Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

Here's another napkin to toss on the floor...

More of a consolidation and building a foundation for future growth based on the current poor condition of the CA.

Consolidation and concentration of Ref Force units to help ease the current personnel issues while a focus can be put on modernization of equipment and capabilities. Same for the Reserves - "right sizing" the units and consolidating them under Reg Force command structure. Short term focus will still have to be augmentation, but once all the required elements are in place (training, structure, equipment and legislation) the units can shift toward being deployable.

View attachment 75380

Funny thing about the Reserves...


The soldiers are always more 'deployment ready' than the Officers and SNCOs, mainly due to them being (mainly) students with few family and work obligations.

 

[IKnowNothing]

I am a fan of the Aussies, like a lot of other folks.

This article caught my attention.

"It ultimately comes down to the ultimate question that we're not really good at answering in this country— what are we really trying do with our military?"​

Australia delays largest program, IFV, as Strategic Defense Review grapples with 'hard choices' - Breaking Defense

Will the SDR make big decisions and refocus Australia's strategy? "It ultimately comes down to the ultimate question that we're not really good at answering in this country— what are we really trying do with our military?" Marcus Hellyer of ASPI said.

breakingdefense.com

Couple of related points

The Ukrainians have been effectively employing the Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle (11 to 16 tonnes) as well as the ancient M113s (12 tonnes) - both of which have been donated by Australia and has prompted to Australia to look at re-opening its Bushmaster production line.

The Australians are tightly associated with the USMC and are a hinge, a lynch pin, for the island hopping strategy.

Australia has a lot better shipping arrangements available to it than Canada.

Australia has a much better developed defence industry infrastructure than Canada.

Report on the contenders - The Rheinmetall Lynx (34 to 50 tonnes) and the Hanwha Redback (42 tonnes)

https://www.aspi.org.au/report/deciding-future

This article got me thinking, and thinking has lead me down a likely ignorant and unrealistic (and certainly unpopular path.

Assumption- Canada has two reasons to maintain heavy capability
A- to support NATO
B- to maintain the capability should there be need to expand it if geopolitical realities change to create more reasons than A

Challenge- accomplish the above with as few PY's as possible

What do we really need to do that well? Depends on the NATO commitment. Lets say it's
Lead a tracked combined arms eFP Latvia Battlegroup, contributing the HQ, CS, CSS, and one combat arms coy
Lead a flyover tracked mechanized eFP Latvia Bde, Contributing HQ, CS, CSS, one combined arms Bn, that absorbs the eFP BG
A follow up Combined Arms BN for depth (needs to be shipped over)

Focusing on the combat arms, would we not be able to accomplish that our with existing tanks (all training tanks upgraded to 2A4+ CAN standard 3x 14 tank coy's domestic, 2x + 8 spares Latvia), 2x regimental sets of CFV's (one domestic, one Latvia), 4 Bn CS coy sets of mortars etc (two domestic, two Latvia) and 5 Inf Coy sets of IFV's plus spares, (3 domestic, 2 Latvia)

Domestic Organization would be thus
1x RegF Cavalry Regiment (Fully Equipped)
1x RegF Square Combined Arms BN (Fully Equipped)
2x PRes Square Combat teams (50% Equipped - one shared set)

Readiness cycle 1/5 with the Cav regiment providing half squadrons to the BG, the combined arms Bn providing full coy's. eFP BG has prescribed foreign contribution of 1 tank Coy and one Inf Coy. When we're on a tank roto it's the Bde armoured Bn, and our fly over is a mech, when we're on an Inf roto it's reversed. To maintain the operational pace when we're on an Inf roto a formed coy from a LAV bn is seconded, completes crossover training and works up.


With the NATO commitment addressed, reorganize the rest of the CA with light and LAV equipment to better fulfill the non heavy fight

 

[GR66]

Funny thing about the Reserves...


The soldiers are always more 'deployment ready' than the Officers and SNCOs, mainly due to them being (mainly) students with few family and work obligations.

