Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

That is the way that I see it. I'm not so sure about a light "division" my own napkin force has a mech division, a light high readiness brigade, a low readiness light bde, a separate med readiness mech bde, two arty bde, a CS bde and a CSS bde and a training structure within that pers envelope.

I guess we're really looking at slicing the same pie two different ways. You envision plugging all the personnel we currently have into deployable units to generate an expandable force. I on the other hand envision using that same number of troops in order to make a smaller number of Brigades sustainable in the field.

The advantage of my approach to my mind is that fielding Divisional-level formations takes a lot of "overhead" in supporting capabilities (including CSS support/tactical and strategic lift, volume of ammo, etc.) that you don't need if you're plugging Brigades into allied Divisions.

I see it as somewhat of a to-MAY-to/to-MAH-to difference as ultimately we're still looking at the same number of troops overall.

@GR66 I agree that the mech bde has little usefulness for the Pacific. It's not meant for that but to earn us brownie points within NATO.

Do we get more out of earning brownie points with our European NATO partners or with the US? Are the Europeans really going to do us any great favours if we increase our NATO force commitment? In the event of a war with Russia (still much more unlikely than a conflict with China in my opinion) our contribution, even at a Divisional level, will be a relatively small part of the overall allied effort.

In a conflict with China however, as I mentioned in my previous post, the US will get much, much less assistance from their European NATO allies. That means any assistance they get from Canada will be much more greatly appreciated (and noticeable).

The key issue is that we are not a two war military like the US - we can do one. In that one war is Europe the div is the front line and everyone else the replacement and sustainment. If that war is Pacific then everyone else is the the lead and the mech division forms the core of replacement and sustainment. I haven't really given much consideration what the "rest" should look like (except in very broad strokes) because, quite frankly, the Pacific is in my mind more a navy and air force thing and I haven't seen anything in the way of a niche for our army there (except maybe our own coastal defence (and that includes Arctic). Effectively I've earmarked manpower, because I haven't forgotten about it, but haven't designed it.

I agree that we're not a two war military like the US...but unlike our European allies we ARE an expeditionary military like the US. Our current expeditionary capabilities are lacking, but that is one capability that I believe the US would certainly appreciate us being able to provide.

Also agreed that the Pacific is much more likely to be a naval and air conflict, but there are certainly Army capabilities (AD, USMC-type capabilities, LRPF, etc.) that would be useful.

Regardless. I think our defence outputs should be considerably bigger than what they are for the current investment in treasure and manpower. What's missing is a plan for a "big event". Just to reiterate my thought process - I started in this game when we had nukes. I can't see defending this country with a handful of underequipped, understrength battle groups when things get serious. And I'm firmly convinced that they will get serious. Not today, not tomorrow, but they will.

No arguments here

 

[FJAG]

I guess we're really looking at slicing the same pie two different ways. You envision plugging all the personnel we currently have into deployable units to generate an expandable force. I on the other hand envision using that same number of troops in order to make a smaller number of Brigades sustainable in the field.

The advantage of my approach to my mind is that fielding Divisional-level formations takes a lot of "overhead" in supporting capabilities (including CSS support/tactical and strategic lift, volume of ammo, etc.) that you don't need if you're plugging Brigades into allied Divisions.

I think the idea of divisional overhead is a chimera. It's more organizational than additive. The vast bulk of your "divisional troops" comes from aggregating the brigade groups' artillery, engineer, and CSS into divisional units. It's easier, in my mind, to create small deployable elements from a divisional structure than to try to build a division (when you need one) from separate brigades. We already have the "overhead" in the form of four administrative divisional headquarters a CSS bde and the service battalions (albeit that side is weak and needs bolstering regardless of which solution one goes for)

I see it as somewhat of a to-MAY-to/to-MAH-to difference as ultimately we're still looking at the same number of troops overall.

True enough. I'm just looking at maximizing the potential from what there is.

Do we get more out of earning brownie points with our European NATO partners or with the US? Are the Europeans really going to do us any great favours if we increase our NATO force commitment? In the event of a war with Russia (still much more unlikely than a conflict with China in my opinion) our contribution, even at a Divisional level, will be a relatively small part of the overall allied effort.

