Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[MilEME09]

We have gotten crafty before to get around TB, we can do it again, problem is we are our own worst enemy. In the words of Rick Hillier the CAF is a self licking ice cream cone. We will continue to build empires it seems to increasing erode our operational effectiveness unless someone finally puts a stop to it, I don't know who would be the choice for a conservative MND but one can hope, and that's it....hope change can happen.

 

[KevinB]

If you actually compare what you can do in training areas across the country your logic is backwards. Western Canada offers the best manoeuvre areas for a heavy force by far, while you have to leave the area to find good training for the light battalion (although the location of the Rockies is helpful).

Transport of tanks isn't ridiculous, it's actually rehearsing something that would be done in a real contingency. Just need all the heavy haulers in one place.

Wouldn't it be nice to actually live on a training area for your gear?
As well have a railhead so your aren't double loading (loading on a low bed vehicle to have them drive to load on a railhead)?

IF Canada wants to have a Heavy Force (and I am dead set that the Army isn't big enough to make a worthwhile heavy force that could actually participate in a peer - peer conflict *US Peer, as Canadian Military Peers are like Uganda and Botswana at this point), Then ONLY Training systems should be in Canada, and the Heavy Bde be forward deployed - it can even rotate ever few years for Regimental "Equity"

Heavy Forces have zilch to do with Canadian Territorial Defense - because if you think anyone invading Canada is going to do anything more than Snicker at a Div of Heavy Tanks (which Canada doesn't have anyway) you out of your mind.
Light Forces can disperse and run an insurgency - because that is what the size of the force can do.

Really? They just spent 20 years fighting in the landlocked areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, and have standing SPMAGTF's that are globally deployed to land bases abroad. They wish to reinvigorate the "Green/Blue" relationship to "get back to their roots", but they frequently do go ashore without the Navy.

They need a role again - the butchers are at the door - and the Expeditionary nature of the USMC is being reinvested in.

Weight of a Stryker ICV = 16,800kg

Weight of a CV 90 MkIV = 37,000kg

Weight of a Marder 1A5 = 34,000kg

Weight of a M2 Bradley = 27,500kg

Weight of a LAV 6.0 = 28,600kg

Weight of Namer ICV = 60,000kg

Be careful how you define light, medium, and heavy forces....

I'd rather one look at what it needs to be moved - and create a 4th category.
Light -- Can work in a UH-60/Osprey type craft
Med-Light - can work in a CH-47
Medium - can work in a C-130
Heavy - needs C-17, better yet sea borne transport.

Regardless of what you call it - if you look at what Canada is willing to put on the table these days - It's an under equipped Div.
Trying to make a Heavy Bde requires a significant amount more capital to be invested in equipment - unless everyone is content with a "In Name Bde" (again).


The bizarre Missing items (Air Defense) fill a Defense of Canada role much better than a lot of other either missing or antiquated gear.

Reading the Government Mandate to the CF - I'd be hauling the pretty much everyone from BG up for an inquisition on why they are for the most part incapable of filling ANY of the missions allocated currently.

 

[FJAG]

We have gotten crafty before to get around TB, we can do it again, problem is we are our own worst enemy. In the words of Rick Hillier the CAF is a self licking ice cream cone. We will continue to build empires it seems to increasing erode our operational effectiveness unless someone finally puts a stop to it, I don't know who would be the choice for a conservative MND but one can hope, and that's it....hope change can happen.

James Bezan Selkirk-Interlake-Eastman from Manitoba is the current CPC Shadow MND.

Bezan was born May 19, 1965 in Russell, Manitoba[3] Bezan majored in livestock technology in Olds College's Agricultural Production program.[4] Bezan worked in the livestock and cattle industries in the 1980s and 1990s, and started his own company in 1996. He served as Chief Executive Officer of the Manitoba Cattle Producer's Association, and has sat on boards in the fields of cattle and food production. He also operates a family farm near Teulon, Manitoba.[5]

In first session of the 41st Parliament, Bezan served as the Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence

On September 19, 2013, Bezan was appointed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence. He began the 2nd session of the 41st Parliament with this role.[2

Bezan was one of thirteen Canadians banned from traveling to Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2014.[31] He replied through his official Twitter feed, "Sanctions by Russia will not silence me standing up for Ukraine. This is a badge of honour for all critics of the Crimea Invasion."[31

James Bezan - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

He's very into Ukrainian issues which could make things interesting vis-a-vis NATO support.

Heavy Forces have zilch to do with Canadian Territorial Defense - because if you think anyone invading Canada is going to do anything more than Snicker at a Div of Heavy Tanks (which Canada doesn't have anyway) you out of your mind.
Light Forces can disperse and run an insurgency - because that is what the size of the force can do.

But what would we do if the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team from the Idaho National Guard should attack us and we won't have a heavy brigade in western Canada to defend ourselves with? They have M1s and Bradleys and Paladins and everything. ... and, and if the Utah National Guard with their artillery brigade with HIMARS and more Paladins and all those helicopters should join in.

