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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

The NES situation is very different today than it was in the early 90s. I started the training year in 1991 with four of twelve soldiers in my Troop Book on NES, and the unit was indeed carrying a large number of chronic NES. By 1995 this had changed as we had the administrative tools to clear the rolls and units were held accountable if they did not. NES is controlled well today.

Now, there can be folks that walk the line, parading just enough on Thursday nights to stay off NES while not attending weekend and summer training. Sometimes that's not a bad thing. Maybe someone's life gets really busy with work and a young family, but they can still contribute on those evenings until things settle down.

I had a Trooper (then Corporal) that was the opposite. They worked shift at a car plant and could not make Thursday evenings. They could, however, make all the weekends if they had enough notice. We had an annual training directive in August with the weekends all laid out until June. My Tp WO and I were very happy to have a reliable Driver for the FTXs and (miracle of miracles) we stuck to the training plan and it all worked out.

Anyhoo.
 
My default example for a disaster response and assistance organization is Germany's Technische Hilfswerk (THW).


Not that they are more competent that the Kiwis or Ozzies (though they may be), but because I am was more familiar with their set-up, primarily at the local level. A neighbour of mine when I lived in Schuttern (a village outside Lahr) thirty years ago was a member of the Lahr section. Though their section was pretty small back then in terms of manpower, equipment and facilities, they often responded to local events as well as larger regional/national scale situations. They seem to have grown considerably in the intervening years and apparently benefited from us vacating the airfield.

(you may have to auto-translate from the German)

They are unpaid volunteers. While the organization is national, the advantage that I see over a military run disaster response, is their wide spread local representation.


The local sections can respond quickly to local situations. It was common for requests for assistance to be made directly to the local section by the Polizei or Feuerwehr for developing problems, even things like major accidents on the autobahn.

View attachment 79447
Thanks for this Blackadder1916,

I had not heard of Germany's THW but when I read through their taskings and roles it's apparent they are a much more engineering/search and rescue/flood response than wildfire which is more my background. Still impressive to see how they are supporting the German Gov't through deployment of support responses up to and including UN missions. Also aware that Germany funds a number of NGO initiatives but it's not clear if they are UN/NGO/German Gov't initiatives being lead.

New Zealand still remains in my mind a great model. They have a core group of staff but most are volunteers and more importantly train on the basis they will receive additional volunteers/out of country resources. Earthquakes in Christchurch in 2011 showed their response was well intended but the few resources they had were overwhelmed by the number of tasks and that the trained staff needed more experience in application. As a result they have since deployed, around the world - Canada, Australia, Greece off hand I can think of - to both floods, fires and other major disasters. In 2016 a second major earthquake hit Christchurch again and while damages were bad the response was excellent in part due to experience learned elsewhere.

Regardless of organization name - CAF Reserves, Danish Home Guard, Australian CAF/RFS, German THW it's clear that all of them depend upon robust training, a strong core of admin support to provide structure for operations to take place around, somewhat up to date machinery/technology, a clear mission and experience deploying as formed units.

The last point is especially critical as I think of the many great individuals in certain roles...but are weak or fail in other taskings...and only learned through experience where the weakness lies. Unless we want a repeat of early WW1 or WW2 with most of the CAF leadership getting replaced I firmly believe that tasking for the CAF reserve and/or CAF requires mobilization greater than single resources and instead needs to develop the necessary Platoon/company level command experience or in the case of CAF brigade/taskforce/DIV operational experience. This is however a unicorn dream unless the job security and frankly employer compensation is addressed politically ... and we all know the score on that front currently.
 
Regardless of organization name - CAF Reserves, Danish Home Guard, Australian CAF/RFS, German THW it's clear that all of them depend upon robust training, a strong core of admin support to provide structure for operations to take place around, somewhat up to date machinery/technology, a clear mission and experience deploying as formed units.

The last point is especially critical as I think of the many great individuals in certain roles...but are weak or fail in other taskings...and only learned through experience where the weakness lies. Unless we want a repeat of early WW1 or WW2 with most of the CAF leadership getting replaced I firmly believe that tasking for the CAF reserve and/or CAF requires mobilization greater than single resources and instead needs to develop the necessary Platoon/company level command experience or in the case of CAF brigade/taskforce/DIV operational experience. This is however a unicorn dream unless the job security and frankly employer compensation is addressed politically ... and we all know the score on that front currently.