We'll never know until we try. What's clear is that right now we're seen as the weak sister in the organization and our influence is next to zero. Our present leadership thinks that the way to influence is virtue signalling. How's that working out?

In a conflict with China however, as I mentioned in my previous post, the US will get much, much less assistance from their European NATO allies. That means any assistance they get from Canada will be much more greatly appreciated (and noticeable).

I don't disagree at all. We need to figure out how to do that. I'm convinced we can swing both ways during peacetime but in time of conflict we may need to choose.

I agree that we're not a two war military like the US...but unlike our European allies we ARE an expeditionary military like the US. Our current expeditionary capabilities are lacking, but that is one capability that I believe the US would certainly appreciate us being able to provide.

Clearly the oceans give us a degree of protection which point us to being an expeditionary force but with a very low expeditionary capability. But the assets needed for that are primarily air force and navy. As I said before, my view of what's needed there isn't clear. When I look at the key partners there I see the Marines doing one thing but countries like Australia and Singapore and Korea and Japan all still having a large conventional army capability.

I'm not tied in the the system enough anymore to know what the CF direction in this area is (if there actually is one) - What do you see as a force structure that we should be prepared to contribute?

 

[GR66]

I think the idea of divisional overhead is a chimera. It's more organizational than additive. The vast bulk of your "divisional troops" comes from aggregating the brigade groups' artillery, engineer, and CSS into divisional units. It's easier, in my mind, to create small deployable elements from a divisional structure than to try to build a division (when you need one) from separate brigades. We already have the "overhead" in the form of four administrative divisional headquarters a CSS bde and the service battalions (albeit that side is weak and needs bolstering regardless of which solution one goes for)

I respectfully disagree. How many more beans and bullets do you need to deliver on a daily basis to maintain a Division in combat vs. a Brigade? You can't look at an Army Division in isolation. Basically tripling the size of your deployed force means tripling the logistical and support infrastructure required to support it. War stocks, shipping capacity (and escorts to protect them), airlift capacity, forward supply infrastructure and vehicles, in theatre transport, security forces to protect the logistics infrastructure, etc.

Even at 2% of GDP a military budget is limited and supporting a deployable Army Division means substantial extra investment in domestic infrastructure as well as Navy and Air Force investments to support that deployment...investment that could potentially be put into Navy and Air Force combat capability instead.

We'll never know until we try. What's clear is that right now we're seen as the weak sister in the organization and our influence is next to zero. Our present leadership thinks that the way to influence is virtue signalling. How's that working out?

I'm in no way suggesting that virtue signalling be our continued COA going forward. I fully support increased investment in the CAF (including the Army) and I think that a well equipped, Canadian-led multi-national Brigade in Latvia that is backed by the depth and Reserve capacity in the CA to be maintained in combat would be a very welcome contribution in the eyes of our European allies.

I also think that a Light component in our military that is capable of deployment to wherever they are needed globally (be that the Pacific, Europe or anywhere else in the world) would be seen as well as a welcome capability both by our European allies but even more importantly by the US.

I don't disagree at all. We need to figure out how to do that. I'm convinced we can swing both ways during peacetime but in time of conflict we may need to choose.

You're correct that it is not out of the question that a conflict that breaks out in one of the regions (Europe or the Pacific) could as a result of the alignment between China and Russia could end up expanding to the other region. In that case I would argue that the relative balance of power between NATO and Russia favours NATO while the balance of power between China and the US (and regional allies) is much more in question. In that case I'd argue that our ability to contribute in the Pacific would have a much greater impact than in Europe.

Clearly the oceans give us a degree of protection which point us to being an expeditionary force but with a very low expeditionary capability. But the assets needed for that are primarily air force and navy. As I said before, my view of what's needed there isn't clear. When I look at the key partners there I see the Marines doing one thing but countries like Australia and Singapore and Korea and Japan all still having a large conventional army capability.

Agree that the Navy and Air Force are likely to be the most important assets in a Pacific conflict. I also believe that China is much more likely to initiate a conflict with the US than Russia is to attack NATO due to the relative balances of power in each region. That's why I feel that while the CA definitely needs investment, it should not come at the expense of creating the Navy and Air Force that we require.

