Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

Where I do have the issue is with your basic overall force structure still focusing exclusively on unit types that are primarily suited for a European theatre of operations. You have one Mechanized Division consisting of 4 x Canadianized SBCTs (one forward deployed to Latvia) and a Light Infantry Division of 4 x Canadianized IBCTs. There is nothing here that is really suitable for the Indo-Pacific Theatre.

IMHO, its not that great for Europe either. My prime criteria for this establishment is to use the people and equipment we presently have. In effect we have no SBCTs nor ABCTs. We have three brigades structured on the BCT model with a tank regiment and two LAV infantry battalions as the manoeuvre elements. Plus inadequate artillery and cavalry. It's a mash up and basically there is only the equipment for two such brigades. One brigades worth forward deployed and one in Canada which are shared by three brigades worth of people (remember that the prepositioned brigade is equipment with some maintainers and a command staff only - its meant to be manned by the three Canadian brigades). The numbers are designed to ensure that they are sustainable (both in peace and war) and there is a hope that at some point in the future proper equipment will follow. Effectively as designed it is capable of sustaining one single deployed mechanized brigade which admittedly is targeted at Europe where our current military threat is.

I'm generally equipment agnostic as to future equipment for both divisions for the time being. It's a given that we need better anti-armour and anti-air resources. I generally do not see the armoured regiment or infantry battalions needing to change much in number or structure - just the equipment they may end up with. I do see major possibilities for new types of cavalry and artillery based on new weapons development. I basically look at mortar platoons and arty battalions as having a future that will probably be a mixture of tubes, rockets, loitering things etc. I also see that with longer ranges and new systems, that cavalry units and artillery will be more connected at the hip to extend the fight forward of and in between the gaps of the traditional manoeuvre units.

Again I'm not arguing that air and naval forces won't be the primary contributions to a conflict against China. However, unlike in Europe where the overall balance of military/economic/demographic strength massively favours NATO over Russia in any potential European conflict, the situation is NOT the same in the Indo-Pacific. That to my mind makes it even more important for us to find ways for the Army to contribute in any way it can to support the RCN and RCAF in a conflict with China.

I'm not ignoring China. I just don't feel confident enough to know or pontificate on where we fit in yet. I like the theory of a Multi-Domain Task Force. The US only has two targeted on the Indo-Pacific and I see a use for more. It's a high price for equipment and skills, however. Maybe beyond our Chevy budget.

As far as combat forces are concerned, that's where 2 Div's light battalions fit in for me.

Let's take a look at likely scenarios for a NATO-Russia conflict in Europe. You have fully 1/2 of your proposed force structure (1 Mechanized Division) optimized for deterring Russia and fighting them if required. I think we both agree that the threat from Russia is highly unlikely that they will launch a conventional attack on NATO that realistically they have no real chance of winning:

It's a non-zero possibility.

So let's say that we have our Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Latvia as a deterrent to Russia with the rest of 1 Division back in Canada to sustain/augment them if Russia actually does invade.

I think I can safely say that we are both in agreement that Russia is not going to "make another thrust across the German plains" in some kind of attempt to defeat the whole of NATO. They simply don't have the military capability. So I think we can also agree that any territorial ambitions that Russia has would be in either non-NATO nations or possibly in regions within NATO countries that have significant ethnic Russian minorities that they could exploit in order to expand their influence.

The reason they won't make the thrust is if there is adequate deterrence there. The possibility of a land grab "a la Ukraine" is there for the former Western pact countries if deterrence is too weak.

Ukraine has shown that Russian military involvement in non-NATO countries is highly unlikely to illicit a direct military response by NATO. Other than Ukraine, what are the other non-NATO states in Europe that Russia might invade? Moldova is the most likely, but Russian forces would have to cross Ukraine to get there. How likely is that? Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo? Russian forces would have to fly over NATO territory to get to any of these. The Caucuses (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan)? We've already shown an unwillingness to have any direct military involvement there in the face of Russian military attacks. So that really leaves Russian influence in ethnic Russian areas of NATO countries.

The Baltic states and parts of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria are possibilities depending on the Ukraine outcome. Don't think tomorrow. Think in a decade after the Russians have rebuilt and seeded the ground.

Is Russia going to simply launch a military invasion of Latvia in order to seize the portions of Latvia that have significant ethnic Russian minorities? Certainly that would trigger an Article 5 response by NATO. Do you have any doubt that NATO would be able to mobilize and retake that territory? Do you think that Russia would risk nuclear annihilation by using nukes to defend such seized territory? I don't think so. Any Russian attempts to expand their influence/territory into these ethnically Russian areas would have to be much more in the "Grey Zone".

I I think that your optimism (which NATO shared for a couple of decades) is dangerous. It's why Russia keeps nibbling away at the borders of neighbouring countries that no longer tow the Moscow line. Boots on the ground do more than deter Russia. They bolster the confidence of these little states that are at risk. I was in the room back in the early 00s when a Russian diplomat told us quite bluntly that if the Baltic States joined NATO "the tanks will roll". I believed him then and I do now. Russians have a different world view than we do. Moscow has control of the states security forces and media and make Trump look like a tyro when it comes to bald-faced lies.

So let's look at a possible alternate scenario for Russian activities against Latvia:

• ethnic Russians begin street protests demanding language rights and certain areas of self-determination within Latvia
• strikes and protests by ethnic Russians become increasingly violent with street fights, molotov cocktails being thrown, etc.
• the Latvian government cracks down on protesters with arrests, raids, curfews, detentions, etc.
• ethnic Russian attacks against government forces escalate with protesters (aided by "little green men" from Russia and military type weapons crossing the border) including bombings of police stations, RPG attacks on police vehicles, sniper attacks, etc.
• the Latvian government moves military forces in to deal with protesters and declares martial law in the restive regions of the country
• pro-Russian Latvian forces seize key government buildings and declare an independent Republic

At what point along this continuum do we authorize our Mechanized Brigade Group to engage against the Latvian separatist forces?
At what point along this continuum does Russian regular military forces crossing the border into Latvian territory NOT trigger an Article 5 NATO military response?