I Know the system has changed somewhat over the years but the one thing that stood out in my mind from my last domestic domop - a forest fire - was that disaster response is a system of systems where the different parts come together with a wide variety of skills to create the whole.

In our case we sent up a battery of around a hundred and twenty of which only 35 were assigned and quickly trained as a fire attack crews. The rest of the battery was assigned the task of running a base camp for the entire operation which included EMO supplied canvas shelters, sleeping gear, latrines, our field kitchens, transport, water, POL, and QM functions.

Leadership came from Forestry and EMO which managed the headquarters and controlled the operations of all fire crews and the specialized logistics. Logistics was a big issue from tents to pumps and hoses, back pack pumps, axes, transport etc etc.

There were a number of specialized and trained fire attack crews - some functioned as quick reaction crews but quite a few formed the leadership for the over 400 volunteer and mostly untrained crews that were recruited off the streets for the fire. Some of the trained attack crews came from within forestry and EMO and some were brought in from other provinces and nearby states.

An interesting function came from around ten folks from Montana who flew in with specialized communications gear from base systems to dozens of handhelds to issue to teams. They not only provided the radios but kept them charged and maintained throughout the operation.

Forestry also provided an air boss for the half dozen to a dozen contract helicopters that came to do water drops and transport attack crews and a team to keep them fueled.

Running an enterprise like this of roughly a thousand folks in the middle of a forest takes a lot of preplanning and organization and, as I mentioned above, tiered capabilities from the highly skilled and equipped to the often untrained or lightly trained volunteer s who contributed brute manpower. Flexibility is also a major issue as disasters don't run on predictable patterns. Fires for example can suddenly change for the better or the worse within a few hours or spring up elsewhere requiring a redeployment of forces. Pre-planning is critical as operations launch quickly.

Forest fires and floods were then, and still are, the bread and butter for domops. They operate somewhat similarly from an organizational and planning standpoint albeit some of the detailed functions obviously differ - as an example a greater need for a security force to operate with the police to secure evacuated areas during floods and thereby requiring RoEs. I can't speak for today, but in my day those coordinating functions from the DND side were usually done poorly. I presume that this is all done now at the Regional Joint Task Forces under CJOC which, in theory at least, should have a better handle on it then we did.

I still won't die on this hill, but I think there is a role for an expanded, low cost, low or semi-skilled, expansion of the Rangers which can be force generated with TBGs and Domestic Response Companies even in urban areas where flooding is the likeliest and most growing domestic disaster threat (the existing Rangers already working well with Arctic Response Company Groups). Same Rangers - different functions .

🍻
 
I see the Aussies are continuing their drive to increase their "long range artillery" capabilities.


Defense Industry Minister Pat Conroy told reporters that Australia’s National Security Committee had approved the $1.3 billion AUD ($833 million USD) purchase of more than 200 Tomahawk cruise missiles and the $431 million AUD ($276 million USD) purchase of advanced long-range anti-radar missiles (AARGM-ER).

Some of these will be air launched and some sea launched but both can also be ground launched.
 
“To be clear, America still benefits from platforms that are large, exquisite, expensive, and few. But Replicator will galvanize progress in the too-slow shift of US military innovation to leverage platforms that are small, smart, cheap, and many,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks


‘Replicator’ revealed: Pentagon initiative to counter China with mass-produced autonomous systems

Though being "cagey" about details, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kath Hicks said the new Replicator program is meant to get "multiple thousands" of autonomous systems in the hands of servicemembers with two years.​

By LEE FERRAN and JASPREET GILLon August 28, 2023 at 8:54 AM

US Army soldier with candidate Short Range Reconnaissance SRR drone

A soldier tests a candidate for the Army’s Short-Range Reconnaissance (SRR) drone in 2020 (photo by Mr. Tad Browning, US Army Operational Test Command)
Updated 8/23/2023 at 11:30am ET to include additional comments from Hicks and new outside analysis.
BERGEN, Norway, and WASHINGTON — To counter China’s military mass, the Pentagon today announced a new initiative, dubbed Replicator, that aims to crank out “multiple thousands” of “attritable autonomous systems” across “multiple domains” within two years.
“To be clear, America still benefits from platforms that are large, exquisite, expensive, and few. But Replicator will galvanize progress in the too-slow shift of US military innovation to leverage platforms that are small, smart, cheap, and many,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said today at National Defense Industrial Association in Washington, DC. “So now is the time to take all-domain, attritable autonomy to the next level: to produce and deliver capabilities to warfighters at the volume and velocity required to deter aggression, to win if we’re forced to fight.”