As far as US regional allies in the Pacific are concerned I'd argue that South Korea and Singapore have designed their forces with self defence in mind as the threats to their territory are very clear. Australia I'd argue (and Japan to a lesser extent) are clearly transforming their forces from traditional Armies to much more expeditionary forces capable of fighting at range.

I'm not tied in the the system enough anymore to know what the CF direction in this area is (if there actually is one) - What do you see as a force structure that we should be prepared to contribute?

I'm pretty swamped at work at the moment but I've been working on an outline for a possible baseline structure that I'll share as soon as I get the chance to finish it.

 

[FJAG]

I respectfully disagree. How many more beans and bullets do you need to deliver on a daily basis to maintain a Division in combat vs. a Brigade? You can't look at an Army Division in isolation. Basically tripling the size of your deployed force means tripling the logistical and support infrastructure required to support it. War stocks, shipping capacity (and escorts to protect them), airlift capacity, forward supply infrastructure and vehicles, in theatre transport, security forces to protect the logistics infrastructure, etc.

I'm not sure how to take that. If you mean during peacetime then the answer is no - because there's nothing that says you need to deploy the whole division. Remember, its the same manpower that you have now, just organized as a division. You choose how much you choose to deploy. The fact that you are organized and equipped as a division merely means that you have the option to deploy it. If all you have is a brigade then that's the end of it.

Even at 2% of GDP a military budget is limited and supporting a deployable Army Division means substantial extra investment in domestic infrastructure as well as Navy and Air Force investments to support that deployment...investment that could potentially be put into Navy and Air Force combat capability instead.

You've already got 4 brigades. And the infrastructure for them. The people and much of the gear for a division is there. Are there deficiencies? Sure there are but there deficiencies for the four brigades as well which need to be resolved. You've got about half the needed artillery, enough engineers enough LAVs. IMHO, the Navy and air force have enough cash going into them. I'd like to see them prove that they can actually make use of the gear they have. If the objective is to be seen to be counted, ships and planes have less impact than a forward deployed force exercising regularly.

I'm in no way suggesting that virtue signalling be our continued COA going forward. I fully support increased investment in the CAF (including the Army) and I think that a well equipped, Canadian-led multi-national Brigade in Latvia that is backed by the depth and Reserve capacity in the CA to be maintained in combat would be a very welcome contribution in the eyes of our European allies.

We don't disagree. I wouldn't want to see a forward deployed division either. A brigade with a partial forward presence and the rest as flyover is enough but with the promise that if push came to shove we could up that to a division. - It could even be a Canadian led multinational division with only half coming from Canada. The point is not to deploy it but to have it available for deployment if the circumstances demand it and to be seen as willing and able to commit that.

I also think that a Light component in our military that is capable of deployment to wherever they are needed globally (be that the Pacific, Europe or anywhere else in the world) would be seen as well as a welcome capability both by our European allies but even more importantly by the US.

Yup. And a division wouldn't stand in the way of that.

You're correct that it is not out of the question that a conflict that breaks out in one of the regions (Europe or the Pacific) could as a result of the alignment between China and Russia could end up expanding to the other region. In that case I would argue that the relative balance of power between NATO and Russia favours NATO while the balance of power between China and the US (and regional allies) is much more in question. In that case I'd argue that our ability to contribute in the Pacific would have a much greater impact than in Europe.

Not arguing against that.

Agree that the Navy and Air Force are likely to be the most important assets in a Pacific conflict. I also believe that China is much more likely to initiate a conflict with the US than Russia is to attack NATO due to the relative balances of power in each region. That's why I feel that while the CA definitely needs investment, it should not come at the expense of creating the Navy and Air Force that we require.

We're getting new ships. The issue of which coast you base them at shouldn't be dictated by our ridiculous habit of making sure that everyone is treated equally. If 2/3 or 3/4 of the navy should be on the west coast - so be it. That should be part of a defence policy. As for the air force - I'm one of those who think that the F-35 will be the last of that type of aircraft. My money is on the next generation being unmanned and much cheaper, flying long range missiles and other things that the jet jockeys are avoiding. That incidentally is IMHO a large component of our northern defence should be as well. (And those could be part of the artillery )

As far as US regional allies in the Pacific are concerned I'd argue that South Korea and Singapore have designed their forces with self defence in mind as the threats to their territory are very clear. Australia I'd argue (and Japan to a lesser extent) are clearly transforming their forces from traditional Armies to much more expeditionary forces capable of fighting at range.

