The Revolt of the Retired Generals has created considerable discomfort in the E-Ring of the Pentagon and at the White House. President George W. Bush felt compelled last week to issue a written statement expressing his "full support" for the SecDef. For now, Bush has no intention of firing Rumsfeld. "He likes him," says a close friend of the president's, who requested anonymity in discussing such a sensitive matter. "He's not blind. He knows Rumsfeld sticks his foot in it." Adds a senior Bush aide, who declined to be named discussing the president's sentiments: "I haven't seen any evidence that their personal rapport is at all diminishing. They see each other often and talk often." Rumsfeld says he has twice offered his resignation to Bush, who has declined it.
The old generals can be quite biting about Rumsfeld; retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni wrote an op-ed calling the secretary of Defense "incompetent strategically, operationally, and tactically." But their criticisms are probably best understood as "the first salvos in the war over 'Who Lost Iraq'," says Douglas Macgregor, a retired U.S. Army colonel whose book "Breaking the Phalanx" was influential in inspiring the military's blitzkrieg assault on Baghdad. "Yes, Rumsfeld should go," says Macgregor. "But a lot of the generals should be fired, too. They share the blame for the mess we are in."
Rumsfeld is the chief villain of a very influential new book, "Cobra II," by retired Marine Corps Gen. Bernard Trainor and New York Times reporter Michael Gordon. In their detailed, thorough accounting of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, Rumsfeld is shown badgering the reluctant but mostly quiescent generals into attacking with as few troops as possible. Despite all the talk of the war's being hatched by a neoconservative cabal, Rumsfeld himself appears indifferent to ideology; he was profoundly suspicious of the notion that America could bring democracy to Iraq. Rather, he focused on forcing a transformation of the hidebound, heavy-laden, slow-moving Army. Rumsfeld disdains "nation-building" and blithely counts on the Iraqis to rebuild their own country. But right after the invasion he signed off on orders by the American proconsul, Paul Bremer, to disband the Iraqi Army and fire most of the top civil servants—leaving the country vulnerable to chaos and a growing insurgency.
The publication of "Cobra II," plus talk-show comments from Zinni, the former chief of CENTCOM who was promoting his own book, "The Battle for Peace," appear to have encouraged retired generals to attack Rumsfeld in public. "There was a lot of pent-up agony," says Trainor. "The dam broke."
One of the most powerful indictments came from Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, who was chief of operations for the Joint Staff during the early planning of the Iraq invasion. Writing in Time magazine, Newbold declared, "I now regret that I did not more openly challenge those who were determined to invade a country whose actions were peripheral to the real threat—Al Qaeda." Actually, it was not the job of a uniformed officer, even a high-ranking one like Newbold, to challenge the president's decision to invade Iraq. That's a political judgment: it's up to the president and Congress to decide whom to fight. The military's job is to win the fight.