My guess is that we would not use Canadian forces at all against Latvians and that movement of Russian forces directly into Latvian territory (disputed or not) would definitely trigger an Article 5 NATO response.

So we have fully 1/2 of our force structure tailored for a series of scenarios where it is highly unlikely to actually be used while at the same time it's looking increasingly likely that there may be some kind of conflict in the Indo-Pacific for which we have 0% of our force structure designed to face.

Lets get real and pretend the Russians aren't a threat. Let's say we have a brigades worth of equipment sitting in Latvia and the tanks never role but other things happen. We then still have one brigade's worth of equipment and three brigade's of people in Canada to use as we see fit. If you leave one on standing watch for an opportunistic European deployment that leaves 1 brigade of equipment (and hopefully by then another brigades worth and two brigades worth of people able to man it. (over and above all the light forces in 2 Div) Nothing whatsoever stops you from targeting them on the Pacific. There are places where heavy forces are highly useful - Korea, Taiwan, Japan, even Australia. There utility isn't wasted but again gives the government the option to deploy a heavy brigade to the west, if it chooses to do so.

I'll say again though that I'm not proposing that we abandon NATO and "throw it under the bus" as has been suggested. Let's face it even under @FJAG proposed structure Canada is still a pretty minor proportion of the total NATO deterrence against Russia. Adjusting our force structure to also take into account a potential conflict with China is not going to make the difference between a strong and stable NATO and a renewed Warsaw Pact with all the Baltics, Ukraine and Eastern Poland all speaking Russian behind a new Iron Curtain.

I'm not going to put a Napkin Army here because I'm not sure yet what it might look like but I'd suggest that it could still include a Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Latvia (with the bulk of it being flyover forces) because I agree we need to keep a "Heavy" capability.

That's the point though. At some point the CAF needs to put up a napkin force that makes sense. I never was a fan of managed readiness but admit its utility in Afghanistan when we were committing the better part of a brigade every six months out of a force that had been ravaged the decade before. Our force is ravaged again and the only solution that I see is better training and integration of part-time forces which, because of the limited training time available, requires a more focused regime then the all-singing and dancing thing that we have now. Russia isn't just a operational focus; its a means to an end to establish an organizational and training regime that brings the CAF to a higher level of capability within the current limitations.

We also certainly need to keep a segment of our force that can be quickly transported by air in case of a crisis (either within Canada or elsewhere) but perhaps we need to examine what those forces might look like. Does that need to be a dedicated Light Infantry Brigade? Can dismounted LAV-based forces be deployed as an infantry component? Could CSOR fill that role? Are there other air-deployable types of forces that would be as useful/more useful than light infantry? AD, EW, Rocket Artillery?

All I'm saying is that our current thinking on force structures seems to be firmly locked in a Cold War box. We need mechanized forces to deter/fight the Russians and some Light Infantry to fill the gap in an emergency. We already have those basic building blocks and we just argue about how to shuffle them around (and put back in the enablers that have been lost to budget cuts over the years) rather than starting from first principles and asking what are our military challenges/objectives and what types of forces do we need to meet those.

Let me assure you that Canada is not locked into a Cold War box. That was what Transformation and Advancing with Purpose was all about. To take the Army out of the Cold War box. It created two religious tribes in the Army - The Hillierians who basically disassembled our Cold War capability in an attempt to create an agile, mobile OOTW force that had to adapt as Afghanistan went along and those who said "hold on a minute; let's not throw out the baby with the bath water". I was firmly in the latter camp and watched in disgust as one capability after another was thrown under the bus. The fact that we still have some tanks is a minor miracle of circumstances and has nothing to do with a rationale plan.

Canada isn't even close to being in a Cold War box. Let me just say this. The first principle when of designing a force when you do not know what the challenge is that it has to face is to ensure that your force is balanced adequately to be able to meet (or at least participate) in every part of the conflict spectrum. For me that includes an overriding factor - we'll never be large enough to go on our own and we'll never go without the US so we might as well follow their lead to ensure that we fit as seamlessly as possible into their force structure. To me that means a Delta like SF, a Ranger-like special force, and at least one each (preferably two) of an ABCT, SBCT, IBCT, an artillery brigade, an aviation brigade, a sustainment brigade and what they now call a protection brigade with sufficient reserve force depth and at least one deployable division headquarters. That gives you the ability to go in any direction regardless of what you focus them on in peacetime. We currently have the manning to achieve that (RegF and ResF combined) and a good start on the equipment needed.

Basically you need to start the reorganization while you figure out the equipment you need. You can always fine tune the organization to serve the equipment once its decided on.

I really need to bow out of this thread for a while and get some work done.

 

[FJAG]

Just a quick history question, so 3RCR was part of 2 combat group until the SSF stood up in '77 and then went overseas to take over 3 Mech (not really) CDO?

Yup. To the best of my recollection the 3rd was recreated around 1970 from elements of the Cdn Guards in Pet (it had previously been created for and disbanded after Korea). 1st Bn was down in London. When I got to Pet in 72, 2 RCR was in Gagetown having come back from Germany around 1970 and merged with what was left of the Black Watch. 2 RCR was never really a part of 2 Combat Group - just 1 and 3 RCR - while I was there until 1976. The SSF moved in just after I left and when the 3rd went to Germany.

At some point, I don't remember when, 1 RCR moved up from London to Pet as well. It might have been around the time of the disbandment of 4 CMBG and the CAR.

