Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Oh that was a comment directed at the previously posted orbat with no supports inside a light brigade.
Capabilities are intrinsically tied to equipment (vehicles) and numbers.

Vehicles are equipment. Equipment is not necessarily vehicles. And not all vehicles are held within the unit.

 

[GR66]

Oh that was a comment directed at the previously posted orbat with no supports inside a light brigade.
Capabilities are intrinsically tied to equipment (vehicles) and numbers.

That proposed ORBAT is as mentioned a transitional structure to separate the Light Battalions into a single Brigade structure while their doctrine, equipment and structure are being developed. It would not stay like that....three traditional light infantry battalions. The final structure (and support elements) would be determined once the role and structure are determined.

 

[Kirkhill]

Oh that was a comment directed at the previously posted orbat with no supports inside a light brigade.
Capabilities are intrinsically tied to equipment (vehicles) and numbers.

The light brigade, which I was wrong to not define, was and is, an administrative structure not a tactical one. The key tactical elements I envisage are the DSBs - which are reinforceable, potentially with General Purpose Infantry.

 

[markppcli]

If you want the short form? The LAV restricts strategic mobility, has operational and tactical limitations, and drives the organization of the infantry.

Infantry is infantry with or without the LAV.

I am a glad you have confidence in your vehicle.

PS - you're the one that brought up "evolution"

The Piranha Grizzly AVGP with 3+6 crew (and two jumpseats) and a 50/7.62 hand cranked turret evolved
It became the Piranha Bison APC and the Piranha LAV-25 (USMC 3+6) and then the Coyote which evolved
It became the LAV 3 which further evolved
It became the LAV 6.

And those vehicles are all about their ability to carry troops (so the number of crew and pax doesn't appear immaterial to me), and their ability to fight (so the armament doesn't appear immaterial). As to mobility. Again I am really glad that you have confidence in your vehicle and your ability to employ it and your troops to full advantage.

I only bring up the capabilities because you focus on the limitations exclusively, I imagine if we were in Boxer or Puma or CV90s you’d make the same points. My point on Grizzly to Coyote was that, in the Canadian. Context, those are not like for like. As in we didn’t get Grizzly then Replace it with Coyote. You’re of course correct that they’re all from the same ancestry.

You said you weren’t fussed about numbers but the crux of your argument seems to be that the reduction of the section by two (9 in an m113 to 7 in a lav6) is some how a crippling issue to the infantry and I frankly just don’t see it. It’s also impossible to make these sorts of arguments without talking about pros and cons of being mounted.

 

[markppcli]

Vehicles are equipment. Equipment is not necessarily vehicles. And not all vehicles are held within the unit.

I’m finding this a very frustrating conversation when every point of discussion just gets jumped around when it’s challenged.
Obviously not all equipment is vehicles, obviously, but you can’t separate that from capability. Ie motorized Bn have different capabilities than mechanized, then an air mobile, ect.

 

[Brad Sallows]

We could also rotate readiness between the three Light Battalions to provide a rapid response capability for the Army.

Speaking of readiness, would consolidation (light forces, medium forces, tanks, guns, etc) into one or fewer locations make any appreciable dent in the number of posting moves ?

 

[markppcli]

It would. I also really struggle to see what we need 3 light Bns for. Really stretches the army more than it needs to be frankly.

 

[Infanteer]

Speaking of readiness, would consolidation (light forces, medium forces, tanks, guns, etc) into one or fewer locations make any appreciable dent in the number of posting moves ?

I suspect it wouldn't as posting in between brigade units is only a small part of the APS. Some analytics with the career managers' databases would give you the real figures, but:

1. Most of the Army's move credits are allocated to Officers who move between field units and schoolhouses, reserve support, staff college, NDHQ, and higher HQs. Consolidating field forces wouldn't put a dent in this.

2. For Army NCM move credits, there are generally to and from schoolhouses and reserve support, and to a lesser extent to other higher functions. No CTC school is co-located with a brigade, and save Valcartier the Div TCs are largely dislocated from the field forces.

