Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[markppcli]

Yes. And 39 CBG has enough 'odd' ones to fulfill the requirement

The primary barrier to concentrating for annual summer exercises, as I understand it, is usually leadership (lack of joint RegF/ARes), planning skills (coordination of summer courses with FTX needs) and money.

We used to solve this by having Cougar Salvo over March break no ?

 

[daftandbarmy]

We used to solve this by having Cougar Salvo over March break no ?

Yes, which worked really well, but it's been hit and miss over the past decade or so.

I'm not up to speed as to exactly why, but my pet theory is that the 10 years of being 'rent-a-troop' to the Reg F during AFG, and then multiple big fire years, and now COVID, has thrown us out of whack and lost us alot of 'muscle memory' in how to do this.

I think they sent a few troops to Wainwright last Spring though, although it was only something like a platoon I think, and the rest invaded Comox

https://twitter.com/x/status/1525870319378083840

 

[WestIsle]

Yes, which worked really well, but it's been hit and miss over the past decade or so.

I'm not up to speed as to exactly why, but my pet theory is that the 10 years of being 'rent-a-troop' to the Reg F during AFG, and then multiple big fire years, and now COVID, has thrown us out of whack and lost us alot of 'muscle memory' in how to do this.

I think they sent a few troops to Wainwright last Spring though, although it was only something like a platoon I think, and the rest invaded Comox

https://twitter.com/x/status/1525870319378083840

From what I heard at the time that Spring ex was spun up with a week or two notice for troops so Im surprised anyone showed up.

 

[ueo]

1500 odd reservists can’t manage to mass in one place ?

No answer, politics but no hard data!

 

[daftandbarmy]

From what I heard at the time that Spring ex was spun up with a week or two notice for troops so Im surprised anyone showed up.

Gawd Bless 'Em... the troops will always respond in some way, given the chance, even with crappy leadership

 

[Kirkhill]

Yes. And 39 CBG has enough 'odd' ones to fulfill the requirement

The primary barrier to concentrating for annual summer exercises, as I understand it, is usually leadership (lack of joint RegF/ARes), planning skills (coordination of summer courses with FTX needs) and money.

There are already the Arctic Response Company Groups. How are they provided, selected and manned? Do they exist even when not training in the North?

Shouldn't every Regional Brigade be able to produce at short notice a Regional Company Group? Even in 1866 the lowly Militia was able to field Flank Companies of willing Militiamen.

What would happen if, as a first step, an OC was assigned and volunteers were requested to sign up on a fan out sheet? Then establish sites like this one for each of the Regional Company Groups where the volunteers could communicate with each other and assist in their organization. Aim for a flatter organization.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There are already the Arctic Response Company Groups. How are they provided, selected and manned? Do they exist even when not training in the North?

Shouldn't every Regional Brigade be able to produce at short notice a Regional Company Group? Even in 1866 the lowly Militia was able to field Flank Companies of willing Militiamen.

What would happen if, as a first step, an OC was assigned and volunteers were requested to sign up on a fan out sheet? Then establish sites like this one for each of the Regional Company Groups where the volunteers could communicate with each other and assist in their organization. Aim for a flatter organization.

The ARCGs are operating in other Divisions, AFAIK, but have a limited mandate, scope and training regimen. Why try and fly reservists to the Arctic, with all the attendant hassle of training, equipping, finding time off at the right time etc etc etc, when you've got dozens of Reg F combat arms coy/sqn groups you can pick from?

In reality, anything 'Op Tasking' like that, layered on top of what limited militia resources are already responsible for, is an expensive distraction at best and a political 'the Reserves can do anything the Reg F can do' smoke and mirrors program at worst.

 

[Kirkhill]

The ARCGs are operating in other Divisions, AFAIK, but have a limited mandate, scope and training regimen. Why try and fly reservists to the Arctic, with all the attendant hassle of training, equipping, finding time off at the right time etc etc etc, when you've got dozens of Reg F combat arms coy/sqn groups you can pick from?

