Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

You know there is a spectrum between obsolete and state of the art, right? And your “low cost” descriptor is probably not accurate for most of what you apply it against. The goal is to get the most capability per dollar spent. That is not achieved by trying to keep things rolling decades past their best before date, and it is also not achieved when paying the premium for the newest capability on the market.

But what is "obsolete"?

Sherman - 75mm 90 to 104 rds or 76mm 71 rds

Mass	66,800–84,000 lb (33.4–42.0 short tons, 30.3–38.1 tonnes) depending upon variant[3]

M46 Patton - 90 mm 70 rds

Mass	97,003 lb (48.502 short tons; 44.000 t)[2]

M47 Patton - 90mm - 71 rds

Mass	48.6 short tons (44.1 t) combat ready[2]: 119

M48 Patton - 90 to 105mm

Mass	49.6 short tons (44.3 long tons; 45.0 t)

M60 Patton - 105 mm - 63 rds

Mass	M60: 50.7 short tons (46.0 t; 45.3 long tons) M60A1: 52.6 short tons (47.7 t; 47.0 long tons) M60A2: 52.0 short tons (47.2 t; 46.4 long tons) M60A3: 54.6 short tons (49.5 t; 48.8 long tons)[6]

Leopard 1 - 105 mm - 55 rds

Mass	42.2 tonnes (increased on later models from original 40.0 tonnes)[1]

Leopard 2 - 120 mm - 42 rds

Mass	2A6: 62.3 tonnes (68.7 short tons) 2A7V: 66.5 tonnes (73.3 short tons)

Abrams - 120 mm - 42 rds

Mass	M1: 60 short tons (54 t)[3] M1A1: 63 short tons (57 t)[3] M1A1 SA: 67.6 short tons (61.3 t) M1A2 SEP v2: 71.2 short tons (64.6 t) M1A2 SEP v3: 73.6 short tons (66.8 t)[4]

Challenger 3 - 120 mm

Mass	66 tonnes (65 long tons; 73 short tons)[1]

MPFS - 105 mm - 38 tons = Sherman weight

CV90120 - 120 mm - 26 to 40 tonnes

CV90105 - 105 mm - 25 tonnes

Centauro B2 - 120 mm - 30 tonnes

Centauro B1 - 105 mm - 24 tonnes

MGS - 105 mm - 28 rds

Mass	18.77 tonnes (20.69 short tons; 18.47 long tons)

Is an MPFS "obsolete" matched against an Abrams? Or is it just poorly employed?

 

[Kirkhill]

I think you’re missing the forest from the trees.

Not the first time I have been accused of seeing things differently

Some wars can be fought and won, and are a one and done.

Yup. Kind of rare. But they happen.

Other wars leave the root cause of a conflict, and the victory hasn’t either fixed the problem, or vanquished the aggrieved party to an extent that the issue is buried.

Most common in my view of history.

Armies aren’t policy makers (at least in democratic countries), they are instruments of government policy.

Agreed

Using (and structuring) one’s forces intelligently is a way to ensure that there aren’t forever conflicts.

That, I think, is the essence of utopianism. A belief that there is a right way to do things that will solve all problems.

I don't believe that to be true. I believe that no matter what happens someone on the losing side will continue the fight by fair means or foul. If they can't win with our rule book then they will try to win with their own.

Our laws are not their laws.

It is important for our own self image that we adhere to our laws. They will perceive our laws as rigged against them. They will justify their actions within their own legal and moral framework.


Ukrainians and Poles have existed as people for a lot longer than there has been either a Poland or Ukraine. That hasn't stopped them from fighting back over centuries - with or without a recognized government of their own. And even if they are reduced to rocks and molotov cocktails.

 

[McG]

But what is "obsolete"?

It’s a term you had been using when I wrote my previous reply to you. It is more than a facile comparison of bore size, carried rounds, and total vehicle mass.

Survivability matters, and you can’t just extrapolate that from mass. Lethality matters, and you cannot extrapolate that from bore size and a count of carried rounds. Mobility matters, and it too is more complex.

