Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[McG]

Why do we need five different organizations running bases (poorly)?

Why not a single one that can actually do it properly?

But the different uniform colours need all those orgs to check the box on formation command for more potential 2-leafs.

 

[dapaterson]

But the different uniform colours need all those orgs to check the box on formation command for more potential 2-leafs.

We'll make every building on base its own formation!

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm not sure I understand your point. It seems to be an argument about symmetrical vs. asymmetrical, but that's not really the same argument as having geography dictate who falls under what Brigade vs. having 1 CMBG consist of 1 VP, 2 RCR, and 3 R22R.

I'm sorry I wasn't clear.

Going into WWI one of the major recruiting tools was "the rest of the village is signing up - why aren't you?" Often asked by pretty young girls with white feathers to hand out to the laggards. The result was Kitchener's Army and the Pals Battalions and the Newfoundland Regiment and, in truth the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

But Sam Hughes did the CEF one favour. When he got it to Valcartier he scrambled the pieces so that battalions weren't tied as tightly to a specific town as the Brits. As a result he saved the CEF from one of the major crises of morale that almost derailed the British war effort.

After the First Day of the Somme the casualty reports came out. And villages all over Britain discovered that all the volunteers they had prodded to enlist were dead. Newfoundland still remembers that day.

The effect on the British army was to start redistributing recruits and returning soldiers to regiments other than their local ones. And to start redistributing battalions among brigades and divisions so that, in the event of casualties, the burden would be more uniformly distributed across the country. The cynic might say more easily hidden.

What I am saying is that regardless of how the army raises or trains its brigades in peacetime, in wartime there is an incentive to break up those formations and re-organize them.

And if it is not political pressure then two or three battles will start the process of reorganization in any event.

 

[Kirkhill]

Why do we need five different organizations running bases (poorly)?

Why not a single one that can actually do it properly?

The one mob may not do it properly but they couldn't do it worse - and could be held accountable. Maybe...

 

[FJAG]

I don't think running a base is rocket science. We already have specialists in all the main departments working there from finance to construction engineers to run the departments.

Different bases have very differing requirements. Shilo differs from Halifax which differs from Winnipeg. There are different requirements, different priorities and different ways budgets are allocated.

We don't need yet another centralized bureaucracy in Ottawa led by a three-star with a flurry of staff telling the field formations either what they need or what they are allowed to have.

 

[dapaterson]

The generalists will save us mentality cripples the CAF.

The Army need to focus on fighting, not building positions to hide those unfit to command.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The generalists will save us mentality cripples the CAF.

The Army need to focus on fighting, not building positions to hide those unfit to command.

 

[FJAG]

The generalists will save us mentality cripples the CAF.

The Army need to focus on fighting, not building positions to hide those unfit to command.

So does concentrating every decision and a fifth of all manpower in Ottawa cripple the CAF.

I would think that the ratio of those unfit to command is probably spread equally throughout the force. The problem is far too many senior positions in general and not who they specifically belong to. We have a few colonels/captains commanding brigades and wings and whatever we call a bundle of ships these days and a much, much, much larger menagerie of them commanding cubicles all over Ottawa.

The issue is not solved by creating yet another herd of them in yet another centralized group. It's solved by tuning down the overall number of commands, groups, directorates and what have you so that there is less need to promote marginal people into yet another make-work organization.

I do agree that two divisional headquarters are sufficient for the Army the size that it is. (I'm not even sure one needs to be a MGen to command a division, when a bde is commanded by a colonel, but that's pretty much what it is everywhere).

Just as a point - the Army's (and Navy's and Air Force's) need to focus on fighting also includes having appropriate facilities, an appropriate recruiting and training establishments, appropriate personnel support services, and appropriate supply and maintenance facilities in order to have their ability to fight sustained. The centralization of some of those has also had sub-optimal outcomes as well.

 

[dapaterson]

The Army robs O&M from bases, creating inferior quality of life to the other base operators, in order to run useless collective training events, wasting millions to bring vehicles to Wainwright, declaring units "ready", then posting out the leadership.