In reality, anything 'Op Tasking' like that, layered on top of what limited militia resources are already responsible for, is an expensive distraction at best and a political 'the Reserves can do anything the Reg F can do' smoke and mirrors program at worst.

Fair.

But if the Divisions can raise Company Groups for a particular tasking then why not start the reworking of the Militia (Army Reserves) by raising 10 Company Groups, one from each Division, which is willing and able to deploy nationally at short notice? The should be able to organize a Company Group training event within the territory of each Regional Brigade. Except of course in Newfoundland where it is half an hour later and your Island, permanently wreathed in trees and cannabis.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Fair.

But if the Divisions can raise Company Groups for a particular tasking then why not start the reworking of the Militia (Army Reserves) by raising 10 Company Groups, one from each Division, which is willing and able to deploy nationally at short notice? The should be able to organize a Company Group training event within the territory of each Regional Brigade. Except of course in Newfoundland where it is half an hour later and your Island, permanently wreathed in trees and cannabis.

There is no need for an ARes Coy Gp to 'deploy nationally' IMHO.

But if you want to build good company groups the tried and true way is to, months in advance (e.g., September), declare that there will be an annual concentration at a suitable training area (e.g., Wainwright, August the following year) with a training aim (e.g., Defensive/Offensive Operations), and prepare for it throughout the training year. Include a 'Gun Camp' during the Spring Break to qualify on your crew served weapons, and do other types of preparatory field firing (e.g., PWT4)

For some reason, this pattern has eroded over time with the effect that all training seems disjointed, last minute, poorly supported, and without any clear final aim, goal or purpose.

But that's just the view from my sanger window...

 

[FJAG]

Fair.

But if the Divisions can raise Company Groups for a particular tasking then why not start the reworking of the Militia (Army Reserves) by raising 10 Company Groups, one from each Division, which is willing and able to deploy nationally at short notice? The should be able to organize a Company Group training event within the territory of each Regional Brigade. Except of course in Newfoundland where it is half an hour later and your Island, permanently wreathed in trees and cannabis.

I think the better question is: why bother?

What you're doing is finding a job for the reserves (particularly one the RegF would rather ignore for themselves). In some ways its a way of trying to stay relevant but it fails to address the overarching issue of what is the purpose of the RegF and what is the purpose of the ResF?

Anything with the modifiers "quick reaction" or "short notice" is for all intents and purposes, RegF.

 

[Kirkhill]

There is no need for an ARes Coy Gp to 'deploy nationally' IMHO.

But if you want to build good company groups the tried and true way is to, months in advance (e.g., September), declare that there will be an annual concentration at a suitable training area (e.g., Wainwright, August the following year) with a training aim (e.g., Defensive/Offensive Operations), and prepare for it throughout the training year. Include a 'Gun Camp' during the Spring Break to qualify on your crew served weapons, and do other types of preparatory field firing (e.g., PWT4)

For some reason, this pattern has eroded over time with the effect that all training seems disjointed, last minute, poorly supported, and without any clear final aim, goal or purpose.

But that's just the view from my sanger window...

I think the better question is: why bother?

What you're doing is finding a job for the reserves (particularly one the RegF would rather ignore for themselves). In some ways its a way of trying to stay relevant but it fails to address the overarching issue of what is the purpose of the RegF and what is the purpose of the ResF?

Anything with the modifiers "quick reaction" or "short notice" is for all intents and purposes, RegF.

Good enuff. I'll put them back on the dusty empty shelves from which they came.

 

[Kirkhill]

I was trying to figure out where to post this

But given the responses above I decided to post it here.

Training and operating the Army Reserve costs about $724 million annually, based on figures from the 2013–14 fiscal year.

Would $714 MCAD be better employed maintaining dusty empty shelves in broken down armouries or in fielding drones for the regular army regiments and corps?

