Israel pulling out of Gaza and parts of West Bank

[tig3r]

i'm surprised there isnt a thread on this already, or maybe there is and i havnet looked hard enough, but this topic is all over the news recently and may be worth discussing...

the way i see this event is that ariel sharon is forcing isrealis to leave the gaza strip after some 30 something years of occupation, not because he is commited to peace, but i think he is more interested in the west bank were about 400 000 Jews live, compared to only about 9 000 in the gaza strip. in fact, protecting these 9 000 or so isrealis who live amongst 1 million+ palestinians requires some extensive security, and by leaving the gaza strip, these isreali forces that once protected these people could be used more effectively. it would be very interesting to see how this turns out...so do you agree that sharon is a man commited to peace or is his interests elsewhere...

 

[Guardian]

Have a read of Sharon's biography sometime.

He's a warrior through and through, having fought in every single one of Israel's wars. The man has been there, has seen the cost of war firsthand. First and foremost, he is a patriot.

So I'm not sure it would be proper to call him a "man of peace." Israel's never known peace, because of its neighbors' antipathy. Men like Sharon have kept Israel in existence precisely because they were men of war. Sharon, rather, is a man committed to do anything it takes to ensure the survival of the Jewish state. Whichever will ensure that mission's accomplishment - be it war or peace - he will do it if he thinks it's necessary. I'm sure he is playing to keep more of the West Bank, as you said.

So, man of peace? If necessary, yes. But Sharon recognizes that peace can never be an end in itself - something that the liberal left worldwide has failed to see. If the Palestinians were to ever succeed in pushing Israel into the sea, then there would be "peace" - but that will never be an option. For Sharon, peace is a means to Israel's survival. Rest assured that if he thinks, sometime in the future, military action or even all-out war would be more conducive to Israel's survival than would a more peaceful stance, he will do it.

 

[Infanteer]

It's interesting to see Sharon, co-founder of the Likud, labelling some Jews terrorist now.

It is interesting watching this unfold, one hopes that it at least starts moving down the road to settling things down and ending the Intifada.  However, it seems to ball is in the Palestinian hands, and they've dropped it many times before. 

 

[Andyboy]

To withdraw under pressure
Mission/task Verb) Most often used within a mobile defense concept of operations, this task verb is used for units within the main defensive area and is designed to deceive the enemy into believing he is gaining success. Ultimately, the effect of this task is position the enemy for destruction, shaping him into a specific piece of terrain (normally a killing zone) within the MDA. 

Thoughts?

 

[Gunnar]

It appears that Sharon is giving the Palestinians (and the UN and the like) exactly what they've been asking for:   A Palestinian state.   Israel is going to mind its own affairs, and stop trying to be helpful, or to regulate Palestinian society.   That way, the world can see the Palestinians (and their chaotic lack of leadership) for what they are...a problem.

They've been "displaced" for many years, yet many are still living in refugee centres.   There have been decades of Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories, and they still don't have a police force that works, an economy to speak of, or jobs.   Now we can watch Europe whine about Israel when Israel is no longer involved, no longer patrolling the borders, and no longer interdicting weapon smuggling.   It should be interesting.   Somalia in the Middle East...without the Israelis to provide the vestiges of civilization.

Apparently, Egypt has sent 750 soldiers out to the Gaza border to replace the Israelis who left...wonder why...?   Aren't the Palestinians "brothers"?

 

[Britney Spears]

The cynical explanation would be that the Israelis will make the withdraw as hysterical as possible, for the sake of PR, thus appearing to be the good guys. In the mean time, they will continue to build new settlements in the West Bank, which is the real crux of the Palestinian grievance, and reserve the right to roll right back into Gaza should Palestinian terrorism continue. Gaza was vunerable and costly to defend, in any case, as already mentioned.

It appears that Sharon is giving the Palestinians (and the UN and the like) exactly what they've been asking for:  A Palestinian state.

How so?

 

[Gunnar]

By walling them off and forgetting about them?