A single authority for bases would ensure common standards, appropriate facilities (not what petty empires want, but what they need), support services etc etc.

Stripping out the CDSG/CDSB constructs and their parallels in the RCAF. RCN, CMP and VCDS to consolidate would result in material savings in personnel doing those functions - savings in both money and personnel that could be redirected to operational outputs.

Or keep the Army model of bases having LCols as CO Pers, CO Tech Svcs, CO Blanket washing etc ad nauseum, plus the CDSG having duplicates above, with the Div having duplicates above, the Army duplicates above...

Your call.

 

[Kirkhill]

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[FJAG]

We have the potential to go back and forth for days on this. I tend to agree with most of your positions but not this one.

The Army robs O&M from bases, creating inferior quality of life to the other base operators, in order to run useless collective training events, wasting millions to bring vehicles to Wainwright, declaring units "ready", then posting out the leadership.

I do not consider collective training as useless. However, we agree on CMTC. I think that it was designed to solve a problem of the Army's own creation back in the '00s - managed readiness. I have no idea if the Army "robs" O&M or because of the size and nature of its force it is generally underfunded and needs to adjust priorities.

A single authority for bases would ensure common standards, appropriate facilities (not what petty empires want, but what they need), support services etc etc.

One man's petty empire is another man's bespoke organization tailored to meet requirements.

Stripping out the CDSG/CDSB constructs and their parallels in the RCAF. RCN, CMP and VCDS to consolidate would result in material savings in personnel doing those functions - savings in both money and personnel that could be redirected to operational outputs.

We've all seen those hollow promises before. I was there for integration/unification in the sixties. The CAF is still waiting for many of the benefits that these were supposed to deliver.

Or keep the Army model of bases having LCols as CO Pers, CO Tech Svcs, CO Blanket washing etc ad nauseum, plus the CDSG having duplicates above, with the Div having duplicates above, the Army duplicates above...

Your call.

I'm not saying that the system can't be improved. It can and it should. Stripping out meaningless management structure is high on my list. As I said, reduce the divisions in number by all means - two is appropriate. Thin out management layers by all means. But you'll still need many of the services being provided by something akin to a CDSG so the vast bulk of the people will still be needed.

All that I'm against is taking the CDSGs (and their Navy and Ai Force equivalents) away from the Army, Navy and Air Force and forming yet another 10,000 to 15,000 person establishment run out of Ottawa. Right now the Army's four CDSGs are run by four colonels. Betcha dollars to donuts that if this bunch plus the Navy and Air Force bases came under a unified authority there'd be a three star and a herd of two stars, one stars and the gods only know what else put in charge. This is starting to sound like a make-work plan to get loggies a whole bunch of extra stars and career field.

 

[KevinB]

But,

Politically, what is the effect if the 1 CMBG is tasked to a major effort and then takes casualties at the rate of the First Day of the Somme, or even Verrieres Ridge?

I can easily see the infantry battalions switched around even if the rest of the brigade structure is shipped over, and employed, intact.

The CF recruiting method for the reg force isn't like that -- while that applies to the reserver units - it doesn't apply to the regular Army.
Losing a village won't happen if 1 VP was wiped out one day.
Besides the PPLCI has a long Regimental tradition of being wiped out and reconstituted...


The cardinal rule is if 3 CF Officers get together - they form a HQ.
Just looking at the current ORBAT I am legimiately confused by the number of seemingly redundant HQ's.


Any actual change needs to start at the ground up - then justify everything above it.

Ideally this would start with filling line units to full strength.
Then their Higher Command HQ and Support functions.