One of the reasons that I'm suggesting the the Reserve Brigade HQs be 100% Reg force and the Battalion HQ Companies be 70% Reg/30% Res.

 

[Kirkhill]

Here is what is necessary for modern war....

2,250,000 155mm MACS charges
864,000 155mm shells - Base Bleed, Rocket Assist and Conventional - all compatible with the PGM-K precision kit
12,050 155mm Excalibur PGMs

106,000 GMRLS Missiles
1,700 MGM-140 ATACMS Missiles
700 M142 HIMARS Trucks

28,300 Javelin Missiles
12,000 Joint Air to Ground Missiles (Hellfire and TOW replacements)
3,100 Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles
950 Long Range Air to Surface Missile
2,600 Harpoon Missiles
1,250 Naval Strike Missiles

5,600 Stinger Missiles - MANPADs
5,100 Sidewinder Missiles - NASAMS
5,100 AMRAAM Missiles- NASAMS
3,850 Patriot Missiles
1.500 SM-6 Missiles (Dual Function GBAD and IRBM)

An awful lot of precision, a lot of stand-off range and a lot of GBAD there.

An awful lot of arrows. The horses should be worried.

 

[KevinB]

Here is what is necessary for modern war....

2,250,000 155mm MACS charges
864,000 155mm shells - Base Bleed, Rocket Assist and Conventional - all compatible with the PGM-K precision kit
12,050 155mm Excalibur PGMs

106,000 GMRLS Missiles
1,700 MGM-140 ATACMS Missiles
700 M142 HIMARS Trucks

28,300 Javelin Missiles
12,000 Joint Air to Ground Missiles (Hellfire and TOW replacements)
3,100 Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles
950 Long Range Air to Surface Missile
2,600 Harpoon Missiles
1,250 Naval Strike Missiles

5,600 Stinger Missiles - MANPADs
5,100 Sidewinder Missiles - NASAMS
5,100 AMRAAM Missiles- NASAMS
3,850 Patriot Missiles
1.500 SM-6 Missiles (Dual Function GBAD and IRBM)

An awful lot of precision, a lot of stand-off range and a lot of GBAD there.

I think you’re on a very low end at best.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think you’re on a very low end at best.

I wouldn't doubt that in the slightest. But even at that it demonstrates a direction of travel considerably at variance with my understanding of Canada's travel plans.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think you’re on a very low end at best.

Source info.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1600473574245945344

 

[Kirkhill]

Do these things tie together under the Future Army banner? A more flexible approach to systems development?

Open systems architecture

Open systems architecture can unlock 'limitless potential:' Army Undersecretary - Breaking Defense

Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo said he was particularly impressed by the service’s adoption of the C5ISR Modular Suite of Standards program, a platform that will allow soldiers to plug in cards embedded with networking and EW capabilities

breakingdefense.com

The development of Kropiva

Kropiva Battle Management

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/zhyr5o

https://twitter.com/x/status/1575972921612193792

Precision artillery guidance using cheap tablets – how Ukrainian high-tech for effective projectile targeting works - Technology Org

Several days ago, the Armed Forces of Ukraine announced an artillery long-strike record achieved with an old soviet-era tank T-64. The target was destroyed

www.technology.org

How Ukraine turns cheap tablets into lethal weapons

Army SOS, an activist-led NGO, converts Android-based tablets into smart units with automated precision guidance.

www.aljazeera.com

They do things differently.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Not sure if this has been posted before (couldn't find it in the search).

Joe Paul on the future...

From Ukraine with urgency: How the lessons of conflict are shaping the Army agenda​

What direction did you put on the table during Army Council?

I’ve made it clear that, first of all, we will be implementing the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy. I told them that I was not planning on doing version 2 and 3. The time of writing is done. Now it’s time for action. We will be making some adjustments based on the lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict, but CAMS is the way ahead.