Hicks said the Replicator project was spurred by China’s current “biggest advantage” militarily, “which is mass. More ships. More missiles. More people.”
“To stay ahead, we’re going to create a new state of the art — just as America has before — leveraging attritable, autonomous systems in all domains — which are less expensive, put fewer people in the line of fire, and can be changed, updated or improved with substantially shorter lead times.
“We’ll counter the [People’s Liberation Army’s] mass with mass of our own, but ours will be harder to plan for, harder to hit, harder to beat. With smart people, smart concepts, and smart technology, our military will be more nimble, with uplift and urgency from the commercial sector,” she said.

Scaling, Hicks said, is the problem Replicator will most directly try to solve.
“We’ve looked at that innovation ecosystem [and] we think we’ve got some solutions in place… across many of those pain points, but the scaling piece is the one that still feels quite elusive — scaling for emerging technology,” she said during a Q&A portion of her presentation. “And that’s where we’re really going to go after with Replicator: How do we get those multiple thousands produced in the hands of warfighters in 18 to 24 months?
“I mean it’s not without risk; we’ve got take a big bet here, but what’s leadership without big bets and making something happen?”
Hicks said the Replicator name refers not only to the mass production of individual systems, but the push to replicate “how we will achieve” the mass production goal, “so we can scale whatever’s relevant in the future again and again and again.” It’s a culture change as much as a technological one, she said.
And while Hicks made the Replicator announcement at a gathering of defense industry players, many of whom will presumably compete to make the systems the Pentagon is envisioning, she revealed few concrete specifics — by design.
“We’ll spell out the details of Replicator in the coming weeks,” she said, but added that the Pentagon is “going to be cagey in terms of what we want to share, particularly with the PRC.”
As for what exactly the new initiative hopes to produce, she only said she’d work “very closely” with combatant commanders “on what some of those […] operational challenges are” and work to “drive through” pain points in which necessary tech is getting hung up unnecessarily.
Hicks said she will “personally” oversee the effort, along with the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Defense Innovation Unit, and that the Defense Innovation Steering Group would be the “driving engine for Replicator.”
Byron Callan, an aerospace and defense analyst at Capital Alpha Partners, said in a note to investors that the new initiative signaled that the Pentagon has learned from the widescale use of attritable systems in the war in Ukraine, and that it could provide an opportunity for new entrants to the defense industry, along with the usual major primes — though he said his firm doesn’t have a “high conviction view on which companies are ‘well-positioned.'” The direct mention of “all domain,” he said, suggests each military branch could get a piece of the new initiative’s eventual offerings.
In her speech, Hicks told the audience, “We must ensure [China’s] leadership wakes up every day, considers the risks of aggression, and concludes, ‘today is not the day’ — and not just today, but every day, between now and 2027, 2035, 2049 and beyond. Innovation is vital to how we do that.”

She seems to be suggesting that there is no end-state. That new technologies will be constantly introduced on the fly (so to speak).
 
More on Replicator


In the case of Replicator, it’s really not yet possible to get an ideas of what these platforms might cost, but, clearly, affordability, rapid iterative development cycles, and the possibility of mass production are all considerations at this stage.

Hicks brought up the example of the war in Ukraine to show how “emerging tech developed by commercial and non-traditional companies” can be “decisive in defending against modern military aggression.” Specifically, she pointed to Starlink satellite internet constellation, Switchblade loitering munition, and the use of commercial satellite imagery to influence the conflict.
 
Couple "Replicator" with this "co-production" and it seems likely that there is a bit of a Revolution in Procurement Affairs developing.


Whatever you do, don't forget the "affirmative action" ploy ;)

Creation of a 5% target in procurement-Indigenous business​

The Government of Canada is committed to increasing the participation of Indigenous businesses in federal procurement, to do so, we are working with Indigenous Services Canada and the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat to create a new target to have 5% of federal contracts awarded to businesses managed and led by Indigenous Peoples

Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) has awarded 12 contracts to 10 Indigenous businesses, logistics and air charter services, accommodation and cleaning services, IT professional services, masks and thermometers, these contracts are collectively worth nearly $40 million

 
@GR66 referenced this structure as a solid base for a restructuring of the Canadian Army, specifically 1 Can Div.

