Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

For individual training could more emphasis be placed on self-learning through on-line study with one night a week being set aside for supervised TOETs and tutoring?

No. Never. Not a chance.

As with most trades the only way to learn your craft properly is through on the job experience, augmented with good, practical in-person course type training.

Platoon Commanders learn by commanding platoons, Company Commanders companies etc etc. It is reasonable to assume that this could be accomplished within range of the normal mix of currently available courses and training time during the week and weekends. There is alot of work to do to reinforce and improve this training and on the job learning, believe me, but the basics are probably already there within the range of the training year, courses and available RSS support.

However, with few exceptions, anyone at the rank of LCol and CWO - and above - in the militia is probably seriously under trained, has never been tested, selected or performance managed within a competitive process for senior leaders and are, at worst, figureheads. Some of them, because of the 'last man standing' principle, are dangerously incompetent and almost wholly unaccountable for their actions unless they screw up on a large scale.

For example, unlike during my full time service, in over 30 years of militia service I never once saw a militia CO issue orders for anything or really lead anything personally, especially a field exercise of some sort or even during a CAX/CPX. Unless it was a ceremonial parade or social event of some sort, there were no orders given from on high, which isn't any good for the units or the professional development of our most senior leaders. Not all their fault, of course, it's just the way things are run in the nuthouse...

Militia Bde Comds, Generals and their CWO sidekicks? These absurdly outsized roles are seemingly political appointments so the Reg F can claim they are 'listening' to the needs of the militia, as well as being 'fair' to those who want to pursue some kind of upwards part-time career progression. They appear to be mainly 'bag holders' for their Reg F counterparts AFAIC, otherwise there wouldn't still be so many probelms in the militia world writ large.

 

[FJAG]

In the 10th the artillery is brigaded at the divisional level with the exception of the ARNG BCT that brings its own artillery battalion along with it when it joins the division. Presumably that battalion then falls under the artillery brigade's command and control. Does the 10th feel that freeing the light brigade commanders from the artillery enhances their speed of response and flexibility perhaps?

I'm not sure how far the lessons can go as to the different establishments. Divisionalization is an ongoing process and current structure does not necessarily reflect the future end state.

7th Div is a special case. It's purpose is as a feeder of rotational BCTs to Korea and not the deployment as a division in its own right. Notice the absence of the critical Div Sustainment Brigade/Command. Note that 2 Div in Korea already has both a complete rocket artillery brigade and sustainment brigade but only a single rotational BCT. Currently rotating BCTs come with their organic close support arty bns which plug into the div arty bde.

The 11th is still sorting itself out.

The all-singing all-dancing BCT, on the other hand, seems to work well for the ARNG as a plug and play entity when transferred from State to Federal control.

The issue here is whether or not these units are in a pretransitional phase or already at end state. We'll know in due course.

In any organizational changes of artillery there are three key factors to consider: 1. who supplies the fire support coordination cells and forward observers that must accompany the manoeuvre brigades and battalions? 2. who commands the fire units? 3. who provides the logistics support for the fire units?

For ARNG units there are also questions of state control and the line of peacetime administrative & training responsibility. To a certain extent, ARNG firing units are plug and play building blocks that can easily be shuffled around. FSOs and FOs should be training with the manoeuvre bdes and bns with which they are most likely to deploy. Logistics support should either be organic to the division with which the firing units are most likely to deploy with or be developed into a plug and play component that can be easily transferred from the BCT's Brigade Support Battalion to the receiving division. Accordingly we may eventually end up with varying structures for ARNG battalions reflecting those assigned to a combat division (like 10 Mtn) and those kept in a more general pool to be assigned as needed.

And both the 7th and the 10th could be described as 70/30 Divisions.

They certainly could. For the reasons described in my previous post, I prefer the 70/30 split to be at a lower level, mainly starting at the battalion level. I certainly do like the idea that the the ARNG BCTs in the 7th and the 10th are equipped, manned and organized as a viable fighting formation rather than the administrative situation we have within Canada's CBGs and Divs. The key to a proper 70/30 structure is that the ARes component can be mobilized. In my view the first phase of that is the organizational and training changes followed in due course by the equipment changes needed.

For individual training could more emphasis be placed on self-learning through on-line study with one night a week being set aside for supervised TOETs and tutoring?