 

[a_majoor]

Part of this decision has to do with domestic politics; the settlers in Gaza represent the hopes and dreams of a large segment of the Zionist movement. At the same time, security concerns eat a lot of time and resources and energy that many Israelis would rather spend on other things. There are other, deeper issues about Zionism and the role of religion in society which do not track with anything we know or understand about Canadian domestic politics.

The fact that the Palestinians have never renounced their desire to destroy Israel and drive the Jews into the sea, combined with their complete inability to organize a civic society has led Sharon to conclude that disengagement best serves the domestic agenda of security and resource management. (I rather doubt that he, of all people, believes in the "Land for Peace" formula). What we think is pretty irrelevant to him.

An interesting look at the domestic scene over there:

Color War
Two flags and an Israeli schism.

By Meyrav Wurmser

Last week Israel accomplished its withdrawal from Gaza. Now in its 57th year, Israel finds itself divided as never before: about Gaza and relations with Palestinians, and more importantly about the future of Zionism itself.

Israeli society split over the withdrawal from Gaza. The debate transcended questions of territory; it was an argument over Israeli identity and the essence of Zionism. The dispute has touched the raw nerve of Israeli society: relationships between Zionism and Judaism, between nationalism and religion. Tension over Gaza was a proxy for a debate over who Israelis are and what they want to be.

The Battle of the Flags
Depths of this tension were evident in the battle of flags on Israeli streets. Independence Day 2005 was the first in memory in which many Jews â ” and ironically, those belonging to the more nationalist side of the divide â ” did not only wave the blue and white national Israeli flag.

Instead, some chose to wave orange flags, the color of the Gaza municipal government, to express opposition to the planned Gaza withdrawal and solidarity with Gaza's nearly 9,000 Jewish settlers, the vast majority of whom had chosen to stay in their homes until they were forced by Israel's government to leave their homes.

The orange camp consisted of the religious-nationalist camp in Israel, which includes Gaza settlers and many of their supporters in the West Bank settlements and various Israeli cities. After the orange campaign met with some success in swaying public opinion, proponents of withdrawal have responded with a blue and white campaign, rallying around the Israeli flag. But less blue was visible than orange.

The orange camp sensed itself in a rearguard attempt to save its vision of Israel; the blue camp, composed principally of the Israeli Left, is less comfortable with nationalism. Moreover, it found itself in the awkward position of having to defend right-wing Prime Minister Sharon.

The battle of flags reflected a schism between two parts of Israeli society that, until the withdrawal from Gaza coexisted, albeit without much love. That schism actually existed long before even Israel's founding in 1948.

Zionism from its very founding over a century ago was for all its camps always about how the Jewish people can redeem its soul from the fallen state in which it existed. Both camps now have come to believe the other endangers the essence of what Zionism is supposed to be.

The Religious-Nationalist Orange Camp
The withdrawal exposed significant divisions within the seemingly unified orange camp â ” not just between the mainstream and the more extreme and violent minority, mainly the followers of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane. Rather, there was significant discord within the majority regarding the legitimate means of struggle against the withdrawal. Most in this camp supported civil disobedience and opposed violence against the police and armed forces.

The champions of disobedience had changed tactics several times, as a series of their nonviolent measures including wearing orange stars, blocking intersections and entrances to school in metropolitan Tel Aviv, offended the very public opinion they sought to move to oppose disengagement.

But the most difficult question facing the religious-national camp was not over tactics but how to balance religious duty and national obligation. Religious-national officers and soldiers had faced a clear quandary: Should they carry out their commanders' orders to evacuate the settlements in Gaza despite what they see as God's commands and their rabbis' call to oppose evacuation.

The spiritual leader of the Religious-Zionist camp, former Askenazi Chief Rabbi Avraham Shapira, called on soldiers to disobey orders to evacuate Gaza, even at risk of death or imprisonment. However, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, head of the large yeshiva in the Beit El settlement, argued that civil disobedience was legitimate, but that soldiers had to follow commanders' orders, otherwise the Israeli army would collapse.

Yet the rabbi of Beit El, Rabbi Zalman Melamed, joined with Shapira in objecting to the order for withdrawal, claiming that if Rabbi Kook was alive today he, too, would have called on the soldiers to object.