 

[McG]

My question to that is who supports this Light Brigade? Who provides it mobility, who fixes its trucks, who provides it medical assistance? Simply throwing them all together does not a brigade make.

I would rather see us man our Bn's fully, ie with combat support companies manned full time not by reserve mortar and assault pioneer platoons. The ATGM capability can be manned by our existing tow systems for now. The PYs would come from the 3rd Bns with one left to provide that "operational quick reaction" we seem to require. Maybe it could be jump qualified.

The idea that the PRes will train a soldier to be rifleman & mortarman (or rifleman & pioneer) seems to be setting ourselves to achieve neither skill set to adequacy. Simultaneously, not generating & maintaining these skills in Reg F infanteers seems like underutilization of the full-time personnel.

Anyway, here are some thoughts on properly establishing support capabilities for the infantry battalion of 2025: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc47/sp/McGregorA.pdf

 

[Kirkhill]

I only bring up the capabilities because you focus on the limitations exclusively, I imagine if we were in Boxer or Puma or CV90s you’d make the same points. My point on Grizzly to Coyote was that, in the Canadian. Context, those are not like for like. As in we didn’t get Grizzly then Replace it with Coyote. You’re of course correct that they’re all from the same ancestry.

You said you weren’t fussed about numbers but the crux of your argument seems to be that the reduction of the section by two (9 in an m113 to 7 in a lav6) is some how a crippling issue to the infantry and I frankly just don’t see it. It’s also impossible to make these sorts of arguments without talking about pros and cons of being mounted.

You are quite correct. I would make the same points. It is not the LAV in particular that bothers me. It is the focus of the army on the Medium concept that bothers me. As Infanteer has routinely pointed out there isn't much to choose between the strategic mobility of a LAV/Leo2 based Medium Brigade and a CV90/Leo2 based Heavy Brigade. Frankly I would sooner have the heavies. But we have the LAVs so needs must.

Unlike many others, and despite my leading questions here, I do see the utility of the General Purpose Infantry Battalion. Not least for its strategic response time and its terrain and platform independence. You can even turn them into Boarding Parties.

With respect to the issue of the tendency to light forces vs mechanized forces I suspect we are seeing the same data and drawing different conclusions.

1. Armed forces everywhere are drawing down the number of tanks and not replacing them.
2. Armed forces are upgunning their light troops with longer ranged, heavier effect weapons
3. Armed forces are adding armoured vehicles but.
4. The new armoured vehicles are dispensing with turrets and replacing them with RWS stations so as to increase the number of troops inside
(Marder 3+6, Bradley 3+6, Warrior 3+7, CV90 3+6 to 8, USMC LAV25 3+6, Stryker 2+9, Stryker Dragoon 2+9, Boxer 3+8, USMC ACV 1 + 12). They are also swapping firepower for armour plate to protect the contents.
The emphasis, in my opinion is moving from the vehicle being a light tank to accompany heavy tanks and towards a more secure carrier of larger groups of infantry.
5. Armed forces are equipping their infantry with more vehicles but those vehicles, aside from the ones mentioned above, are dispensing with armour and weaponry to make the vehicles, and the infantry they support, more strategically and operationally deployable by air (both fixed and rotary wing).
6. The Armed forces are also enhancing their Stand-Off capabilities adding range to all weapons systems all the way down to the 40mm grenade launcher in the form of both guided projectiles and uas systems.

It is my belief that if, on the modern battlefield, you have driven your vehicle to within autocannon range you have done something seriously wrong.

The issue is not that I think an extra infanteer in the back makes a difference. But I do think that an infantry built around sections of 8 or 9 or 12 or 16 fights differently than an infantry built around sections of 6. And I would like to see one common training standard across a utilitarian, strategically deployable, operationally useful infantry corps.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Warrior may be gone or kept for longer if the Ajax problems don't get resolved. The USMC is actually going from a larger vehicle to a smaller one. I noticed a picture recently with Namers now equipped with RWS and what appears to be an auto-cannon.