Yes - but I wouldn't say emphasis. Much of the DP1 and 2 level training involves hands-on experience followed by confirmatory exercising to bring the education component into focus and to develop and advance skills and knowledge. We're discussing things in broad and general terms here and I haven't mapped out a comprehensive training scheme but I certainly see all existing education and training tools having a role. What's important, I think, is a uniformity of training at the DP1 and 2 level as between RegF and PRes so as to make individual soldiers equally schooled if not exercised. I see the mass of the ARes being at the DP1 and 2 level with fewer at the DP3 and above where most of the roles will be filled by RegF who have not only had the training but the experience needed. All training, including RegF training should be heavily reviewed and revised to ensure that delivery of all the essential skills are deliverable to ARes trainees as well as RegF ones. That might require having some of it as distance learning or even shortening courses to concentrate on the "must knows" of the position.

 

[Kirkhill]

No. Never. Not a chance.

As with most trades the only way to learn your craft properly is through on the job experience, augmented with good, practical in-person course type training.

Platoon Commanders learn by commanding platoons, Company Commanders companies etc etc. It is reasonable to assume that this could be accomplished within range of the normal mix of currently available courses and training time during the week and weekends. There is alot of work to do to reinforce and improve this training and on the job learning, believe me, but the basics are probably already there within the range of the training year, courses and available RSS support.

However, with few exceptions, anyone at the rank of LCol and CWO - and above - in the militia is probably seriously under trained, has never been tested, selected or performance managed within a competitive process for senior leaders and are, at worst, figureheads. Some of them, because of the 'last man standing' principle, are dangerously incompetent and almost wholly unaccountable for their actions unless they screw up on a large scale.

For example, unlike during my full time service, in over 30 years of militia service I never once saw a militia CO issue orders for anything or really lead anything personally, especially a field exercise of some sort or even during a CAX/CPX. Unless it was a ceremonial parade or social event of some sort, there were no orders given from on high, which isn't any good for the units or the professional development of our most senior leaders. Not all their fault, of course, it's just the way things are run in the nuthouse...

Militia Bde Comds, Generals and their CWO sidekicks? These absurdly outsized roles are seemingly political appointments so the Reg F can claim they are 'listening' to the needs of the militia, as well as being 'fair' to those who want to pursue some kind of upwards part-time career progression. They appear to be mainly 'bag holders' for their Reg F counterparts AFAIC, otherwise there wouldn't still be so many probelms in the militia world writ large.

I seem to recall a whole bunch of mindless bumf that had to be digested that took up valuable scarce hours on Wednesdays and Weekends. Dental hygiene springs immediately to mind. Lessons on ORBATs. Where to find QR&Os. The role of the BOR. Yadda Yadda.

Even the role, weight and characteristics of the FNC1A1 shoulder fired semi automatic rifle. I don't know many youngsters that aren't keen and capable of reading up on weapons, vehicles, radios and radars.

Let them learn on their own time. Test them in the armouries. Trial them in the field. And put them on salary/stipend.

As for leaders and commanders - of course they need to learn on the job. Their learning is made easier if they have access to information AND troops they don't have to spend time training from scratch.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yes - but I wouldn't say emphasis. Much of the DP1 and 2 level training involves hands-on experience followed by confirmatory exercising to bring the education component into focus and to develop and advance skills and knowledge.

WRT my previous to D&B.

For example - soldier shows up on Wednesday night. Gets a 5 minute confirmatory test to determine if the weapon and safety drills are well understood and spends the next hour and a half with the weapon on a range or simulator and half an hour stripping, cleaning and assembling the weapon and returning it to stores. Half an hour on adm and prep work for the upcoming monthly weekend exercise.

We're discussing things in broad and general terms here and I haven't mapped out a comprehensive training scheme but I certainly see all existing education and training tools having a role. What's important, I think, is a uniformity of training at the DP1 and 2 level as between RegF and PRes so as to make individual soldiers equally schooled if not exercised. I see the mass of the ARes being at the DP1 and 2 level with fewer at the DP3 and above where most of the roles will be filled by RegF who have not only had the training but the experience needed. All training, including RegF training should be heavily reviewed and revised to ensure that delivery of all the essential skills are deliverable to ARes trainees as well as RegF ones. That might require having some of it as distance learning or even shortening courses to concentrate on the "must knows" of the position.

Violent agreement.

 

[KevinB]

IMHO the CA needs to make important distinction between our (US) Orbat and the Canadian.
While we are returning to the Div as generally the basic maneuver element, Canada cannot do that simply due to size.
If you want to x3 the CA then that would make sense.
Canada to me needs to have the Bde as the basic element, for it cannot field a homogeneous Div.


@FJAG I don’t see the ARNG changing from the BCT simply as it allows then to train as a combined arms formation outside the Regular Army. If there where to break up towards a supported Div, the collective training model would suffer (IMHO).