 

[GR66]

IMHO, its not that great for Europe either. My prime criteria for this establishment is to use the people and equipment we presently have. In effect we have no SBCTs nor ABCTs. We have three brigades structured on the BCT model with a tank regiment and two LAV infantry battalions as the manoeuvre elements. Plus inadequate artillery and cavalry. It's a mash up and basically there is only the equipment for two such brigades. One brigades worth forward deployed and one in Canada which are shared by three brigades worth of people (remember that the prepositioned brigade is equipment with some maintainers and a command staff only - its meant to be manned by the three Canadian brigades). The numbers are designed to ensure that they are sustainable (both in peace and war) and there is a hope that at some point in the future proper equipment will follow. Effectively as designed it is capable of sustaining one single deployed mechanized brigade which admittedly is targeted at Europe where our current military threat is.

I'm generally equipment agnostic as to future equipment for both divisions for the time being. It's a given that we need better anti-armour and anti-air resources. I generally do not see the armoured regiment or infantry battalions needing to change much in number or structure - just the equipment they may end up with. I do see major possibilities for new types of cavalry and artillery based on new weapons development. I basically look at mortar platoons and arty battalions as having a future that will probably be a mixture of tubes, rockets, loitering things etc. I also see that with longer ranges and new systems, that cavalry units and artillery will be more connected at the hip to extend the fight forward of and in between the gaps of the traditional manoeuvre units.

I'd point to this as an example of where there is a determination to stick with what is basically a WWII structure in the combined arms Brigade without examining if there are any different constructs that might be more appropriate based on the technology of the 2020s and beyond. The exact same building blocks as 1945 just with us looking to upgrade our equipment/vehicles to a more modern standard.

Now I realize it's very risky to just go and change from a formula that worked in the past but I'd put this down to yet another failure of past and present Canadian Army leadership. There have been no serious efforts made for decades to examine our way of war or to experiment with new ideas. Rather we've just stuck to the same formula and dropped capabilities in order to maintain the basic structures until we've stripped so much away capability that the structures we're left with are unable to perform their original tasks. We've sacrificed function for form.

I'm not ignoring China. I just don't feel confident enough to know or pontificate on where we fit in yet. I like the theory of a Multi-Domain Task Force. The US only has two targeted on the Indo-Pacific and I see a use for more. It's a high price for equipment and skills, however. Maybe beyond our Chevy budget.

As far as combat forces are concerned, that's where 2 Div's light battalions fit in for me.

We do more trade with China (our #2 trade partner) that with the entire EU and that doesn't include trade with Japan (#4), South Korea (#7), Hong Kong (#11) and India (#14). It really is crazy that we as a nation and our military in particular have such a blind eye to the Indo-Pacific and its importance to our own prosperity.

2 Division's Light Battalions are really just an afterthought. I can't remember which forum member it was that said that we don't have Light Infantry because we don't have any doctrine for their use. What we really have is extra Infantry Battalions that we're too cheap to buy vehicles for. Sending our Light Battalions to the Indo-Pacific would be the modern equivalent of Hong Kong in 1941.

It's a non-zero possibility. [added context: meaning a Russian invasion of NATO]

The reason they won't make the thrust is if there is adequate deterrence there. The possibility of a land grab "a la Ukraine" is there for the former Western pact countries if deterrence is too weak.

The Baltic states and parts of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria are possibilities depending on the Ukraine outcome. Don't think tomorrow. Think in a decade after the Russians have rebuilt and seeded the ground.

I I think that your optimism (which NATO shared for a couple of decades) is dangerous. It's why Russia keeps nibbling away at the borders of neighbouring countries that no longer tow the Moscow line. Boots on the ground do more than deter Russia. They bolster the confidence of these little states that are at risk. I was in the room back in the early 00s when a Russian diplomat told us quite bluntly that if the Baltic States joined NATO "the tanks will roll". I believed him then and I do now. Russians have a different world view than we do. Moscow has control of the states security forces and media and make Trump look like a tyro when it comes to bald-faced lies.

Lets get real and pretend the Russians aren't a threat. Let's say we have a brigades worth of equipment sitting in Latvia and the tanks never role but other things happen. We then still have one brigade's worth of equipment and three brigade's of people in Canada to use as we see fit. If you leave one on standing watch for an opportunistic European deployment that leaves 1 brigade of equipment (and hopefully by then another brigades worth and two brigades worth of people able to man it. (over and above all the light forces in 2 Div) Nothing whatsoever stops you from targeting them on the Pacific. There are places where heavy forces are highly useful - Korea, Taiwan, Japan, even Australia. There utility isn't wasted but again gives the government the option to deploy a heavy brigade to the west, if it chooses to do so.

Not many things are "a non-zero possibility" but some things are more likely than others. I personally would rank Russia launching a near suicidal attack on NATO fairly low on the risk of possibilities.

How high in comparison would you rank the possibility of China invading Taiwan and coming in conflict with US forces? And if that happens, how high would you rank the possibility of North Korean forces becoming involved in the conflict? Personally I'd rate both of these possibilities as considerably higher than Russia invading a NATO country. Are China and North Korea any less belligerent in their rhetoric about their neighbours than Russia? In fact the military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific puts the risk of the West losing a conflict there much higher than against Russia. But I don't see any suggestions that instead of putting a pre-positioned Mechanized Brigade in Latvia we put one in South Korea where the risk of direct conflict is potentially much greater than in Europe. It's for reasons like this that I suggest that some of the proposed thinking around our future force structure are stuck in Eurocentric thinking.

That's the point though. At some point the CAF needs to put up a napkin force that makes sense. I never was a fan of managed readiness but admit its utility in Afghanistan when we were committing the better part of a brigade every six months out of a force that had been ravaged the decade before. Our force is ravaged again and the only solution that I see is better training and integration of part-time forces which, because of the limited training time available, requires a more focused regime then the all-singing and dancing thing that we have now. Russia isn't just a operational focus; its a means to an end to establish an organizational and training regime that brings the CAF to a higher level of capability within the current limitations.