 

[Kirkhill]

Warrior may be gone or kept for longer if the Ajax problems don't get resolved. The USMC is actually going from a larger vehicle to a smaller one. I noticed a picture recently with Namers now equipped with RWS and what appears to be an auto-cannon.

Or is the USMC going from a small boat with tracks to a large amphibious APC?

And the Namer does the first thing right. It protects its infantry. (3+9). But at 60 tonnes it is exactly as strategically effective as the Leo 2. Which would make it a great pairing for a Heavy Brigade.

 

[markppcli]

Warrior may be gone or kept for longer if the Ajax problems don't get resolved. The USMC is actually going from a larger vehicle to a smaller one. I noticed a picture recently with Namers now equipped with RWS and what appears to be an auto-cannon.

AJAX's service will determine the life time of Scimitars, not Warriors. The Warriors will now be whole sale replaced by the Boxer. What that Boxer will look like, ie main armament, is yet to be seen.

You are quite correct. I would make the same points. It is not the LAV in particular that bothers me. It is the focus of the army on the Medium concept that bothers me. As Infanteer has routinely pointed out there isn't much to choose between the strategic mobility of a LAV/Leo2 based Medium Brigade and a CV90/Leo2 based Heavy Brigade. Frankly I would sooner have the heavies. But we have the LAVs so needs must.

Unlike many others, and despite my leading questions here, I do see the utility of the General Purpose Infantry Battalion. Not least for its strategic response time and its terrain and platform independence. You can even turn them into Boarding Parties.

With respect to the issue of the tendency to light forces vs mechanized forces I suspect we are seeing the same data and drawing different conclusions.

1. Armed forces everywhere are drawing down the number of tanks and not replacing them.
2. Armed forces are upgunning their light troops with longer ranged, heavier effect weapons
3. Armed forces are adding armoured vehicles but.
4. The new armoured vehicles are dispensing with turrets and replacing them with RWS stations so as to increase the number of troops inside
(Marder 3+6, Bradley 3+6, Warrior 3+7, CV90 3+6 to 8, USMC LAV25 3+6, Stryker 2+9, Stryker Dragoon 2+9, Boxer 3+8, USMC ACV 1 + 12). They are also swapping firepower for armour plate to protect the contents.
The emphasis, in my opinion is moving from the vehicle being a light tank to accompany heavy tanks and towards a more secure carrier of larger groups of infantry.
5. Armed forces are equipping their infantry with more vehicles but those vehicles, aside from the ones mentioned above, are dispensing with armour and weaponry to make the vehicles, and the infantry they support, more strategically and operationally deployable by air (both fixed and rotary wing).
6. The Armed forces are also enhancing their Stand-Off capabilities adding range to all weapons systems all the way down to the 40mm grenade launcher in the form of both guided projectiles and uas systems.

It is my belief that if, on the modern battlefield, you have driven your vehicle to within autocannon range you have done something seriously wrong.

The issue is not that I think an extra infanteer in the back makes a difference. But I do think that an infantry built around sections of 8 or 9 or 12 or 16 fights differently than an infantry built around sections of 6. And I would like to see one common training standard across a utilitarian, strategically deployable, operationally useful infantry corps.

I suppose that's fair, but in reference to point 4, the more recent adoptions of behicles points to a practical limited of around 8 dismounts to a vehicle, and I can't think of many new vehicle's coming online that are a down grade of weapon systems. From Patria AMVs to Puma's by and large the weapons on carriers, even if it is an RWS, are getting larger and more complex, not smaller. But I'm probably getting two into the smaller details of armoured vehicles than the actual over arching concepts.

I fundamentally do not think that you must deploy a Bn with it's vehicles. In fact the CAF has done so on Op Reassurance and Op Impact rotations, deploying companies from mechanized Bn's to do roles far from their LAVs. So I don't buy the argument that you loose all strategic mobility.

 

[Brad Sallows]

As Infanteer has routinely pointed out there isn't much to choose between the strategic mobility of a LAV/Leo2 based Medium Brigade and a CV90/Leo2 based Heavy Brigade.