1693602860786.png

I agree.

My eye is drawn to the Protection Brigade (Defence and Duties?)

I propose the following.

That 1 CAN Div gets 11 docks into which it can plug. The Protection Brigade supplies that dock. One such dock is expeditionary and could be forward deployed. The other 10 docks are national and are provided by the Territorial Brigades.

Looking at the Protection Brigade functionally

HQ Company = HQ & Sigs Sqn
Brigade Support Battalion = Service Battalion
CBRN Battalion = Engineer Battalion ( a broader scope of services)
MP Battalion = Infantry Companies for Vital Point defence and Cavalry Squadrons for Security Patrols
Air Defence Battalion = Artillery Regiment.

Focusing on the Air Defence Battalion we get a little more info on its structure from the Airborne Division graphic

1693603499452.png

The Battalion consists of:

HQ Battery
3x MSHORAD Batteries with 12 MSHORAD LAVs each
1x Indirect Fire Protection Capability Battery (guessing that means some type of C-RAM capability like SkyNex)
1x Counter UAS Battery.

Suppose the Territorial Protection Brigade Artillery Regiment were to look like this:

HQ Battery
STA Battery
Gun Battery
3x AD Batteries (mix of C-RAM/C-UAS at the high end and MANPAD/LMLs at the low end?)

Everybody gets a job and a training focus commensurate with their trade. Every trade has a task in case of emergency. Every trade is capable of delivering individuals and team/section augmentees to the Regular force.

Spare guns, vehicles and kit in general held in regional warehouses as "warstock".

This would allow 1 Can Div to move en masse to any of 10 hubs to respond to any emergency. Or it could be dispersed across the hubs.
 
Looking at the Protection Brigade functionally
I have - when it was called a Manoeuvre Enhancement Brigade. An MEB was a catchall for divisional combat support elements which could be added or subtracted as required. Our CCSB is something like it.

What I've been puzzling about is why the division's engineer battalion has been moved into an independent reporting line. Having it under the MEB facilitated both command and control and logistics.

I have a similar but not identical problem with the MPF battalion as a direct divisional asset. The MPF bn is NOT a tank battalion. As an MPF its role is to provide intimate direct fire support to infantry battalions and as such they will most probably distributed for operations to the Inf bde's. So what role does the MPF bn hq provide other than logistics and technical support. It can do that better from within the MEB (or PB) where it is collocated with its FSB's BSB.

It's a bit different for the Div Cav Bn (Sqn?) which is more of a div asset than the MPF bn really is, but again, its FSB comes from the MEB's/PB's) BSB and generally it would benefit from a tighter linkage to the MEB/PB but still have its command element collocated with the Div HQ.

From a general viewpoint I think we need to think and restructure more to the US Army div structure. With my general attitude of needing an Army for Today and an Army for Tomorrow, and based on the 40,000+ size of the CA, that calls for two divisions - one for Today and one for Tomorrow., each should have a combat support brigade (akin to the MEB/PB) and a sustainment brigade tailored to the types of roles and specific missions they are envisioned to have. Personally I dislike the name "Protection Brigade". It's too limiting. Combat support brigade is more encompassing of a wide and varied group of combat support enablers while sustainment brigade is straight forward and self explanatory and should replace the hodge podge of ad hoc agencies we slap together now. By having one each organized for day-to-day peacetime operations and one for expanded higher levels of conflict one can tailor their respective structures with the appropriate mix of RegF and ResF and set them up so that they remain mutually supporting during bot peacetime and wartime.

🍻
 
I have - when it was called a Manoeuvre Enhancement Brigade. An MEB was a catchall for divisional combat support elements which could be added or subtracted as required. Our CCSB is something like it.

What I've been puzzling about is why the division's engineer battalion has been moved into an independent reporting line. Having it under the MEB facilitated both command and control and logistics.