 

[Kirkhill]

New video from Battle Order on the USMC Littoral Squad

Current thinking

Staff Sgt Squad Leader
Sgt Asst Squad Leader

2x Teams of 6 led by a Sgt each.

Squads to be armed with a common rifle.
MGs, CG84s and Switchblades to be held at Platoon or Company and drawn when necessary.

Key element - The Asst Squad Leader is actually a Joint Fires Observer.

The basic unit of action is the reinforced platoon.

 

[GR66]

You might find that this actually exacerbates the “godfather” influence within regiments while increases tribalism between regiments.

I say we go ahead and make everyone's head explode and just have a Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry. 1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion.....12th Battalion, etc.

One common capbadge across the board. Historic linkages can be maintained through Battalion "nicknames" like those used by units in the US Army.

• 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team "Arctic Wolves" located at Fort Wainwright, Alaska
  • Headquarters and Headquarters Company "Dire Wolves"
  • 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) "Blackhawk"
  • 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment "Bobcat"
  • 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment "Gimlet"
  • 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment "Legion"
  • 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment "Automatic"
  • 70th Brigade Engineer Battalion "Kodiak"
  • 25th Brigade Support Battalion "Opahey"

 

[FJAG]

Been following this for a while

Good for you and a good effort to get into the discussion. I'll just concentrate on a couple of points

Only 1 cap badge per battalion. Intent is to eliminate the regimental godfather blessing and focus on role more.

I agree with this. The problem here comes in the multiple ways we use the term "regiment" and "unit". In days of yore, regiments were "units" led by a colonel and which, for tactical reasons could be formed into battalions as required. That went on to be developed into standalone battalions (generally led by a Lieutenant-Colonel) where several battalions could be organized into a "regiment" or a brigade. Currently a "unit" is a battalion sized entity (roughly 4-800 folks) which in the infantry and some services is called a battalion while in others, the armoured corps, and artillery, is called a regiment. To complicate matters further the nine RegF infantry battalions are grouped administratively (not tactically) into three regiments (RCR, PPCLI and R22eR) of three battalions each. A very few ResF infantry regiments are also grouped this way.

What really matters though is that the three infantry "regiments" carry an unequal weight in the Army when it comes to numerous matters that effect everyone as they can quickly form a united front to push their issues. Like you, I believe that this power base needs to be disrupted.

Wikipedia lists 49 units in the reserves some of which have multiple battalions and does not address those with separate Companies.

• At approximately 5 units/ regular force unit that means that to fill the missing company each reserve unit would be required to man 2 sections for deployment in the event of ROTO tour.

I'm a little unsure of what you mean by this but let me give you my thoughts. Rifle companies, artillery gun batteries and tank and recce squadrons should be made up of either all RegF soldiers or a very large proportion of ARes soldiers with a small RegF cadre. The reason for this is that the collective fighting skills there need to be taught as a group and because of the time commitments of ARes soldiers it is virtually impossible to integrate them in day-to-day peacetime training.

RegF soldiers are available for training mostly in the fall to spring with commitments got postings, leave etc during the summer when their kids are out od school. ARes soldiers are mostly involved in school or their work during the fall to spring with a little bit of time available on weekends or evenings but are more open for longer training during summer vacation months. It's simply impossible to do integrated training for a mixed RegF ARes company. The exception is in combat support and combat service support companies where one has to go to the individual platoon level as, for example, mortar platoons, recce platoons and even anti-armour platoons can train independently. Its similar, but not identical for artillery and armour and engineers and service support.

The key then is to find the right level that one can allow a RegF entity and a ARes entity to train separately without compromising the collective training. For the most part that's at the company. Companies should be a single homogeneous entity and not made up of two sections from here or there. One has more flexibility at the battalion level where you can bring together companies from separate groups.

Increased number of units to help break the cap badge mafia within Reg Force and promote a wider range of thinking. Tradition is important but there needs to be more than 3 ways of thinking.

I've got no problem with tradition. I think its worth saving but not in such a way that it gets in the way of efficiency. Mafias get in the way of efficiency.

 

[FJAG]

I seem to recall a whole bunch of mindless bumf that had to be digested that took up valuable scarce hours on Wednesdays and Weekends.

I too recall disorganized training there. I think I went through the introduction to the FNC1 lecture three times because of instructor changes and new students dropping in who hadn't had the lecture before.

For example - soldier shows up on Wednesday night. Gets a 5 minute confirmatory test to determine if the weapon and safety drills are well understood and spends the next hour and a half with the weapon on a range or simulator and half an hour stripping, cleaning and assembling the weapon and returning it to stores. Half an hour on adm and prep work for the upcoming monthly weekend exercise.