Strategic movement of any significant amount of heavy equipment is so far away from being a capability of the CAF as to be set aside for a near-term spitball session. But for the kinds of operations and tasks Canada undertakes, has a predominantly wheeled force yielded any measurable administrative benefits (eg. lower VOR rates, lower maintenance costs) and/or more tactical advantages?

 

[Infanteer]

I fundamentally do not think that you must deploy a Bn with it's vehicles. In fact the CAF has done so on Op Reassurance and Op Impact rotations, deploying companies from mechanized Bn's to do roles far from their LAVs. So I don't buy the argument that you loose all strategic mobility.

Those aren't good examples. They are not infantry battalion missions, they are SFCB missions that don't require "infantry", but rather require a TF HQ and a mish-mash of leader heavy detachments to "build capacity" in a static location(s).

 

[Colin Parkinson]

AJAX's service will determine the life time of Scimitars, not Warriors. The Warriors will now be whole sale replaced by the Boxer. What that Boxer will look like, ie main armament, is yet to be seen.


I suppose that's fair, but in reference to point 4, the more recent adoptions of behicles points to a practical limited of around 8 dismounts to a vehicle, and I can't think of many new vehicle's coming online that are a down grade of weapon systems. From Patria AMVs to Puma's by and large the weapons on carriers, even if it is an RWS, are getting larger and more complex, not smaller. But I'm probably getting two into the smaller details of armoured vehicles than the actual over arching concepts.

I fundamentally do not think that you must deploy a Bn with it's vehicles. In fact the CAF has done so on Op Reassurance and Op Impact rotations, deploying companies from mechanized Bn's to do roles far from their LAVs. So I don't buy the argument that you loose all strategic mobility.

That was the original intent, but if the Ajax program is in as serious trouble as claimed in the media, they may have to rerole the Warriors for awhile.

 

[Underway]

Is strategic mobility for the army not provided by planes, trains, and ships? Is it not the capability to deploy and sustain forces worldwide? I was corrected earlier in this thread that the LAV can deliver only operational and tactical mobility.

Any restriction caused in strategic mobility by a LAV would be equal to any other vehicles of similar size and/or weight. As @Brad Sallows pointed out most of the assets that can affect strategic mobility are not CAF assets.

 

[Infanteer]

Is strategic mobility for the army not provided by planes, trains, and ships? Is it not the capability to deploy and sustain forces worldwide? I was corrected earlier in this thread that the LAV can deliver only operational and tactical mobility.

Any restriction caused in strategic mobility by a LAV would be equal to any other vehicles of similar size and/or weight. As @Brad Sallows pointed out most of the assets that can affect strategic mobility are not CAF assets.

Correct.

 

[blacktriangle]

If three light battalions is too limiting, is there any merit in keeping one true light battalion or light BG? Perhaps based on 3 RCR? Something that is owned by the Army, capable of independent operation, and also interoperable with CANSOF? Is there a need for Canada to have a limited Global or Territorial Response capability that resides in the CA itself?

The other two battalions could be folded into the remaining six mech units to flesh out combat support capabilities and personnel shortfalls. If no light unit is required, then fold 3 RCR in as well. Or perhaps CANSOF would like something along the lines of a Ranger Bn, and use it as a pipeline for direct entry into that world.

 

[Kirkhill]

Is strategic mobility for the army not provided by planes, trains, and ships? Is it not the capability to deploy and sustain forces worldwide? I was corrected earlier in this thread that the LAV can deliver only operational and tactical mobility.

Any restriction caused in strategic mobility by a LAV would be equal to any other vehicles of similar size and/or weight. As @Brad Sallows pointed out most of the assets that can affect strategic mobility are not CAF assets.

I would say "supply" strategic mobility rather than "affect" it. The weight and dimensions of any kit will impact the transport in which it can be deployed and the speed and distance.

The availability of air and sealift are the key elements in being able to deploy a force in a strategically useful manner. Too little or too late is not useful. Fustest with the mostest usually wins.