There are three buckets of decisions that have to be made. We will be tackling the first before Christmas. There are a few items in that bucket, but one we’ll be paying attention to is the mission tasks of the divisions. The Reserve mission task is a great concept. But four years in, we need to take stock, assess, and adjust. How has it been delivered? What has been effective? What are areas for improvement? And are there areas where Canada, the CAF and the Army would benefit from other types of mission tasks? One of the lessons of Ukraine (for example), has been their [effort] to go after the logistical tail of Russia. What do we need to do to strengthen and reinforce force protection for the logistical tail of the Canadian Army? In the second bucket, we’ll look at Army structure (Force 2025). Everything is on the table.

Does the conflict reprioritize any of your capability requirements? Is what you’re seeing in Ukraine creating more urgency?

Yes. There are constraints, obviously. Some processes I do not own. But regarding everything that is under my purview and within my authority, absolutely, we’re trying to move as fast as possible. The Army programs are competing for space with programs from the Navy and the Air Force. But I must say, the fact that the government has accepted to have a leadership role of the eFP Battle Group in Latvia has certainly been acknowledged by everybody in this department. And there’s recognition of the fact that we could end up having to speed up some of these projects.

The most urgent ones have to do with air defence, counter UAS systems, and anti-tank systems. These are in the machinery and moving as quickly as they can. But these are the basic entry points. I keep reminding everybody that it’s not because you have a point air defence system on your shoulder that you have air defence – it’s just one of the many moving parts. You need to have radars, mid- and long-range fires. An M-SHORAD (Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense) system like the one we’re looking at right now is like a band aid, it’s a quick fix. What we are after is a totally integrated, much larger type of capability. But that program is going to take a while before it can deliver.

The number one thing on which I’m focused right now is C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). Everything that has to do with command and sense. We have multiple projects that are trying to address current deficiencies. You need to be able to optimize your sensors and your shooters, [and for that] you need to draw data, convey data and analyze data. You need to provide commanders the decision-making tools they need to make the right decisions quickly. And you need to secure these networks.

But as we move toward being more digitalized, we still need to be able to do HF, VHF radio, we need to maintain the capability of laying lines. It wouldn’t take much to shut down the GPS constellation. So, just as you train to navigate with your compass, you need to be able to operate your command-and-control system with lines. I believe there’s still a place for runners in our organization, with a motocross bike or an ATV. You need to have a multi-layered system that gives you redundancy.

Is there anything that needs to be brought forward now?

Everything that has to do with the aFP brigade. If it does not contribute to deterring an authoritarian regime, I’m not interested right now.

From Ukraine with urgency: How the lessons of conflict are shaping the Army agenda | Canadian Army Today

canadianarmytoday.com

 

[Kirkhill]

I love this paragraph

There is an ongoing defence policy update that will be presented to the government. We’ll see then how much treasure the government is willing to give us. Because, as I like to say, a vision without the resources is just a hallucination. If I don’t have the money, if I don’t have the people, if I don’t have the kit, it’s not going to happen. Until I know how much resources I’m allocated, it’s kind of difficult to reorganize.

 

[Rifleman62]

Pipe dream.

 

[dapaterson]

Ok, my napkin Army.

First, move all bases / base support functions under a single BGen in Ottawa (Level 2 in NDHQ speak).

Second, the Army Individual Training Authority can be a second BGen (also a L2).

Third, the Army Futures position should be a MGen, and tagged for bigger and better.

Fourth, keep a BGen COS Ops.

Fifth, divest the RJOC functions. Let CJOC run them with LCol caretakers.

Sixth, organize the field force, fixed Reg and Res, into a single division of six brigades. Not brigade groups. Brigade groups should be temporary formations, not standing.

The six brigades:

One Armored Bde, with two Armd and one Inf Bns. Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.

Two Infantry Bdes, each with two inf and one armd Bns. Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.

One fires Bde, for all Artillery and enablers.

One Engr Bde, with combat and construction units.

One CSS Bde, with Maint, Tn, Sup, Food Svcs and pers support / replacement Bns.

 

[ArmyRick]

Ok, my napkin Army.

First, move all bases / base support functions under a single BGen in Ottawa (Level 2 in NDHQ speak).