I don't see that yet. I see Japan's increased budget (which is still only 1% of their GDP and $ going to ADM systems but beyond that I don't see much. There's one rapid deployment amphibious brigade but other than that they have 9 divisions (which are more like large brigades rather than divisions) and 8 independent brigades. There's nothing in their navy or air force that talks expeditionary - rather it goes to the name of the force itself - self defence. I'm not really too sure what to say about the Australians. They are cutting back on the concept of a balanced force to one devoted to firepower but its hard to see how that works. I've never liked their structure. It looks like ours only worse.

Honestly, I always understood the Pacific strategy during WW2 but for the life of me have no idea what either China's or the US's strategy is for these days.

I'm pretty swamped at work at the moment but I've been working on an outline for a possible baseline structure that I'll share as soon as I get the chance to finish it.

Same deal here. I've been meaning to rewrite "Unsustainable" but am too wound up in finishing "A Few Guns" to get at anything else. I only tend to do drive by posts on this site as it is.

 

[Ostrozac]

Honestly, I always understood the Pacific strategy during WW2 but for the life of me have no idea what either China's or the US's strategy is for these days.

The Chinese seem to believe that they can throw up a ring of steel (in the form of an anti-access/area denial bubble), seize and annex Taiwan, and then declare peace, with the red flag flying over Taipei and the ROC leadership already shipped off to the re-education camps.

The Americans believe that this won’t work, and that the US can and will penetrate an AA/AD zone effectively enough to sink sufficent PLAN vessels that the landings on Taiwan fail.

Both sides believe in their own strategy, and think the other side’s is deeply flawed, so probably neither side are being deterred. War might not be inevitable, but it’s a serious possibility.

 

[KevinB]

Imagine having spares.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1687080317054578688

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't see that yet. I see Japan's increased budget (which is still only 1% of their GDP and $ going to ADM systems but beyond that I don't see much. There's one rapid deployment amphibious brigade but other than that they have 9 divisions (which are more like large brigades rather than divisions) and 8 independent brigades. There's nothing in their navy or air force that talks expeditionary - rather it goes to the name of the force itself - self defence.

I think you're right wrt Japan. IMO a lot of Japan's current shift in focus is based on geography and technology. Technology allows them, like everyone else, to exploit Long Range Precision Fires. Geography demands that the air above the islands and the water between the islands is key terrain. It also demands that each island have its own cohesive, self-sustaining land army. And, as in the case of Singapore, the locals are motivated by the prospect of Russians, North Koreans and Chinese showing up in their rice fields. They are already in their waters and skies.

I'm not really too sure what to say about the Australians. They are cutting back on the concept of a balanced force to one devoted to firepower but its hard to see how that works. I've never liked their structure. It looks like ours only worse.

I think the Aussies suffer from the same problem I described when talking about the Canadian Army and Light Forces. Although the Aussies have a fading recollection of the bombing of Darwin they don't really know how they would defend the Homeland. The risk of invasion is higher than ours but the difficulty of defending a large, inhospitable land mass with a small population is similar.

I can see why the Aussies are attracted to Long Range fires. They are essentially pushing their Coastal Artillery out farther. They are backing their F18 launched LRASMs with Air Portable HiMARS launched LRASMs and PrSMs which can rapidly relocate the "Coastal Artillery" to counter the threat. Australia's best defence is to ensure no threat gains a toehold on their island. If that ever happens then the Aussies could never build a big enough Army to be effective even if all 30 million of them were armed.

They can't wait to defeat the threat in the hills and streets. Even fighting them on the landing grounds is likely to be too little too late.

I can see why they are putting money into their Air Force as well as a Littoral Navy. Those approaches are their primary concern. Along with Wolf Warriors.

Understanding Chinese “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” | The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)

www.nbr.org

More little green men.

 

[KevinB]

I think you're right wrt Japan. IMO a lot of Japan's current shift in focus is based on geography and technology. Technology allows them, like everyone else, to exploit Long Range Precision Fires. Geography demands that the air above the islands and the water between the islands is key terrain. It also demands that each island have its own cohesive, self-sustaining land army. And, as in the case of Singapore, the locals are motivated by the prospect of Russians, North Koreans and Chinese showing up in their rice fields. They are already in their waters and skies.




