Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

With the advent of the AOP's the ability to move people ashore has increased by a factor of 2. They now can safely bring ATV's and similar ashore with their landing craft. Hire a CCG helicopter to sling equipment ashore as well. We are almost where the USMC was back in the 1920-30's.

Better yet get a real helicopter - it appear the HH-60 would fit on the AOPS no issue

 

[Kirkhill]

You would think that Coastal based Reserve infantry units would get a secondary tasking of ship to shore ops as part of their mandate and interior ones perhaps Arctic warfare. Sigh I can remember Reserve infantry units with functioning AT platoons, mortar platoons and heavy weapon platoons, not to mention 6 gun batteries with two CP's.

For the record - Sweden's CB90 force, and their Coastal Commandos, are part of the Navy.

 

[Kirkhill]

Better yet get a real helicopter - it appear the HH-60 would fit on the AOPS no issue

Nothing wrong with any of the Cormorant, Cyclone or Chinook for moving light vehicles from ship to shore. Especially when they don't actually have to be based on the ship. They can lift off from Resolute, Iqaluit, Rankin or Inuvik, fly out to the ship, refuel, pickup cargo and deposit it on some other island, another ship or on the ice, then return to primary with a refuelling stop on the AOPS along the way.

We have the kit. We even have the bodies. We don't seem to have a plan or the inclination.

 

[KevinB]

Nothing wrong with any of the Cormorant, Cyclone or Chinook for moving light vehicles from ship to shore.

Uhm how many of those do you have?

Especially when they don't actually have to be based on the ship. They can lift off from Resolute, Iqaluit, Rankin or Inuvik, fly out to the ship, refuel, pickup cargo and deposit it on some other island, another ship or on the ice, then return to primary with a refuelling stop on the AOPS along the way.

I would suggest that an integral HH-60 would be of vastly more effective.

We have some kit. We even have some bodies. We don't seem to have a plan or the inclination.

FIFY.

 

[Kirkhill]

Uhm how many of those do you have?

Light vehicles or helicopters?

23/28 x CH148 Cyclones, 13 x CH149 Cormorants, 15x CH147F Chinooks

The Cyclones and Cormorants are 5 tonne payload and the Chinook is 10 tonne payload. The Cyclones would have to roll all that roller mounted ASW gear out of the rear ramp first.

But that is a fleet of up to 51 transport helicopters. We should be able to find an available squadron some where.

I would suggest that an integral HH-60 would be of vastly more effective.

Possibly. But we don't have them. We do have other stuff. And I am not sure that it would be vastly more effective for inshore work. It strikes me that shore based maintenance is likely to be better than that provided by a det at sea.

Not to mention you could sustain more RCAF crews ashore, and they could stay in hotels, and be much better rested.

Katimivik Suites - Rankin Inlet

 

[KevinB]

Light vehicles or helicopters?

23/28 x CH148 Cyclones, 13 x CH149 Cormorants, 15x CH147F Chinooks

The Cyclones and Cormorants are 5 tonne payload and the Chinook is 10 tonne payload. The Cyclones would have to roll all that roller mounted ASW gear out of the rear ramp first.

But that is a fleet of up to 51 transport helicopters. We should be able to find an available squadron some where.

Cyclones are dedicated ASW - the conversion time and issues mean that unless there is an extreme need, those are off the books.
The 13 Cormorants - that's SAR, so don't expect them outside of a 1-2 bird flight.
The 15 Hooks - I am pretty sure CANSOF has several of those dedicated...

So you may get 2-3 Hooks and 1-2 Corms.

Possibly. But we don't have them. We do have other stuff. And I am not sure that it would be vastly more effective for inshore work. It strikes me that shore based maintenance is likely to be better than that provided by a det at sea.

Not to mention you could sustain more RCAF crews ashore, and they could stay in hotels, and be much better rested.

View attachment 73708 Katimivik Suites - Rankin Inlet

Fixed sites are not nearly as flexible -- I don't disagree that shore based maintenance is better - but if you had spare birds you could rotate then out...

You won't ever sell me on the CAF has enough vertical lift at this point.

 

[Kirkhill]

Cyclones are dedicated ASW - the conversion time and issues mean that unless there is an extreme need, those are off the books.
The 13 Cormorants - that's SAR, so don't expect them outside of a 1-2 bird flight.
The 15 Hooks - I am pretty sure CANSOF has several of those dedicated...