Second, the Army Individual Training Authority can be a second BGen (also a L2).

Third, the Army Futures position should be a MGen, and tagged for bigger and better.

Fourth, keep a BGen COS Ops.

Fifth, divest the RJOC functions. Let CJOC run them with LCol caretakers.

Sixth, organize the field force, fixed Reg and Res, into a single division of six brigades. Not brigade groups. Brigade groups should be temporary formations, not standing.

The six brigades:

One Armored Bde, with two Armd and one Inf Bns. Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.

Two Infantry Bdes, each with two inf and one armd Bns. Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.

One fires Bde, for all Artillery and enablers.

One Engr Bde, with combat and construction units.

One CSS Bde, with Maint, Tn, Sup, Food Svcs and pers support / replacement Bns.

Interesting. Your background in Logistics? Its sometimes overlooked by ground apes like me to remember nothing happens with no ammo, food, water or fuel.

 

[dapaterson]

Whoops - I forgot the Sigs Bde!

But yes, a dedicated CSS Bde would be an improvement over the continual desire to do CSS on the cheap.

 

[FJAG]

Ok, my napkin Army.

First, move all bases / base support functions under a single BGen in Ottawa (Level 2 in NDHQ speak).

Second, the Army Individual Training Authority can be a second BGen (also a L2).

Third, the Army Futures position should be a MGen, and tagged for bigger and better.

Fourth, keep a BGen COS Ops.

Fifth, divest the RJOC functions. Let CJOC run them with LCol caretakers.

Sixth, organize the field force, fixed Reg and Res, into a single division of six brigades. Not brigade groups. Brigade groups should be temporary formations, not standing.

The six brigades:

One Armored Bde, with two Armd and one Inf Bns. Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.

Two Infantry Bdes, each with two inf and one armd Bns. Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.

One fires Bde, for all Artillery and enablers.

One Engr Bde, with combat and construction units.

One CSS Bde, with Maint, Tn, Sup, Food Svcs and pers support / replacement Bns.

Not arguing with the basic structure (especially bdes v Bde Gps - albeit what constitutes a "small CSS footprint" may need some negotiating) but just doing meatball math, that can all be done within the authorized strength of the existing RegF with several battalions worth of RegF left over even if you fluff up the remaining battalions.

I would consider adding a CS brigade for enablers such as EW, MI, Sigs Bn, Special Troops Bn, CBRN Bn; MP Bn. Div Recce and the like.

What are your guestimates as to tiered readiness and ResF percentages?

 

[KevinB]

IMHO Bde Groups make sense if you don’t plan on deploying larger forces, as you can allocate additional HQ assets to coordinate the Group Enablers.

Honestly for Canada, I’ve always thought the Group makes more sense, as the odds of sending a Div are snowballs chance in hell (not enough gear, and it would take years to move them with the CAF movement assets).


I still think Canada should have Div Assets and ideally 2 Deployable Divisions (one Heavy and one Light) accepting that some of those Bde’s would be ‘Total Force’ mixtures.

The Heavy Div would consist of 2 Armored Bde’s and 1 Mech Bde plus CS and CSS Bde’s and be primarily tracked (I’m willing to accept HIMARS for the GS Regiment though)
1 Prepositioned Armored Bde and Div HQ, remaining Div equipment prepositioned in Europe with 30/70 troops for flyover).

The Light Div would have 2 Light Bde’s and 1 Cav Bde plus related CS and CSS, primarily wheeled.

 

[GR66]

IMHO Bde Groups make sense if you don’t plan on deploying larger forces, as you can allocate additional HQ assets to coordinate the Group Enablers.

Honestly for Canada, I’ve always thought the Group makes more sense, as the odds of sending a Div are snowballs chance in hell (not enough gear, and it would take years to move them with the CAF movement assets).


I still think Canada should have Div Assets and ideally 2 Deployable Divisions (one Heavy and one Light) accepting that some of those Bde’s would be ‘Total Force’ mixtures.