I think the Aussies suffer from the same problem I described when talking about the Canadian Army and Light Forces. Although the Aussies have a fading recollection of the bombing of Darwin they don't really know how they would defend the Homeland. The risk of invasion is higher than ours but the difficulty of defending a large, inhospitable land mass with a small population is similar.

The closest route to Australia from China is 2,600 Miles (or ~4,200km)
China with no experience in either Airborne, Airmobile, or Amphibious opposed operations.

I can see why the Aussies are attracted to Long Range fires. They are essentially pushing their Coastal Artillery out farther. They are backing their F18 launched LRASMs with Air Portable HiMARS launched LRASMs and PrSMs which can rapidly relocate the "Coastal Artillery" to counter the threat. Australia's best defence is to ensure no threat gains a toehold on their island. If that ever happens then the Aussies could never build a big enough Army to be effective even if all 30 million of them were armed.

They can't wait to defeat the threat in the hills and streets. Even fighting them on the landing grounds is likely to be too little too late.

I can see why they are putting money into their Air Force as well as a Littoral Navy. Those approaches are their primary concern. Along with Wolf Warriors.

Understanding Chinese “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” | The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)

www.nbr.org

More little green men.

The likelihood of the Chinese invading Australia at this point is about the same as it invading Canada. Yes that calculus could change if they swept up the rest of Asia, but to deter that, an Expeditionary ARMY is also needed to be able to credible reinforce endangered territories.

 

[Kirkhill]

The closest route to Australia from China is 2,600 Miles (or ~4,200km)
China with no experience in either Airborne, Airmobile, or Amphibious opposed operations.

Point taken

The likelihood of the Chinese invading Australia at this point is about the same as it invading Canada. Yes that calculus could change if they swept up the rest of Asia, but to deter that, an Expeditionary ARMY is also needed to be able to credible reinforce endangered territories.

I don't think I was arguing against an Expeditionary Army. I was more making the case that domestically an army has less value than what I am describing as Coastal Artillery, a dome or umbrella over the Motherland.

But, since you brought it up.

As to the value of the Expeditionary Army - that is a political matter.

For centuries Britain managed without one and when it had one it was a small one, often raised for the occasion. Much of the expansion of the British Army was occasioned by the need to protect settlers and the desire to impose values, both developments of the Victorian era. The Ukraine experience is closer to Britain's historical norm of standing off in the wings providing cues and assistance to the side of its choice.

European armies were seldom expeditionary unless you include stepping over borders and removing gates. And the occasional attempt to march on Moscow.

George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson all counselled against the foreign involvements that would necessitate an Expeditionary Army. O'Bannon's section and a battalion of locally acquired help was America's first expeditionary force.

In my opinion the Expeditionary Army of the US was in large part due to the threat of Black Jack Pershing becoming unemployed once the West was settled and Pancho Villa was contained. WW1 both justified and created the large expeditionary army.

 

[FJAG]

Imagine having spares.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1687080317054578688

I presume that's the early flat bottom thin steel version that doesn't do well on mines (like our LAVIIIs).

Take them to the Sierra Depot in the desert. Storage is real cheap there. Bet they could be rebuilt as light armoured logistics vehicles fairly cheaply as well.

 

[KevinB]

I presume that's the early flat bottom thin steel version that doesn't do well on mines (like our LAVIIIs).

Take them to the Sierra Depot in the desert. Storage is real cheap there. Bet they could be rebuilt as light armoured logistics vehicles fairly cheaply as well.

Even the LAV III and early Strykers had V hulls. Just not the double V of the LAV 6.0 and current Strykers.
To be honest I’m not sure. We are replacing all the older power plant versions (inc the same as the LAV 6.0) because they don’t have enough power to run some of the EW and DE systems as well as the network requirements.

Which I find somewhat odd given the fact the Army isn’t really keen on the Stryker ATM.

 

[Furniture]

As to the value of the Expeditionary Army - that is a political matter.

