Jeffrey Deslisle-former RCN, convicted of spying

[The Bread Guy]

What jumps out at me is this bit ....

.... CSIS ultimately decided not to transfer its thick Delisle dossier to the RCMP. The spy agency, acting on legal advice, opted to keep its investigation sealed for fear of exposing a trove of Canadian and U.S. secrets of the intelligence trade in open court proceedings ....

Gotta wonder how the lawyers weighed the risks of revelation via open court vs. letting buddy continue - assuming those were the only other options available.

 

[George Wallace]

More on the Jeffrey Delisle case, especially regarding CSIS/RCMP non-cooperation in this report which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/csis-knew-of-convicted-navy-spys-activity-but-held-file-back-from-rcmp/article12158482/#dashboard/follows/

I'll wait for the legal and security/intelligence experts to comment.

That article reeks of incompetence on the part of CSIS.  There should have been NO excuse why they could not pass information on to the RCMP.  Is just shows shoddy and lazy practice on the part of the CSIS agents.  That, or even worse, perhaps they are not properly trained and qualified to perform their duties as members of Canada's civilian intelligence agency.  Intelligence products are edited versions of the information collected, designed to protect their sources.  There is absolutely no reason that CSIS could not provide the RCMP an Intelligence package that would warrant the arrest of Delisle. 

 

[Jed]

That article reeks of incompetence on the part of CSIS.  There should have been NO excuse why they could not pass information on to the RCMP.  Is just shows shoddy and lazy practice on the part of the CSIS agents.  That, or even worse, perhaps they are not properly trained and qualified to perform their duties as members of Canada's civilian intelligence agency.  Intelligence products are edited versions of the information collected, designed to protect their sources.  There is absolutely no reason that CSIS could not provide the RCMP an Intelligence package that would warrant the arrest of Delisle.

The only thing good I have ever heard about CSIS was on the fictional TV shows. Things have been pretty frigged up ever since its conception after the RCMP lost this part of their erstwhile mandate.

 

[The Bread Guy]

.... There is absolutely no reason that CSIS could not provide the RCMP an Intelligence package that would warrant the arrest of Delisle.

Apart from the mysterious legal advice mentioned in the article - wonder if that's ATIP'able?

 

[George Wallace]

.... There is absolutely no reason that CSIS could not provide the RCMP an Intelligence package that would warrant the arrest of Delisle.

Apart from the mysterious legal advice mentioned in the article - wonder if that's ATIP'able?

There is no reason that information/intelligence could not be passed to the RCMP, other than "Empire building" and "risk adverse" legal advisors.  A competent intelligence analyst could have easily written an "Intelligence Product" that had the necessary facts for those that needed to know (RCMP), in order for them make an arrest.  There is no need to 'specifically' identify sources.  There is no need to divulge large amounts of information collected, some, or a lot of it, irrelevant.  Not to have passed on information/intelligence to the RSMP defeats the whole existence of this organization.  It means that they are a "toothless" agency of the government, and a waste of taxpayer's dollars.  Someone has to really get their shyte together.

 

[The Bread Guy]

.... There is no reason that information/intelligence could not be passed to the RCMP, other than "Empire building" and "risk averse" legal advisors .... Someone has to really get their shyte together.

Agreed - big time.

 

[J.J]

Apart from the mysterious legal advice mentioned in the article - wonder if that's ATIP'able?


There is no reason that information/intelligence could not be passed to the RCMP, other than "Empire building" and "risk adverse" legal advisors.  A competent intelligence analyst could have easily written an "Intelligence Product" that had the necessary facts for those that needed to know (RCMP), in order for them make an arrest.  There is no need to 'specifically' identify sources.  There is no need to divulge large amounts of information collected, some, or a lot of it, irrelevant.  Not to have passed on information/intelligence to the RSMP defeats the whole existence of this organization.  It means that they are a "toothless" agency of the government, and a waste of taxpayer's dollars.  Someone has to really get their shyte together.