And our light forces have no anti-armour weapons. We'll have to make IEDs out of pressure cookers or something. I'm not sure we'd be allowed to run an insurgency because I'm quite sure our current leadership are more the surrender monkey types.

The bizarre Missing items (Air Defense) fill a Defense of Canada role much better than a lot of other either missing or antiquated gear.

I don't want to get your hopes up too high but the GBAD program is looking at short range and very short range AD. So from a "defence of Canada" point of view we could maybe cover Parliament Hill including Bytown Market. Hopefully the Navy could cover the two shipyards.

 

[Infanteer]

Wouldn't it be nice to actually live on a training area for your gear?
As well have a railhead so your aren't double loading (loading on a low bed vehicle to have them drive to load on a railhead)?

Is a two hour drive down a four lane freeway really that much of an impediment?

Heavy Forces have zilch to do with Canadian Territorial Defense - because if you think anyone invading Canada is going to do anything more than Snicker at a Div of Heavy Tanks (which Canada doesn't have anyway) you out of your mind.

Where is it stated that heavy forces are required for territorial defence?

 

[GR66]

Not if we maintain a Heavy Brigade in Europe 24/7/365 because, you know, statistics show that they're prone to 'family feuds' that get out of hand.

Seriously, does anyone here actually believe that re-establishing a full-time Canadian Brigade Group in Europe is a realistic possibility? We're not only talking the cost of re-equipping the Army like we're discussing here to be able to stand up in a peer conflict against Russia (which based on the state of the post-Covid economy on top of the CSC program and the upcoming fighter replacements I have serious doubts about being properly fulfilled as it is), but also the cost of forward deploying fully 1/3 of our current Reg Force Army to face a potential enemy (Russia) which frankly I seriously doubt most Canadians see as significant enough a threat to justify the cost.

An alternative approach which I think would be more likely achievable from an economic and political standpoint would be to expand our light force capability and have the ability to rapidly (i.e. within 72 hours) deploy a well-equipped and supported Light Battle Group anywhere in the world with the ability to expand this to a full Brigade within a week or so. And practice this capability. This would go a long way to demonstrating to both our allies and potential enemies our capability and willingness to respond to aggression.

Shifting to primarily lighter forces would also free up some of our heavier equipment (I'm not 100% sold on divesting in all our heavier equipment like tanks...not every job requires just a screwdriver, so better to have a well-equipped toolbox just in case). We could for example use the surplus vehicles to pre-position a full Battle Group worth of LAVs and Leopards and all the other supporting weapons and equipment in Europe (co-located with our eFP Latvia force?) and fly over the troops to man the equipment (again, practised at least annually).

The ability to in fairly short order fly over the troops to man an additional Mechanized Battle Group in Latvia and an additional Light Battle Group (wherever required) - which can be expanded to a full Brigade - would in my mind gain almost as much political capital with our allies and deterrent effect to our enemies as the more costly (and less flexible) forward deployment of a Mechanized Brigade Group.

 

[KevinB]

But what would we do if the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team from the Idaho National Guard should attack us and we won't have a heavy brigade in western Canada to defend ourselves with? They have M1s and Bradleys and Paladins and everything. ... and, and if the Utah National Guard with their artillery brigade with HIMARS and more Paladins and all those helicopters should join in.

This is why I'd be focusing on AD and AT stuff for Defense of Canada missions - it also serves as fantastic force protection elements for Expeditionary Light Forces.

And our light forces have no anti-armour weapons. We'll have to make IEDs out of pressure cookers or something. I'm not sure we'd be allowed to run an insurgency because I'm quite sure our current leadership are more the surrender monkey types.

No worries - I'm thinking Milley and Austin might surrender first...

I don't want to get your hopes up too high but the GBAD program is looking at short range and very short range AD. So from a "defence of Canada" point of view we could maybe cover Parliament Hill including Bytown Market. Hopefully the Navy could cover the two shipyards.

I continue to cry.

Is a two hour drive down a four lane freeway really that much of an impediment?

2 hrs to Wx from CFB Edmonton? I've done that drive a few times - and while possible to be under 2hrs in a PMV, I know it used to be a 4*hr road move in LAV's (thought that was before the Freeway upgrade) it is still 127miles from 1PPLCI's gate to the entry road past Range Control in WX - so I would be inclined to accept 2.5-3hr drive for a transport - plus loading and unloading time.

So one loses 1/2 day on each end --
As opposed to driving across Hwy 17 in Pet - and no TDY to go zero a LAV...
I get you like drivey-shooty things and Edmonton, and I know your smart - but a cost benefit analysis shows its a fools errand to base heavier stuff there, I think you are letting emotions crowd your judgment on the validity of that base choice.

Where is it stated that heavy forces are required for territorial defence?

It isn't - Hency why any CF heavier force should be forward deployed and not allowed to sit in an useless base where they can't direct train in Canada...