The rabbis' call for objection caused over 20,000 modern-Orthodox IDF soldiers to announce that they will not follow orders to evacuate and would choose prison instead. This, in return, led the new IDF chief of staff, Dan Halutz, to threaten that he would shut all the Religious-Zionist Hesder yeshivas, where students combine religious study with military service.

The religious-national camp's attempt to bring about a change in public opinion has been somewhat successful. In the two months prior to the withdrawal, their campaign successfully reduced support for the disengagement from 70 percent to less than 50 percent. Except when their actions cause a backlash â ” such as when they poured oil and nails on the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem highway â ” they were slowly gaining empathy from larger segments of Israeli society. But the orange camp did not make inroads on either the Israeli Left or in the Sharon government, which remained opposed to the orange camp's positions.

The Israeli New Left Blue Camp
Wearing blue t-shirts and waving blue flags were those Israelis who believe â ” often with no less passion than the orange camp â ” that Israel can no longer exist without permanent borders. This group consisted of both right-wing backers of Prime Minister Sharon and the Left.

Sharon's supporters believed that withdrawal was necessary to separate from the Palestinians and reduce the demographic threat of a growing Palestinian population in Gaza to Israel. Right-wing proponents of withdrawal had maintained a low profile; they were a decided minority within Israel's Likud party which remained largely opposed to its own prime minister.

The loudest voices in the withdrawal camp belong to those on the Left who view the occupation as corroding and demoralizing Israeli society. For them, saving the Zionist enterprise means leaving Gaza, Hebron, and other cities in the West Bank. Many believe the withdrawal will normalize Jewish existence and make Israel a Western society that lives in peace with its neighbors.

This camp realized that in leaving Gaza Israel faced a painful amputation, but thought this surgery was necessary to save the rest of the body, the Zionist enterprise itself. Sadly, one faction in this camp looked forward to the surgery with delight. For them, the disengagement offered a chance to end the occupation and, more importantly, an opportunity to limit the influence of Jewish religion and nationalism on the national psyche and turn Israel into a modern, secular, post-nationalist society.

Since the 1970s, but even more so since the Oslo accords, Israel's Left has adopted peace as its raison d'etre. But since the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995, peace became less an ideology and more a form of post-national identity. Peace has given an identity and a moral code to a camp that found itself in conflict with the two of the key components of Israeli identity: nationalism and the Jewish religion.

For many in this group, Israeli identity is defined principally in terms of a language, culture, and a code of behavior (an assertive and even confrontational manner, that includes trying to 'beat the system'). They view themselves as democratic, humanistic, and tolerant â ” beyond outdated notions of nationalism and religion. They believe that the ongoing immoral Israeli occupation is the only factor that prevents Israel from becoming welcomed into the Western family of nations.

The blue camp, demoralized since the failure of Oslo and the fall of Ehud Barak's government, had been somewhat revived by the plan to evacuate Gaza. Most of its members supported the withdrawal, despite a distaste for Prime Minister Sharon, because his plan moved Israel a step closer to ending the occupation and establishing peaceful coexistence with the Palestinian Authority.

The Debate and Israeli Democracy
The Left was caught off guard by the popular support generated by the orange camp. In response, the blue camp chose to counter challenge the orange camp in the hopes of showing that there was a silent majority of Israelis who supported disengagement. They believed they were fighting to have their voices heard in an Israel dominated by the Right.

Many of their arguments focused on the limits that free societies should place on those who in the name of freedom of expression, attempt to destroy democracy. Leading left-wing commentators evoked images of Germany's Weimar republic which was unable to prevent the rise to power â ” through democratic means â ” of Hitler's regime. They believed that since the Knesset has already approved the withdrawal plan, the campaign of the opponents of the withdrawal represented a real threat to democracy.

That is why left-wing commentators supported tough steps to punish settlers. They widely backed, for example, the attorney general's initiative to punish settlers who encourage their children to participate in demonstrations. They also supported the decision to arrest, without trial, young settler girls who participated in demonstrations.