George,
I think you are failing to recognize CSIS's role, they are not peace officers and do not follow the Canada Evidence Act in the collection of information. CSIS collects information "differently" than traditional law enforcement agencies, example in that they gather information from foreign sources and governments that do not follow the same rules as we do. A lot of information gathered by CSIS would not be admissible in court. When CSIS refers something to the RCMP, it has to follow very strict protocols, without giving evidence or direction to the RCMP.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/judge-spikes-child-porn-case-against-muslim-preacher-targeted-by-csis/article4328332/

What CSIS does is to identify and disrupt organizations that are of national security concerns. I don't know why they didn't notify the RCMP earlier, but I believe identifying foreign intelligence operatives and their network might have been a mitigating factor.

 

[George Wallace]

.............. When CSIS refers something to the RCMP, it has to follow very strict protocols, without giving evidence or direction to the RCMP.

............... I don't know why they didn't notify the RCMP earlier, but I believe identifying foreign intelligence operatives and their network might have been a mitigating factor.

All intelligence gathering organizations have to follow strict protocols to protect their 'sources'.  That is a given.  They can still produce an Intelligence Product that can be disseminated to those that need to know, ie. the RCMP.  They failed to do so.  Saying that they did not want to identify foreign intelligence operators and their network is a red herring.  They would not have done so in the first place, as that would not have been in any way, shape or form protecting a source(s). 

 

[J.J]

Have you read any of this yet?  As already stated several times; there is no need for them to have revealed a "trove of Canadian and U.S. secrets of the intelligence trade".  Competent Intelligence Operators/Analysts are quite capable of protecting their "sources" and craft.  An intelligence product passed to the RCMP should have been a very simple matter.  As stated, there is no requirement to give the RCMP a mountain of paper.  Only the relevant information needed to be shared.  This was an "Epic Fail".

There is something in the collection of evidence call the "fruit of the poisonous tree", if the courts believe the information was collected not according to the law, all information, evidence etc that benefited from that information is not admissible. Many cases have fallen because of this issue.
I don't disagree that it is a common practice for agencies to disclose their human source information, but you must "source it back". Meaning you have to explain how your source came to know this information, if the information was collected illegally or would identify your source, you don't use it. An example would be, if CSIS was talking to country X and country X does not need legislative authorities for wiretaps or has a history of torture etc, that information cannot be used as evidence in a Canadian court.




(Edited to reflect correct person who is quoted.)

 

[cupper]

On the other side of the coin, Organizations like CSIS do have a tendency to be very risk adverse and can be overly cautious when it comes to revealing information to outside agencies, even when it serves national interests.

Sometimes it can be rather comical, sometimes they end up tripping over their own ... feet?

 

[Retired AF Guy]

On the other side of the coin, Organizations like CSIS do have a tendency to be very risk adverse and can be overly cautious when it comes to revealing information to outside agencies, even when it serves national interests.

Sometimes it can be rather comical, sometimes they end up tripping over their own ... feet?

Remember this was the first time anyone has been charged under the SIA. I would suspect that the legal-beagles wanted to have all their ducks-in-a-role before they proceeded with the case.

Still, it doesn't explain why they didn't bring the RCMP in right-away.  After all, if this guy was selling secrets like everyone says he was, you don't want to waste any time before arresting him.

 

[dapaterson]

On the other side of the coin, Organizations like CSIS do have a tendency to be very risk adverse and can be overly cautious when it comes to revealing information to outside agencies, even when it serves national interests.

Sometimes it can be rather comical, sometimes they end up tripping over their own ... feet?

Hmm... not quite the way I'd describe the CSIS personnel I've known.  Or, in other words, You don't know Jack.

Given the folks I know, it would not surprise me at all if CSIS verbally requested the FBI to tip off the RCMP.  Very non-ATIP-able (if that's a word); meets the need; and protects what they've done from a defence attorney requesting disclosure.

I suspect CSIS exploited the knowledge of the spy to identify Russian handlers, then use them to identify and track other agents.

Games within games...

 

[Fishbone Jones]

On the other side of the coin, Organizations like CSIS do have a tendency to be very risk adverse and can be overly cautious when it comes to revealing information to outside agencies, even when it serves national interests.

Sometimes it can be rather comical, sometimes they end up tripping over their own ... feet?

Hmm... not quite the way I'd describe the CSIS personnel I've known.  Or, in other words, You don't know Jack.

Given the folks I know, it would not surprise me at all if CSIS verbally requested the FBI to tip off the RCMP.  Very non-ATIP-able (if that's a word); meets the need; and protects what they've done from a defence attorney requesting disclosure.