 

[FJAG]

Seriously, does anyone here actually believe that re-establishing a full-time Canadian Brigade Group in Europe is a realistic possibility? We're not only talking the cost of re-equipping the Army like we're discussing here to be able to stand up in a peer conflict against Russia (which based on the state of the post-Covid economy on top of the CSC program and the upcoming fighter replacements I have serious doubts about being properly fulfilled as it is), but also the cost of forward deploying fully 1/3 of our current Reg Force Army to face a potential enemy (Russia) which frankly I seriously doubt most Canadians see as significant enough a threat to justify the cost.

I could think of several scenarios that might work with relatively minor changes in financial impact other than ones we need to make regardless (such as properly equipping air defence and anti-armour capabilities and beefing up our CS and CSS). All of them, however, have the precondition that a Canadian government is prepared to have a brigade sized presence in Europe. All scenarios contemplate prepositioning equipment with minimal personnel actually in theatre.

The first scenario would involve creating smaller armoured squadrons of 14 tanks each. That should provide the ability to form six tank squadrons with enough (give or take one or two). With five squadrons and with six LAV companies, you have enough vehicles to form a combined arms brigade of three manoeuvre battalions with an armoured squadron spare for use in a cavalry regiment. Flesh out the rest of the brigade with whatever gear is needed to make it work.

The remaining tank squadron and two LAV companies get prepositioned as a combined arms training battalion in Wainwright. Essentially that uses up all of our tanks and 8 companies of LAVs leaving ten companies of LAVs. Leave two LAV companies with each of 2 and 5 Brigades as a training resource and turn their six infantry battalions to light battalions. Place the remaining four LAV companies with 1 Bde as their operational/training vehicles (over and above the Wainwright stock. At this point you have the ability to run courses and exercise at the combined arms battalion level year round for the army in general at Wainwright and to operationally deploy up to two mech battalions anywhere in the world (from the remaining LAV training stocks). In addition each region has some LAVs to train additional crews locally before sending them to Wainwright for collective training or Europe for brigade level exercises throughout the year. 1 Bde becomes the primary flyover force, but each Bde can have rotations where they prepare for and assume a mech role. Because the vast majority of the tanks are located in Europe, much of the armoured individual and collective training will need to be made to fit in at Wainwright or in Europe.

Equip the light brigades in whichever way floats your boat.

Option two is very different but also becomes a fly-over force.

Let's face it, if we approached the US and offered to add a flyover ABCT to V Corps in Poland so long as the Americans equipped it in Poland and also provided up to an ABCT's worth of equipment in Canada as training stocks at no capital cost to us (we'd be responsible for maintenance and training costs of course), they would do it out of their spare stocks in a heart beat because a) they have the gear and b) we'd add tremendous joint political clout to the alliance. Again, the idea is to maximize training in Europe throughout the year by flying over battle groups and up to bde level. The flyovers would be practice for operations and would negate the need for a separate CMTC element in Wainwright.

By doing that, we would still have 18 companies of LAV 6.0s which would equip one CMGB (preferably 5 CMBG) as a three LAV battalion medium brigade, leave 2 CMBG as a light brigade and have 9 LAV companies available as training stock for quite a few reserve units and as operational stock for up to a battle group deployment somewhere else in the world.

So. Easy-peasy. There are numerous variants of this for people who dislike Wainwright or think the numbers won't quite work but essentially, if we consider Europe as our "CMTC" and preposition all the heavy equipment there and can be used by multiple units throughout the year, our costs to access it doesn't change much from much of what we already spend on exercise travel as we merely transport people and not equipment. As to facilities, Poland (and NATO I think) is paying for much of V Corps' infrastructure and would, most probably, do the same for Canada. We could always insist on that as a precondition. And yes, we would need a pretty good MOU with the Americans to make this a) work and b) keep our highly valued "Canadian independence" from the American War Machine.

An alternative approach which I think would be more likely achievable from an economic and political standpoint would be to expand our light force capability and have the ability to rapidly (i.e. within 72 hours) deploy a well-equipped and supported Light Battle Group anywhere in the world with the ability to expand this to a full Brigade within a week or so. And practice this capability. This would go a long way to demonstrating to both our allies and potential enemies our capability and willingness to respond to aggression.

Shifting to primarily lighter forces would also free up some of our heavier equipment (I'm not 100% sold on divesting in all our heavier equipment like tanks...not every job requires just a screwdriver, so better to have a well-equipped toolbox just in case). We could for example use the surplus vehicles to pre-position a full Battle Group worth of LAVs and Leopards and all the other supporting weapons and equipment in Europe (co-located with our eFP Latvia force?) and fly over the troops to man the equipment (again, practised at least annually).

The ability to in fairly short order fly over the troops to man an additional Mechanized Battle Group in Latvia and an additional Light Battle Group (wherever required) - which can be expanded to a full Brigade - would in my mind gain almost as much political capital with our allies and deterrent effect to our enemies as the more costly (and less flexible) forward deployment of a Mechanized Brigade Group.

I have no problems with a flyover, but it doesn't happen as rapidly as you think unless you preposition equipment. Even a light brigade is a pretty heavy animal. Once you preposition then there is practically no difference as between a light, medium or heavy brigade because the manpower involved is pretty much the same (about 5,000 folks barring additional theatre level assets).