If you want a fighting vehicle to be relevant today, it needs to see first and shoot first. That means weapon stabilization, modern fire control systems & optics, various night optics, driver viewing aid, separate commander’s sight, electric turret drive. These are real cost drivers, and you are not going to find great cost savings building 60 year old designs with these modern components and modern powerpacks.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Can we hire this officer to speak on the CAF behalf...?

 

[IKnowNothing]

If you want a fighting vehicle to be relevant today, it needs to see first and shoot first. That means weapon stabilization, modern fire control systems & optics, various night optics, driver viewing aid, separate commander’s sight, electric turret drive. These are real cost drivers, and you are not going to find great cost savings building 60 year old designs with these modern components and modern powerpacks.

Is there a significant mass driven differential on ongoing costs- operating, maintenance, infrastructure?

If so, and in light of the RCAC wanting to go to a single stream for organization and training, could the Army make use of a "not-a-tank" like the MPF to fill the identified cavalry gap and create a much more capable RCAC without the full cost of tripling the MBT footprint?

 

[Rifleman62]

Excellant interview.

 

[KevinB]

Is there a significant mass driven differential on ongoing costs- operating, maintenance, infrastructure?

If so, and in light of the RCAC wanting to go to a single stream for organization and training, could the Army make use of a "not-a-tank" like the MPF to fill the identified cavalry gap and create a much more capable RCAC without the full cost of tripling the MBT footprint?

Armor isn’t Cav.
Honestly the RCAC has their head up their ass if they think that a Leo2 training package would be the same for a LAV or TAPV.
Crew drills, and employment are different - and that affects the command as well as they cannot be employed in the same manner.

Of course this is the same RCAC that pretended for years the Cougar was a Tank substitute.

 

[Kirkhill]

It’s a term you had been using when I wrote my previous reply to you. It is more than a facile comparison of bore size, carried rounds, and total vehicle mass.

Survivability matters, and you can’t just extrapolate that from mass. Lethality matters, and you cannot extrapolate that from bore size and a count of carried rounds. Mobility matters, and it too is more complex.

If you want a fighting vehicle to be relevant today, it needs to see first and shoot first. That means weapon stabilization, modern fire control systems & optics, various night optics, driver viewing aid, separate commander’s sight, electric turret drive. These are real cost drivers, and you are not going to find great cost savings building 60 year old designs with these modern components and modern powerpacks.

Lethality and survivability are indeed important. But they are also relative. The are relative to place and time and what the enemy has available.

May be a 100 tonne tank can be a war winner if you can figure out how to get one to theatre. Maybe, like the ancient trebuchet, it can be assembled on site.

On the other hand some times all you need is an 8 tonne aluminum runabout with a 76mm gun.

My point is that when we ditch old kit in favour of new kit we don't just replace we improve. But every time we improve we end up with a different set of compromises, that invariably end up costing us more, so we end up with fewer guns (the primary reason for having a tank at all), and that require more support and rely on more exotic spares.

Plan B would have been to maintain, in cosmo grease, older, simpler, lighter vehicle which would complement the newer designs. The older stuff could relieve employment pressure on the high end stuff, reducing wear and tear on the top end. It would also improve the efficacy of your second and third tier forces - your reserves.

The concept is not a novel one -

 

[McG]

The concept is not a novel one -

All those vehicles were put into preservation before they were worn-out through over use. That is not a model Canada can implement until we start replacing fleets before they are worn-out. That is not a model Canada can implement until we start replacing fleets without allowing the spare & replacement parts stocks to dwindle through the last years of the fleet's service.

 

[FJAG]

Lethality and survivability are indeed important. But they are also relative. The are relative to place and time and what the enemy has available.

May be a 100 tonne tank can be a war winner if you can figure out how to get one to theatre. Maybe, like the ancient trebuchet, it can be assembled on site.

On the other hand some times all you need is an 8 tonne aluminum runabout with a 76mm gun.

My point is that when we ditch old kit in favour of new kit we don't just replace we improve. But every time we improve we end up with a different set of compromises, that invariably end up costing us more, so we end up with fewer guns (the primary reason for having a tank at all), and that require more support and rely on more exotic spares.