The Heavy Div would consist of 2 Armored Bde’s and 1 Mech Bde plus CS and CSS Bde’s and be primarily tracked (I’m willing to accept HIMARS for the GS Regiment though)
1 Prepositioned Armored Bde and Div HQ, remaining Div equipment prepositioned in Europe with 30/70 troops for flyover).

The Light Div would have 2 Light Bde’s and 1 Cav Bde plus related CS and CSS, primarily wheeled.

I'm going to take the contrarian position that two deployable Divisions (and all the equipment and support that is required to field and sustain them) is not the best use of limited Canadian defence dollars - even if we increase our spending to the 2% of GDP target.

1. Canada is essentially an island nation and therefore the RCN and RCAF should be the primary focus of our spending. Expanding and properly equipping the Army to two deployable Divisions would divert money and manpower that would be better spent on increasing our naval and air capabilities.
2. China is the most urgent threat that Canada and the collective "West" need to prepare to face. That threat, like continental defence, requires mainly air and sea power. That's where we should concentrate our efforts.
3. While I 100% agree that we should not discount the threat posed by Russia just because of the beating they are currently taking in Ukraine, I do still maintain that Canadian military contributions to NATO collective defence are mainly a political rather than a military necessity. European NATO has a vastly larger population and economy than Russia and even leaving nuclear deterrence aside, that means that in the long run Russia is not really in a position to defeat NATO. Frankly, even if the US didn't deploy a single soldier to Europe but instead once again acted as the "Arsenal of Democracy" and simply fed Europe a steady supply of equipment and ammunition to keep them in the fight they would eventually defeat Russia just due to the imbalance of power between them. Canada should find the right balance between what's politically required and what's militarily required to support NATO. I'm not convinced that a full Canadian Division earmarked for deployment to Europe is required for that.

I'd suggest that a properly equipped, Canadian-led Brigade Group in Latvia (either multi-national in composition with a significant Canadian contribution or a fully Canadian flyover Brigade Group with a significant forward deployed element) meets the political contribution requirement to deter Russia from a potential (but highly unlikely) attack against NATO.

That likely means we'd need two Reg Force Mechanized/Armoured Brigades (one Anglo and one French) with at least two properly equipped Reserve Brigades (again one Anglo and one French) to sustain the NATO Brigade in any potential conflict.

We'd also likely want at least a Battle Group sized force available as a Rapid Deployment Force to respond to quickly developing situations. That would suggest a Reg Force Light Brigade Group.

A (largely) Reg Force Fires Brigade with 1 x Towed Howitzer Regiment, 2 x SP Howitzer Regiments, 1 x AD Regiment and 1 x LRPF (HIMARS?) Regiment would be required to support the maneuver Brigades. You'd also want the Canadian Combat Support Brigade to provide the extra enablers for your deployed force as well as a (mostly) Reg Force Sustainment Brigade to keep them in the field.

The current Reg Force Army could likely work out for this structure in terms of manning once it's properly equipped if we strip out unnecessary HQ's, etc. The question is how to best use the Reserve Forces that are not yet fully utilized. I'd argue that rather than adding more Mechanized/Light Infantry Battalions/Brigades we'd be better off adding more Fires (both guns and rocket), AD, EW and Sustainment units. These would allow our deployed Brigades to maintain effectiveness during a conflict.

Basically I'm arguing that Europe has the manpower required to ultimately defeat Russia in a war and that a Brigade-sized contribution from Canada is enough deterrent to meet our political contribution. In my opinion our ability to surge key (and in short supply) high-end enablers to support NATO should a war begin (again Fires, AD, EW, logistics, etc. from the Army as well as RCAF and RCN contributions) would have a greater military impact on the conflict than the ability to send additional maneuver Brigades.

$0.02

 

[KevinB]

I'm going to take the contrarian position that two deployable Divisions (and all the equipment and support that is required to field and sustain them) is not the best use of limited Canadian defence dollars - even if we increase our spending to the 2% of GDP target.