For centuries Britain managed without one and when it had one it was a small one, often raised for the occasion. Much of the expansion of the British Army was occasioned by the need to protect settlers and the desire to impose values, both developments of the Victorian era. The Ukraine experience is closer to Britain's historical norm of standing off in the wings providing cues and assistance to the side of its choice.

You're comparing apples to MacBooks here... The average training required for a soldier on the 16th-19th century battlefield was measured in days. The acceptable losses back then would make even Patton cringe.

In my opinion the Expeditionary Army of the US was in large part due to the threat of Black Jack Pershing becoming unemployed once the West was settled and Pancho Villa was contained. WW1 both justified and created the large expeditionary army.

If you discount early globalization then perhaps that view makes sense.

In the world of international trade and global commerce, keeping hot spots in check is required of all nations that want to prosper. You keep hot spots in check with expeditionary armies, and surface ships sailing around announcing their presence.

You don't keep international trade running with coastal artillery, and AD assets.

 

[Kirkhill]

You don't keep international trade running with coastal artillery, and AD assets.

You keep global trade running with this....

 

[Furniture]

You keep global trade running with this....

View attachment 79256

That, and about 250K "private" expeditionary troops in the East India Company...

 

[Kirkhill]

That, and about 250K "private" expeditionary troops in the East India Company...

Pshaw - Private Security Contractors - Security Guards....

 

[Ostrozac]

In my opinion the Expeditionary Army of the US was in large part due to the threat of Black Jack Pershing becoming unemployed once the West was settled and Pancho Villa was contained. WW1 both justified and created the large expeditionary army.

The Philippines and China probably had a bigger role. Once the US decided to become an imperial power in Asia, they needed to have an expeditionary army to enforce their claim.

 

[KevinB]

The Philippines and China probably had a bigger role. Once the US decided to become an imperial power in Asia, they needed to have an expeditionary army to enforce their claim.

Hey Gunboat Diplomacy wasn’t going to create itself.

But in a more serious note.
The global world view is why I don’t like the LAV for the CAF.

Europe, for an Expeditionary Force, needs either a Light QRF, or a Heavier Armored Predeployed formation. Asia doesn’t need the heavy forces.

Both need a Navy and AirForce.

Quite honestly going through untold versions of a Napkin CAF, I don’t see the point in a Larger CA.
1 Bde Predeployed to Europe (70/30)
1 Lt Bde for QRF (90/10)
1 Med Bde for OOTW. (50/50)
1 Med Bde of 10/90
Div Enablers for Lt, Hvy (Pre Deployed), and Med.
Robust Svc Support Bde.
Training Infrastructure Bde.
That should easily done within the current PY (with several thousand to spare).

Shift around 5k Reg PY out of the CA.
1k to CANSOF (the Influence Activities, and related)
3k to the RCN
1k to the RCAF (and task some of the PRes Inf to Airfield Security)

 

[IKnowNothing]

Hey Gunboat Diplomacy wasn’t going to create itself.

But in a more serious note.
The global world view is why I don’t like the LAV for the CAF.

Europe, for an Expeditionary Force, needs either a Light QRF, or a Heavier Armored Predeployed formation. Asia doesn’t need the heavy forces.

Both need a Navy and AirForce.

Quite honestly going through untold versions of a Napkin CAF, I don’t see the point in a Larger CA.
1 Bde Predeployed to Europe (70/30)
1 Lt Bde for QRF (90/10)
1 Med Bde for OOTW. (50/50)
1 Med Bde of 10/90
Div Enablers for Lt, Hvy (Pre Deployed), and Med.
Robust Svc Support Bde.
Training Infrastructure Bde.
That should easily done within the current PY (with several thousand to spare).

Shift around 5k Reg PY out of the CA.
1k to CANSOF (the Influence Activities, and related)
3k to the RCN
1k to the RCAF (and task some of the PRes Inf to Airfield Security)

While that axe is swinging, is the 50/50 Med Bde really a necessity? Could that capability be delivered by either having a vehicle pool for the 90/10 light to beef up with MRAP's when needed, or by expanding the 10/90 Med to more to a 30/120 that is overstrength when mobilized?

 

[Kirkhill]

Hey Gunboat Diplomacy wasn’t going to create itself.

But in a more serious note.
The global world view is why I don’t like the LAV for the CAF.