The problem is when Gunner Bloggins shows up and hasn't done the reading. You suddenly have a split class where someone has to take Bloggins aside and clue him in and hopefully get that done in time for him still to get to the aim of today's lesson.

IMHO the CA needs to make important distinction between our (US) Orbat and the Canadian.
While we are returning to the Div as generally the basic maneuver element, Canada cannot do that simply due to size.
If you want to x3 the CA then that would make sense.
Canada to me needs to have the Bde as the basic element, for it cannot field a homogeneous Div.

I kind of agree but ... I think you need to consider the following:

1. What is the largest entity you think Canada may need to generate at the worst state and build that. Personally with 40,000 plus soldiers we should aim to a field a division as our worst case entity.

2. Even if all we deploy is a brigade in a worst case scenario it will undoubtably be employed within the framework of an allied division (If anyone will even take us on and not stuff us into a Corps reserve role again).

3. The worst case entity should be capable of deploying smaller entities for lower end missions or day-to-day peacetime missions.

Staying with the artillery example you could have:

a. a divisional artillery brigade organized and trained to hive off a CS regiment together with its logistic support train to an independently deployed manoeuvre brigade; or

b. organic BCT artillery battalions and the BSBs support element which can be aggregated into a Canadian or allied pre-existing divisional artillery brigade headquarters.

The key is to be able to have doctrine and a methodology to transform easily, one way or the other, as the mission scales up or down.

@FJAG I don’t see the ARNG changing from the BCT simply as it allows then to train as a combined arms formation outside the Regular Army. If there where to break up towards a supported Div, the collective training model would suffer (IMHO).

I disagree to the extent that manoeuvre units rarely train in peacetime with their fires delivery elements or CSS. They do need train constantly with their FSO/FSCC and FO/FOO elements. In my 16 years with the guns I can count on the fingers of one hand the number of times guns fired live on exercise in support of a battalion (aside from fire power demonstrations). BCs and FOOs on the other hand were with their battalions often as well as training at other times with the guns in live fire. So far my interviews for the Afghanistan books confirms that even in predeployment training in the early years for Kandahar there were few opportunities taken to integrate live artillery fire into routine manoeuvre training.

Canada needs to conceptually, maybe even organizationally, separate the FSO/FSCCand FO/FOO dets from the fires delivery elements and their logistics trains. In any event, there needs to be a functional Div Arty headquarters and divisional support element where guns and CSS can be plugged into.

In a perfect world we would use live fires and CSS on all bn and bde exercises but we really don't other than as exceptions rather than the rule.

All that to say I have no problem with keeping the CS regiment (whether RegF or ARes) with the BCT as long as there is a mechanism to group the guns and the CSS into a pre-existing division and divisional arty HQ and sustainment system. Those BCT artillery battalions need to be technically "managed" by the arty bde HQ and should exercise frequently as divisional fire support. Regardless of how we deploy for major conflict, as either a Canadian brigade or a Canadian division, a Canadian artillery battalion will need to slot into either a Canadian or coalition divisional framework. That doesn't happen overnight. Our data communications systems, our staff systems and our logistics systems right now are not optimized for that. That takes time and practice to get right.

I say we go ahead and make everyone's head explode and just have a Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry. 1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion.....12th Battalion, etc.

No! Hell, No! I do not want to see another screwed up unification/integration boondoggle! Head has exploded.

 

[GR66]

No! Hell, No! I do not want to see another screwed up unification/integration boondoggle! Head has exploded.

Let each Battalion wear their historical headdress/kilts with their ceremonial dress. Let each maintain an honourary Lt Col to maintain ties to their community. Let each Battalion have their own Colours with their Battle Honours. Have their historical Regimental Name on their shoulder flash...or historical cap badge collar dogs, etc. (or their own unique ascot if you wish ).

I don't see this as the same thing as Hellyer's unification/integration. It's not like you're taking sailors and air crew and putting them in Army-like uniforms. They're all Army already. They're all the same trade already even. The UK doesn't seem to have great difficulty changing regiments around over time and somehow the US has managed to scrape through a couple of conflicts with numbered Regiments and Battalions.

 

[KevinB]

I too recall disorganized training there. I think I went through the introduction to the FNC1 lecture three times because of instructor changes and new students dropping in who hadn't had the lecture before.

The problem is when Gunner Bloggins shows up and hasn't done the reading. You suddenly have a split class where someone has to take Bloggins aside and clue him in and hopefully get that done in time for him still to get to the aim of today's lesson.