Plan B would have been to maintain, in cosmo grease, older, simpler, lighter vehicle which would complement the newer designs. The older stuff could relieve employment pressure on the high end stuff, reducing wear and tear on the top end. It would also improve the efficacy of your second and third tier forces - your reserves.

This might surprise you, but in this case I actually agree with you.

If one replaces older equipment sooner, while it still has some life in it, it can be used to train and strengthen a part of the force that would otherwise go without.

The Cougar was a case in point. When it first came out we all knew it wasn't a tank, it was a tank trainer that would let regiments in Canada and the ResF learn many of the necessary skills of armoured warfare so that transitioning them to a position on Leos with the RCDs (which were in Germany then) would be easier. At the same time we knew that it had an operational role in for recce in OOTW. The Grizzly was seen in the same way; as introductory equipment for training both RegF and Res force for transition to positions with 4 CMBG and a secondary OOTW operational role.

I don't think that we are about to strengthen the army by equipping it with new gear at a scale of five to six brigades. But I think we could get to a point where we could equip one or two brigades to high intensity Tier 1 operational capabilities and four or five to lesser Tier 2 capabilities which would serve as a step in the training program and have some value in low intensity OOTW operations. M113s, Bisons, light tanks, even LG1 and C3 howitzers could play a role. Yes. These would create a maintenance burden on the force but it's a burden we should pay to generally elevate the overall capability of the force. We could do even better if we aimed at replacing the LAVs, Leo 2s and M777s in one or two brigades with Tier 1 IFVs, newer tanks and SP guns (before the LAVs, Leo2s and M777s get clapped out) so that that the new gear would go to high end Tier 1 brigades while the equipment they replace goes to the Tier 2 ones. Our decades long "divest to invest" program is a death spiral that we need to get off of.

All those vehicles were put into preservation before they were worn-out through over use. That is not a model Canada can implement until we start replacing fleets before they are worn-out. That is not a model Canada can implement until we start replacing fleets without allowing the spare & replacement parts stocks to dwindle through the last years of the fleet's service.

You are right. We absolutely need to do that.

 

[Kirkhill]

All those vehicles were put into preservation before they were worn-out through over use. That is not a model Canada can implement until we start replacing fleets before they are worn-out. That is not a model Canada can implement until we start replacing fleets without allowing the spare & replacement parts stocks to dwindle through the last years of the fleet's service.

Absolutely. 100%.

It is part of the same decision spectrum that says we have to get rid of 60mm mortars so we can have GMGs. It is a nonsense. Which in turn brings up the identified need for a "serious talk about defence".

Socks.

 

[Kirkhill]

This might surprise you, but in this case I actually agree with you.

I hope so. I thought I was parroting you.

If one replaces older equipment sooner, while it still has some life in it, it can be used to train and strengthen a part of the force that would otherwise go without.

The Cougar was a case in point. When it first came out we all knew it wasn't a tank, it was a tank trainer that would let regiments in Canada and the ResF learn many of the necessary skills of armoured warfare so that transitioning them to a position on Leos with the RCDs (which were in Germany then) would be easier. At the same time we knew that it had an operational role in for recce in OOTW. The Grizzly was seen in the same way; as introductory equipment for training both RegF and Res force for transition to positions with 4 CMBG and a secondary OOTW operational role.

I don't think that we are about to strengthen the army by equipping it with new gear at a scale of five to six brigades. But I think we could get to a point where we could equip one or two brigades to high intensity Tier 1 operational capabilities and four or five to lesser Tier 2 capabilities which would serve as a step in the training program and have some value in low intensity OOTW operations. M113s, Bisons, light tanks, even LG1 and C3 howitzers could play a role. Yes. These would create a maintenance burden on the force but it's a burden we should pay to generally elevate the overall capability of the force. We could do even better if we aimed at replacing the LAVs, Leo 2s and M777s in one or two brigades with Tier 1 IFVs, newer tanks and SP guns (before the LAVs, Leo2s and M777s get clapped out) so that that the new gear would go to high end Tier 1 brigades while the equipment they replace goes to the Tier 2 ones. Our decades long "divest to invest" program is a death spiral that we need to get off of.




