Informing the Army’s Future Structure
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To be fair, I did say we should leave close combat to the Europeans. That doesn't mean there aren't other, better ways to contribute to the alliance.
daftandbarmy
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IIRC that Mackenzie-King tried to keep us out of yet another European Civil War by offering to run this program instead:
British Commonwealth Air Training Plan - Wikipedia
That didn't work out so well either
But yes, there are other roles that might be useful as an alternative to close combat, however, we'd better get used to having not much say in what happens...
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Other than in the minds of the uniformed bureaucracy in Ottawa & perhaps some on this forum, I'd say that's already the case.
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For me the concept of force structure and equipment has always been fairly easy. Since we will undoubtedly not deploy without a major presence from our North American neighbour we should be structured and equipped exactly like them so that we can fully interoperate, if necessary using their equipment, seamlessly. And they do have a lot of spare equipment and new capabilities to work with.
My problem with that is that there is then little difference between Canada and the Warsaw Pact. We might as well recruit Canadians and use them to fill seats in American vehicles. And we weren't willing to do that for the Brits, even when we were British. Sam Hughes fixed that problem.
Are we destined to be an Imperial Auxiliary? Or do we get to pick and choose our fights?
And if we are getting to pick and choose why not choose to pick something that we feel we can afford in both treasure and blood.
Was Paul Hellyer so wrong in his appreciation of the situation? I don't think so. We are a long way from the fight. Any fight. What strategic influence can the army, any army, in any structure, bring to bear in a timely fashion. I can't say that I am a fan of a heavy force deployed in Canada. Garrisoned in Europe. Yes. Garrisoned in Canada? Without adequate transport? No.
Regardless of the weight of force we choose to deploy, it has to be able to get into the fight before the fight is over.
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Speak for yourself. I learned to love me some chicken fried steak washed down with MGD. And biscuits and gravy.The weakness in this plan is, of course, the food.
If we had to eat hominay, black eyed peas and chicken fried steak I'm pretty sure we'd have a rebellion on our hands (except the Newfies of course).
daftandbarmy
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Speak for yourself. I learned to love me some chicken fried steak washed down with MGD. And biscuits and gravy.
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Having equipment commonality with the Americans or NATO Europe (M1A2/Leo2) makes a lot of sense and I think that is starting to be stipulated with the tanker acquisition and the LVM projects.
I wonder do we need to transport our own equipment into the European theater if we are using common equipment? Should it not be possible for us or the US or European NATO to have extra equipment pre positioned? How much equipment are we really talking about that we could or would actually man if things turned hot.
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Thanks Mark, I look forward to watching it. The comparison between Australia and Canada is always fascinating. I'm not sure the Australians have their force structure all figured out either though. They do without a doubt have no trouble in commiting the money to a change in direction. But I'm still curious how they see using 75 M1A2, 450 IFV's, and 200+ Boxers. Australia's north is already extremely limiting terrain for heavy fighting vehicles. Indonesia's is probably much worse
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What if the Army, regardless of structure, is incapable of delivering a strategic impact?
Colin Parkinson
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It's why I think we should invest in some amphibious landing ships. They can move our equipment and allies, support missions around the world and garner valuable international Brownie points for minimal political risk.IIRC that Mackenzie-King tried to keep us out of yet another European Civil War by offering to run this program instead:
British Commonwealth Air Training Plan - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
That didn't work out so well either
But yes, there are other roles that might be useful as an alternative to close combat, however, we'd better get used to having not much say in what happens...
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In a shooting war, Amphibs are still a legitimate target - perhaps even HVT depending what type of ship we went with.
If we are still speaking primarily of Europe & the CA, I think we should be focusing on what can we afford to have in place, on Day 1 of conflict, to support the alliance. Along the lines of what Kirkhill was getting at earlier.
I suggest a combination of modern sensors & effectors to put the adversary at risk. It would provide some form of deterrent, as well as an actual capability in case of war. If however, we are bent on conducting close combat, or acting as an "inside force", then I suggest we add something along the lines of a cavalry BG that T2B spoke of. If we are really serious, do both. And they'd both be applicable to other missions around the world.
Colin Parkinson
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Fully agree in a shooting war, amphibs and AOR''s are primary targets. However there are many missions that the navy does at the bidding of the government and it's allies, that don't bring that level of threat. Man the Amphibs with Fleet Auxiliary and small naval detachment, like the RN does.
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If we are just trying to buy brownie points, perhaps we should ask our allies what they need & want?
It may not be an Amphib. What if it's an EP-3 or Rivet Joint det somewhere? Are we still game?
It may not be an Amphib. What if it's an EP-3 or Rivet Joint det somewhere? Are we still game?
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What I found most interesting about this video was that Australia originally had a Heavy Mechanized Brigade, a Medium Weight Motorized Brigade, and a Light Brigade.
They then switched to Mixed Brigade Groups because they were unable to properly sustain a single brigade for long periods of time in Iraq.
Essentially they built the Canadian model which was the CMBG as stated by @Infanteer. All Mid weight+. One unit regenerating, the next working up, and the third on deployment. And here some of us are advocating doing what they had before the change with one Brigade focused as a Heavy Mechanized one Middle Weight and the last Mid-Light forces.
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A bit different.