Send him home with no pay…

I kind of agree but ... I think you need to consider the following:

1. What is the largest entity you think Canada may need to generate at the worst state and build that. Personally with 40,000 plus soldiers we should aim to a field a division as our worst case entity.

I don’t disagree with you, but it needs to be a homogeneous Div, not a Heavy Bde, a Light Bde and a Med Bde.
Frankly I think at least Canada should be able to field 3 real Divisions - but as the GoC won’t even equip 1 properly, I’ve given up hoping for sanity.

2. Even if all we deploy is a brigade in a worst case scenario it will undoubtably be employed within the framework of an allied division (If anyone will even take us on and not stuff us into a Corps reserve role again).

3. The worst case entity should be capable of deploying smaller entities for lower end missions or day-to-day peacetime missions.

Staying with the artillery example you could have:

a. a divisional artillery brigade organized and trained to hive off a CS regiment together with its logistic support train to an independently deployed manoeuvre brigade; or

b. organic BCT artillery battalions and the BSBs support element which can be aggregated into a Canadian or allied pre-existing divisional artillery brigade headquarters.

The key is to be able to have doctrine and a methodology to transform easily, one way or the other, as the mission scales up or down.

I don’t disagree there. My issue is the Div system doesn’t work well when so many assets are missing.

I disagree to the extent that manoeuvre units rarely train in peacetime with their fires delivery elements or CSS. They do need train constantly with their FSO/FSCC and FO/FOO elements. In my 16 years with the guns I can count on the fingers of one hand the number of times guns fired live on exercise in support of a battalion (aside from fire power demonstrations). BCs and FOOs on the other hand were with their battalions often as well as training at other times with the guns in live fire. So far my interviews for the Afghanistan books confirms that even in predeployment training in the early years for Kandahar there were few opportunities taken to integrate live artillery fire into routine manoeuvre training.

I guess I lived in the boom times. We had 4 Ottawa Militia District live fires when I was in 30RCA, did 2 with 2 RCHA and had two in 1VP.

Canada needs to conceptually, maybe even organizationally, separate the FSO/FSCCand FO/FOO dets from the fires delivery elements and their logistics trains. In any event, there needs to be a functional Div Arty headquarters and divisional support element where guns and CSS can be plugged into.

In a perfect world we would use live fires and CSS on all bn and bde exercises but we really don't other than as exceptions rather than the rule.

Agree there. I would think at least 1 Bde a year should be doing a full Bde live fire and ideally all Bde’s more than 2x a year

All that to say I have no problem with keeping the CS regiment (whether RegF or ARes) with the BCT as long as there is a mechanism to group the guns and the CSS into a pre-existing division and divisional arty HQ and sustainment system. Those BCT artillery battalions need to be technically "managed" by the arty bde HQ and should exercise frequently as divisional fire support. Regardless of how we deploy for major conflict, as either a Canadian brigade or a Canadian division, a Canadian artillery battalion will need to slot into either a Canadian or coalition divisional framework. That doesn't happen overnight. Our data communications systems, our staff systems and our logistics systems right now are not optimized for that. That takes time and practice to get right.

I’d argue that if the Bde is resourced properly to do that, the Bde Arty cell could join with the Div/Corp as needed.
Of course when you only have 12 guns across the country - does it matter .

No! Hell, No! I do not want to see another screwed up unification/integration boondoggle! Head has exploded.

Retain the units as it, but instead of Regimental’ism post the officers around between all three and make them wear whatever cap badge of the unit they are in.

 

[FJAG]

The UK doesn't seem to have great difficulty changing regiments around over time and somehow the US has managed to scrape through a couple of conflicts with numbered Regiments and Battalions.

The Brits continue to gripe about these things. The American's started out with numbered regiments from square one.

I actually like the way the Americans do it. It makes postings really easy with just a change of the odd enamelled badge and maybe a shoulder flash. If I was starting from square one I'd adopt some of that. They even redesignate battalions e.g. from infantry to armour. We did that during WW2 as well as the need arose.

Unfortunately the current system is deeply engrained and I believe in causing as little trauma as possible even when things need to change radically. My motto is "don't sweat the little stuff". We need to reorganize into effective units with effective training. We do not need to willy nilly throw out a 2 1/2 centuries of history.

 

[Kirkhill]

Let each Battalion wear their historical headdress/kilts with their ceremonial dress. Let each maintain an honourary Lt Col to maintain ties to their community. Let each Battalion have their own Colours with their Battle Honours. Have their historical Regimental Name on their shoulder flash...or historical cap badge collar dogs, etc. (or their own unique ascot if you wish ).