I suspect that the Army would quickly run out of bodies
For instance looking at the Rifle Bn
4 x 180 man Rifle Coy = 720
1 x Recce Platton. = 40
1 x Sniper Troop. = 16
1 x Adm/Spt Coy. =140
1 x HQ = 84 (just to make it even)

That is without a fully Cbt Spt Coy

So 9 of those =9000 bodies

Arty Reg't
3 x 8 Gun Bty = 420
8 Gun Bty = ~ 140 (been a while since I look at this but 10 / gun, 2 CP's @ 5 each, Recce @ 6, 2 OP's @4, BC's Party/DCC @ 8, plus TSM's, BCM, BK etc - so 140 sound sounds good/ BTY
1 Adm Bty
I've not been paying attention for a while, but radar guys, AD Bty, Mortars (cause apparently Infantry can't be trusted)

Your at 600 min there
2 RCHA, a RALC, and W Bty in Gagetown = there is at least 2000 bodies.

I'm even worse at the Engineer Regiment math
3 sections @10 / troop (plus Troop Cdr, TSM, etc. - lets say 45
2 troops / Squadron so at least 120 / Sqn
3 Sqn / Reg
so 360 in just Field squadrons
Then Heavy Equipment Sqn at another 120
CSS Squadron
etc
Lets call it 600 there too
so 3 CER's (I can't recall the French term) plus the Airfield folks - I'll be low here - but 2,000

Now the Armored - I never paid attention to them - so bear with me here)1
4 tanks / platoon (4 folks in a tank) 16
2 Platoon/ Troop - 50 inc HQ / troop
2 Troops / Sqn so 120 ish / Sqn
3 Sqn Reg 360
Recovery Sqn ~ 120
Recce Sqn ~ 120
HQ folks - say 700 total?
3 Armored units - so 2,100

So we are over 15k in just Cbt Arm PY's

No Service BN
No Comms Reg
No Higher HQ's

Having 1 Can Div HQ is a stretch - having more is like putting your boots on without getting dressed and heading out to work.

 

[Good2Golf]

Stripping out the CDSG/CDSB constructs and their parallels in the RCAF. RCN, CMP and VCDS to consolidate would result in material savings in personnel doing those functions - savings in both money and personnel that could be redirected to operational outputs.

Yeah, because “Shared Services” functionality works so well? So CFJ(army)OSG will make everything run so smoothly?

…or one could just leave the RCAF Wings and RCN Bases alone, since they’re not substantively broken, and let them do their L2-administered L3/L4 support as they have, and let CFJOSG do what CJOC tasks it to do, and let the Army continue to soul-search how to sort out a properly functioning support CDSG/CDSB/ASG/ASU/Base/Whatever structure to support the generating field force…

 

[blacktriangle]

Assuming 1000 positions/battalion as per Kevin's example, I wonder how many the CA could fully man today using only those found in BN lines?

If the answer is only six or seven, perhaps that's what the CA should be working with to start. It would also serve to further highlight how silly the number of divisions is. Repeat this process with every organization/capability, until you see the army you actually have (or don''t have, as the case may be)

 

[FJAG]

Assuming 1000 positions/battalion as per Kevin's example, I wonder how many the CA could fully man today using only those found in BN lines?

If the answer is only six or seven, perhaps that's what the CA should be working with to start. It would also serve to further highlight how silly the number of divisions is. Repeat this process with every organization/capability, until you see the army you actually have (or don''t have, as the case may be)

There's another theory of manning units, however.

Develop a war establishment as per doctrine and then only man the organization sufficiently during peacetime to allow for proper training and to develop the full offr and NCM leadership cadre needed for expansion. Then fill in the blank files from other units or reservists if and when the need arises.

I constantly carp on how we have too many people in administrative management positions (especially in Ottawa) but at the same time I think we really can never have too many full-time officers and NCOs capable of operating at the unit level. A financially and operationally efficient military should be able to find the balance.

While reducing the numbers of battalions to meet current personnel strength would benefit the remaining units and even the equipment distribution, it would severely limit the ability of the force to grow in an emergency.

With three Reg F brigades and another 15 - 20,000 reservists, a two division force is reasonable even if we're still short of two divisions' worth of equipment

 

[MilEME09]

If we follow doctrine, we open up a new can of worms, we will need a lot more men and equipment. As example Below is a Division maintenance battalion, yes that is right a RCEME Battalion, and it is larger then most front line A ech units. We would need an army much large to flush this organization out. Not even touching the fact that by doctrine maintenance is separate but in practice we are part of service battalions. This organization is also very out of date and last revised pre-90s.

 

[Kirkhill]

2013 4182 1056

The reference year

The number of infanteers authorized for the field force

The number of non-infanteers authorized to support the infantry battalions.

1000 PYs per battalion.

4 battalions? Maybe 5?

Or do we use another number than 1000?

 

[FJAG]

If we follow doctrine, we open up a new can of worms, we will need a lot more men and equipment. As example Below is a Division maintenance battalion, yes that is right a RCEME Battalion, and it is larger then most front line A ech units. We would need an army much large to flush this organization out. Not even touching the fact that by doctrine maintenance is separate but in practice we are part of service battalions. This organization is also very out of date and last revised pre-90s.

View attachment 66333

Boy, I haven't seen that for quite some time. Luckily I still have a copy of CFP 314 Vol 2 Maintenance in Battle from back in 1987 - part of Gen Baril's scheme to actually put a doctrine into play so that we all knew just how tricky a big Cold War army needed to be and what all its moving parts had to be to be successful. I think something like this was reissued in the late 1990s as well before everything went to hell in a handbasket under transformation.

Here's the key takeaway from this, however. This is what was, at the time, the best staff estimate to set out what was necessary to support three brigades in the field each of which had its own A Ech maintenance elements at the unit level and a maintenance company at the brigade group level. It stands to reason that an organization of the nature of a DISGP and its maintenance battalion should exist within peacetime for a three-brigade army to provide maintenance support at the above-brigade level and, if there was any intent on ever deploying one or more brigades, to be capable of mobilizing itself or a portion of itself for the field so as to provide the appropriate support for the deployed Canadian force in theatre. Composite DISGP battalions could be spun off to each of the three major brigade support bases.

But no. Instead we have a CF Joint Operational Support Group that nebulously strips deploying units and brigade headquarters of their A Ech and ad hoc cobbles together NSEs from bases and support units all over the country which provide both forward support and the rear link for whatever we deploy.

Do we even teach maintenance doctrine anymore? That's a rhetorical question. Of course we do. I'm just not sure if anyone still takes it seriously?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Geography is a real constraint and has a huge impact on your ability to train together. It also matters for understanding the constraints each unit faces. I used to think 2 RCR was probably pretty similar to 2VP, being separated from the Brigade, having a big training area next door, etc. After one intro/SAV to Shilo, boy was I ever wrong.

I'd also assume that 2VP and 1 RCHA would receive even less favourable base services from 3 CDSG. Right now if something is falling off the rails, Comd 1 CMBG is across the street from both Comd 3 CDSG and Comd 3 Div, it can be easily addressed. I don't think it would work so well if it was Comd 2 CMBG fielding complaints and having to try and get them addressed.

Having 2 RCR/C Sqn or 2VP/1 RCHA seperated from their Brigades already has pros/cons (for the units), but increasing the distance seems like it would only magnify the cons and not come with any additional benefits. It would everything more difficult logistically, the displaced units would be less able to get support from their Bde HQ, etc.

I don't know why we wouldn't organize geographically and then try to force generate, to the extent possible, from established and cohesive formations, rather trying to throw a mix of things together which would lead to an awful lot of C2 problems at the start. Bolting one rifle company onto a cohesive Battlegroup is one thing and I doubt there weren't some C2 issues to be worked out.... but bolting together various parts from various different regions/HQs to try and stand up a cohesive formation, methinks would be a C2 disaster.

Except that everyone 'hates' R22eR, stuffed into their 'Belle Province' ghetto.

We've built three Army solitudes. That's not a good thing.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Pull all bases out of the RCN, CA, RCAF, VCDS and CMP, put them under Support Command. Toss the supply depots there as well, the MP group, HS group, recruiting group.

Voila. The Army can divest the four Areas turned Divs, recycle them into one Reg F div and one Res F Div HQ. Lots of savings possible there...

Yeah, because centralizing IT in SSC and centralizing CE in RP Ops has been such a raging success…