Same page here we are.

Europe, for an Expeditionary Force, needs either a Light QRF, or a Heavier Armored Predeployed formation. Asia doesn’t need the heavy forces.

And again.

Canada, as a country, needed and needs an army of Lighthorse and Rangers, WWI consumed infantry but was won by the Ordnance - gunners with their guns and sappers with their siege engines - tanks and such. WWII became a case of trying to find places to bring the sappers of all sides into battle with the Air Force taking on the battle-shaping role of the Lighthorse and the Rangers - dominating the spaces between the places. The Cold War cemented the Sapper Army's dominance on the 2000 km siege lines of the Iron Curtain. When those lines were broken and fell into disrepair the Sapper Army with all its heavy engines was no longer fit for purpose. There was less demand for the Sappers and more demand for Lighthorse and Rangers. Good sappers with good siege engines will always be necessary. They just need better team-mates with additional skills.

Canada could supply Lighthorse in WWI and did but there was no need for them so Canada did a great job of supplying infantry, gunners and sappers who deployed with nothing more than skills and enthusiasm and fell in on whatever equipment the Treasury made available at the Front.
In WWII if was lather-rinse-repeat. The Cold War petrified the WWI-WWII solution with the Gulf Wars confirming the bias. In both of the Gulf cases the Front was short and so was the timeline. Korea is the one place place where there is an ongoing need for Sappers because the siege continues.

Concurrently Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Somalia, the Balkans, the Middle East all demonstrated the continuing utility of "Lighthorse and Rangers". As did the Global Wars on Drugs and Terror. They seem to draw on the political success of the Global War on Slavery which supplied the moral underpinning for the liberal order that benefited the City of London and Wall Street as well as the banks of Europe.

Canada entered the world stage with an emplaced Siege Army in Europe. That army needed, then, heavy siege equipment like Tanks and Self-Propelled Howitzers that would operate under direct enemy fire. The equipment didn't need to travel over long distances, or even particularly fast but it did need lots of armour plate. Tracks enabled all that armour plate to be moved for short distances over rough terrain in most seaons.

In my opinion the LAV should have topped out at the 15 tonne mark. That is a weight that can be rapidly deployed by air and sea and which can be employed by the Lighthorse and Rangers to increase the areas they can operate and tasks they can perform. That weight range means thing like the M113 and the Bison and Coyote and even the TAPV (a good idea massaged by committee to convert a horse into a camel) and MRAPs. JLTVs and lighter of course along with ATVs and OSVs. Helicopters and cargo aircraft are also good.

Canada's "Sappers" (in my broadly analogous sense) need the heavy siege engines. Canada still needs them to have heavy tanks and AEVs and supporting arms on tracks. But those, as noted, need to be available on the siege lines and that means either buying lots of transport to move the kit or else buying lots of kit that can be located in multiple depots close to existing and potential siege lines.

In Europe the location of those siege lines is clear and they are all relatively close to each other.

In Asia and the Indo Pacific the locations of those lines are neither clear nor close. The Sappers have no target. They will have to wait to see what the "Lighthorse and Rangers" turn up.

Both need a Navy and AirForce.

Yup.

Quite honestly going through untold versions of a Napkin CAF, I don’t see the point in a Larger CA.
1 Bde Predeployed to Europe (70/30)
1 Lt Bde for QRF (90/10)
1 Med Bde for OOTW. (50/50)
1 Med Bde of 10/90
Div Enablers for Lt, Hvy (Pre Deployed), and Med.
Robust Svc Support Bde.
Training Infrastructure Bde.
That should easily done within the current PY (with several thousand to spare).

Shift around 5k Reg PY out of the CA.
1k to CANSOF (the Influence Activities, and related)
3k to the RCN
1k to the RCAF (and task some of the PRes Inf to Airfield Security)

 

[Eaglelord17]

At this point why don’t we just duplicate what the US Marines (and Navy) have going on and call it a day.

Just sign up for all their orders at the same time, get to buy in bulk for a bit cheaper, and train alongside them.

Covers the Army, Navy, and Airforce and is fairly integrated.

Give up on pretending we are a heavy force, as right now we aren’t as we can’t even keep out tanks running effectively so practically that is about the same as them not existing.