My problem with light brigades is what is their role once they get there? Prepositioning a mech battle group in Latvia is and idea but it would need to be a full one as the elements we have there are already fully wedded into a multi-national battle group and you can't just start taking that apart. That BG doesn't need extra Canadians as its pretty sizeable in its own right already.

The problem with light brigades is that the need in Europe is still for an additional six ABCTs (3 manned "stay in the game", 3 prepositioned) in the region as a proper deterrent/fighting force (see: RAND Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States: What it takes to win 2017) Yes there is also a need to add six SBCT/IBCTs but first and foremost is to get the numbers of ABCTs or their equivalents in place.

I certainly appreciate that conditions change as weapon systems change BUT it seems to me everyone thinks that these advances in technology only apply to light forces and that we "heavy" guys are looking to maintain armoured forces exactly as they were in the 1980s. That's a fallacy: heavy forces will also be making tremendous strides forward as countermeasures and offensive systems become more robust. The one thing with light forces which will always be a given is that while they might develop tremendous defensive capabilities, they will always be handicapped by limited tactical mobility, and even strategic mobility, unless the air environment is very permissive, and they will never have the counterpunch capability of armoured forces.

I'm not anti-light. I'm for a balance force (even one as small as ours). Don't throw the heavy baby out with the bathwater like your 1990-2000 forefathers tried.

No worries - I'm thinking Milley and Austin might surrender first...

Sooo ....... you're ruling out Trump in 2024?

 

[FJAG]

I get you like drivey-shooty things and Edmonton, and I know your smart - but a cost benefit analysis shows its a fools errand to base heavier stuff there, I think you are letting emotions crowd your judgment on the validity of that base choice.

I'm fully with Infanteer on this one.

Suffield is the best but the Brits are using it throughout the best training seasons and there is no sign of that's stopping anytime soon. in addition there is no infrastructure there that isn't Brit so even co-sharing the base is impossible. On top of that there is very little military housing available for people based permanently to the base ad very little available in the adjacent communities. Medicine Hat is about 45 km away which is doable but a drag (especially in winter). That leaves Wainwright, Shilo, Meaford, Petawawa, Valcartier, Aldershot and Gagetown.

Meaford and Aldershot - way too small.

Valcartier - very restricted. Do they even fire tanks there or go to Gagetown for that?

Shilo can do several combined arms battle runs (although in my day that was with 105mm and I have zero knowledge of the required ricochet traces for 120mm and how they would fit in these days. My guess is that they could.

Petawawa has much less useable space than Shilo and while it could support some static shooting (same 105 v 120 issue for me) it would be severely restricted on how much combined arms maneuvering you could do even with dry training.

That leaves only three real possibilities: Shilo (see above), Wainwright and Gagetown. I took my advanced gunnery course and my combat team commander's course in Gagetown, did battle runs with Germans in Shilo and exercised with artillery up and down Wainwright, Shilo, and Gagetown (Not to mention Petawawa, Suffield, Meaford and Yakima).

Of the three, Wainwright has the most useable space that would be ideal for combined arms training, Shilo would come second. I'm torn by Gagetown. It clearly is the largest, has a great manoeuvre area (although again I'm not sure how much 120mm is restrained there). I mean there's nothing you can't do there for artillery and mech infantry (including training for getting unstuck from boggy ground). It's biggest deficit is that the Combat Arms School is there and as such fully occupies the infrastructure and the range training schedules. There's nothing that says it can't be shared (We did it for RV 81 but that took years of coordination to get the 4-6 weeks or so the Div had there.)

So ... practically speaking if the overriding criteria is to be able to step out of the compound and directly onto the ranges, the most logical one is --- Shilo??? --- It has infrastructure for two battalions/regiments; has accessible housing; and has adequate (but not great) manoeuvre and impact areas (and yup - there's even a crappy railhead if you need to move things in and out to the real close CPR mainline.)

Wainwright? Good for training. No competition from anyone else. Very limited housing and would need infrastructure upgrading to become a permanent facility. On the other hand, Edmonton's facilities are pretty new and quite adequate save for the drive down the highway. (I presume that there is a large enough training area there for adequate small arms training and very limited dry manoeuvre training - I haven't been to the base since long before the move up from Calgary)

I'm not sure if 1 CMBG permanently prepositions shared gear in Wainwright so that its just a bus ride down but even a road move isn't wasted if you treat it as a training event. We used to have to road and rail move 3 RCHA to Wainwright at least every second year and the moves were training activities in their own right. Not every day needs to be spent putting bullets down range to be worthwhile. Rail moves are a fact of life and need to be mastered the way that they were in 4 CMBG (which incidentally didn't have a large training area near it either and always entailed a move to somewhere else.)

 

[Infanteer]

So one loses 1/2 day on each end --
As opposed to driving across Hwy 17 in Pet - and no TDY to go zero a LAV...
I get you like drivey-shooty things and Edmonton, and I know your smart - but a cost benefit analysis shows its a fools errand to base heavier stuff there, I think you are letting emotions crowd your judgment on the validity of that base choice.