Yes, at some point somebody has to put up a napkin force that makes sense. Most of what we're doing right now though is just shuffling around our existing units on the page making slight variations to our existing structure. We're not really looking at anything new or different like the UK's "Deep Recce Strike Brigade", the US Army's "Multi Domain Task Force" or the USMC's "Littoral Regiment". Again, it seems like a task beyond the capabilities of our military leadership.

Let me assure you that Canada is not locked into a Cold War box. That was what Transformation and Advancing with Purpose was all about. To take the Army out of the Cold War box. It created two religious tribes in the Army - The Hillierians who basically disassembled our Cold War capability in an attempt to create an agile, mobile OOTW force that had to adapt as Afghanistan went along and those who said "hold on a minute; let's not throw out the baby with the bath water". I was firmly in the latter camp and watched in disgust as one capability after another was thrown under the bus. The fact that we still have some tanks is a minor miracle of circumstances and has nothing to do with a rationale plan.

I'll agree that the current Canadian Army isn't locked into a Cold War box. They are stuck in a cubicle in NDHQ. What you're describing above is not really a battle between two concepts of war fighting within the Army it was more a battle between those who bought into "The End of History" and believed that we wouldn't have to fight another major war again and those who didn't.

Canada isn't even close to being in a Cold War box. Let me just say this. The first principle when of designing a force when you do not know what the challenge is that it has to face is to ensure that your force is balanced adequately to be able to meet (or at least participate) in every part of the conflict spectrum. For me that includes an overriding factor - we'll never be large enough to go on our own and we'll never go without the US so we might as well follow their lead to ensure that we fit as seamlessly as possible into their force structure. To me that means a Delta like SF, a Ranger-like special force, and at least one each (preferably two) of an ABCT, SBCT, IBCT, an artillery brigade, an aviation brigade, a sustainment brigade and what they now call a protection brigade with sufficient reserve force depth and at least one deployable division headquarters. That gives you the ability to go in any direction regardless of what you focus them on in peacetime. We currently have the manning to achieve that (RegF and ResF combined) and a good start on the equipment needed.

Basically you need to start the reorganization while you figure out the equipment you need. You can always fine tune the organization to serve the equipment once its decided on.

The Cold War box isn't where the Army is but rather where the thinking is on where the Army should go. The US Army structures you want us to re-create in miniature are the same basic units designed to fight Russia. Why not an ABCT and two Littoral Regiments? Or a SBCT with tanks an Artillery Brigade and an AD Brigade? A Deep Recce Strike Brigade and Airborne Brigade and an ABCT?

I'll I'm suggesting is that there may be fights coming where the same traditional Brigades that we've developed to fight in Europe against the Russians might not be well suited to fight. And these conflicts may actually be more likely than a renewed one against Russia. And also that all of the force types your describing already exist in NATO and the same non-traditional types of units that might be better suited for an Indo-Pacific conflict might also be very effective in a conflict against Russia alongside our allies.

I can't help but think that now...when we're basically starting from scratch is an ideal time to start seriously thinking about these things.

I really need to bow out of this thread for a while and get some work done.

 

[FJAG]

I got some work done.

I'd point to this as an example of where there is a determination to stick with what is basically a WWII structure in the combined arms Brigade without examining if there are any different constructs that might be more appropriate based on the technology of the 2020s and beyond. The exact same building blocks as 1945 just with us looking to upgrade our equipment/vehicles to a more modern standard.

Now I realize it's very risky to just go and change from a formula that worked in the past but I'd put this down to yet another failure of past and present Canadian Army leadership. There have been no serious efforts made for decades to examine our way of war or to experiment with new ideas. Rather we've just stuck to the same formula and dropped capabilities in order to maintain the basic structures until we've stripped so much away capability that the structures we're left with are unable to perform their original tasks. We've sacrificed function for form.

I'm one of the bigger cynics on this site and I wouldn't go that far.

There's a considerable industry out there in organizations that do exactly what you suggest - wargame the possibilities of how to incorporate and optimize new weapon systems as they come online. There are folks in the Army, some of them here on this forum, who are quite smart and progressive but like any organization there are the curmudgeons who drag their feet. I spoke with Mike Jeffery about the Advancing with Purpose Transformation process and he described that one of the hardest things was to build unity - to get consensus on the way ahead. You might recall he moved us into a progressive program for a lighter more agile force but at the same time kept a heavy component in his pocket. Hillier blew that away on the eve of Afghanistan. Coming out of Afghanistan it was clear that even fighting the Taliban that a heavy component was needed (as they were blowing our lighter crap away) but the move to do that faltered after Leslie left in 2011.

The subtle point here is that every time the shooting starts, we find a need to dust off some of the Cold War gear and thinking.

We do more trade with China (our #2 trade partner) that with the entire EU and that doesn't include trade with Japan (#4), South Korea (#7), Hong Kong (#11) and India (#14). It really is crazy that we as a nation and our military in particular have such a blind eye to the Indo-Pacific and its importance to our own prosperity.

Our trade figures aren't that simple. Our biggest trading partner by far is the US - roughly 75% and, more importantly its a pretty healthy trade surplus for us., China comes in at 10% of our imports and 5% of our exports which leaves us in a constant trade imbalance with them. The EU numbers are slightly ahead of Chinas but again a trade imbalance. When you add the UK our European trade exceeds that with China and with the UK at least we have a trade surplus. If it wasn't for rare earth metals we could probably kiss China good-bye.

International merchandise trade for all countries and by Principal Trading Partners, monthly

International merchandise trade data grouped by Principal Trading Partners (PTP). Users have the option of selecting Imports, Exports, or Trade Balance. Data are unadjusted and seasonally adjusted, and are on a Customs and Balance of Payments basis.

www150.statcan.gc.ca

2 Division's Light Battalions are really just an afterthought. I can't remember which forum member it was that said that we don't have Light Infantry because we don't have any doctrine for their use. What we really have is extra Infantry Battalions that we're too cheap to buy vehicles for. Sending our Light Battalions to the Indo-Pacific would be the modern equivalent of Hong Kong in 1941.