1. Canada is essentially an island nation and therefore the RCN and RCAF should be the primary focus of our spending. Expanding and properly equipping the Army to two deployable Divisions would divert money and manpower that would be better spent on increasing our naval and air capabilities.
2. China is the most urgent threat that Canada and the collective "West" need to prepare to face. That threat, like continental defence, requires mainly air and sea power. That's where we should concentrate our efforts.
3. While I 100% agree that we should not discount the threat posed by Russia just because of the beating they are currently taking in Ukraine, I do still maintain that Canadian military contributions to NATO collective defence are mainly a political rather than a military necessity. European NATO has a vastly larger population and economy than Russia and even leaving nuclear deterrence aside, that means that in the long run Russia is not really in a position to defeat NATO. Frankly, even if the US didn't deploy a single soldier to Europe but instead once again acted as the "Arsenal of Democracy" and simply fed Europe a steady supply of equipment and ammunition to keep them in the fight they would eventually defeat Russia just due to the imbalance of power between them. Canada should find the right balance between what's politically required and what's militarily required to support NATO. I'm not convinced that a full Canadian Division earmarked for deployment to Europe is required for that.

I'd suggest that a properly equipped, Canadian-led Brigade Group in Latvia (either multi-national in composition with a significant Canadian contribution or a fully Canadian flyover Brigade Group with a significant forward deployed element) meets the political contribution requirement to deter Russia from a potential (but highly unlikely) attack against NATO.

That likely means we'd need two Reg Force Mechanized/Armoured Brigades (one Anglo and one French) with at least two properly equipped Reserve Brigades (again one Anglo and one French) to sustain the NATO Brigade in any potential conflict.

We'd also likely want at least a Battle Group sized force available as a Rapid Deployment Force to respond to quickly developing situations. That would suggest a Reg Force Light Brigade Group.

A (largely) Reg Force Fires Brigade with 1 x Towed Howitzer Regiment, 2 x SP Howitzer Regiments, 1 x AD Regiment and 1 x LRPF (HIMARS?) Regiment would be required to support the maneuver Brigades. You'd also want the Canadian Combat Support Brigade to provide the extra enablers for your deployed force as well as a (mostly) Reg Force Sustainment Brigade to keep them in the field.

The current Reg Force Army could likely work out for this structure in terms of manning once it's properly equipped if we strip out unnecessary HQ's, etc. The question is how to best use the Reserve Forces that are not yet fully utilized. I'd argue that rather than adding more Mechanized/Light Infantry Battalions/Brigades we'd be better off adding more Fires (both guns and rocket), AD, EW and Sustainment units. These would allow our deployed Brigades to maintain effectiveness during a conflict.

Basically I'm arguing that Europe has the manpower required to ultimately defeat Russia in a war and that a Brigade-sized contribution from Canada is enough deterrent to meet our political contribution. In my opinion our ability to surge key (and in short supply) high-end enablers to support NATO should a war begin (again Fires, AD, EW, logistics, etc. from the Army as well as RCAF and RCN contributions) would have a greater military impact on the conflict than the ability to send additional maneuver Brigades.

$0.02

At the end of the Day, boots on the ground is a true show of support. You can sail around or fly around to your hearts content - but nothing says I am here to help and will fight with you like troops in defensive positions do.

If/when Russia crumbles, those troops in Europe will be needed for stability operations while Marshall 2.0 goes into effect. As well as a counter to Chinese ambitions on Russian territory.

Two Cdn Divisions should be what Canada can field currently with its numbers, and properly utilizing the Reserves.
Even at Canada’s current 1.3’ish Defense Budget, a properly structured 2Div Army shouldn’t mean that the RCN and RCAF suck hind tit.

I agree that a Pacific tilt is occurring/needs to occur, but see 1 Light Div would be a credible CAF contender in that AO provided the RCN and RCAF have assets in that area as well.