Tell me what that cost benefit analysis is then?

Explain the magnitude of additional time and fuel costs for a road move from Edmonton to Wainwright, perhaps with a DTSF? Show me how a 3-4 hour road move on Day 1 of an exercise significantly impacts the remaining exercise plan differently from a 30 minute road move. Also, let's see a good comparison of AFV manoeuvre boxes in Petawawa or Valcartier vs Wainwright or Suffield (and even Cold Lake - want to shoot sabot?). And we better evaluate the difference between range limitations in Gagetown and training areas out West too.

You can pitch "bias" and "emotion" at me because I don't agree with your cost benefit analysis, but lets see what said cost benefit analysis has behind it.

 

[GR66]

Let's face it, if we approached the US and offered to add a flyover ABCT to V Corps in Poland so long as the Americans equipped it in Poland and also provided up to an ABCT's worth of equipment in Canada as training stocks at no capital cost to us (we'd be responsible for maintenance and training costs of course), they would do it out of their spare stocks in a heart beat because a) they have the gear and b) we'd add tremendous joint political clout to the alliance. Again, the idea is to maximize training in Europe throughout the year by flying over battle groups and up to bde level. The flyovers would be practice for operations and would negate the need for a separate CMTC element in Wainwright.

I'm inspired by your confidence that the US will gladly supply for free two full ABCT's worth of equipment to a NATO partner that is already spending well below the mandated 2% of GDP on defence. Especially as they are proposing huge Covid-recovery budgets in the states and the Democrats have a razor thin majority in the Senate (for now).

I'm also inspired by your confidence that a Canadian government would gladly face the political backlash by the opposition by Canada basically outsourcing our Army to be an integrated part of the US military. No matter what type of MOU you put in place it WILL be spun by the opposition as that.

 

[Kirkhill]

Wouldn't it be nice to actually live on a training area for your gear?
As well have a railhead so your aren't double loading (loading on a low bed vehicle to have them drive to load on a railhead)?

IF Canada wants to have a Heavy Force (and I am dead set that the Army isn't big enough to make a worthwhile heavy force that could actually participate in a peer - peer conflict *US Peer, as Canadian Military Peers are like Uganda and Botswana at this point), Then ONLY Training systems should be in Canada, and the Heavy Bde be forward deployed - it can even rotate ever few years for Regimental "Equity"

Heavy Forces have zilch to do with Canadian Territorial Defense - because if you think anyone invading Canada is going to do anything more than Snicker at a Div of Heavy Tanks (which Canada doesn't have anyway) you out of your mind.
Light Forces can disperse and run an insurgency - because that is what the size of the force can do.





They need a role again - the butchers are at the door - and the Expeditionary nature of the USMC is being reinvested in.



I'd rather one look at what it needs to be moved - and create a 4th category.
Light -- Can work in a UH-60/Osprey type craft
Med-Light - can work in a CH-47
Medium - can work in a C-130
Heavy - needs C-17, better yet sea borne transport.

Regardless of what you call it - if you look at what Canada is willing to put on the table these days - It's an under equipped Div.
Trying to make a Heavy Bde requires a significant amount more capital to be invested in equipment - unless everyone is content with a "In Name Bde" (again).


The bizarre Missing items (Air Defense) fill a Defense of Canada role much better than a lot of other either missing or antiquated gear.

Reading the Government Mandate to the CF - I'd be hauling the pretty much everyone from BG up for an inquisition on why they are for the most part incapable of filling ANY of the missions allocated currently.

Medium - can work in a C-130

	M (tonnes)	L (m)	W (m)	H (m)
C130 E	19.1​	12.5​	3.0​	2.7​
C130 J 30	19.1​	17.1​	3.0​	2.7​
Lynx	8.5​	4.6​	2.4​	2.2​
M113	9.8​	4.9​	2.7​	2.5​
Bv206	4.5​	6.9​	1.9​	2.4​
M151	1.1​	3.4​	1.6​	1.8​
Iltis	1.6​	4.0​	1.5​	1.8​
Ferret	3.7​	3.7​	1.9​	1.9​
Grizzly	10.5​	6​	2.5​	2.5​
Cougar	10.7​	6​	2.5​	2.5​
Bison	12.4​	6.5​	2.5​	2.2​
MLVW	6.3​	6.7​	2.4​	2.9​
Coyote	14.4​	6.4​	2.5​	2.7​
LAVIII	16.9​	7​	2.7​	2.8​
LAV6.0	28.6​	7.62​	2.78​	3.16​
MSVS	18.1​	10.4​	3.2​	3.5​
A400M	37​	17.7​	4​	3.85​
C17	76.9​	27​	5.5​	3.76​

It occurs to me that since the 1964 purchase of the fleet of 24 C130 E Hercules that every vehicle the infantry owned was transportable by Herc.

That was true for everything up to and including M113s, Grizzlies and Bisons.