I don't see this as the same thing as Hellyer's unification/integration. It's not like you're taking sailors and air crew and putting them in Army-like uniforms. They're all Army already. They're all the same trade already even. The UK doesn't seem to have great difficulty changing regiments around over time and somehow the US has managed to scrape through a couple of conflicts with numbered Regiments and Battalions.

I have a strong recollection of showing up at Gagetown with all my kit, as issued from Base and Regimental stores, and the course Warrant, calling out the items on the list. Those that were short were required to call out their deficiencies. I wore out my tonsils that day.

Instead of pants, black socks, tunic, beret and forage cap - I was reporting kilt, sporrans, hose, hose tops, spats, Glengarry and Balmoral.

As proud as I was of my Regiment I think everyone should be issued common DEUs. Keep the Ceremonials for appropriate regimental functions.

I would have worn my Calg Highrs badge on a beret in DEUs and still thought of myself as a Highlander.

 

[Kirkhill]

Send him home with no pay…

Yup!

Or if the troops are getting a salary or stipend, with the expectation that they will be doing their homework on their own time, dock him on his next pay cheque for disrupting training.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Brits continue to gripe about these things. The American's started out with numbered regiments from square one.

For a good chunk of their history many of Britains storied Regiments were hard pressed to field more than 4 or 5 companies of 40 to 50 men.

Yellow fever and dysentery will do that to you.

 

[FJAG]

Send him home with no pay…

Regardless, Distance learning works okay if its on an academic topic that's a stand alone and doesn't lead in to other skills that need to be taught and practiced manually.

I don’t disagree with you, but it needs to be a homogeneous Div, not a Heavy Bde, a Light Bde and a Med Bde.
Frankly I think at least Canada should be able to field 3 real Divisions - but as the GoC won’t even equip 1 properly, I’ve given up hoping for sanity.

We violently agree. You know my model. A division of heavy brigades made up of primarily reservists to do the "in case of fire break glass" work in extreme cases and a second division of light and medium brigades weighed towards full-timers designed to spin off battlegroups or even companies for quick reaction and day-to-day peacetime work.

I don’t disagree there. My issue is the Div system doesn’t work well when so many assets are missing.

That to me is a given. Based on the timeline to generate equipment, one has to stage changes which first work with what we have and then buy the equipment to round it out. There is little to be gained by waiting for equipment before reorganize because you'll just slip back into the status quo.

I guess I lived in the boom times. We had 4 Ottawa Militia District live fires when I was in 30RCA, did 2 with 2 RCHA and had two in 1VP.

I expect the 30 Fd ones were more in the nature of staged firepower events rather than unscripted fire and manoeuvre. Even the few actual live fire and manoeuvre exercises we did used normal safety distances. Quite frankly the 13 live fire battle runs I did with the Germans in Shilo with their draft army at the time were more realistic than anything I ever did with the Canadians but nowhere near as realistic as the Brits at BATUS.

Agree there. I would think at least 1 Bde a year should be doing a full Bde live fire and ideally all Bde’s more than 2x a year

I've never been on a Maple Resolve and have no real personal idea how complex they get. In my day the higher the level of the exercise was, the less value it brought at the company level. Based on my experience I think the best trade-off of value that you get is at a battlegroup exercise where everyone gets challenged. I might be wrong, brigade exercises might be better now and they might work well at the simulated level but I still have my doubts about live fire.

I’d argue that if the Bde is resourced properly to do that, the Bde Arty cell could join with the Div/Corp as needed.
Of course when you only have 12 guns across the country - does it matter .

As I said above, I ignore resources because I think it is so vital to shift the paradigm that we need to start while waiting for the resources. Also the two can be done in tandem. When you know the force that needs to be built to meet your defence objectives then it is much easier to define the resources needed to get there.

Retain the units as it, but instead of Regimental’ism post the officers around between all three and make them wear whatever cap badge of the unit they are in.

That I'm fully in favour of. Frankly, in my mind, I see the CA wearing CADPAT (or whatever is in vogue) for 99.9% of the time. They might have a distinctive shoulder badge and hat badge. Hell, I like to see ceremonial parades in fighting order and not S3s. Save those for weddings and funerals. But you are right, if a RegF officer is appointed CO of the RHLI he wears RHLI identifiers and not whatever RegF battalion he served in 10 years ago. Staff officers maybe their last battalion's. We need to separate career management from a regimental title. Maybe all infantry officers in 1 Div are managed as a block. When you only have one PPCLI battalion to staff in the west but seven other battalions then one can expect to change hat badges from time to time. Maybe not sweat what colour stripe is on one's mess dress trousers.

 

[KevinB]

Regardless, Distance learning works okay if its on an academic topic that's a stand alone and doesn't lead in to other skills that need to be taught and practiced manually.