No they aren't. Otherwise I wouldn't have held back 2 battalions of LAVs in reserve. They're specifically light because I envision them used in places and scenarios where light is needed or quick reaction is needed. Why the light battalions still don't have proper light transport is beyond me although I'll take a guess. I had a crackerjack GGFG sergeant working for me in Ottawa on Class B for three years. He went RegF as an officer and was posted to 3 RCR and for two years was involved in determining how the battalion would transform to TAPV. Since TAPV was bought as a type of Nyala replacement my guess is that the plan was for the three light battalions to go largely TAPV and that didn't work out so well as hoped. That's, like I said is a guess. Some of the more knowledgeable infantry folks on this forum might want to pick up on that.

Not many things are "a non-zero possibility" but some things are more likely than others. I personally would rank Russia launching a near suicidal attack on NATO fairly low on the risk of possibilities.

I don't share your optimism.

How high in comparison would you rank the possibility of China invading Taiwan and coming in conflict with US forces? And if that happens, how high would you rank the possibility of North Korean forces becoming involved in the conflict? Personally I'd rate both of these possibilities as considerably higher than Russia invading a NATO country. Are China and North Korea any less belligerent in their rhetoric about their neighbours than Russia? In fact the military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific puts the risk of the West losing a conflict there much higher than against Russia. But I don't see any suggestions that instead of putting a pre-positioned Mechanized Brigade in Latvia we put one in South Korea where the risk of direct conflict is potentially much greater than in Europe. It's for reasons like this that I suggest that some of the proposed thinking around our future force structure are stuck in Eurocentric thinking.

The US is in Korea. They don't need us. Taiwan has allied status with the US and don't need us. Major aside here - both the ROK and the ROC's ground forces are very heavily weighed towards armoured brigades.

Yes, at some point somebody has to put up a napkin force that makes sense. Most of what we're doing right now though is just shuffling around our existing units on the page making slight variations to our existing structure. We're not really looking at anything new or different like the UK's "Deep Recce Strike Brigade", the US Army's "Multi Domain Task Force" or the USMC's "Littoral Regiment". Again, it seems like a task beyond the capabilities of our military leadership.

I've seen far too many initiatives stillborn so I really can't argue this. My take, through second hand info, is that the Army gets too small a piece of the defence pie post Afghanistan (both the Navy and Air Force are saying its our turn) and of what it gets, there is no unity amongst the competing Army senior actors for a way forward.

I'll agree that the current Canadian Army isn't locked into a Cold War box. They are stuck in a cubicle in NDHQ. What you're describing above is not really a battle between two concepts of war fighting within the Army it was more a battle between those who bought into "The End of History" and believed that we wouldn't have to fight another major war again and those who didn't.

My problem with the abandoning heavy concept is that there are failed states scenarios where various warlords could give us a shit kicking right now with T62 tanks and drones which exist in abundance. You basically need a heavy force with air defence and other systems to deal with a third power country much less a peer.

The Cold War box isn't where the Army is but rather where the thinking is on where the Army should go. The US Army structures you want us to re-create in miniature are the same basic units designed to fight Russia. Why not an ABCT and two Littoral Regiments? Or a SBCT with tanks an Artillery Brigade and an AD Brigade? A Deep Recce Strike Brigade and Airborne Brigade and an ABCT?

Your problem with looking at my structures is that you do not see the weapon systems. You just see rectangle placeholders which are equipped with what we currently hold. I want to change the organization and methodology of how we train so that we can lift up the ResF to be a power multiplier and not a mere augmentee force when we have six months to train them. But take a closer look at the organizations. The three(4) mech brigades are in fact melds of an ABCT and an SBCT by virtue of there being tanks and LAVs. 38 Arty brigade has a deep strike component to it because it combines the divisional cavalry regiment (combined recce and anti-armour) with artillery regiments and (too be acquired) rocket regiment.

Take a look at 2 Div. There are two coastal regiments each of which is a meld of cavalry, an amphibious battalion a light (or in the west, mountain) battalion and a Canadian ranger battalion. The two light battalions each include a para battalion and a Canadian ranger battalion. There are two artillery brigades which are undefined right now but would need to be combinations of our current system which are highly inadequate. Personally my purchase program would include 1 x HIMARS battalion and 2 (preferably 3) 155mm SP regiments. I would leave all the M777s with 2 Div alongside the LG1s (basically 1 regt of each) and make the third regiment dedicated to a variety of UCAVs or other loitering munitions.

Note that all my recce regts also bear an anti-armour symbol (which means very little under our current equipment holdings) These are meant to have a heavy role in finding and attriting the enemy far forward in combination with long range tube artillery, rockets, UCAVs and air strikes.

One thing I'd like to see, but never will, is an aviation brigade. We had one once in 10 TAG, but the Army, in its wisdom, and funding crisis, gave that up.

I'll I'm suggesting is that there may be fights coming where the same traditional Brigades that we've developed to fight in Europe against the Russians might not be well suited to fight. And these conflicts may actually be more likely than a renewed one against Russia. And also that all of the force types your describing already exist in NATO and the same non-traditional types of units that might be better suited for an Indo-Pacific conflict might also be very effective in a conflict against Russia alongside our allies.

I'm not sure where "non traditional" leads us. I still see the main combat functions of Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain as valid regardless of the foe. As long as an organization is established to fundamentally cater to those either organically or through available enablers then you've got a good start. As long as you have the ability to train in those fundamentals then adapting to new weapon systems are possible. Just as an example, in 2003 Canadian artillery deployed to Kabul with LG1s (which it had) and a new UAV (Sperwer) and a rented counter mortar radar (ARTHUR) It took a while to get a handle on that but in 2005 we transformed the artillery to cater to UAVs and CMRs and when we went to Kandahar we quickly adapted to M777s, Skylark UAVs and LCMRs all of which were bought on rapid purchase UORs. It wasn't as easy as all that but because we had the basic TTPs from our earlier tour it was relatively easy to integrate the new gear.

