Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Brad Sallows]

Why are platoons being issued with 60 km UAVs these days?

Range == time on station.

 

[GR66]

A 2 x div corps is pretty common. Another div can always be plugged in if it becomes available; the heavy lift is getting to the point of having a corps.

Especially when a deployable, combat capable Brigade is a challenge

 

[KevinB]

Especially when a deployable, combat capable Brigade is a challenge

Which is criminal at this point in time. The CA has personnel for a (smaller sized) Corps, the fact that the Army isn’t setup for that is entirely the fault of the Army’s leadership for decades.

But then if organized as a Corps the cupboard would be very very clearly bare. As opposed to playing with BattleGroup sized entities that hot swap equipment to attempt to pretend it’s equipped.

 

[Rjgillies]

I have been following some similar debates about the best configuration for UK army forces and this has popped up

https://twitter.com/x/status/1763855598930588000

 

[FJAG]

I like the Brit's ResF policies and structures only slightly more than ours. Like Canada, their focus is almost exclusively on the RegF, but at least they have much larger ResF battalions.

 

[WestIsle]

I like the Brit's ResF policies and structures only slightly more than ours. Like Canada, their focus is almost exclusively on the RegF, but at least they have much larger ResF battalions.

Still a huge fall from the Territorial Army of the Cold War which didnt include the reserves.

 

[markppcli]

Still a huge fall from the Territorial Army of the Cold War which didnt include the reserves.

Huh? The TA was reservists. It’s a semantic difference.

I like the Brit's ResF policies and structures only slightly more than ours. Like Canada, their focus is almost exclusively on the RegF, but at least they have much larger ResF battalions.

They’re also willing to sacrifice history for operational practicality. Of course the history of 400 yr old Scottish regiments that fought Napoleon is nothing compared to the history of the Backwoods Fusiliers and the 17 people they send in operations one year.

 

[daftandbarmy]

They’re also willing to sacrifice history for operational practicality. Of course the history of 400 yr old Scottish regiments that fought Napoleon is nothing compared to the history of the Backwoods Fusiliers and the 17 people they send in operations one year.

Meanwhile, the (largely being retained for ceremonial purposes and internal political shenanigans) Guards Division be like...

 

[ArmyRick]

I just finished reading @FJAG book, Unsustainable at any cost 2nd Ed. I wanted to share my thoughts on it.

First, if you haven't read it, please get a copy and read it. Its worth it 100%.

So, for context, Wolf was an artillery officer and a Lawyer (serving 4 decades in uniform), he speaks not just in theory but experienced based as well. My observations are coming from a retired Infantry WO served 28 years total (Reg and P Res time) who served 3 tours overseas (all in Bosnia NATO)

First, it was very illuminating (sorry for the arty pun) about our systemic problems that plague the CAF. Wolf highlights a few key points that at the root cause of the problem

-Canada has very little political will to keep large "forces in being" (The Reg F, the ready to move now troops). They are very costly (most of it going to wages). I agree. Our nation (left or right, don't matter) only like to talk about defence spending in larger numbers for things like The Yugoslavian War, 9/11 and Afghanistan, Fighting ISIS or the current War in The Ukraine. When times are good or appear to be good, defence spending takes a very deep back seat to affordable living and food, education and health. So we do have to accept that Canadians do not have the stomach for a large peacetime military budget.

-We completely fail to manage the Primary Reserves effectively. I agree 100%. Their are many, many issues that come up but Wolf hits most of these points very well in his book. Many of the issues I agree with as I have seen them first hand myself. We need a better way to manage and use our P Res forces. Right now, they are mostly a manpower pool.

-To get the most out of our P Res, we need a whole of society buy in. We need job protection for reserve soldiers, incentives for people to commit and a steadfast re-assurance that the reserves can and will make their commitment. Without that 99.9% commitment, the reserves can not train effectively and thus are not usable to their full extent. We fall back to the P Res being nothing but a manpower pool. This unrelenting steadfast commitment must come from society, government at all levels and the individual members.

-Canada has become WAY too much of an ad hoc force. Yes, you should always tailor the organization to the mission at hand but when I first joined the Regs, when we deployed as a battalion to become a battle group, we bolted on supporting arm sub units and filled in manpower gaps with PRes. I never deployed to Afghanistan (I was training soldiers in Meaford at the time and then when I wanted to deploy had a terrible medical crisis that put me in TCAT, almost into PCAT) however the guys told me of the mix and matching going on at the time to meet mission requirements. It was at the time unusual (now we accept it as the norm). Wolf offers a total force and viable solution to stop always ad hoc formations. Again, it requires the previous point to be met first.

-Wolf mentions excellent ways to capture and encourage the skill sets of experienced soldiers as they release from the Reg F

-On the idea of making WO ranks more like the US Army WO ranks. I very much disagree. Not just because I was a WO, but I see the value of having the rank function as senior NCM leadership. The WO ranks (WO-CWO) can hold leadership appointments such as CSM or RSM. However we can also be employed in staff jobs or other non-supervisory roles as well. On this point, for Wolf to capture skilled individuals, I would rather see a creation of "technician" or "specialist" ranks like the US Army does. I do see value in capturing the skills of civy people without making them be Private no hook.

-Has has various ratios of Reg:Res manning ratios. I see the value of it for sure, however as a simple dumb ass trench digger, i was starting to get lost in the weeds in all the ratios (10:90, 30:70, 70:30, 100:00). For me (and probably the bureaucrats in Ottawa who are usually pretty dumb to begin with IMO) to pick one ratio and run with it (I like 30:70 with Regs leveraging their expertise and experience in many senior leadership or key manning positions)

-Wolf has an idea of forming brigades in the traditional function such as maneuver and various support brigades. I am truly torn on this point. I see the value of artillery, logistics and engineer brigades (for both operational and administrative management) however I was raised on the CMBG organizations (Its great to have most of what you need). I am kind of not sure what way to lean. I can totally get on board with the Wolf's proposal as long as their is no bureaucratic BS getting in the way of getting the support you need for the troops fighting, in peace and war.

@Infanteer @TangoTwoBravo any other serving officers, have you read this book?

 

[FJAG]

Thanks @ArmyRick. As I said above, I value all viewpoints. The one about ratios has me thinking and I'll mull through that one.

I do want to address the WO issue though because I probably wasn't clear enough.

Firstly, we start with the existing system where there are two distinct career service lines: NCMs and commissioned officers.

I actually see no change to these other than some minor name changes. For example WOs are renamed as staff sergeants, MWOs as Sergeants Major and CWOs could be named Battalion or Regimental or Command Sergeants Major. The two keys here is the term "sergeant" as a distinctive nod to the senior NCM linage. This is simply to free up the "warrant" name and title. In all other respects, sergeants major function exactly the same as they do now under the "warrant" title. They have the same roles and authority and are equally capable in functioning in other staff and leadership roles as they do now.

You're right, I envision the new third category of service - the "warrant" category as a specialist system. The problem with the US "Specialist" rank is that it only exists at the E-4 level as a skilled equivalent of the rank of corporal (except in Space Force). What I'm trying to achieve (and I admit it could be done in different ways but the WO system is already in use in several armies) is to create a system where an individual can come into the army as a civilian, or transfer in as a serving soldier at any rank, and apply for a special technical career field without having to have a university education. He would take a form of BMQ (let's call it BMWQ) for the general WO career stream and then take the specialist training required for him as a PD1 WO in the specific trade/field. On graduation he would start off with a pay category equivalent to let's say, a lieutenant.

Depending on the career field, incoming WOs may or may not have some leadership responsibilities. If leadership responsibility exists it would only be in their technical field and with responsibilities commensurate with a lieutenant. WOs would progress within their specialty fields to different rank levels with pay and responsibilities commensurate with the ranks of capt and maj and top out at LCol. Conceivably CWOs could take on responsibilities commensurate with a commissioned LCol such as commanding a school.

The extent that the WO rank would penetrate the trades could vary widely from very narrow technical fields to broader fields that span the trades such as graduates of the current technical warrant officer program (in part they would specialize in weapon systems and their procurement and fielding)

Like NCMs, the WO system would provide a method to CFR to commissioned officer.

The idea of a third career stream is not tied to the WO name, but is meant to create flexibility that would allow an individual to come into a specific skilled specialist trade at a pay scale equivalent to a commissioned officer and without the need to spend decades in the ranks as an NCM or having to have a university education. It provides a third career stream option. As I indicated above, the NCM and commissioned officer streams remain unchanged except for some very minor name changes.

Once again. Thanks for reading the book.

 

[KevinB]

The problem with reg/res ratios is it requires a complete upending of the CA and somewhat Canadian society.

I agree it needs to be done to make a viable CA, and CAF as a whole, I’m just not sure Canada is there yet.

I’m not 100% set that 30/70 is the best blanket method to adopt. I’m going to play with the Napkin Army task again - as I think there is value in a few different force constructs.

Obviously one needs 100% Reg for immediate out the door tasks, but I tend to think different units can get by with different ratios after that.

10/90 didn’t work for the Infantry, but seemed to function fine for the Artillery units that had been implemented like that.

As long as you have the ability to call up PRes forces to full time status when needed as well as protect their time for training etc, one can do a lot with part time soldiers / the Army National Guard showed that was possible during GWOT.

But there needs to be equipment for the reserves or it is all for naught, right now the Army can’t even effectively equip the Reg Force, and while you can save $ on salaries using Reserves, the up front cost of a unit’s equipment is the same regardless of that unit is Regular or Reserve.

 

[Kirkhill]

Lessons applied at NTC and JRTC.

With an eye on Ukraine, Army revamps training to reflect modern war​

Soldiers are learning to hide their Starlink dishes—and relearning the importance of digging a deep foxhole.​

BY SAM SKOVE
STAFF WRITER
MARCH 5, 2024

FORT IRWIN, California—From the air, the camouflaged headquarters of Maj. Gen. Jim Isenhower looked much like any other rocky hill in the barren desert landscape.

The effect was almost perfect—except for the distinctive white square of a Starlink satellite antenna that would be all too visible to the commercially available drones used by Blackhorse, the Army unit playing Isenhower’s adversary.

“Throw a blanket on that,” Maj. Gen. Curt Taylor, commander of Fort Irwin’s National Training Center, instructed one soldier.
As the Army absorbs the lessons of Ukraine, the service’s top training centers are pushing more and more realistic scenarios on soldiers, while also giving them opportunities to try new ideas, often based on commercial tech such as Starlink.

The changes reflect the priorities of the new Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Randy George, who is pressing units to adapt to the increasingly surveilled battlefield and to embrace cheap, commercially available tech over multi-billion dollar weapons.

The Army has “a real sense of urgency,” about operating under constant observation, George said in a January interview.
Part of the solution is technology that can reduce the threat “in a lot of cases out there,” he said at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Louisiana.

Many of these lessons are based on observations of Ukraine, commanders said.

“We have been really studying,” said NTC’s Taylor, who cited Ukraine’s New Year’s Eve strike on a Russian base located by tracking soldiers’ cellphones.

Both Taylor and Col. Matt Hardman, who leads JRTC’s operations group, said they were in regular contact with Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, the U.S.-led organization that coordinates international-led training and equipping of Ukrainian forces.

In recent exercises at NTC and JRTC, soldiers effectively entered the exercise from the moment they woke up in their home bases, much as they would in an actual war. For one January exercise at JRTC, soldiers flew some 400 miles by helicopter from their base, said Hardman.

For a February training exercise at NTC, soldiers assembled at a railhead some 40 miles away and then drove their military vehicles for the last leg of their journey, said Taylor. The old method would have seen soldiers bus into NTC, allowing them plenty of time to get their bearings.
“They get off the bus, they think they’re going to bed down and go into admin,” said Taylor.

The logistic portion also increasingly strives for realism. Before, units receiving artillery shells would receive virtual shells — now they must transport mock rounds weighing the same as the real thing, said JRTC commander Brig. Gen. David Gardner.

Constant surveillance

As soon as they enter the training site, soldiers find themselves under constant observation, by drone, satellite, and electronic surveillance. The cellphones they carry become potential homing beacons for enemy forces.

Standing in a command center in the middle of the NTC desert, Maj. John Mahood said that Blackhorse drones had tracked his convoy from the moment they entered the training site all the way to the command center.

“Almost the entire time that we were driving, there were small UAS systems hovering over our convoy,” Mahood said. “They know we're here.”
In the past, opposing forces might not strike a unit’s command post. To replicate the dangers seen in Ukraine and elsewhere, though, those same command posts may now find themselves at the receiving end of a simulated missile or artillery strike.

“We have no problem doing” mass casualties events at command posts now, said Gardner. Strikes can come as little as three days into the exercise, said 1st Lt. Seth M. Deltenre, Gardner’s aide-de-camp.

Still, the centers try to strike a balance so that units get in some training before they’re targeted, said JRTC’s Hardwood.

“We don’t want to give the Kobayashi Maru” scenario, he said, referring to a fictional training exercise in Star Trek meant to be unwinnable.
In a shift, units hit by simulated enemy fire can no longer call in an easily targeted helicopter to evacuate soldiers from the exact spot where they were injured, said Gardner. Instead, “wounded” soldiers are dragged back to casualty stations farther from the front line.

Jamming is ever-present, with units' communications and GPS signals attacked by the soldiers playing their enemies. Besides cutting units’ ties with their command posts, the attacks also increase the potential for (simulated) friendly-fire, said Taylor.

“We have to be more deliberate with procedural control,” said Taylor, referring to controlling units by designating certain areas as free-fire zones, and certain areas as off limits. “We can't have positive control, which means ‘I know where you are at all times’.”

Technical experimentation

NTC and JRTC have become hotbeds of technical experimentation with better ways to hide, evade, or strike back.
At the most basic level, at least some command posts now come equipped with camouflage nets that also serve to dampen the electronic magnetic signature of the equipment inside.

Some units, like Isenhower’s command post, are also making use of high-powered communications tech borrowed from the commercial world. Starlink devices, as used, can provide high-bandwidth communications in small, easy-to-use packages. Other units use Kymeta, a Starlink competitor.

At one command post at JRTC, the older alternative to these next-gen satellite services was clear to see: a large dish at least five times the size of the Starlink.

Other communications tools include equipment that lets soldiers access cell networks, allowing them to both hide in the mass of civilian signals and gain fast internet access.

Units are also leaning on TAK, commercially available tracking software, to improve coordination. Deployed units, vehicles, and command posts are all using some version of the tool. At JRTC, the TAK gear had allowed two command posts to shed most of their bulky monitors and cables. Instead, they used just a projector and a sheet to display the locations of their forces.

Re-learning old skills

Yet some units are relearning lessons hardly changed since WWI, such as: low-ranking commanders must make decisions on their own; U.S. forces will be under threat from the air; soldiers must learn to dig foxholes.

For one, the risk of communications being jammed or tracked means that commanders must now become skilled at issuing clear yet simple instructions, said Gardner.

That’s no easy task, said Mahood, noting that officers must now write clear, succinct orders even as they battle stressful situations. It’s also a “mental shift” for senior officers, he said, who are used to their staff producing more detailed plans. Officers must adjust to seeing that orders are “good enough,” he said.

Soldiers also have to learn to hide. At NTC, they moved their vehicles under warehouses to keep them away from prying drones and satellites, just as in Ukraine soldiers often make use of bridges and other buildings to conceal themselves.

Individual soldiers, meanwhile, are learning to take cover from drones by using the woods of JRTC, according to Hardwood.

“Rotational training units are getting better and better at camouflage cover concealment and dispersion, most importantly, in terms of the small UAS threat,” said chief warrant officer Christian Lehr, a member of Geronimo, the unit that plays the Army adversary at JRTC.

Units are also doing their best to reduce the amount of equipment needed to set up command posts, and to practice taking them down quickly to prevent being easily targeted.

Capt. Charles O’Hagan of the 101st Airborne’s second brigade, said that his unit had done an audit of the headquarters and stripped away every possible unnecessary cable.

After running multiple drills, the unit shrank the time needed to break down the camp to 35 minutes — down from the hour and a half that it took the first time. The unit eventually hopes to get down to twenty minutes, he said.

And even as drones take over the sky, the infantry will still have to learn a basic skill since the time of the Romans: how to dig, fast.
Such skills are necessary to cope with artillery and other long-range fires.

“We've got to get serious about dig-or-die,” said Taylor. When simulated artillery lands, “We're gonna we're going to be very unkind to you as to how we assess casualties.”

George’s last stop at JRTC took him to the newly dug position of the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment company. Its soldiers had spent 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. the previous night digging foxholes in cold, wet weather in the Louisiana forest. Their camouflaged-smeared faces looked out over machine guns and anti-tank weapons. As much as drones and satellites may have changed war, they were no less tired for sleeping the night in a muddy hole.

“I hope they come,” one soldier said as George departed. “I didn’t dig this for no reason.”

 

[daftandbarmy]

-On the idea of making WO ranks more like the US Army WO ranks. I very much disagree. Not just because I was a WO, but I see the value of having the rank function as senior NCM leadership. The WO ranks (WO-CWO) can hold leadership appointments such as CSM or RSM. However we can also be employed in staff jobs or other non-supervisory roles as well. On this point, for Wolf to capture skilled individuals, I would rather see a creation of "technician" or "specialist" ranks like the US Army does. I do see value in capturing the skills of civy people without making them be Private no hook.

If we didn't have WOs, who would be responsible for making our Officers better?

 

[Kirkhill]

Mission Command and Culture -

From the Small Wars Journal

What National Culture Teaches Us About Mission Command | Small Wars Journal

Mission Command was made in America. While the formal term Mission Command was not coined until 2003, it has been in practice throughout American military history. Three core tenets of Mission Command are Commander’s Intent, Mutual Trust, and Common Understanding. In essence: Commanders...

smallwarsjournal.com

 

[FJAG]

If we didn't have WOs, who would be responsible for making our Officers better?

Sergeants, Staff Sergeants and Sergeants Major.

 

[Brad Sallows]

If we didn't have WOs, who would be responsible for making our Officers better?

Salty corporals.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Salty corporals.

Knowing now what I didn't know then, I would not take advice from Cpl Wannabe on anything, let alone good officership

 

[KevinB]

Knowing now what I didn't know then, I would not take advice from Cpl Wannabe on anything, let alone good officership

Well you could know what not to do

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Well you could know what not to do

That usually happened afters the Extras were handed out

 

[Brad Sallows]

Knowing now what I didn't know then, I would not take advice from Cpl Wannabe on anything, let alone good officership

Surely no-one at that rank level would possibly offer advice that might be self-serving or mischievous.