We violently agree. You know my model. A division of heavy brigades made up of primarily reservists to do the "in case of fire break glass" work in extreme cases and a second division of light and medium brigades weighed towards full-timers designed to spin off battlegroups or even companies for quick reaction and day-to-day peacetime work.

That to me is a given. Based on the timeline to generate equipment, one has to stage changes which first work with what we have and then buy the equipment to round it out. There is little to be gained by waiting for equipment before reorganize because you'll just slip back into the status quo.

I don't disagree - I think a viable White Paper needs to come first - to give clear guidance to the CA as to what is expected. The RCAF and RCN seem to have decent vision as to their requirements (albeit I think they are a little myopic on the land support side), but my concern in building anything before a new WP arrives and you will see the Canadian TAPV Bde get kitted out before anything else, and of course more LAV's because everyone needs a personal LAV...

I expect the 30 Fd ones were more in the nature of staged firepower events rather than unscripted fire and manoeuvre. Even the few actual live fire and manoeuvre exercises we did used normal safety distances. Quite frankly the 13 live fire battle runs I did with the Germans in Shilo with their draft army at the time were more realistic than anything I ever did with the Canadians but nowhere near as realistic as the Brits at BATUS.

Two of the OMD ones I did in the OP, the problem with scripted means you have to have a competent force...
2 Gun line ones where simply Defensive LF's = so really just pounding rounds down range on both ends.
But yes in general principle I agree with you -- nearly all the stuff was attempted to be very scripted.
Oh I forgot a W Bty one - but that was basically a FP Ex.
Suffied is a real training area, one can do a lot within it...

I've never been on a Maple Resolve and have no real personal idea how complex they get. In my day the higher the level of the exercise was, the less value it brought at the company level. Based on my experience I think the best trade-off of value that you get is at a battlegroup exercise where everyone gets challenged. I might be wrong, brigade exercises might be better now and they might work well at the simulated level but I still have my doubts about live fire.

As an Infantryman Life Fire Bde Ex's are Boring AF - unless its a live fire defensive with fast air and arty. MR was after my time, and my only RV was in Div Arty CP with 2 Horse.

As I said above, I ignore resources because I think it is so vital to shift the paradigm that we need to start while waiting for the resources. Also the two can be done in tandem. When you know the force that needs to be built to meet your defence objectives then it is much easier to define the resources needed to get there.

Agreed - I'm just jaded on the lack of a clear CAF Defence Policy that seems to allow a lot of random and odd projects to sputter along, with some major gaps being unrealized.

That I'm fully in favour of. Frankly, in my mind, I see the CA wearing CADPAT (or whatever is in vogue) for 99.9% of the time. They might have a distinctive shoulder badge and hat badge. Hell, I like to see ceremonial parades in fighting order and not S3s. Save those for weddings and funerals. But you are right, if a RegF officer is appointed CO of the RHLI he wears RHLI identifiers and not whatever RegF battalion he served in 10 years ago. Staff officers maybe their last battalion's. We need to separate career management from a regimental title. Maybe all infantry officers in 1 Div are managed as a block. When you only have one PPCLI battalion to staff in the west but seven other battalions then one can expect to change hat badges from time to time. Maybe not sweat what colour stripe is on one's mess dress trousers.

Staff Officers can wear the RCIC Cap Badge, or even a General Service one - so everyone in those spots are the same.

 

[foresterab]

I kind of agree but ... I think you need to consider the following:

1. What is the largest entity you think Canada may need to generate at the worst state and build that. Personally with 40,000 plus soldiers we should aim to a field a division as our worst case entity.

2. Even if all we deploy is a brigade in a worst case scenario it will undoubtably be employed within the framework of an allied division (If anyone will even take us on and not stuff us into a Corps reserve role again).

3. The worst case entity should be capable of deploying smaller entities for lower end missions or day-to-day peacetime missions.

Staying with the artillery example you could have:

a. a divisional artillery brigade organized and trained to hive off a CS regiment together with its logistic support train to an independently deployed manoeuvre brigade; or

b. organic BCT artillery battalions and the BSBs support element which can be aggregated into a Canadian or allied pre-existing divisional artillery brigade headquarters.

So to follow the 3 key questions being asked here...
1. Short of a major war declaration (WW2 level) the largest short notice deployment I can see is being a combat brigade (I don't think I have terminology correct here) based upon two regiments and associated support detachments. This would be paired most likely with a local brigade to flesh out the numbers needed. A good precedent is the Canadian Army units sent in WW1 which deployed as part of the British Army until such numbers were recruited, mobilized, "trained", and formed into the eventual Canadian Divisions and then years into the conflict the Canadian Corp.