Revolution in Military Affairs vs Military Revolution: The Emergence of Drones and Robotics as a driver in Societal Change | Small Wars Journal

The war in Ukraine has proven one explicable truth, the convergence of commercial off-the-shelf drone technology with the military-industrial complex (MIC) drone platform is here to stay and possibly the first military revolution we’ve seen since the advent of the nuclear age.

smallwarsjournal.com

 

[Kirkhill]

Your Company Pioneer. One for every company and battery. And changes the dynamics of the Armoured Engineer.

 

[FJAG]

Would $714 MCAD be better employed maintaining dusty empty shelves in broken down armouries or in fielding drones for the regular army regiments and corps?

You and I both know that's a silly question because you know the value and cost efficiency that a properly run reserve force can bring.

Empty shelves in broken down armouries are priority choices made by a variety RegF managers along the way. There are dozens of ways to correct that and get better value for money than we are now.

The RegF could easily afford drones for everyone if they fired half of its senior staff and reduced its central headquarters by 25%.

There is more defence output value in a broken down armoury, even as poorly run as it is, than in large swaths of Ottawa.

 

[Rifleman62]

Where there is a will ...............

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

There are already the Arctic Response Company Groups. How are they provided, selected and manned? Do they exist even when not training in the North?

Shouldn't every Regional Brigade be able to produce at short notice a Regional Company Group? Even in 1866 the lowly Militia was able to field Flank Companies of willing Militiamen.

What would happen if, as a first step, an OC was assigned and volunteers were requested to sign up on a fan out sheet? Then establish sites like this one for each of the Regional Company Groups where the volunteers could communicate with each other and assist in their organization. Aim for a flatter organization.

There are Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCGs) and also Territorial Battle Groups (TBGs). The members lead a bit of a dual life - they belong to their home unit but are identified as being part of one of those organizations. The ARCGs have lead CBGs and units that organize their training. The ARCGs conduct specialized training and have equipment for their role. The ARCGs are a success story, providing an excellent real-world capability.

The TBGs have successfully conducted DOMOPs and conduct training for their role - the recent storm out east is an example. Doesn't completely relieve the Reg F of IRU (Immediate Response Unit) duties but I think it's an improvement from past practices. At a minimum, it provides a structure for the orderly relief in place of an IRU on a DOMOP.

 

[Kirkhill]

You and I both know that's a silly question because you know the value and cost efficiency that a properly run reserve force can bring.

Empty shelves in broken down armouries are priority choices made by a variety RegF managers along the way. There are dozens of ways to correct that and get better value for money than we are now.

The RegF could easily afford drones for everyone if they fired half of its senior staff and reduced its central headquarters by 25%.

There is more defence output value in a broken down armoury, even as poorly run as it is, than in large swaths of Ottawa.

I do know that.

And I agree with all of your statements.

Including, and importantly, the priority choices being made (by whomever).



However my comment was the result of the comments that I took to suggest that it is inappropriate to find jobs for the Reserves. I know your feelings towards the need for a "Break Glass In Time Of War" force. But real people don't survive behind glass. They need to live and breathe - and they need to want to offer themselves up for the benefit of others.

Likewise with D&B's comment about National Deployment. I want to see BC Militiamen removing trees on PEI and Ontarians helping out with landslides in BC. They see the country. Meet their counterparts, Learn to work under other management. Learn how to deploy rapidly and adapt to a variety of situations. And create a nucleus of troops in each of the Brigades with tales to tell. The tales they will tell will depend on how well they are treated and how much they enjoyed their experience.

And as your boss, and a past CSIS boss I believe, your limited number of Reg Force brethren are getting nowhere near enough time practicing tactical skills

 

[quadrapiper]

The ARCGs are operating in other Divisions, AFAIK, but have a limited mandate, scope and training regimen. Why try and fly reservists to the Arctic, with all the attendant hassle of training, equipping, finding time off at the right time etc etc etc, when you've got dozens of Reg F combat arms coy/sqn groups you can pick from?