That's basically what a balanced force will give you. The ability to develop skills at all ends of the conflict spectrum so that once the politicians make their choice, then you have either something ready to go or to adapt to the particular mission. Once you give up a particular skill set, regardless of how minor in importance it looks and once the gear is gone and the officers and NCOs who ran it are gone then it becomes a major undertaking to get it back. Air defence is the primary bad example of stupidity. Heavy is another. Combined arms tactical skills don't come easy particulalry if you are missing half of the weapon sets. Tanks and IFVs are only a part of a proper combined arms team. They miss a lot of sense and shield and we don't seem to be too good on the sustain either. We've been trying to improve command for twenty years and still aren't there.

If we have a decent light and a decent heavy capability we can do something for the Indo-Pacific as soon as someone figures out what it is. Don't get sucked in by the Marine rhetoric. Their solution is to fix the problem that they see to suit their role. That is only a part of that theatre. There's clearly an army role as well and as you can see by ROC and ROK, that includes lots of heavy armour.

 

[FJAG]

Oh Yeah! And then there's this.

Canadian Army shrank by 1,200 soldiers in 2022 as Latvia mission set to expand in June

But the Canadian Army cannot sustain a significantly larger deployment to Latvia over the long term, says its commander Lt.-Gen. Joe Paul

windsorstar.com

 

[KevinB]

I can think of no better way than moving NATO forces into Ukraine after the conflict to strengthen the radical elements in Russia. You'd basically be confirming their pre-war propaganda about NATO's attempts to encircle Russia. Surveillance overflights and a security guarantee are more likely (and less provocative) than NATO forces or NATO membership at least until a post-Putin Russia sorts itself out.

My point was a contingency if Russia became a failed state, and wanted/needed security support.
Not an invasion of Russia.
Also if Putin was to go, depending on who boosted him, they may want NATO’s support for a Marshall 2.0 to rebuild and resist China (and Hard Line Russian Nationalists).

Light Forces are great to get somewhere fast.
They can be extremely agile in some cases with enablers, but they aren’t a replacement for Heavy Forces when the slugging starts.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Is there a path forward that does both?

I'm probably missing something, but looking at @FJAG 's F2026 it seems like that with a couple tweaks it leaves room for @GR66 's "something else" (my words).

The tweaks
- instead of functional divisions with separate CS/CSS Bde's maintain the self-contained and deployable brigade group
-reduce 1 Div by a bde

• reduce 2 Div by 2 bdes
• form 3 Div with 3 bdes

The result
1 Div - 2x 30/70 mech bde's tasked for the NATO heavy fight (Edmonton and Quebec)
2 Div 2x 70/30 Light* bdes for all other "conventional" tasks (Petawawa and Quebec
3 Div 3x 30/70 xyz** bdes for xyz, (BC, SW Ontario, Maritimes)

*Flex Weight vehicle agnostic, anything and everything thats not the mechaniz fight, from leg QRF to Mrap COIN

** My preference being a "Coastal Defense Bde", based on the shooty bits of a multi domain taskforce
Strike Bn with NSM and brimstone/ Spike NLos batteries
Security / Motorized Inf Bn
AD Bn - layered batteries, patriot or atleast NASAMS 3 with MADIS

Missions- Arctic and Coastal Sovereignty, Indopacific contribution, focussing on area denial

 

[Kirkhill]

My point was a contingency if Russia became a failed state, and wanted/needed security support.
Not an invasion of Russia.
Also if Putin was to go, depending on who boosted him, they may want NATO’s support for a Marshall 2.0 to rebuild and resist China (and Hard Line Russian Nationalists).

Light Forces are great to get somewhere fast.
They can be extremely agile in some cases with enablers, but they aren’t a replacement for Heavy Forces when the slugging starts.

I'll ask this question: How much slugging can you afford?
Second question: When should you commit to a slugfest?

I can see there being a key point that needs to be held at all costs. But is that the same as a key point that needs to be taken at all costs? Or does that vital point just need to be destroyed, suppressed, neutralized or even just evacuated? Or can it be bypassed and cut off?

When do you need to go toe to toe with a matched force? Should you?

A lot of wars have been fought without heavy cavalry.

 

[FJAG]

I'll ask this question: How much slugging can you afford?
Second question: When should you commit to a slugfest?

Based on the last forty years of history, you commit to slugging when the politicians can no longer afford to be seen by the public or their major allies to be doing nothing. And then as little as possible.

I can see there being a key point that needs to be held at all costs. But is that the same as a key point that needs to be taken at all costs? Or does that vital point just need to be destroyed, suppressed, neutralized or even just evacuated? Or can it be bypassed and cut off?

When do you need to go toe to toe with a matched force? Should you?

A lot of wars have been fought without heavy cavalry.

That's because you needed light cavalry to define the enemy picture and there were plenty of heavy manoeuvre forces to do the heavy cavalry work when needed. Nowadays there are more and better reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities so that the need for light cavalry is lessened, while the costs of manoeuvre forces is high and the wider spaces between them and in front of them need to be filled by something more capable of fighting.

IMHO, the move to heavier cavalry combined with UAVs, satellite and other surveillance and longer range guns and newer airborne weapon systems is a maturing of the recce/cavalry capability that needs development and exploiting, if nothing else, than as an economy of force measure.

 

[Kirkhill]

Based on the last forty years of history, you commit to slugging when the politicians can no longer afford to be seen by the public or their major allies to be doing nothing. And then as little as possible.

40 years is not history. That is yesterday's news.

That's because you needed light cavalry to define the enemy picture and there were plenty of heavy manoeuvre forces to do the heavy cavalry work when needed. Nowadays there are more and better reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities so that the need for light cavalry is lessened, while the costs of manoeuvre forces is high and the wider spaces between them and in front of them need to be filled by something more capable of fighting.