I have a similar but not identical problem with the MPF battalion as a direct divisional asset. The MPF bn is NOT a tank battalion. As an MPF its role is to provide intimate direct fire support to infantry battalions and as such they will most probably distributed for operations to the Inf bde's. So what role does the MPF bn hq provide other than logistics and technical support. It can do that better from within the MEB (or PB) where it is collocated with its FSB's BSB.

It's a bit different for the Div Cav Bn (Sqn?) which is more of a div asset than the MPF bn really is, but again, its FSB comes from the MEB's/PB's) BSB and generally it would benefit from a tighter linkage to the MEB/PB but still have its command element collocated with the Div HQ.

From a general viewpoint I think we need to think and restructure more to the US Army div structure. With my general attitude of needing an Army for Today and an Army for Tomorrow, and based on the 40,000+ size of the CA, that calls for two divisions - one for Today and one for Tomorrow., each should have a combat support brigade (akin to the MEB/PB) and a sustainment brigade tailored to the types of roles and specific missions they are envisioned to have. Personally I dislike the name "Protection Brigade". It's too limiting. Combat support brigade is more encompassing of a wide and varied group of combat support enablers while sustainment brigade is straight forward and self explanatory and should replace the hodge podge of ad hoc agencies we slap together now. By having one each organized for day-to-day peacetime operations and one for expanded higher levels of conflict one can tailor their respective structures with the appropriate mix of RegF and ResF and set them up so that they remain mutually supporting during bot peacetime and wartime.

🍻

A Platoon has a Weapons Det
A Company has a Weapons Platoon
A Battalion has a Weapons Company (Combat Support)
A Brigade has a Weapons Battalion???
A Division has a Weapons Brigade???

I seem to recall reading somewhere that the Weapons Company was also construed as a Defence Company and was the cornerstone element in planning the Battalion's defence? It from that firm base the assault companies could "sally".

WRT nomenclature how about we just call the Territorial Brigades Territorial Brigades but assign them the role of Protection Brigades domestically? The Integral PB of the Expeditionary Division could be redesignated Combat Support Brigade and you can hang the MPF battalion on that tree.

As you say the Cavalry Sqn should be closely associated with the Div HQ and Div Int, especially true if it is going to be UAS heavy.

The same rationale for a Battalion HQ being tight with its Sigs Platoon, its Int Cell and its Recce Platoon.
 
I don't look at the MEB/PB as a "weapons" element but more as a combat support enabler element. Engineers aren't weapons nor is CBRN or for that matter MPs. They're basically CS enablers rather than CSS enablers for manoeuvre and fires elements. For me those constitute the four core functions of a division: manoeuvre; fires; CS and CSS.

🍻
 
I have - when it was called a Manoeuvre Enhancement Brigade. An MEB was a catchall for divisional combat support elements which could be added or subtracted as required. Our CCSB is something like it.

What I've been puzzling about is why the division's engineer battalion has been moved into an independent reporting line. Having it under the MEB facilitated both command and control and logistics.
You'll note that there is a bit of confusion regarding the Engineers in the Light Division structure. There is the Combat Engineer Battalion with an independent reporting line but there is also an additional Engineer Battalion shown within the Protection Brigade. The author questions it's inclusion in the ORBAT as it doesn't appear in any of the other Division types. I wonder if it might be included to cover the heavier engineering elements for the Division (bridging, heavy clearance and construction vehicles, etc.) in order to leave the independent Combat Engineer Battalion light enough to move with the Light Battalions?
I have a similar but not identical problem with the MPF battalion as a direct divisional asset. The MPF bn is NOT a tank battalion. As an MPF its role is to provide intimate direct fire support to infantry battalions and as such they will most probably distributed for operations to the Inf bde's. So what role does the MPF bn hq provide other than logistics and technical support. It can do that better from within the MEB (or PB) where it is collocated with its FSB's BSB.
Perhaps this is to allow the Divisional commander the option for the MPF battalion to maneuver independently somewhat like a Tank Battalion if facing a non-peer enemy that doesn't have an armour threat?

I think in a Canadian Divisional context a Tank Regiment would make sense for this slot.
It's a bit different for the Div Cav Bn (Sqn?) which is more of a div asset than the MPF bn really is, but again, its FSB comes from the MEB's/PB's) BSB and generally it would benefit from a tighter linkage to the MEB/PB but still have its command element collocated with the Div HQ.