The comparison between the threat to democracy posed by Nazis and the Israeli Right, and the call for severe countermeasures appropriate to such a threat have opened yet another fissure in Israeli society. This fissure has not come to fruition as of yet; most acts of opposition, such as Israeli officers who had resigned their commission, were lawful.

There have also been acts of civil disobedience, some unlawful. An Israeli settler shot and killed three Palestinian and wounded two. But most protests did not turn violent, despite high-profile showdowns. Most of the evacuation was carried out peacefully, but not without significant emotions from settlers and soldiers alike.

Even a mass march by the settlers to Gaza meant to reverse the withdrawal was peacefully stopped by the border at Kfar Maimon. After a two-day standoff, the settlers disbanded instead of confronting the police violently. During the march, the organizers used loudspeakers to warn crowds that only peaceful means should be used. It worked; of tens of thousands who marched, only about half dozen were arrested for scuffling.

And it is precisely the gap which has thus far emerged between the nonviolent nature of the protests on the Right, and the harshness of response advocated by the Left, that has led many on the Right to argue that the Left seeks severe measures against the settlers, not to protect debate and democracy, but to crush a debate that they are beginning to lose. So, just as both sides argued that they are saving Zionism from its destruction by the other camp, both camps claimed that they are trying to save Israeli democracy from the other side's destructive intentions.

The Dilemma
The Israeli war of colors between the orange and blue camps was a battle over the essence of Israel and Zionism. Following the withdrawal, the religious-national camp which has been reenergized by its current campaign, will have to ask itself what remains of its beliefs â ” and on what basis can they continue to claim ownership of the Zionist enterprise.

Israeli politics itself had changed. The settlers might have lost the battle for Gaza, but they are winning the battle of Israel's hearts and minds. This camp, which was largely delegitimized by the assassination of the Prime Minister Rabin by a settler, has lost is pariah status. An increasing number of Israelis now see the settlers as true Zionists who embody the ideals of the nation. Although defeated, this camp is likely to play a growing role in Israel's future politics.

In the aftermath of the withdrawal Israelis, will have to debate the meaning of Zionism. The period after the withdrawal will bring a new dawn for Israel. After the nation finishes mourning the trauma of the evacuation that is now tearing it apart, it will remain to be seen what new Israeli reality will emerge.

â ” Meyrav Wurmser is the director of the Center for Middle East Policy at the Hudson Institute.

  http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/wurmser200508240819.asp

       

 

[I_am_John_Galt]

What's scary about it is that the Palestinians are portraying this as a victory (with the obvious subtext of it being a victory for terrorist tactics) ... like the 3/11 bombings (specifically, the election result and withdrawal from Iraq) long-term implications could be far worse than what is currently being contemplated.

 

[Britney Spears]

By walling them off and forgetting about them?

You're joking, right?

The fact that the Palestinians have never renounced their desire to destroy Israel and drive the Jews into the sea,

What's scary about it is that the Palestinians are portraying this as a victory (with the obvious subtext of it being a victory for terrorist tactics) ... like the 3/11 bombings (specifically, the election result and withdrawal from Iraq) long-term implications could be far worse than what is currently being contemplated.

Really? The PA doesn't seem to hold this view, and they still represent a significant percentage of the Palestinian population. Can we agree that Hamas is not the sole representative of Palestinian public opinion?

Israel has NOTHING to lose from this action. If the PA manages to retain control over Gaza and rein in the extremists, then Israel gains a stable and peaceful southern border, without giving any concessions on the West Bank, the real heart of both the Palestinian grievance and Zionist ambitions. If Hamas takes over Gaza, then that's just more proof that you can't trust them Palestinians. The Israelis will be safe behind their Gaza wall to launch attacks in to Gaza, and use the lack of PA control as an excuse to expand further into the West Bank. Either way the world is flooded with images of wailing Israelis being dragged out of their homes (illegally built on expropriated Palestinian land) "for the sake of peace", and the PA, who were never even consulted about the plan, are again the bad guys. Sharon is no fool.