In reality, anything 'Op Tasking' like that, layered on top of what limited militia resources are already responsible for, is an expensive distraction at best and a political 'the Reserves can do anything the Reg F can do' smoke and mirrors program at worst.

Would some sort of opportunity for Reserve augmentation to those tasks be worthwhile as bait?

 

[Kirkhill]

There are Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCGs) and also Territorial Battle Groups (TBGs). The members lead a bit of a dual life - they belong to their home unit but are identified as being part of one of those organizations. The ARCGs have lead CBGs and units that organize their training. The ARCGs conduct specialized training and have equipment for their role. The ARCGs are a success story, providing an excellent real-world capability.

The TBGs have successfully conducted DOMOPs and conduct training for their role - the recent storm out east is an example. Doesn't completely relieve the Reg F of IRU (Immediate Response Unit) duties but I think it's an improvement from past practices. At a minimum, it provides a structure for the orderly relief in place of an IRU on a DOMOP.

And I find I am covering ground well covered by T2B above.

 

[AvroArrow92]

Going off what others have been posting, would this orbat make any sense? Equipment holdings would largely remain the same outside of additional ATGM, GBAD, and precision fires program which are already in the pipeline. The only thing I would consider purchasing additional numbers of is the LAV 6.0 Recce so we could actually have armoured calavary regiments at the regular force level at least.

Canadian Army, Land Force 2025

-1 active armour brigade group (Adazi) 10-90
-2 active mechanized brigade groups (Edmonton, &Valcartier) 70-30
-1 active light brigade group (Petawawa) 90-10

-1 active-reserve ranger patrol brigade (Yellowknife) 30-70
-1 active-reserve combat support brigade (Gagetown) 70-30
-1 active-reserve combat support services brigade (Montreal) 70-30

-3 reserve infantry brigades (Calgary, Toronto, &Montreal) 30-70

-1 nondeployable divisional headquarters (Winnipeg)
-1 deployable divisional headquarters (Kingston)
-1 training doctrine center (Kingston)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st Canadian Division (Kingston)

-1 active armour brigade group (Adazi) 10-90
-2 active mechanized brigade group (Edmonton, &Valcartier) 70-30
-1 active-reserve combat support brigade (Gagetown) 70-30
-1 active-reserve combat support services brigade (Montreal) 70-30

The 1st Canadian Division is designed to fulfil any expeditionary land force needs of the Canadian government, with a particular focus on supporting NATO on the Baltic Front. The 4th CABG is a fly over force, with only one mechanized infantry battalion, a css battalion, and a headquarters staff being full staffed. This unit also doubles as the Canada contribution tp the enhanced battlegroup in Lativa. In the event of a conflict a combined personal from the 1st &5th CMBG will immediately fly over to fully staff the brigade. In the event of a prolonged conflict the CMBG and other assets of the 1st Canadian Division would deploy in mass to Europe as one cohesive divisional formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3rd Canadian Division (Winnipeg)

-1 active light brigade group (Petawawa) 90-10
-1 active-reserve ranger patrol brigade (Yellowknife) 30-70
-3 reserve infantry brigade groups (Calgary, Toronto, &Montreal) 30-70

The 3rd Canadian Division is designed to fulfil any domestic land force needs of the Canadian government, with a particular focus on supporting the continental defence of North America. The 2nd CLBG is the rapid deployment force of the Canadian Army, able to deploy in a battlegroup anywhere in Canada within seventy-two hours; with the remainder of the brigade within seven days. The ranger patrol brigade has three ranger patrol groups; each of the reserve infantry brigades can mobilize one arctic response company (ARC) to surge to the ranger patrol brigade. Each brigade can mobilize three territorial defence companies (TDC) for domestic land force needs or one territorial battle group say in seven days (still not sure of that one).