I don’t see the CA Mortar Platoons being that anymore.
They're tied directly into the bn/BG FSCC which is all you need.
I think that the bn mor pl concept is tactically and organizationally still valid. I do wonder whether a mortar platoon should be manned by "uptrained riflemen" or whether they shouldn't be a specialty in their own right like in the US. One could have a trade called indirect fire support that covers everything from tube to UCAVs ... maybe even heavy anti-armour ... etc. Basically keep all weapon systems used within the rifle company as your standard infantryman qualification and career stream and everything from bn support weapons and create a separate stream.
We're never going to match the per capita (or even absolute) size that the Finn's and Swiss generate via conscription, but there might be something to be learned from their employment and surge capability, that there's a middle ground to be found with deployable reserves without US expenditure levels, and without massive leaps required to get the reserves trained on using and maintaining the best and most complicated kit.
That makes me think a bit cart before the horse. It works on the proposition that we have a reserve and a cheap government so let's see what we can do with it without first looking to see if we need a cheap, moderately trained force.
Where and how will we use these territorial units? Will it be for home defence? That presupposes an attack on Canada. And where do we need them, our main harbour areas? the north? Will we send it overseas as part of a NATO force? They already have such forces. Do they need or want more? Or do they want armoured or mech or artillery brigades? Will we use it on missions outside the country such as UN or training support missions? That's not a ResF job per se under our political/military construct - that's a full-timer job.
I keep pivoting the ResF towards a mech force in Europe. Why? 1) Europe needs more armoured and mech forces as a deterrent to the Putins in life and it fits our current NATO obligations, 2) such forces do not need to be forces in being - flyovers exercising regularly in Europe add deterrent value at a fraction of the cost of a full-time force and can be mobilized and deployed as threat levels go up 3) we already have the bulk of the equipment we need to equip such a force to a brigade level and to train and sustain it, 4) our RegF should pivot to being a) a leadership/training/support cadre for a mobilizable force, and b) light quick reaction forces and specialized units that are needed on a day-to-day, full-time basis and/or need constant training to hone their skills.
Our main impediment to restructuring the force in that way is that the RegF does not want to give up their toys to part-timers. The mantra that the ResF can't maintain them is ridiculous. The fact is that the ResF can't maintain this equipment
under the current system. In any organization worth its salt if there is a capability gap then you redesign the system to close the gap. We have ignored doing that for decades. We continue to fine tune a broken concept.
We need to stop looking for a role for an inadequate ResF and restructure the force to make it affordable and capable for real defence needs.
The first step should always be - what are our day-to-day defence needs and what is the force we might need to generate for an extreme event. I do not see a Ukrainian style territorial force as falling under either category in the foreseeable future. That might have been the case in the period before the Boer War but not now.