 

[tig3r]

just to add to what has been already said, i think it is clearly evident over the last few years that the PA has had no luck in controlling the activities of Hamaas and I don't see this changing in the near future. It was mentioned that the isrealis are safe to lauch attacks into gaza, but that could also work the other way. Hamaas could just as easily use this area to expand their network and lauch attacks into isreali controlled areas. Either way you look at it, this pullout from gaza definitely does not look like a step towards peace...

 

[Britney Spears]

Hamaas could just as easily use this area to expand their network and lauch attacks into isreali controlled areas.

I think that the Israelis, with their apaches and UAVs, will have no trouble dominating Gaza militarily, they didn't have any when the settlers were still there. Israeli police still control the border with their wall. While the Palestinians could potentially strike deeper into Israel with rockets and mortars based in Gaza, They'd have to get pretty good at the shoot/scoot thing if they haven't already.

But I've never been there, I have no idea. 

 

[I_am_John_Galt]

Israel has NOTHING to lose from this action.

If you don't consider the image of caving into terrorism.

the world is flooded with images of wailing Israelis being dragged out of their homes 

... under Palestinian paramilitary death-squad* refugee mortar and rocket fire**.

Sharon is no fool.

Agree with that: he's doing exactly what he thinks is best for Israel (and I reckon, Israel only).


*Sorry, applies to pro-American forces only.
**Also sorry, this hasn't been shown or reported in Western media.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

You're joking, right?


Really? The PA doesn't seem to hold this view, and they still represent a significant percentage of the Palestinian population. Can we agree that Hamas is not the sole representative of Palestinian public opinion?

Israel has NOTHING to lose from this action. If the PA manages to retain control over Gaza and rein in the extremists, then Israel gains a stable and peaceful southern border, without giving any concessions on the West Bank, the real heart of both the Palestinian grievance and Zionist ambitions. If Hamas takes over Gaza, then that's just more proof that you can't trust them Palestinians. The Israelis will be safe behind their Gaza wall to launch attacks in to Gaza, and use the lack of PA control as an excuse to expand further into the West Bank. Either way the world is flooded with images of wailing Israelis being dragged out of their homes (illegally built on expropriated Palestinian land) "for the sake of peace", and the PA, who were never even consulted about the plan, are again the bad guys. Sharon is no fool.

Here is one of many translations available on the web of the PLO/PA Charter....

Bottom Line:  Your statement is factually wrong.  Article 15 was supposed to have been changed as part of the Oslo Accords, however that has never happened.  Additionally, Abbas was quoted just the other day as saying the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was the direct result of the sacrifices of the martyrs (giving the credit to the suicide bombers). 



Matthew.   

=================================================================================================================

The PLO Charter

Below is the Palestinian National Covenant, the official charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The text is the English version published officially by the PLO, unabridged and unedited.
Note, however, that the PLO's translation sometimes deviates from the original Arabic so as to be more palatable to Western readers. For example, in Article 15, the Arabic is translated as "the elimination of Zionism," whereas the correct translation is "the liquidation of the Zionist presence." "The Zionist presence" is a common Arabic euphemism for the State of Israel, so this clause in fact calls for the destruction of Israel, not just the end of Zionism.

Where subtleties in the original Arabic are important, the Arabic word has been inserted in parentheses.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER:
Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, July 1-17, 1968

Text of the Charter:

Article 1: Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

Article 2: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3: The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.

Article 4: The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership in the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them.

Article 5: The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine or outside it - is also a Palestinian.

Article 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

Article 7: That there is a Palestinian community and that it has material, spiritual, and historical connection with Palestine are indisputable facts. It is a national duty to bring up individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner. All means of information and education must be adopted in order to acquaint the Palestinian with his country in the most profound manner, both spiritual and material, that is possible. He must be prepared for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation.

Article 8: The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now living, is that of national (watani) struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the conflicts among the Palestinian national forces are secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic conflict that exists between the forces of Zionism and of imperialism on the one hand, and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses, regardless of whether they are residing in the national homeland or in diaspora (mahajir) constitute - both their organizations and the individuals - one national front working for the retrieval of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.

Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.

Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national (watani) struggle among the different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and the Arab masses, so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, its escalation, and victory.

Article 11: The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national (wataniyya) unity, national (qawmiyya) mobilization, and liberation.

Article 12: The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share toward the attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.

Article 13: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work toward the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work toward the realization of the other.

Article 14: The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depend upon the destiny of the Palestine cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in the realization of this sacred (qawmi) goal.

Article 15: The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (qawmi) duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation - peoples and governments - with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly, the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, human, moral, and spiritual capabilities to participate actively with the Palestinian people in the liberation of Palestine. It must, particularly in the phase of the armed Palestinian revolution, offer and furnish the Palestinian people with all possible help, and material and human support, and make available to them the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to carry out their leading role in the armed revolution, until they liberate their homeland.

Article 16: The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the Holy Land with an atmosphere of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of worship and of visit to all, without discrimination of race, color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17: The liberation of Palestine, from a human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his dignity, pride, and freedom. Accordingly the Palestinian Arab people look forward to the support of all those who believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in the world.

Article 18: The liberation of Palestine, from an international point of view, is a defensive action necessitated by the demands of self-defense. Accordingly the Palestinian people, desirous as they are of the friendship of all people, look to freedom-loving, and peace-loving states for support in order to restore their legitimate rights in Palestine, to re-establish peace and security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19: The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-determination.

Article 20: The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong.

Article 21: The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization.

Article 22: Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat vis-a-vis peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for the support of all the progressive and peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective of their affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people all aid and support in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland.

Article 23: The demand of security and peace, as well as the demand of right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples may be preserved, and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded.

Article 24: The Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity, and in the right of all peoples to exercise them.

Article 25: For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization will perform its role in the liberation of Palestine in accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.

Article 26: The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle - to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination in it - in all military, political, and financial fields and also for whatever may be required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels.

Article 27: The Palestine Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its potentialities; and will adopt a neutral policy among them in the light of the requirements of the war of liberation; and on this basis it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

Article 28: The Palestinian Arab people assert the genuineness and independence of their national (wataniyya) revolution and reject all forms of intervention, trusteeship, and subordination.

Article 29: The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude toward all states and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt vis-a-vis to the Palestinian revolution to fulfill the aims of the Palestinian people.

Article 30: Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31: The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance, and an anthem. All this shall be decided upon in accordance with a special regulation.

Article 32: Regulations, which shall be known as the Constitution of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, shall be annexed to this Charter. It will lay down the manner in which the Organization, and its organs and institutions, shall be constituted; the respective competence of each; and the requirements of its obligation under the Charter.

Article 33: This Charter shall not be amended save by [vote of] a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization [taken] at a special session convened for that purpose.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From Leila S. Kadi (ed.), Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement, Palestine Research Centre, Beirut, December 1969, pp. 137-141.

 

[Britney Spears]

Cdn Blackshirt, for the sake of battling mis-information, you're off the ignore list for now.

1) The PLO and the PA are seperate entities.

2)<a href=http://www.pna.gov.ps/key_decuments/index.asp>Straight from the PA's mouth</a>

* The borders between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel will be the June 4th 1967 Armistice Line, though the two sides may agree to minor, reciprocal, and equal boundary rectifications that do not affect, among other things, territorial contiguity. The Palestinian and Israeli sides shall have no territorial claims beyond the June 4, 1967 borders. These borders will be the permanent boundaries between the two states.

3) You're citing a work dated 1969 to reflect current Palestinian attitudes. 

So, tell me, should we just go back to ignoring each other? I'm leaning towards it.  :

 

[Infanteer]

Personally, when I look at a map of Israel/Palestine, I see no hope - you have a Palestine that is made up of two little globs, with Israeli settlers still in half of the bigger glob.  How the hell can you call that a nation-state?

Anyways, it seems to me (as somebody else pointed out), the real, long-term determinant is the Arab population bomb.