From a general viewpoint I think we need to think and restructure more to the US Army div structure. With my general attitude of needing an Army for Today and an Army for Tomorrow, and based on the 40,000+ size of the CA, that calls for two divisions - one for Today and one for Tomorrow., each should have a combat support brigade (akin to the MEB/PB) and a sustainment brigade tailored to the types of roles and specific missions they are envisioned to have. Personally I dislike the name "Protection Brigade". It's too limiting. Combat support brigade is more encompassing of a wide and varied group of combat support enablers while sustainment brigade is straight forward and self explanatory and should replace the hodge podge of ad hoc agencies we slap together now. By having one each organized for day-to-day peacetime operations and one for expanded higher levels of conflict one can tailor their respective structures with the appropriate mix of RegF and ResF and set them up so that they remain mutually supporting during bot peacetime and wartime.

🍻
 
I don't look at the MEB/PB as a "weapons" element but more as a combat support enabler element. Engineers aren't weapons nor is CBRN or for that matter MPs. They're basically CS enablers rather than CSS enablers for manoeuvre and fires elements. For me those constitute the four core functions of a division: manoeuvre; fires; CS and CSS.

🍻

It kind of brings up the problem of where the Pioneers and the Signallers sit in Battalion Org Charts. Or for that matter where the Mortars sit.

I have seen Signallers in the CS Coy and the HQ. I have seen Pioneers grouped with the CS although they are not weapons. I have seen American battalions that group the Mortars and Recce with HQ and have a separate Weapons Coy for DFS. In some armies a Mortar Platoon the size of Canada's would qualify as a separate company. Bolger's Death Ground is a great place to start comparing models.

The Marines conventionally define themselves as a Triangular Structure but to me they are a Square. The fourth point is always the Command and Support Element which includes an HQ with comms and a Weapons element. The new Squad structure just reinforces the Square with the fourth point, previously the Squad Leader on his own, being reinforced by an Assistant who, IIRC, is also the surveillance systems operator.


The basic structure for combined arms at all levels seems to be three manoeuver elements, a support element and a sustainment element with a separate C4ISR element.

I am proposing that the Canadian Reserves focus on supplying the support element and that the support element, the Territorial Brigade, include the equivalent of the Pioneers, Defense and Duties, and Air Defence. D&D could emphasize entrenched crew served weapons, VP security and Vehicle Patrols. The Brigade would also include a Transport Coy in its Service Bn.

The regular division would organize its Support Brigade and its Sustainment Brigade to suit its expeditionary purpose.
 
Having babysitter brigades for a division’s combat support is a relatively new phenomenon. They came about in part as a means to support regional or theatre capabilities in rotational COIN operations. Before that, when divisions operated as manoeuvre formations (as they are again expected to do), the combat support units were controlled directly by the Div HQ and they were supported directly from the division sustainment group/brigade.
 
I have seen Pioneers grouped with the CS although they are not weapons.
Combat Support includes support weapons, but it does not mean support weapons. Pioneers and Recce are combat support. Engineers, artillery, and assault transport (helicopters or amphibians) are combat support.
 
You'll note that there is a bit of confusion regarding the Engineers in the Light Division structure. There is the Combat Engineer Battalion with an independent reporting line but there is also an additional Engineer Battalion shown within the Protection Brigade. The author questions it's inclusion in the ORBAT as it doesn't appear in any of the other Division types. I wonder if it might be included to cover the heavier engineering elements for the Division (bridging, heavy clearance and construction vehicles, etc.) in order to leave the independent Combat Engineer Battalion light enough to move with the Light Battalions?
This makes sense to me.

Perhaps this is to allow the Divisional commander the option for the MPF battalion to maneuver independently somewhat like a Tank Battalion if facing a non-peer enemy that doesn't have an armour threat?

I think in a Canadian Divisional context a Tank Regiment would make sense for this slot.

It is interesting that the Booker MPF Non-Tank is very, very similar to the Leopard 1 in weight and armament. Some people are adamant that the Booker should not be used as a tank. But it is in effect just a less capable tank that is similar in capabilities to older generations of tanks. That means, to me that it can do some of the jobs that tanks do but not all the jobs in all situations.

Now the MGS Stryker - that is a different story. That was/is a Self-Propelled Field Gun as opposed to a Self-Propelled Howitzer.
 
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