2. If we are assuming that in the case of large scale conflict we would be in a multinational brigade situation I would hope the defending nation (Latvia? Singapore? Jordan?) would be filling in the gaps. This is more like the Canadian Army in WW2 with the addition of British and Polish troops under the Canadian Army. However the capacity that force brings to the brigade is the difference in leadership...if it's just troops and rifles you have much less say than a LAV mobile unit complete with Air Defence, Artillery Support and Field Hospitals. It is the basis of providing the 2/3rd complete (and 100% complete backup often not mentioned logistics and support forces) that allows the Canadian Force to form the Skelton of an international brigade vs. a Korea like situations where we are just a force of many contributing to the Commonwealth Division. (Full disclosure I don't know as much about Korea so definitely not trying to downplay Canadian efforts there...it's just my initial impression).

3. This is where I think, under the current manning and taskings there may be a better direction provided. We have a collection of units that range from section to company to regimental size but try to treat as equals regardless of mission and resourcing provided. Instead I view it as a collection of administrative units that provide formed section/platoon (Reserves) that fit into a pre-determined Company contained within a parent Reg. Force Unit. The advantage of Echo Company remaining "unmanned" is that should emergency deployment be required then Bravo Company of Reg Force X can be assigned the mission, as a formed sub unit, until additional mobilization can fill needs. This is more similar to the later Yugoslavia missions where reserve units were providing a much higher percentage of forces (Roto specific) than Reg Force as I understand and in a much more formed structure than what happened with Afghanistan.

The other aspect of ensuring as high of caliber smaller unit leadership is looking at what's happening now on the East Coast. 300, now 700 members are deployed to assist in clean up. But any time I've heard of the military showing up it's common to have them split into subunits (company/platoon/section) for taskings with only CO and others remaining at a central point to coordinate with civilian authorities. It's not normally 800 troops of a regiment working on the same street or even neighborhood although it has happened in the past.

 

[KevinB]

So to follow the 3 key questions being asked here...
1. Short of a major war declaration (WW2 level) the largest short notice deployment I can see is being a combat brigade (I don't think I have terminology correct here) based upon two regiments and associated support detachments. This would be paired most likely with a local brigade to flesh out the numbers needed. A good precedent is the Canadian Army units sent in WW1 which deployed as part of the British Army until such numbers were recruited, mobilized, "trained", and formed into the eventual Canadian Divisions and then years into the conflict the Canadian Corp.

A Brigade (Bde) regardless of type (Light, Mech, Armor etc) is generally 3 Maneuver elements (Battalion sized) with Engineers, etc.

Generally a Bde is considered the smallest maneuver element than can be self sufficient (and that is a misnomer anyway - but).
However Canada tends to avoid sending Bde's anywhere these days (likes to ignore it's own doctrine )

2. If we are assuming that in the case of large scale conflict we would be in a multinational brigade situation I would hope the defending nation (Latvia? Singapore? Jordan?) would be filling in the gaps. This is more like the Canadian Army in WW2 with the addition of British and Polish troops under the Canadian Army. However the capacity that force brings to the brigade is the difference in leadership...if it's just troops and rifles you have much less say than a LAV mobile unit complete with Air Defence, Artillery Support and Field Hospitals. It is the basis of providing the 2/3rd complete (and 100% complete backup often not mentioned logistics and support forces) that allows the Canadian Force to form the Skelton of an international brigade vs. a Korea like situations where we are just a force of many contributing to the Commonwealth Division. (Full disclosure I don't know as much about Korea so definitely not trying to downplay Canadian efforts there...it's just my initial impression).

The problem with expecting others to fill in the gaps - is a lot of those host nations don't have any enablers to fill gaps --
Ideally one would field a Bde- that is only deficient in Infantry - as everyone has those guys...

 

[GR66]

I don’t disagree with you, but it needs to be a homogeneous Div, not a Heavy Bde, a Light Bde and a Med Bde.

Since we don't even really have a single Heavy Brigade and not enough LAVs for a full Medium Division I could possibly see some usefulness in a mixed Division of 2 x Light Brigades and 1 x Medium LAV Brigade.

The LAV Brigade (equipped with the proper ATGM, Mortar, DFS, SHORAD, etc. variants) could provide some "stiffening" to a defending Light Brigade being attacked by heavier enemy units. It could also provide the opportunity to exploit an opening should an enemy attack get badly mauled against entrenched Light Brigade defenders, or alternately provide a mobile blocking force to counter enemy mounted units attempting to flank a Light Brigade with limited mobility.