On the Fires aspect - even every other Service Support/Combat Support entity - they need to be tailored to the force they support. Having Light Infantry trying to be supported by Tracked systems makes no sense, in the same way that Light support cannot effective support a heavy tracked entity.
An ISV doesn’t need an ARV to recover it, and similarly a MBT isn’t getting recovered at all or supplied well by a light utility truck or medium logistics vehicle.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I'm going to take the contrarian position that two deployable Divisions (and all the equipment and support that is required to field and sustain them) is not the best use of limited Canadian defence dollars - even if we increase our spending to the 2% of GDP target.

1. Canada is essentially an island nation and therefore the RCN and RCAF should be the primary focus of our spending. Expanding and properly equipping the Army to two deployable Divisions would divert money and manpower that would be better spent on increasing our naval and air capabilities.
2. China is the most urgent threat that Canada and the collective "West" need to prepare to face. That threat, like continental defence, requires mainly air and sea power. That's where we should concentrate our efforts.
3. While I 100% agree that we should not discount the threat posed by Russia just because of the beating they are currently taking in Ukraine, I do still maintain that Canadian military contributions to NATO collective defence are mainly a political rather than a military necessity. European NATO has a vastly larger population and economy than Russia and even leaving nuclear deterrence aside, that means that in the long run Russia is not really in a position to defeat NATO. Frankly, even if the US didn't deploy a single soldier to Europe but instead once again acted as the "Arsenal of Democracy" and simply fed Europe a steady supply of equipment and ammunition to keep them in the fight they would eventually defeat Russia just due to the imbalance of power between them. Canada should find the right balance between what's politically required and what's militarily required to support NATO. I'm not convinced that a full Canadian Division earmarked for deployment to Europe is required for that.

I'd suggest that a properly equipped, Canadian-led Brigade Group in Latvia (either multi-national in composition with a significant Canadian contribution or a fully Canadian flyover Brigade Group with a significant forward deployed element) meets the political contribution requirement to deter Russia from a potential (but highly unlikely) attack against NATO.

That likely means we'd need two Reg Force Mechanized/Armoured Brigades (one Anglo and one French) with at least two properly equipped Reserve Brigades (again one Anglo and one French) to sustain the NATO Brigade in any potential conflict.

We'd also likely want at least a Battle Group sized force available as a Rapid Deployment Force to respond to quickly developing situations. That would suggest a Reg Force Light Brigade Group.

A (largely) Reg Force Fires Brigade with 1 x Towed Howitzer Regiment, 2 x SP Howitzer Regiments, 1 x AD Regiment and 1 x LRPF (HIMARS?) Regiment would be required to support the maneuver Brigades. You'd also want the Canadian Combat Support Brigade to provide the extra enablers for your deployed force as well as a (mostly) Reg Force Sustainment Brigade to keep them in the field.

The current Reg Force Army could likely work out for this structure in terms of manning once it's properly equipped if we strip out unnecessary HQ's, etc. The question is how to best use the Reserve Forces that are not yet fully utilized. I'd argue that rather than adding more Mechanized/Light Infantry Battalions/Brigades we'd be better off adding more Fires (both guns and rocket), AD, EW and Sustainment units. These would allow our deployed Brigades to maintain effectiveness during a conflict.

Basically I'm arguing that Europe has the manpower required to ultimately defeat Russia in a war and that a Brigade-sized contribution from Canada is enough deterrent to meet our political contribution. In my opinion our ability to surge key (and in short supply) high-end enablers to support NATO should a war begin (again Fires, AD, EW, logistics, etc. from the Army as well as RCAF and RCN contributions) would have a greater military impact on the conflict than the ability to send additional maneuver Brigades.

$0.02

I've argued this before here lol It doesn't go well lol

 

[Halifax Tar]

At the end of the Day, boots on the ground is a true show of support. You can sail around or fly around to your hearts content - but nothing says I am here to help and will fight with you like troops in defensive positions do.

With the deepest respect, I think that's a very narrow view and very Army centric view. The most important campaign/battle/theatre for the ETO during WW2 was the BOA. Regardless of the opinions of the riflemen in the field. A sharp sword is of no value if its shattered beyond the point.