With the Coyote we started pushing our luck maxing out the height limitation. LAVIII broke the height barrier as did the LAV6.0 and the MSVS. And the LAV6.0 handily breaks the weight barrier.

In short we have been pushing the envelope, with respect to deployability and finally broke it.

And the deflection point was 2 October 2003 - Cpl Robbie Beerenfenger and Sgt Robert Short,

Understandably protection became a higher priority than deployability, especially when deployability could be fixed with C17s, help from our friends and the time available to trickle in troops, vehicles and supplies.



But


In the bad old days, with 24 C130 Hercs I believe that Canada had the ability to deploy the following:

A parachute battalion with M151 Jeeps reinforced by an L5 pack howitzer battery and engineers in a single lift.

A 4 company battalion with recce platoon, anti-tank platoon, mortar platoon and pioneers air landed with 14 M113s and 9 Lynxes in a second lift. The battalion would be capable of establishing a 3 company perimeter for all round defence while employing the M113s and the Lynxes as a mobile element for recce, screen and quick reaction. The rest of the battalion's vehicles could follow by air in subsequent lifts taking advantage of time in exactly the same way it was exploited in Afghanistan.

The civil background to this was the couple of thousand airports, fields, and strips available throughout Canada. Not to mention frozen lakes and lands.

In short, the Special Service Force in Petawawa could land a mechanized force anywhere in Canada in a week. Or could land a battalion in Cyprus.

That capability was retained even when the urban AVGP (the Grizzly), the Bison and the Bv206 were acquired.

That is a capability that has been lost.



It could have been retained, along with acquiring more protection, if more C17s had been acquired. That option is no longer open to us.

It seems that a solution (at least partial) could be found by acquiring 24 A400Ms to complement the C17s. (And nobody ask where the pilots and engineers are going to come from - in the scheme of things it is a rounding error - especially if the need is there).

The reason the solution is only partial is that while the LAV6.0 may be a suitably protected vehicle with many uses one thing it is not is a replacement for either the M113, or the Bv206 when it comes to the rough terrain that defines 70 to 90% of Canada and requires a light, tracked, (amphibious) vehicle that can be supported, and preferably transported, by CH-147F.


Moving up from the CC-130 to the A-400M would raise the definition of Medium to include the LAV6.0 and set new limits on both Cavalry and Artillery vehicles for domestic and expeditionary service.

Even an M109 would fit in an A-400M. For delivery anywhere in Canada. Or globally.


In fact you could probably, just about, lift an ancient 105mm Leopard 1 (C2) in an A400M. (if fully unloaded, unmanned and dried out)

 

[FJAG]

I'm inspired by your confidence that the US will gladly supply for free two full ABCT's worth of equipment to a NATO partner that is already spending well below the mandated 2% of GDP on defence. Especially as they are proposing huge Covid-recovery budgets in the states and the Democrats have a razor thin majority in the Senate (for now).

I'm also inspired by your confidence that a Canadian government would gladly face the political backlash by the opposition by Canada basically outsourcing our Army to be an integrated part of the US military. No matter what type of MOU you put in place it WILL be spun by the opposition as that.

The fact is that the US has quite a few M1s in storage at the Sierra Depot. Yes they are not the latest versions with all the bells and whistles, but neither are the ones in ARNG and even some Active units. Somewhat the same for Bradleys and M109s. Like us, the US does have manpower and budget issues and having a NATO member, even a cheap one like us, partner up with them by adding something they consider of value to V Corps in Poland would probably be an attractive thing for a low cost. They are actively selling refurbished equipment cheaply to several countries and granting equipment to former Soviet Block countries in order to shore up alliances. Betcha a $1 multi-year lease wouldn't be out of the question.

My guess it would be much easier to convince the US to loan us some of this equipment (and one or two ABCTs are a drop in the bucket) than to convince our government/military to take on the burden of training on and maintaining this gear. Canada is exceptionally good at finding fault with just about any course of action. Political opposition is a given unless in the midst of a deep crisis like 9/11. Sometimes you just have to do the right thing and stop wringing your hands over whether Swords into Plowshares will be unhappy. The internet being what it is in influencing the nation, what you really need is a good Twitter campaign to sell this.

Seriously though. And let's be blunt. If DND can't come up with the cash to properly equip our army; and if we can't get DND to sort out its spending priorities so that we have an effective army; and if we can't sort out our procurement system so that we can spend our money in a relatively efficient manner; and if we try to second and third guess every reaction to a step forward; then why don't just pack the whole thing in and shut the DND down to an air defence command and a small reserve constabulary force? Personally this neither fish nor fowl stasis we are in is offensive. Sometimes I wonder as to whether the things that DND does is simply to keep a hundred thousand plus folks (especially all their GOFOS and EXs) earning half the defence budget rather than concentrating on defence outputs. Keeping nine "light" infantry battalions without proper gear is like an expensive social security program because equipped as they are we'd be loath to deploy them into any serious harms way - so what's their purpose in peacetime? Basically were an insurance policy and maybe its time to buy the policy with the $19.99 per month premium rather than the $2,000,000,000 per month one.

