially when there is little to no interaction with the local population.
One would have thought that Kabul would have been the ideal place for Canadian troops to maximize their interaction with Afghans -- to take the helmets off from time to time and try to humanize the NATO mission and earn some genuine respect and admiration from the locals.
It's not for a politician to say where and when this kind of interchange is possible -- that's up to local commanders. However, it is important. And if it isn't possible in Kabul, it is extremely doubtful it is going to be possible in Kandahar, where the Taliban remains an elusive and powerful presence.
What we saw in Kabul in terms of winning hearts and minds wasn't encouraging. We saw Canadian soldiers accelerating through the streets inside their armoured vehicles, decked out in helmets, sunglasses and scarves to protect them from the incessant dust, machine guns swivelling at the ready.
Maybe that was just a snapshot. Maybe there has been plenty of interchange in recent months and we just didn't see any of it or hear about any of it. Let's hope.
But the "Triple D" concept -- combining defence with diplomacy and development -- is supposed to be at the core of Canada's approach to reconstructing failed post-Cold War states, yet there appeared to be little connection between Canada's military presence in Kabul and its diplomatic presence: the Canadian Embassy.
So, is Canada likely to mount a more meaningful contribution toward the rebuilding of Afghanistan when new troops move into Kandahar in August? Gen. Rick Hillier, newly appointed chief of defence staff, testified before our committee on May 30, and suggested, for a start, the force going to Kandahar would focus more on the product.
"I am a little concerned about the ratio of the number of people required to support versus the number of people who operate ... we have to be more ruthless ... if we put 200 men and women in uniform, having another 500-plus contractors to support that in-theatre is something that draws my attention right away."
Everything has to go right in Kandahar. It is a far more dangerous place than Kabul. Even when U.S. forces have scored successes in knocking out large cadres of Taliban fighters, reports indicate that these are quickly replenished by new fighters from Pakistan.
Kandahar will present the increased likelihood of combat, and Canadian fatalities. That is inevitably what you get when you intervene anywhere the bad guys are still a force, and the Taliban is surely still a force in Afghanistan. For the most part, their fighters prefer to engage, retreat to the mountains and wait for the right moment to engage again.
This raises two questions. The first is whether the Canadian government is ready for the risks that will come with the move to Kandahar. It had better be, and it had better ensure the troops are as well supported as they can be.
Second, is there any hope of making a difference?
There is not just a fierceness to the Taliban and their fellow travellers. There is an incredible patience. This patience sustained the relentless opposition to the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. These people exhausted the mighty Soviet military and drained the Soviet economy before Moscow finally acknowledged defeat.
If Afghanistan is going to change, it's going to take a very, very long time. One major I talked to called it a "five-generational project."
The men in the mountains will be there five generations from now. I can't think of anyone I know who wants a Canadian presence in Afghanistan five generations from now. So how long will it take to accomplish ... what?
Christopher Alexander, Canada's ambassador in Kabul, calls Afghanistan one of the great causes of the 21st century. He says the end game will depend on the three Ps -- Pakistan, poppies and the private sector.
Can the West get Pakistan to stop playing host to Muslim extremists training young zealots for war? Can infusions of economic aid help boost the average Afghan income above $1,000 a year, which some very optimistic people contend would undermine the warlords who run the lucrative opium trade? Will international investors shrug off the dangers of Afghanistan and help rescue its stagnant economy?
Perhaps all these things will happen eventually. Then again, perhaps just getting near the poppy fields causes pipe dreams.
There are good reasons for Canada's being in Afghanistan. But as we approach the next stage of our mission there -- one that may well involve body bags -- one has to wonder whether the cost is going be worth the gain.
Is there any strategy in place that will get us where we want to go? I wish I had a good answer to that. So far I haven't seen one.
Colin Kenny is chair of the Senate committee on national security and defence. He can be reached by e-mail at kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca
Any reactions to this?
Lost in Afghanistan
As Canada prepares to move its forces to the troubled Kandahar region, it must consider whether it's making an impact on the war-torn nation
Colin Kenny
Citizen Special
Friday, June 10, 2005
Canada's military presence in Afghanistan is based on sound premises. Unfortunately, that doesn't automatically mean what our troops are doing there -- and will do there -- will have much of an effect on Afghanistan's future, or the future of the world.
The original invasion of Afghanistan was a response to the al-Qaeda-led attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the fanatical Taliban, a cruel and despotic regime providing al-Qaeda sanctuary. Afghanistan was a hotbed for terrorist training, and Canada's commitment to fighting terrorism made our participation a no-brainer.
Threats to the security of Canadians are best fought as far away from Canada's borders as possible. Afghanistan represents a case study of trying to eradicate a threat before it arrives on our doorstep.
There are 700 Canadian troops in Kabul, the now relatively peaceful capital, down from the 2,000 that participated in the first rotation of Canada's NATO mission, and fewer than the 1,250 that will be in more-volatile Kandahar by February (250 will move in August).