I suspect CSIS exploited the knowledge of the spy to identify Russian handlers, then use them to identify and track other agents.

Games within games...

Yeah, I was kinda wondering where cupper came by his amazing insight into the inner workings of these organizations and what qualifies him to make these statements also.

 

[Haggis]

Yeah, I was kinda wondering where cupper came by his amazing insight into the inner workings of these organizations and what qualifies him to make these statements also.

The Internet, of course!  ;D

Like any piece of current affairs journalism these days, this article only shows one side of the story.  The other side we may never see, unfortunately, due to OPSEC. 

 

[Sig_Des]

Apart from the mysterious legal advice mentioned in the article - wonder if that's ATIP'able?


There is no reason that information/intelligence could not be passed to the RCMP, other than "Empire building" and "risk adverse" legal advisors.  A competent intelligence analyst could have easily written an "Intelligence Product" that had the necessary facts for those that needed to know (RCMP), in order for them make an arrest.  There is no need to 'specifically' identify sources.  There is no need to divulge large amounts of information collected, some, or a lot of it, irrelevant.  Not to have passed on information/intelligence to the RSMP defeats the whole existence of this organization.  It means that they are a "toothless" agency of the government, and a waste of taxpayer's dollars.  Someone has to really get their shyte together.

What I'm curious about, is why the CFNCIU wasn't involved ( I'm just assuming, but I can't remember any reference to it at all in anything I've seen on the Delisle affair). From reading their mandate, it seems to me like it would have been the obvious choice. Unless I'm missing something.

Wouldn't CSIS and the NCIU have some sort of relationship?

 

[George Wallace]

What I'm curious about, is why the CFNCIU wasn't involved ( I'm just assuming, but I can't remember any reference to it at all in anything I've seen on the Delisle affair). From reading their mandate, it seems to me like it would have been the obvious choice. Unless I'm missing something.

Wouldn't CSIS and the NCIU have some sort of relationship?

I guess not.

 

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Perhaps they were involved and are flying under the radar to avoid the spotlight.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Wouldn't CSIS and the NCIU have some sort of relationship?

There is. The NCIU's mandate is investigate and counter threats to the Canadian Forces. That includes liaising with civilian police/security agencies to help identify any threats. See Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit, and Security Intelligence Liaison Program ,

 

[CougarKing]

Edited to add: Thanks to the mods for the thread name change. 

A related update for Sept. 2013:

link

Military was steamed about not being able to court martial navy spy
The Canadian Press

OTTAWA - The Canadian military was privately furious the Harper government did not allow it to court-martial a naval intelligence officer who sold top-secret allied information to the Russians.

And the decision could well have far-reaching implications and potentially compound the damage done by former sub-lieutenant Jeffrey Delisle, says an intelligence expert who followed the case.

The 42-year-old Delisle was sentenced to 20 years in prison earlier this year after pleading guilty to selling classified Western intelligence to Russia during a four-year period which began in 2007.

He was arrested in January 2012 after the FBI tipped off the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which after months of surveillance brought in the RCMP to build a criminal case.

The military was brought into the loop only after the investigation was well on its way towards a civilian prosecution.

"All senior government authorities involved in security and intelligence matters should be made aware of the alternatives available to pursue suspects subject to the Code of Service discipline, so that automatic defaults to mechanisms more applicable to civilians do not occur," said a newly declassified military assessment of the damage wrought by the spy scandal.

"Little or no discussion concerning the advantages of employing the military police to lead the criminal investigation, the (Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit) to lead the counter-intelligence investigation and laying the charges under the Military Justice Systems appears to have occurred and/or fully informed decisions made with regard to the way ahead."

When someone joins the Forces, they are subject to a totally separate justice system while in uniform and on base. Infractions committed off-base can be dealt with in civilian courts, such as in the case of the sex murder charges against former air force colonel Russell Williams.

The rules for courts martial give the military wide latitude on what evidence is presented in public and what is kept secret.

It would have been in the country's best interest to prosecute Delisle by court martial because the public disclosure of details through the civilian system has laid bare weaknesses in the intelligence community, said Michel Juneau-Katsuya, a former CSIS agent.

(...)

 

[The Bread Guy]

Shouldn't this thread be updated/retitled to "The Lt. (N) Jeffrey Delisle espionage case" to prevent confusion?

Good call.

Milnet.ca Staff