Hopefully my pessimism doesn't uninspire you. I'm actually not bipolar.

 

[blacktriangle]

If the path forward is a mechanized medium/heavy force, I agree with those that believe it should be in Europe, on day 1 of conflict.

But perhaps that is not the best way to provide support to our NATO allies? Considering the Russian emphasis on artillery, perhaps we should focus on countering that threat specifically? Extended range cannons, rocket artillery, AD & indirect fire protection, EW & ISR capabilities etc...

Or, could we focus on the unconventional side of the house, and have light forces with their own mobility assets ready to counter LGM wherever they appear?

 

[Infanteer]

If the path forward is a mechanized medium/heavy force, I agree with those that believe it should be in Europe, on day 1 of conflict.

Is the cost of garrisoning 4,000 CAF members and their families abroad something that the system can handle? The Brits have pulled out of mainland Europe, the the US is retrenching its positions worldwide. How is it that Canada can afford to fund this expense when our allies are trying to move the otherway?

 

[KevinB]

Tell me what that cost benefit analysis is then?

Explain the magnitude of additional time and fuel costs for a road move from Edmonton to Wainwright, perhaps with a DTSF? Show me how a 3-4 hour road move on Day 1 of an exercise significantly impacts the remaining exercise plan differently from a 30 minute road move. Also, let's see a good comparison of AFV manoeuvre boxes in Petawawa or Valcartier vs Wainwright or Suffield (and even Cold Lake - want to shoot sabot?). And we better evaluate the difference between range limitations in Gagetown and training areas out West too.

You can pitch "bias" and "emotion" at me because I don't agree with your cost benefit analysis, but lets see what said cost benefit analysis has behind it.

Cost in TDY $ for any courses that can't now be done locally
1 VP for instance will cost a lot more than 1 RCR or 1 R22eR to run a LAV Gunner class - as you have students now needing TDY pay for the overnights - that the other units with me ranges don't need to pay.

Cost in Transportation $ For the Low Beds, and crews - I'm not sure if the CF actually has enough low bed tractor trailers to heavy haul a Bn let alone a Bde in one or even 5 moves.
Seeing what if costs to move a CONEX Box (Sea Container) of ammo from Indiana to WV on a standard bed tractor trailer, and how much to low bed a MRAP from Norfolk to WV - I suspect you would be looking at a contracted out cost / move of about $3k each round trip.

Cost in Vehicle O&M for those that road move? I'm much more familiar with blade hour budgeting for certain US Rotary wing assets these days (and why its often cheaper to rent Twin Huey time here for units that can - but I am sure the CF has some formula for X KM and/or Y Hours - because your adding 250miles and 5 hours min round trip to the platforms that road move.

That may not come out of units budgets - but it is coming from somewhere - and reducing the pot of money (and time) that you could be doing other things.

I suspect quite quickly that the cost of infrastructure to base the Bde in Wx would be recovered - especially as a lot of that infrastructure is going to be needed anyway if you keep running personnel out there.

 

[KevinB]

Is the cost of garrisoning 4,000 CAF members and their families abroad something that the system can handle? The Brits have pulled out of mainland Europe, the the US is retrenching its positions worldwide. How is it that Canada can afford to fund this expense when our allies are trying to move the otherway?

I suspect that the host country would bend over backwards to assist the CF with any infrastructure needs.

Sure the cost of the moves upfront is significant - but I would also guess (based on previous history) the US Army would also bend over backward to get the CF all the kit it could desire from US Stock to fill that unit up to the max.

Beyond the Relocation expenses - I don't think there would be a significant burden, unless you did it entirely solo and setup your own little village for the Bde personnel.

 

[Kirkhill]

Is the cost of garrisoning 4,000 CAF members and their families abroad something that the system can handle? The Brits have pulled out of mainland Europe, the the US is retrenching its positions worldwide. How is it that Canada can afford to fund this expense when our allies are trying to move the otherway?

The Brits have indeed pulled out of mainland Europe - and have moved definitively to a lighter force equipped with novel technologies, a more dispersed foot print and more reliant on special forces (special being extremely broadly defined).

They have retained some heavy capabilities but that seems to be the area in which there is the least amount of investment and the greatest divestment of legacy capabilities.

Tracks are displaced by wheels and wings, both fixed and rotary. Bullets are displaced by missiles.

 

[blacktriangle]

Is the cost of garrisoning 4,000 CAF members and their families abroad something that the system can handle? The Brits have pulled out of mainland Europe, the the US is retrenching its positions worldwide. How is it that Canada can afford to fund this expense when our allies are trying to move the otherway?

I don't think it can under current conditions. I don't think we will ever deploy a true formed brigade again except under extreme duress (and with extreme delay) I'm also not convinced it would make much of a difference, anyways.

Canada could help to counter some of the unconventional/hybrid operations that adversaries can and would conduct. Both kinetic and non-kinetic.

 

[Infanteer]

Cost in TDY $ for any courses that can't now be done locally
1 VP for instance will cost a lot more than 1 RCR or 1 R22eR to run a LAV Gunner class - as you have students now needing TDY pay for the overnights - that the other units with me ranges don't need to pay.