This is our largest overseas deployment by far right now. If we are going to be there, we should be performing as effectively as possible. Are we? Will we? Is there really any chance of being effective, of transforming this society into anything resembling a peaceful democracy?
I visited Kabul recently as part of an attempt by the Senate committee on national security and defence to get a handle on some of these questions.
We spent $115.9 million on in-theatre operations in Afghanistan last fiscal year. Because Canada is moving on to a new mission, one might argue that there is no point in dwelling on how well it has fulfilled its latest one. But given the commitment of scarce Canadian resources, Canadians should be assured that we will be getting bang for our buck as we move forward.
The current commitment clearly has more tail than teeth. Because of the need to maintain our base at Camp Julien, provide security for it, and man a rapid-reaction force for NATO's personnel across Kabul, we get a limited product for our 700-person deployment.
The main components of that are: a reconnaissance squadron supporting a nearby German Provincial Reconstruction Team; a group of 14 personnel evaluating British, American and French efforts to train the Afghan Army; and some intelligence gathering.
That isn't much for such a large commitment of money and people, especially when there is little to no interaction with the local population.
One would have thought that Kabul would have been the ideal place for Canadian troops to maximize their interaction with Afghans -- to take the helmets off from time to time and try to humanize the NATO mission and earn some genuine respect and admiration from the locals.
It's not for a politician to say where and when this kind of interchange is possible -- that's up to local commanders. However, it is important. And if it isn't possible in Kabul, it is extremely doubtful it is going to be possible in Kandahar, where the Taliban remains an elusive and powerful presence.
What we saw in Kabul in terms of winning hearts and minds wasn't encouraging. We saw Canadian soldiers accelerating through the streets inside their armoured vehicles, decked out in helmets, sunglasses and scarves to protect them from the incessant dust, machine guns swivelling at the ready.
Maybe that was just a snapshot. Maybe there has been plenty of interchange in recent months and we just didn't see any of it or hear about any of it. Let's hope.
But the "Triple D" concept -- combining defence with diplomacy and development -- is supposed to be at the core of Canada's approach to reconstructing failed post-Cold War states, yet there appeared to be little connection between Canada's military presence in Kabul and its diplomatic presence: the Canadian Embassy.
So, is Canada likely to mount a more meaningful contribution toward the rebuilding of Afghanistan when new troops move into Kandahar in August? Gen. Rick Hillier, newly appointed chief of defence staff, testified before our committee on May 30, and suggested, for a start, the force going to Kandahar would focus more on the product.
"I am a little concerned about the ratio of the number of people required to support versus the number of people who operate ... we have to be more ruthless ... if we put 200 men and women in uniform, having another 500-plus contractors to support that in-theatre is something that draws my attention right away."
Everything has to go right in Kandahar. It is a far more dangerous place than Kabul. Even when U.S. forces have scored successes in knocking out large cadres of Taliban fighters, reports indicate that these are quickly replenished by new fighters from Pakistan.
Kandahar will present the increased likelihood of combat, and Canadian fatalities. That is inevitably what you get when you intervene anywhere the bad guys are still a force, and the Taliban is surely still a force in Afghanistan. For the most part, their fighters prefer to engage, retreat to the mountains and wait for the right moment to engage again.
This raises two questions. The first is whether the Canadian government is ready for the risks that will come with the move to Kandahar. It had better be, and it had better ensure the troops are as well supported as they can be.
Second, is there any hope of making a difference?
There is not just a fierceness to the Taliban and their fellow travellers. There is an incredible patience. This patience sustained the relentless opposition to the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. These people exhausted the mighty Soviet military and drained the Soviet economy before Moscow finally acknowledged defeat.
If Afghanistan is going to change, it's going to take a very, very long time. One major I talked to called it a "five-generational project."
The men in the mountains will be there five generations from now. I can't think of anyone I know who wants a Canadian presence in Afghanistan five generations from now. So how long will it take to accomplish ... what?
Christopher Alexander, Canada's ambassador in Kabul, calls Afghanistan one of the great causes of the 21st century. He says the end game will depend on the three Ps -- Pakistan, poppies and the private sector.
Can the West get Pakistan to stop playing host to Muslim extremists training young zealots for war? Can infusions of economic aid help boost the average Afghan income above $1,000 a year, which some very optimistic people contend would undermine the warlords who run the lucrative opium trade? Will international investors shrug off the dangers of Afghanistan and help rescue its stagnant economy?
Perhaps all these things will happen eventually. Then again, perhaps just getting near the poppy fields causes pipe dreams.
There are good reasons for Canada's being in Afghanistan. But as we approach the next stage of our mission there -- one that may well involve body bags -- one has to wonder whether the cost is going be worth the gain.
Is there any strategy in place that will get us where we want to go? I wish I had a good answer to that. So far I haven't seen one.
Colin Kenny is chair of the Senate committee on national security and defence. He can be reached by e-mail at kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca
