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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

If we have Canadian troops on an operation then we need some form of NCE. There are bone fide national command requirements that need to be met. An NCE relieves the Brigade HQ of that. We also need some form of NSE, apart from the CSS that is with the fighting formation and any allied CSS formations (JLSG etc). NCEs and NSEs can become bloated to the point of becoming self-licking ice-cream cones, but the requirement is still there to allow the fighting formation HQ to focus on the fight while the NCE and NSE handle national issues.

There can be a combined national HQ with a COS National and a COS Operations, but that is more for COIN/stability than for mobile combat operations.
 
If we have Canadian troops on an operation then we need some form of NCE. There are bone fide national command requirements that need to be met. An NCE relieves the Brigade HQ of that. We also need some form of NSE, apart from the CSS that is with the fighting formation and any allied CSS formations (JLSG etc). NCEs and NSEs can become bloated to the point of becoming self-licking ice-cream cones, but the requirement is still there to allow the fighting formation HQ to focus on the fight while the NCE and NSE handle national issues.

There can be a combined national HQ with a COS National and a COS Operations, but that is more for COIN/stability than for mobile combat operations.
I’m not disagreeing on that aspect (anymore). My point is that it may be a lot more effective/efficient to roll those into the Higher Formation.
Adding a Cdn HQ cell into a U.S. Div would reduce the PY requirements form a separate entity itself, as would the CSS and CS assets into the DIV assets.
A Div doesn’t even have all the foundations to be a NSE, but would need to either poach Corps or higher assets if separately deployed or build a large ‘separate’ fixed support structure.

In terms of looking at Latvia, one could build a separate NSE structure - but if it needed to go mobile, it realy couldn’t without a massive increase in personnel and equipment.
 
An NCE does not have to be large, but I don't think it would make sense to roll it into the multi-national (or US) division to which a CMBG would be attached. That Div HQ would be focused on prosecuting the fight - they don't need NCEs attached to them. I would expect to find the NCE somewhere in the theatre where they could be static and probably co-located with the NSE. This might be at/near the SPOD or primary APOD. Now, if its COIN/stability and there is a big multi-national base acting as the APOD and Div HQ for the whole operation then perhaps the various NCEs would also be found there.

If we are talking about a mech brigade conducting operations then there would also be a Service Battalion performing Second Line CSS. If its a multi-national Brigade then it may well be a multi-national Service Battalion. Each theatre will have its own CSS arrangements, but I would expect to see some commodities being handled in common (fuel, water, food) while others would come from national sources (parts, unique natures of ammo etc). In a NATO context there would be a JLSG (basically a multi-national sustainment brigade) that would act as the theatre-level link for the various NSEs and then whatever tactical CSS elements are in play. The JLSG would coordinate CSS for for the various troops contributing nations, seeking to achieve efficiencies.

So a Canadian-led Brigade in a NATO context might have a Canadian-led Svc Bn providing Second Line CSS to the Brigade. This would "in the field." There would also be a Canadian NSE and NCE somewhere in the support area, tied into the JLSG. All likely near an SPOD or APOD. In the middle could be other CSS elements (either multi-national or single nation providing a capability like fuel etc) acting as the link.

In Kabul the size of the AO allowed an NSE to do everything, albeit with limitations. Kandahar certainly stretched that to the breaking point. A mech brigade maneuvering will have a Svc Bn, with a separate NSE somewhere to the rear in the theatre support area.
 
An NCE does not have to be large, but I don't think it would make sense to roll it into the multi-national (or US) division to which a CMBG would be attached. That Div HQ would be focused on prosecuting the fight - they don't need NCEs attached to them. I would expect to find the NCE somewhere in the theatre where they could be static and probably co-located with the NSE. This might be at/near the SPOD or primary APOD. Now, if its COIN/stability and there is a big multi-national base acting as the APOD and Div HQ for the whole operation then perhaps the various NCEs would also be found there.

If we are talking about a mech brigade conducting operations then there would also be a Service Battalion performing Second Line CSS. If its a multi-national Brigade then it may well be a multi-national Service Battalion. Each theatre will have its own CSS arrangements, but I would expect to see some commodities being handled in common (fuel, water, food) while others would come from national sources (parts, unique natures of ammo etc). In a NATO context there would be a JLSG (basically a multi-national sustainment brigade) that would act as the theatre-level link for the various NSEs and then whatever tactical CSS elements are in play. The JLSG would coordinate CSS for for the various troops contributing nations, seeking to achieve efficiencies.

So a Canadian-led Brigade in a NATO context might have a Canadian-led Svc Bn providing Second Line CSS to the Brigade. This would "in the field." There would also be a Canadian NSE and NCE somewhere in the support area, tied into the JLSG. All likely near an SPOD or APOD. In the middle could be other CSS elements (either multi-national or single nation providing a capability like fuel etc) acting as the link.

In Kabul the size of the AO allowed an NSE to do everything, albeit with limitations. Kandahar certainly stretched that to the breaking point. A mech brigade maneuvering will have a Svc Bn, with a separate NSE somewhere to the rear in the theatre support area.
So "ad hocery" is a feature and not a bug?

And no sarcasm intended there.

Max Flex in practice.
 
Adding a Cdn HQ cell into a U.S. Div would reduce the PY requirements form a separate entity itself, as would the CSS and CS assets into the DIV assets.
The NCE can’t be an appendage of a higher allied HQ and still do its job. It is not uncommon that the Canadian TF Comd may wear two hats with the second hat being within the multinational command structure, but the Canadian hat must be supported by a Canadian staff focused on the national responsibilities. This does not necessitate a large NCE, and the organization often is small when the Canadian contribution is OPCON/OPCOM to an allied or multinational HQ that is responsible for operation.
 
Reach back secure real times voice and data support isn’t exactly small when one is dealing with a Bde plus entity. Security, and Logistics support then needs to be added to a NSE if that doesn’t have anything to be attached too.
 
Reach back secure real times voice and data support isn’t exactly small when one is dealing with a Bde plus entity. Security, and Logistics support then needs to be added to a NSE if that doesn’t have anything to be attached too.
The problem we have is that we deploy a Tactical formation (Bde/BG minus) and tack on Strategic level support (NSE) and call it a JTF "Operational" force under the command of a NCE.

It's a hodgepodge of effects that is absolute hell from a support point of view and is even worse for and kind of C2 structure at any level. As a Sigs Planner, you now have triple the IERs that need to be factored and often times multiple Services that can't use the same bearer. Add in the fact you have largely static HQ/Support trying to maintain the same level of real time Voice/Data comms with a highly mobile tactical formation... you're in for a bad time.

Now add Air and Maritime assets to the ORBAT and your J6 might have an aneurysm.
 
The problem we have is that we deploy a Tactical formation (Bde/BG minus) and tack on Strategic level support (NSE) and call it a JTF "Operational" force under the command of a NCE.

It's a hodgepodge of effects that is absolute hell from a support point of view and is even worse for and kind of C2 structure at any level. As a Sigs Planner, you now have triple the IERs that need to be factored and often times multiple Services that can't use the same bearer. Add in the fact you have largely static HQ/Support trying to maintain the same level of real time Voice/Data comms with a highly mobile tactical formation... you're in for a bad time.

Now add Air and Maritime assets to the ORBAT and your J6 might have an aneurysm.
NSE as we know it is a symptom, or perhaps a band aid to a larger issue. Beyond the service battalion, we have no deployable CSS elements above brigade level, CDSG's aren't deployable nor should they, but do we need a non ad-hoc COSCOM Logistics Brigade? yes i know we do not have people for such an organization but humor me. Should we as a expeditionary force have a CSS organization solely dedicated to forward deploying strategic logistical services and needs of the task forces, especially if Latvia is becoming a brigade?
 
NSE as we know it is a symptom, or perhaps a band aid to a larger issue. Beyond the service battalion, we have no deployable CSS elements above brigade level, CDSG's aren't deployable nor should they, but do we need a non ad-hoc COSCOM Logistics Brigade? yes i know we do not have people for such an organization but humor me. Should we as a expeditionary force have a CSS organization solely dedicated to forward deploying strategic logistical services and needs of the task forces, especially if Latvia is becoming a brigade?

I feel you. CFJOSG is literally everything and nothing at the same time when it comes to supporting a deployed force; mainly because they are responsible for the opening, sustaining, and closure aspect of all CJOC operations concurrently, while lacking the personnel and equipment to sustain any of those missions for a prolonged theatre.
 
The problem that I see is that the combat and combat support arms have basically two jobs - train for operations and deploy on operations.

The CSS, on the other hand have three - sustain the force, train for operations and deploy on operations.

In order to do all three jobs, the CSS needs to be established with enough supernumeraries on strength so that sustaining the force can carry on undiminished while some elements train for operations and deploy on them. Deciding how large that "excess" force should be is hard what with fluctuating missions.

Unfortunately, what with the size of the CAF, there isn't much appetite for creating "overstrength" CSS organizations. And thus you rob Peter to pay Paul.

🍻
 
Sell it as in aid of disaster response? Might encourage keeping the "excess" in at least vaguely deployable unit formats, too.
Would require more then just that, as we would have to admit we are robbing peter to pay paul, admit that we do not have a big enough CSS force to sustain the army, admit that we use Class B's to plug holes in the reg force TOE because we have all these units and not enough PY's, etc...
 
Enis has been with this program since it began and also was involved with the IDF’s use of the Thor quadcopter drone, which conducts surveillance and can also be used in swarms, according to previous reports. The Thor is used at the battalion level for ISR missions, whereas the Spike FireFly will be incorporated at the company level with each operator also having access to several of the drones.
“It’s not fancy and distant, it’s a hundred meters away, and [operators] need to run and sweat and know they are saving lives” by using an unmanned loitering munition rather than sending soldiers, Enis said.
Enis described some of the challenges involved with training soldiers with the new technology, who are more used to the relative simplicity of assault rifles.
The FireFly is considered by Rafael to be part of its larger Spike family of systems, that include anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). It’s technically not classified as a drone; Rafael refers to it as a “miniature tactical loitering weapon.”

In the desert with the Israeli soldiers training on new Firefly loitering munition

As the IDF expands the drone's use from special operations to infantry, Breaking Defense observes training of the first infantry soldiers, and learns how the capability will fit into the IDF’s ground forces in the future.​

By SETH J. FRANTZMANon September 21, 2023 at 10:32 AM

230920_spike_firefly_FRANTZMAN

Israeli Defense Forces’ Spike Firefly loitering munition sits at the ready at a recent training exercise in September 2023. (Seth Frantzman / Breaking Defense)
JERUSALEM — This week the Israel Defense Forces said they used a “Maoz” drone to strike a target in Jenin, among the first uses of what’s known in English as the Spike Firefly loitering munition — a suicide drone that’s still being incorporated into IDF’s general combat capability.
The Firefly, made by Israeli defense giant Rafael, is for short-range combat and is aimed for the kind of urban or complex combat that Israel has faced on its borders and now in the West Bank. The way the IDF sees it, smaller loitering munitions like this may eventually be so ubiquitous for infantry units that they become similar to mortars or other standard weapons for platoons and companies.
Recently Breaking Defense got a chance to spend a day with an IDF officer who is training the next generation of soldiers on the Firefly. The training takes place at Mahane Tzor, a base in Israel’s Negev Desert.
It’s a dusty and hot day when Breaking Defense meets Lt. Daniel Enis, who is heading up the training, at a mock urban warfare site. The drone course is three weeks and begins in a classroom, before entering the training area where the soldiers learn to actually fly the system. Everyone in the IDF who is using the FireFly have passed through this training at this facility.
“I train them how to use it in every situation, and I teach the commander at what points they need it, such as grave danger or in battle or when no other weapon suffices. It can be used against targets, such as an enemy in a room, so the operator and commander need to understand when to use it,” said Enis.


The FireFly was first rolled out to special forces units — its first public use came in June — and now is being deployed to general infantry units. The IDF has looked at loitering munitions for infantry in the past, going back to 2016 when reports said it was considering use of IAI’s Rotem quadcopter.


From BREAKING DEFENSE
Here, future instructors are also undergoing training in the concept of operations for the weapons so they can spread the knowledge to soldiers more broadly. The idea is that each company level unit may have several operators skilled in the munition’s use. “That’s the goal and it will take several years,” Enis says. “It will be used by infantry and special units.” Several dozen users have been trained so far in small courses.
Enis has been with this program since it began and also was involved with the IDF’s use of the Thor quadcopter drone, which conducts surveillance and can also be used in swarms, according to previous reports. The Thor is used at the battalion level for ISR missions, whereas the Spike FireFly will be incorporated at the company level with each operator also having access to several of the drones.
“It’s not fancy and distant, it’s a hundred meters away, and [operators] need to run and sweat and know they are saving lives” by using an unmanned loitering munition rather than sending soldiers, Enis said.


By MICHAEL MARROW
The FireFly is considered by Rafael to be part of its larger Spike family of systems, that include anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). It’s technically not classified as a drone; Rafael refers to it as a “miniature tactical loitering weapon.”
The munition has electro-optics at its base and a replaceable battery compartment, which means it can also be used without a munition payload to extend its flight time from around 15 minutes to 30 minutes, according to Rafael’s material on the system. It weighs six pounds and has a range up to 1,000 meters, with flight speeds up to 60 kilometers per hour.
At the training site, reporters observed soldiers operating the drone for a quarter of an hour as they practiced flying and landing. It buzzed overhead and eventually landed on the side of a berm near a small building. Compared to some drones that are very loud, like flying lawnmowers, this one is relatively quiet and any other background noises, such as trucks driving or guns firing, would obscure the sound.
Enis described some of the challenges involved with training soldiers with the new technology, who are more used to the relative simplicity of assault rifles. They need to learn to understand what they are seeing when they operate the drone via a tablet-like interface, for instance. The trainers also get feedback from the users, including those who are using the drone in the field, such as in Jenin. With the current tempo of operations in the West Bank, they are getting near real-time feedback.
Israeli defense companies are adapting loitering munitions for many new uses. Recently, Elbit Systems announced a $95 million sale of its SkyStriker loitering munition to an unnamed European country. That weapon has a 10-kilogram warhead, and this is the first time it has been sold in its new canister configuration. The Israeli firm Spear UAV showed off a version of its loitering munition that is also launched from a canister at the recent DSEI show in London.
As for the Firefly, Enis said, “They talked about this munition for years, it’s a big privilege to train with it and now it’s inside the IDF and now the IDF can use this and more advanced tech.”

 
the 80pc solution is better than a 100pc solution delivered too late

Cheap-Good-Fast?
Cheap-Fast-Good Enough.
And lots of it.

The exquisite is no longer affordable.

How the defence industry is developing ‘£100 solutions for £100m threats’

High-volume, low-cost military equipment is redefining modern warfare

ByHoward Mustoe16 September 2023 • 6:00am

The Daily Telegraph Military and Civilian Drone School. Kyiv area

Drone operators near Kyiv earlier this year. The effect of cheap kit has caught the eye of the defence industry CREDIT: JULIAN SIMMONDS
In Kyiv, air raid sirens force local residents to seek shelter as soon as possible.
The pace at which they do so is key, as more often than not Russia’s cruise and ballistic missiles can hit Ukraine’s capital with worrying efficacy.
Driving the Kremlin’s attacks are commonly Iskander and Kalibr rockets, which cost $1m (£807,000) apiece and strike their targets within minutes.
However, the weapons that have caused Ukraine greater economic damage of late are drones that cost as little as $10,000.
Unlike Russia’s rapid-fire missiles, the drones can shut down Kyiv for hours because their piston-driven engines take so long to make an impact.
The significant toll of this cheap military kit on Ukraine is something that has caught the eye of Britain’s defence industry.
In a speech at a weapons fair in London last week, minister for defence procurement James Cartlidge said: “The fact is if we’re going to respond to the pace of change we’re seeing in Ukraine, where new technologies are being adapted in a matter of weeks, we’re going to need this sort of innovation.
“Sourcing the £100 solutions that can stop the £100m threat in its tracks.”
His comments echo those made in the US last month when the Pentagon announced a new drone programme called Replicator.
It plans to build thousands of “small, smart, cheap” drones to rival hordes of Chinese counterparts, said deputy defense secretary Kathleen Hicks.
This marks a significant change in military thinking, as before Russia’s invasion the focus of most weapons makers was to outperform enemy hardware, building equipment that was increasingly fast, stealthy or deadly.
All of this led to eye-watering military budgets to pay for equipment greater in tech but fewer in numbers. This only exacerbated the pain of losing a fighter jet or a warship.
However, we now may be re-entering a new era of modern defence buying, as armed forces prioritise greater volumes of cheaper kit.
QinetiQ, the defence technology firm spun out of the Ministry of Defence nearly two decades ago, is developing a disposable drone with top British arms contractor BAE Systems called Jackdaw.
Based on the design of the Banshee target,
which looks like a mini warplane and is made to be shot out of the sky during missile tests, the jet-powered Jackdaw will help lure rockets away from nearby jets, snoop on targets and jam radio transmissions.
This can all be achieved more cheaply than a manned plane.
1696024477606.png
QinetiQ is developing a disposable drone based on the Banshee target, which is designed to be shot out the sky during missile tests CREDIT: POPhot JJ Massey/Royal Navy
Speaking at the DSEI arms fair, QinetiQ chief Steve Wadey said: “We talk to various customers who say we can’t live in a world where we just have few exquisite platforms.
“You’ve got to complement that with high volumes of low-cost capability.”

Off-the-shelf consumer drones don’t make the cut, but there’s a happy medium to be found, he said.
The key thing for buyers to understand is that they will lose a greater amount of cheaper equipment, says Andy Thomis, boss of Cohort, which develops a variety of defence products including anti-drone technology.
“What we’re seeing now is the strategy of developing effective but cheap drones as being the key to this, because no matter how good they are, you’re going to lose a high proportion,” he says.
The priority for armed forces is to avoid spending millions downing craft that cost just thousands.
Two options to achieve this have emerged, said Mr Thomis. One is using blasts of electric power to down drones, while the other is hitting them with mid-calibre weapons.
Drones are by far the most popular group of cheap weapons to have emerged in recent years, as was clear to see during last week’s fair at the Excel conference centre.
Cheaper alternatives are also arising for land and air battles, while some armed forces may avoid replacing outdated kit altogether.
Countries operating the Russian T-72 tank are considering whether a recent armour upgrade will keep them in operation after the tanks performed poorly against Western missile systems.
Thousands of these tanks are active across India, Poland and Ukraine, although governments could consider the recent touch-up a better option than more expensive replacements.
1696024494932.png
Aeralis's jet fighter could replace the RAF’s Hawk training fleet
As for aerial equipment, UK company Aeralis is behind a British-designed jet fighter that could replace the RAF’s ageing fleet of Hawk training planes.
The fighter sells itself on its modular design. Everything from the wings to the engines can be swapped out for different missions, meaning the jet can train pilots, act as a light attack plane, an aerobatics jet or even a potential refueller for drones.
Tristan Crawford, chief executive of Aeralis, says it should be 60pc cheaper to operate because it can be adapted to whatever the need is at the time.
“Having a much bigger target market makes them cheaper,” says Mr Crawford. “You don’t need to start from scratch. To start from scratch is a $2bn programme, for us, it’s a modification.
The firm has already signed a deal with Babcock France with a view to renting them out to air forces for flexible training of fighter pilots.
As well as often being the smarter choice, cheaper equipment is also growing in demand due to greater cost pressures on defence ministries due to inflation.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, while defence spending around the world grew 6.5pc last year, inflation meant that in real terms the growth was only 3.7pc in spite of a flurry of orders for new hardware, ammunition and equipment.
The impact of this inflation on defence spending is also being felt in the UK, as noted by Mr Cartlidge last week.
He said there is an aim to exploit “novel technologies” but admitted that “accepting the 80pc solution is better than a 100pc solution delivered too late to make a difference”.


 
And now, time for another musical interlude....

drones can shut down Kyiv for hours because their piston-driven engines take so long to make an impact.
 

Not even close.

With the US CBO model you can see the adjustment of costs in either adding or subtracting a capability, like a BCT or changing it from one type of BCT to another or - most important of all - converting it from Active Army to National Guard.

That's a useful tool. Having a tool that allows you to add or subtract a percentage to all the light battalions really does very little that is of value.

🍻
 
Not even close.