IMHO, the move to heavier cavalry combined with UAVs, satellite and other surveillance and longer range guns and newer airborne weapon systems is a maturing of the recce/cavalry capability that needs development and exploiting, if nothing else, than as an economy of force measure.

So you are saying that there is a need to develop situational awareness and to shape the battle to your advantage? No disagreement there then.

My point is that striking power has moved from a cavalry function (the kinetic charge) to an artillery function (rifles, tank cannons, machine guns, howitzers, bombers and missiles). Artillery has become ever more dominant once they figured out how to actually hit their targets.

Armour plate has gone in and out of fashion over the millenia. Wars can be fought without armour plate.

 

[FJAG]

40 years is not history. That is yesterday's news.

Not to Canadians.

So you are saying that there is a need to develop situational awareness and to shape the battle to your advantage? No disagreement there then.

My point is that striking power has moved from a cavalry function (the kinetic charge) to an artillery function (rifles, tank cannons, machine guns, howitzers, bombers and missiles). Artillery has become ever more dominant once they figured out how to actually hit their targets.

Armour plate has gone in and out of fashion over the millenia. Wars can be fought without armour plate.

I was merely addressing the traditional distinction between light and heavy cavalry. The former for scouting the latter for shock action. As late as the Crimean War (the 1853-6 one) that distinction existed with a British cavalry force that came in heavy and light brigades. It took the better part of a half a century and the arrival of the machine gun to put paid to the horse-based shock action concept and the arming of cavalry with carbines to create a dragoon/mounted infantry that acted as both scouts and mobile reserves.

Lightly armed and armoured Canadian reconnaissance has been more or less de rigour since the interval between the first two wars when the cavalry branch divided itself into recce and tank with recce filling the reconnaissance and surveillance role and tanks the shock action role. Effectively after almost a half century of dragoons we went right back to light and heavy cavalry.

There has been much bantering back and forth within the armoured/cavalry community as to what constitutes "true cavalry". In the US in the latter part of the Cold War "armored cavalry" was truly heavy, armed with M1 tanks, and tasked to "fight for information" while the other armoured battalions were designed more for working in combined arms formations with varying percentages of infantry.

So back to the point. I disagree with the concept that "striking power" has moved from cavalry to artillery based on the simple premise that artillery cannot take or hold ground. "Striking power" is a flexible term that does not relate to combat functions and in particular, it washes over striking through manoeuvre and striking through firepower. Firepower will always be an enabler to a manoeuvre strike or shock function. At the end of the day you need a heavy mechanized force to deliver that punch.

In my mind the distinction between light and heavy cavalry and armoured forces depends on how far you go on the continuum of the combat scale where at the low end is a pure "sense" capability (i.e light cavalry) and at the high end an "act" capability through shock action (tanks in combined arms battle groups). Somewhere in the middle is something that can do a bit of both but really adds value to the "shield" capability of the force while being able to properly "sense" and, to an extent, "act" when required. That latter capability, which has the ability to sense, shield and act as required, in my mind, is what I term heavy cavalry. All three of these are enabled through firepower.

I should add as well that the light cavalry function is done by way of a suite of sensors which range from satellites to light recce vehicles on the ground. I'll add one more item. I see nothing wrong with a cavalry organization, as small as a battalion, that has both a light component and a heavy component and even enablers such as some infantry and some form of organic fire support. ABCT cavalry squadrons are an example of this. Finding the right balance of equipment is the trick. There may not be a single, universal TOE.

 

[Good2Golf]

I'm not so much worried that Russia will make another thrust across the German plains; its will it try to gather low hanging fruit by "rescuing" the ethnic Russians living in the Baltic States, the Balkans, Poland and elsewhere.

 

[daftandbarmy]

View attachment 75667

Geography may repeat itself:

NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor​

MARCH 3, 2022, 3:45 PM

As the Biden administration monitors Moscow’s reaction to dramatic U.S. and allied increases in assistance to Ukraine as well as the punishing Western economic and financial sanctions on Russia, it should turn its focus to a relatively small corner of northeastern Europe that is familiar to military strategists but often overlooked by most policymakers and the general public.

The Suwalki corridor (also known as the Suwalki Gap) separates the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea from Belarus, now host to thousands of Russian troops and soon home to permanently stationed Russian forces, including advanced fighter jets and nuclear weapons. It is also the only way to get by road or rail from Poland and Central Europe to the Baltic states—arguably NATO’s most exposed members.

A Russian move to seize control of the corridor may seem far-fetched, as it would explicitly involve an attack on NATO territory, triggering a U.S. military response. Nonetheless, if Moscow’s reinvasion of Ukraine has any central lesson to offer at this point, it’s that U.S. and allied officials must prepare now for worst-case scenarios by focusing on actual Russian military capabilities in the region, rather than the Kremlin’s announced intent, considered estimates of Russia’s strategic logic, or intelligence assessments of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s outlook.

Forty miles wide as the crow flies, the Suwalki corridor isn’t much of a corridor, at least in terms of natural boundaries such as rivers, coastlines, or mountains. Driving through the area last October while on a research trip to NATO units, I found it a wide-open rural region, predominantly characterized by rolling farmland interspersed with forests and small villages. Much of it is ideal terrain for tracked vehicles like tanks, given the very limited roadways and the gentle hills.

Two highways—one with two lanes each way, the other with just a single lane each way—plus a rail line, are all the ground-based transportation infrastructure that connect Poland with the Baltic states. Since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, in 2014, Western government officials, military leaders, and think tank experts have paid extra attention to this relatively narrow passageway between allies, primarily because of the chokepoint it represents should Russia seek to cut off the Baltics.

NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor

On the Polish-Lithuanian border, the West must respond to Russia’s actual capabilities rather than making assumptions about its intent.

foreignpolicy.com

 

[rmc_wannabe]

View attachment 75667

It's like hearing a recruit talk about going to CANSOFCOM when they haven't even hit the field yet.

"Alright there buds. Focus on passing your TOETs first"

 

[Good2Golf]

Geography may repeat itself:

NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor​

MARCH 3, 2022, 3:45 PM

As the Biden administration monitors Moscow’s reaction to dramatic U.S. and allied increases in assistance to Ukraine as well as the punishing Western economic and financial sanctions on Russia, it should turn its focus to a relatively small corner of northeastern Europe that is familiar to military strategists but often overlooked by most policymakers and the general public.

The Suwalki corridor (also known as the Suwalki Gap) separates the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea from Belarus, now host to thousands of Russian troops and soon home to permanently stationed Russian forces, including advanced fighter jets and nuclear weapons. It is also the only way to get by road or rail from Poland and Central Europe to the Baltic states—arguably NATO’s most exposed members.

A Russian move to seize control of the corridor may seem far-fetched, as it would explicitly involve an attack on NATO territory, triggering a U.S. military response. Nonetheless, if Moscow’s reinvasion of Ukraine has any central lesson to offer at this point, it’s that U.S. and allied officials must prepare now for worst-case scenarios by focusing on actual Russian military capabilities in the region, rather than the Kremlin’s announced intent, considered estimates of Russia’s strategic logic, or intelligence assessments of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s outlook.

Forty miles wide as the crow flies, the Suwalki corridor isn’t much of a corridor, at least in terms of natural boundaries such as rivers, coastlines, or mountains. Driving through the area last October while on a research trip to NATO units, I found it a wide-open rural region, predominantly characterized by rolling farmland interspersed with forests and small villages. Much of it is ideal terrain for tracked vehicles like tanks, given the very limited roadways and the gentle hills.

Two highways—one with two lanes each way, the other with just a single lane each way—plus a rail line, are all the ground-based transportation infrastructure that connect Poland with the Baltic states. Since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, in 2014, Western government officials, military leaders, and think tank experts have paid extra attention to this relatively narrow passageway between allies, primarily because of the chokepoint it represents should Russia seek to cut off the Baltics.

NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor

On the Polish-Lithuanian border, the West must respond to Russia’s actual capabilities rather than making assumptions about its intent.

foreignpolicy.com

If that’s a thinly veiled recce by Russian apologists to make the case that “it’s only 40km” it’s pretty naive to believe that the Poles wouldn’t unleash a fury of their own, even if NATO decided to ignore Art.5 and excuse itself to the washroom while Russia linked up with Kaliningrad…

 

[Kirkhill]

Meanwhile the USN and the USMC - Steel Knight 23 (1 MEF, 1 MarDiv, 3 MEW) - in the Indo Pacific

Highlighted weapons

Link 16

MV22 - rapid deployment of Marines and ASW (Grumman Tracker Replacements - sonobuoys, torpedoes and onboard processing)
P8s

Lots of opportunities in Canada for VSTOL aircraft (MV-22s and V-280s) to deploy in this fashion.

F35s and longservice F18Cs as bombtrucks with Harpoons and NSMs

AH-1Zs, UH-1Ys, MH-60Rs, MQ-8Cs and LCSs in anti ship roles. (LCS armed with NSMs)

How Marines Went To War Off California To Prepare For A Big Pacific Fight

F-35Cs striking over huge distances, Cobra and Huey helicopters attacking ships, and Ospreys hunting subs were all elements of Steel Knight.

www.thedrive.com

Add in other exotics like KC-130s delivering HIMARS/PrSMs/ATACMs or rolling cruise missiles over the tailgate that the Rogue Fires systems.

And many, many more.

 

[KevinB]

Meanwhile the USN and the USMC - Steel Knight 23 (1 MEF, 1 MarDiv, 3 MEW) - in the Indo Pacific

Highlighted weapons

Link 16

MV22 - rapid deployment of Marines and ASW (Grumman Tracker Replacements - sonobuoys, torpedoes and onboard processing)
P8s

Lots of opportunities in Canada for VSTOL aircraft (MV-22s and V-280s) to deploy in this fashion.

F35s and longservice F18Cs as bombtrucks with Harpoons and NSMs

AH-1Zs, UH-1Ys, MH-60Rs, MQ-8Cs and LCSs in anti ship roles. (LCS armed with NSMs)

How Marines Went To War Off California To Prepare For A Big Pacific Fight

F-35Cs striking over huge distances, Cobra and Huey helicopters attacking ships, and Ospreys hunting subs were all elements of Steel Knight.

www.thedrive.com

Add in other exotics like KC-130s delivering HIMARS/PrSMs/ATACMs or rolling cruise missiles over the tailgate that the Rogue Fires systems.

And many, many more.

But the USMC can be the USMC because of the USN, USAF, and US Army also exist.

 

[Kirkhill]

But the USMC can be the USMC because of the USN, USAF, and US Army also exist.

And the CAF can only exist because the USN, USAF and US Army (and the USMC and Space Force and US SOCOM) also exist.

We can't begin to replicate. We can be complementary while focusing on our national, and domestic needs.

 

[KevinB]

And the CAF can only exist because the USN, USAF and US Army (and the USMC and Space Force and US SOCOM) also exist.

We can't begin to replicate. We can be complementary while focusing on our national, and domestic needs.

Complimentary in this case means interoperable with a willing partner.
Which means putting Troops on the ground in harms way.

 

[Kirkhill]

Complimentary in this case means interoperable with a willing partner.
Which means putting Troops on the ground in harms way.

Do we have to put them on the ground with the III/V? Can't we work alongside I, XVIII or even the USMC?

The USMC is still planning on flying its F18s until 2030 as bombtrucks and WSO carriers. Be interesting to see the benefits of a WSO in an mixed optionally manned formation working with F35s.