You are right. We absolutely need to do that.

 

[Kirkhill]

I wonder how much the Yanks would charge us for a few hundred baseline M113s from Sierra? Get Soucy to retrofit rubber tracks.

 

[Kirkhill]

Germany’s Defence Minister has ruled out sending any further weapons or equipment to Ukraine, admitting that the Bundeswehr will already not be able to replenish its stocks by 2030.

Blighted by chronic underinvestment since the end of the Cold War, the German army is now in even worse shape after having sent equipment, ammunition and vehicles like the Leopard 2 main battle tank to the battlefields of Ukraine.

“To put it bluntly, like other nations, we have a limited inventory,” said Boris Pistorius.

“As federal Defence Minister, I cannot give everything away,” he told German broadcaster Welt.

Gaps in the military will be impossible to bridge by 2030, he added.

The German government wants to grow the Bundeswehr to a 200,000-strong force and spend €130 billion on new equipment by the end of the decade.

“We all know that the existing gaps cannot be completely closed by 2030. It will take years, everyone is aware of that,” he said.

Germany rules out any further weapons deliveries to Ukraine

Defence minister says Germany 'cannot give everything away' to Ukraine as their military is beset by shortages of equipment

www.telegraph.co.uk

Why is this in Canada's Future rather than Ukraine's present?

Because, like Germany, we have neither the time nor the money, nor, frankly, the suppliers, to conduct business as planned. It is time to do "the other thing". Whatever that may be.

And nobody else is immune either.

 

[Kirkhill]

Further to my last:

German military facing recruitment gap, says commissioner​

04/02/2023April 2, 2023
The Bundeswehr is facing recruitment issues that are even worse than its lack of equipment, a top official has said. Commissioner Eva Högl said a plan to boost personnel numbers is "unattainable."

German military facing recruitment gap, says commissioner – DW – 04/02/2023

The Bundeswehr is facing recruitment issues that are even worse than its lack of equipment, a top official has said. Commissioner Eva Högl said a plan to boost personnel numbers is "unattainable."

www.dw.com

Their problem is probably made worse by this

on the question of whether the problems of Ukraine matter for Germany and if the country should get involved. 43% agreed with this statement, an 11 percentage point swing in favour of Germany getting completely out of the conflict.

German public support for Ukraine is falling

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches its first anniversary later this month, it remains unclear how this conflict is supposed to end. Nowhere is this more evident than in Germany’s foreign policy, where Olaf Scholz is proving to be something of an enigma. While it is true that Germany...

unherd.com

"Not my circus! Not my monkeys!"

 

[Kirkhill]

Seems like wise advice for any nation - but particularly an increasingly "non-aligned" Canada.

follow the wise counsel of George Washington who advised his countrymen to be in a position to “choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.”

Walter Lippmann toward the end of his great book made “no apology for seeking to define American foreign policy on which the American people could again become united because it conforms rigorously to American interests.” We must, he continued, “become fully conscious again of our own interests and feel prepared to maintain them.” We should not, he wrote, continue to “exhort mankind to build castles in the air while we build our own defenses on sand.” We need to know our limitations, Lippmann concluded, and follow the wise counsel of George Washington who advised his countrymen to be in a position to “choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.”

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/04/04/we_ignore_the_lippmann_gap_at_our_peril_891664.html

 

[Brad Sallows]

Who could have foreseen that countries wishing to be mini-arsenals of democracy ought to have thought about putting up serious money to increase output, and starting that right away?

 

[Kirkhill]

Integrating industry and Infantry Trials

Good to see tradition - Gunners wearing beaten up forage caps.

 

[Prairie canuck]

I don't know.

Every once in a while you really need to get out there and impress the locals with the fact that you exist as their saviours.

Is the codpiece standard issue too?

 

[markppcli]

Is the codpiece standard issue too?

No but socks clearly are