They only have two infantry battalions per brigade, and neither possesses vehicles (or one battalion may have Bushmasters - can't recall). The Armoured Regiment possesses a reconnaissance (cav) squadron, a tank squadron, and a carrier squadron to "mech up" a battalion of infantry.
To me, this is a structure designed to produce battle groups. I think there are issues with this brigade structure as a fighting entity primarily due to the fact that there are only two real manoeuvre units and they have different mobility platforms.
They only have two infantry battalions per brigade, and neither possesses vehicles (or one battalion may have Bushmasters - can't recall). The Armoured Regiment possesses a reconnaissance (cav) squadron, a tank squadron, and a carrier squadron to "mech up" a battalion of infantry.
To me, this is a structure designed to produce battle groups. I think there are issues with this brigade structure as a fighting entity primarily due to the fact that there are only two real manoeuvre units and they have different mobility platforms.
FJAG
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I'm not fond of the Australian Army's present structure which mirrors our own all too much. Brigades may be organized as brigade groups but the basic mix of equipment does not hint at it being an entity designed to fight as a brigade but more like Infanteer says, one designed to generate battle groups (a total of six based on the six infantry battalions) in a similar three year cycle to our MRS.
Three good points:
1) At least their regiments have gone back to three four-gun M777 batteries (for a twelve gun regiment) instead of our two battery (eight-gun regiment); On the other hand their reserve artillery is all 81mm mortar and gave up any real ability to support the regular artillery under Plan Beersheba;
2) They have a Sustainment brigade with three Force Support battalions and health services battalions over and above the service battalions in the three regular brigades;
3) the army reserve is about our P Res size (at 17,000) but organized into about one third of the battalion sized units making each battalion significantly larger and more viable. (albeit that a report from 2014 indicates that it is not unusual in a 500 man battalion to have only 100 show up for training) (Maybe we should use their amalgamation system. If they can have a 10/27 RAR maybe we could have a 48th Royal Queen's Own Rifles Highlander Regiment of Canada
) I don't see them particulalry well equipped albeit two light reserve brigades are paired with each Reg F brigades.
The really good point is that there is a solid plan to upgrade the war fighting potential. The purchase of 450 IFVs and 160 M1 hulls and 30 K9 howitzers show a clear plan to build all three of their brigades into fully armoured brigade combat teams (albeit the number of guns might be a bit light but they would still have 50 plus M777s in their inventory as well - maybe they'll revive the reserve artillery with those.)
Long story short, I'm still a follower of the US National Guard and Reserve structure for both deployable manoeuvre, combat support and sustainment formations to provide an ability to grow the force rapidly. If necessary pair a reserve brigade with a regular brigade if we can't afford the gear up front (something that's pretty easy considering that Reg F gear stands idle for most of a summer anyway.)
Three good points:
1) At least their regiments have gone back to three four-gun M777 batteries (for a twelve gun regiment) instead of our two battery (eight-gun regiment); On the other hand their reserve artillery is all 81mm mortar and gave up any real ability to support the regular artillery under Plan Beersheba;
2) They have a Sustainment brigade with three Force Support battalions and health services battalions over and above the service battalions in the three regular brigades;
3) the army reserve is about our P Res size (at 17,000) but organized into about one third of the battalion sized units making each battalion significantly larger and more viable. (albeit that a report from 2014 indicates that it is not unusual in a 500 man battalion to have only 100 show up for training) (Maybe we should use their amalgamation system. If they can have a 10/27 RAR maybe we could have a 48th Royal Queen's Own Rifles Highlander Regiment of Canada
) I don't see them particulalry well equipped albeit two light reserve brigades are paired with each Reg F brigades.The really good point is that there is a solid plan to upgrade the war fighting potential. The purchase of 450 IFVs and 160 M1 hulls and 30 K9 howitzers show a clear plan to build all three of their brigades into fully armoured brigade combat teams (albeit the number of guns might be a bit light but they would still have 50 plus M777s in their inventory as well - maybe they'll revive the reserve artillery with those.)
Long story short, I'm still a follower of the US National Guard and Reserve structure for both deployable manoeuvre, combat support and sustainment formations to provide an ability to grow the force rapidly. If necessary pair a reserve brigade with a regular brigade if we can't afford the gear up front (something that's pretty easy considering that Reg F gear stands idle for most of a summer anyway.)
markppcli
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My understanding, and certainly what the video states, is that that structure has changed. The Bn's now own their vehicles with the ACR being one Tank Sqn and two Cav (recce) Sqns. I agree this is about producing battle groups, essentially they see themselves has at most fighting two battle groups at a time, that is however based on their operational experience since WW2. Given that they don't have the burden of commitment to fighting for European Democracy, they can afford to be task oriented to smaller interventions.
3) the army reserve is about our P Res size (at 17,000) but organized into about one third of the battalion sized units making each battalion significantly larger and more viable. (albeit that a report from 2014 indicates that it is not unusual in a 500 man battalion to have only 100 show up for training) (Maybe we should use their amalgamation system. If they can have a 10/27 RAR maybe we could have a 48th Royal Queen's Own Rifles Highlander Regiment of Canada
They also did this wild thing where they looked at their reserves and thought " are we really getting a capability out of reserve Armour / Artillery or would they be better off providing us XYZ?