Great, you've saved a couple hundred bucks in Incidental expenses and breakfast on a LAV gunner course, a rounding error on a Brigade's budget. That's if you choose to execute the course in the manner - the common practice is to deploy to the field as part of a unit exercise, for which TD benefits do not apply (this is what LDA is for), so this issue is not a factor.

Cost in Transportation $ For the Low Beds, and crews - I'm not sure if the CF actually has enough low bed tractor trailers to heavy haul a Bn let alone a Bde in one or even 5 moves.
Seeing what if costs to move a CONEX Box (Sea Container) of ammo from Indiana to WV on a standard bed tractor trailer, and how much to low bed a MRAP from Norfolk to WV - I suspect you would be looking at a contracted out cost / move of about $3k each round trip.

Cost in Vehicle O&M for those that road move? I'm much more familiar with blade hour budgeting for certain US Rotary wing assets these days (and why its often cheaper to rent Twin Huey time here for units that can - but I am sure the CF has some formula for X KM and/or Y Hours - because your adding 250miles and 5 hours min round trip to the platforms that road move.

That may not come out of units budgets - but it is coming from somewhere - and reducing the pot of money (and time) that you could be doing other things.

This is not a cost benefit analysis. This is just some random guesses on vehicle O&M costs (only one factor in the analysis) and no consideration of benefits.

 

[Kirkhill]

Operational structure of the Polish Land Forces - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Polish Land Forces - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

1 Armd Cav Div
3 Mech Divs

4 Armd Cav Bdes
8 Mech Bdes
1 Air Mobile Bde
1 Airborne Bde

1009 MBT

At present, Polish Army has a stock of 1009 tanks (2017). There are a total of 249 Leopard 2 tanks (137 Leopard 2 A4, 105 Leopard 2 A5, 5 Leopard 2PL,[15] 2 Leopard 2 NJ), 232 PT-91 tanks that underwent modernization in 2016, and 328 T-72 tanks. 230 of the T-72 are being upgraded in Bumar-Labedy arms manufacturer plant. Some of the improvements are: installation of new radio communication systems, digital engine control and start-up system, 3rd generation thermal imaging cameras, external transport baskets, and any necessary overhauls and repairs that can improve their longevity and combat ability on the modern battlefield.[16]

Beyond moral comfort what, in practical terms, is the Canadian Army going to offer the Poles?

And, despite the heavy preponderance of heavy and mech forces, why do the Poles waste effort by retaining two light brigades? With whom the Brits regularly practice.

Yes. We could repeat 4 CMBG and relocate it forward to Poland. At considerable expense and with little practical value and permanently tied.

Or. We could add some more light force reinforcement and focus on ISR technologies, the Artillery and the Air Force to supply things that our budget can afford and the Poles can't.

The brigade is currently[when?] composed of five separate battalions; 1 command battalion, 3 airborne infantry battalions, and 1 logistics battalion. The command battalion provides command and control for the brigade and also provides a reconnaissance company, a company of sappers, and an anti-aircraft battery. The airborne battalions consists of: a command company, 3 rifle companies, a mortar company, a logistics company and a medical support team. The brigade's logistics battalion is tasked with supplying any material supplies needed by the brigade during an operation.

Brigade units are stationed in three separate garrisons , its structure is as follows:

• 6th Airborne Brigade "Brig. Gen. Stanisław Sosabowski" in Kraków
  • 6th Command Battalion in Kraków
  • 6th Airborne Battalion in Gliwice
  • 16th Airborne Battalion in Kraków
  • 18th Airborne Battalion in Bielsko-Biała
  • 6th Logistic Battalion in Kraków

The brigade is directly responsible to the Armed Forces General Command (Poland).

25th Air Cavalry Brigade in Tomaszów Mazowiecki

• • 25th Command Battalion in Tomaszów Mazowiecki
  • 1st Light Cavalry Battalion in Leźnica Wielka
  • 7th Uhlan Battalion in Tomaszów Mazowiecki
  • 1st Aviation Group in Leźnica Wielka
    • 1st Squadron with 16x Mi-8T transport helicopters
    • 2nd Squadron with 16x Mi-17-1V transport helicopters
  • 7th Aviation Group in Nowy Glinnik
    • 1st Squadron with 12x PZL W-3WA Sokół armed transport helicopters
    • 2nd Squadron with 12x PZL W-3WA Sokół armed transport helicopters
  • Air Medical Evacuation Unit in Nowy Glinnik with 2x PZL W-3WA AE Sokół and 2x Mi-17AE medical evacuation helicopters
  • 25th Logistic Battalion in Tomaszów Mazowiecki

• • The (25th Air Cavalry) brigade serves in an air assault role, where troops are transported to and then inserted into battle using helicopters. This enables the brigade to have a high degree of maneuverability, being able to be transported rapidly to strategic or tactical situations.

25th Air Cavalry Brigade - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

6th Airborne Brigade (Poland) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org