Anyways, like Britney, I've never been there, so what do I know.

 

[a_majoor]

The relationship between the PLO, the PA and other assorted actors is rather murky in the "Org Chart" sense, but essentially they all feed off one another and work towards the same goals (the destruction of Israel). For the most part the PA is the smiling, "public" face much as Sein Fenn was the smiley face of the PIRA.

Smiley faces are important since Western media and decision makers seem easily confused, witness Canada and attempts to impliment the anti-terrorism bill. Hamas was able to work in Canada for several years after the passage of the bill because they have what might be reffered to as a "civil affairs" branch, because this group works to provide doctors and teachers in areas that Hamas has influence our political class claimed Hamas was not a terrorist group. The fact that setting up doctors and educators (and using para military thugs to collect "taxes" for these people) in areas under your control is a long standing tactic in revolutionary war theory (Parallel Structures to delegitamize existing Government ones) never seemed to enter into the mind sets of the decision makers in Ottawa.

The Palestinians are quite willing to say and do almost anything to present the smiley face to western media. Active reserchers with an understanding of the Arab language reading Palestinian books and newspapers, translating the speeches of Palestinian leaders and watching and recording Palestinian TV and radio broadcasts see a very different side of things, and sometimes the mask slips, such as Palestinians celebrating in the streets after September 11 2001. (Recall that Arafat had been the most honoured guest in the Clinton White house, and President Bush was still comitted to a non interventionist and mostly domestic agenda up until the 10th of September). Sadly, most of what people see and hear is the smiley face propaganda, and few western news sources take the time or effort to report what is being said and done for the internal Palestinian market.

Regardless of your sympathies, the Palestinians need to shake off the thugs and kleptocrats who have twisted and wreaked their civil society, using Isreal, Europe, America and the West and a conveinient lightining rod to divert the blame from the real problems. Palestine could be a state, even within the present geographical boundaries, once they establish the rule of law, property rights and transparent, accountable government. Until then, it really doesn't matter what their geographical boundaries are, they will continue to live in chaos and dispair.

 

[Britney Spears]

Regardless of your sympathies, the Palestinians need to shake off the thugs and kleptocrats who have twisted and wreaked their civil society, using Isreal, Europe, America and the West and a conveinient lightining rod to divert the blame from the real problems. Palestine could be a state, even within the present geographical boundaries, once they establish the rule of law, property rights and transparent, accountable government. Until then, it really doesn't matter what their geographical boundaries are, they will continue to live in chaos and dispair.

All well and good, but when we look at these things, we can't overlook the fact that the Israelis are FAR from blameless in starting this mess, that that's the reason why moderate Palestinians have a hard time making themselves heard. Most moderate Israelis know this.

That's all I was trying to get across, really. As long as we agree on that,  I don't think we need to do any further hair splitting over this little matter (otherwise we end up just like them! ).

 

[Andyboy]

Personally, when I look at a map of Israel/Palestine, I see no hope - you have a Palestine that is made up of two little globs, with Israeli settlers still in half of the bigger glob.   How the heck can you call that a nation-state?

Why must "Palestine" be free of Jews to be a nation state, or is it the separate blobs part that is the problem? 

 

[Infanteer]

Why must "Palestine" be free of Jews to be a nation state

I'm going to set a parameter here that we are arguing about an sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (and making a bigger assumption that the PA will sort itself out).  Are West Bank settlers willing to acede to the authority of a legitimate Palestinian government, or is their ultimate sovereignty going to continue to stem from the IDF?  If the Americans put "settlements" in Canada, would we assume that they would willingly become loyal to the Canadian government?

If we are arguing that the Occupied Territories (are they still called that?  They must be, since Israel just pulled out of one of them) are part and parcel of Israel, then there is no discussion required.

or is it the separate blobs part that is the problem?

I'm just look at the map and see the "Danzig Corridor" as being a political albatross down the road (assuming that everybody gets on from the current problem).  Does it look like a viable nation-state to you?  Personally, I liked one of the earlier British plans for a half-and-half cut up; would of worked, but neither side seemed interested at the time.