With the US CBO model you can see the adjustment of costs in either adding or subtracting a capability, like a BCT or changing it from one type of BCT to another or - most important of all - converting it from Active Army to National Guard.

That's a useful tool. Having a tool that allows you to add or subtract a percentage to all the light battalions really does very little that is of value.

🍻
Agreed and the numbers dont exactly line up with the manning levels. Im not sure what 25% more of an armored regiment would do.
 
Agreed and the numbers dont exactly line up with the manning levels. Im not sure what 25% more of an armored regiment would do.
Especially when you need tonthen add 25% more capital projects to equip it, and 25% more "indirector overhead" funding to support it.

McNamara's fallacy comes to mind...
 

EXCLUSIVE: Norway army chief says Leopard 2 option cut in favor of air defenses

“What we're seeing now is that the current war in Ukraine illustrates that we need to be capable of staying in the fight for a longer duration and that requires volume,” Lars Lervik, chief of staff of the Norwegian Army, told Breaking Defense.​

By TIM MARTINon October 10, 2023 at 12:50 PM

230207_leopard_tanks_norway_armed_forces

Two Leopard tanks at Setermoen fire range during Cold Response 2014. (Marius Kaniewski, Norwegian Armed Forces)
AUSA 2023 — Norway has decided against exercising an option for 18 German-made Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks to instead invest in air defense and long-range fire capabilities, the country’s top army official told Breaking Defense.
Despite turning down the option, Lars Lervik, Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Army, said in an interview that an earlier order of 54 tanks, under contract with manufacturer Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMV), would be enough to enable Oslo to stand up a heavy mechanized brigade in line with NATO requirements and fits into national “wartime plans.”
All deliveries of the new Leopard vehicles are expected to be completed by “mid-2027,” according to Lervik.

He also expressed concern about Europe’s ammunition shortage crisis that has left countries across the continent scrambling to restore stockpiles left wanting by supplies made to Ukraine.
The amount of time “it will take to both re-balance the ammunition we have donated, but also to reach the sufficient level of readiness for the future” remains of issue, said Lervik. “What we’re seeing now is that the current war in Ukraine illustrates that we need to be capable of staying in the fight for a longer duration and that requires volume.”
RELATED: Nammo warns industry could ‘break their neck’ without longer production contracts
At a political level, Oslo had considered dropping required levels of ammunition to sustain supplies to Ukraine, subject to approval by lawmakers. Lervik said he could not comment on such a matter because “details on stockpiles” are confidential.
Even so, he stressed that there are “no quick fixes” to the ammunition problem and backed support for longer production contracts for industry, echoing similar calls made by Norway’s national ammunition producer, Nammo.
In addition to spending 10.7 billion NOK ($99 million USD) on military aid to Ukraine in 2022, Oslo has also introduced a multiyear program of assistance that covers 75 billion NOK issued between 2023 through 2027. Fifteen billion NOK will be offered up each year.
That level of support has not been without controversy, with the government coming under pressure to increase aid to Ukraine under a shadow of making substantial natural gas profits after countries across Europe diversified away from Russian gas.
“I don’t have any comment to that, but I think Norway has come up with a five-year plan that recommends substantial money, both military and civilian aid to Ukraine, and I think that Ukrainians are very happy with that approach,” said Lervik. “There’s a long-term commitment.”
Elsewhere, Nordic military co-operation is also expected to be expanded once Sweden joins NATO. Levrik said that when the entry happens, interoperability and “classifications” will be two key items that will change co-operation for the better.
“We are in a very good position at the tactical level to really make that work as soon as both countries are members of NATO,” added Lervik, referring to Sweden and recent entrant Finland.
Additionally, military ties will also be strengthened by Norway, Finland and Sweden taking part in the Nordic Response training exercise next year.
Lervik stressed that one of his main priories at the AUSA expo in Washington, DC, this week will be holding discussions with industry on counter-UAS systems, which could influence how the technology could eventually be integrated into a layered air defense system.
On the acquisition front, he said he hopes to see a long-range fires tender issued to industry as soon as possible, accelerating a previous timeframe that aimed for the end of 2023, and, should additional money be made available, investments approved for additional K9 self propelled howitzers and K10 ammunition resupply vehicles.
 
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