So you may get 2-3 Hooks and 1-2 Corms.


Fixed sites are not nearly as flexible -- I don't disagree that shore based maintenance is better - but if you had spare birds you could rotate then out...

You won't ever sell me on the CAF has enough vertical lift at this point.

No. The CAF doesn't have enough vertical lift.

But. It has vertical lift that can be reassigned in extremis. And there should be a plan for that.

Just because SOPs declare it shouldn't make it immutable.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Army wants to poach on the Marine's Turf? Coastal Artillery used to be an Army thing in any case.

This article argues that the U.S. Army, rather than the traditional maritime Services, has an emergent opportunity to increase relevancy by exercising sea control to guarantee American access to global markets in competitive spaces in the twenty-first century. In a strategic environment where adversaries are developing sophisticated defenses in-depth to negate American power projection, the institution has a unique capability to create forward positions of advantage with reimagined operational fires commands at scale—as the nucleus of Joint, interagency, and multinational teams—to protect economic prosperity and preserve coalition unity in Central Europe and Southeast Asia in particular, and across the world in general. Advocating for a shift in operational approach that subordinates tactical maneuver in support of operational fires,

The U.S. Army faces a daunting task in the emerging strategic environment

the land power institution must argue for credible relevancy, and therefore sufficient funding

the Army has struggled to define success in a succession of Middle Eastern interventions during the past two decades, where it has found difficulties translating tactical success into lasting strategic gains

The Army and Sea Control

Or putting it another way? The US Army is facing the same question as the Canadian Army. What is the Army for?

The Army is already poaching on USAF turf with UAVs, Tilt Rotors and 1000 km missiles.

Now it seems that the Army kind of likes the USMCs Marine Littoral Regiments. Great idea. Place Artillery Forts with LRPFs all over the world and us the Manouever Army for active defence patrols....

It's a thought.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

You could increase the vertical lift available to the RCN by doing what the CCG does. Lease helicopters and crews from TC. TC buys helicopters from Canada, hires the crews and leases them to the Navy with a gray paint job. Maybe it's the 75% solution, but it will be significantly less than trying to stand up another Squadron of CAF helicopters and get them manned. Nothing stopping you from doing both. The leased birds do a lot of the mundane stuff, freeing up the military birds for the military stuff. This is what both the USN and RN does.

 

[dapaterson]

I thought the lack of crews for the FFHs balanced out the lack of aircrew for the MHs

 

[KevinB]

I thought the lack of crews for the FFHs balanced out the lack of aircrew for the MHs

Some might recommend scrapping an Inf BN or two to harvest the PY’s to the Navy and RCAF…

 

[Skysix]

Nothing wrong with any of the Cormorant, Cyclone or Chinook for moving light vehicles from ship to shore. Especially when they don't actually have to be based on the ship. They can lift off from Resolute, Iqaluit, Rankin or Inuvik, fly out to the ship, refuel, pickup cargo and deposit it on some other island, another ship or on the ice, then return to primary with a refuelling stop on the AOPS along the way.

We have the kit. We even have the bodies. We don't seem to have a plan or the inclination.

UH60M yes, HH60M has less available lift thanks to the medevac floor and stretcher lift system. And no 'gunners windows'

 

[markppcli]

Pedantic point would be, like the MEU-SOC, being Special Operations Capable, not a SOF specific force.

With reality being a small c for capable, as MARSOC MSOB’s stole a lot of the humint, languages and other capabilities out of those.

Yeah my understanding is they have a recce / DA element plus some humint / dog int and other stuff going on. Very hard to find the actual orbat, and I imagine it’s more fluid and and task built maybe. But my understand is the platoons come from the existing Force Recon Coys while MARSOC does it’s own, non MEU thing. But I’m likely not correct so w/e.

 

[Infanteer]

Some might recommend scrapping an Inf BN or two to harvest the PY’s to the Navy and RCAF…

Could make sense until you realize they can't fill the ones they've already got.

 

[KevinB]

Could make sense until you realize they can't fill the ones they've already got.

Make the 2nd and 3rd Bn’s 30/70
No it’s not ideal, but if the CA feels a Battle Group is all it’s deployed then 9 Inf reg Bn are not needed

 

[Infanteer]

I was talking about the Navy and the Air Force.

 

[KevinB]

I was talking about the Navy and the Air Force.

Ack.
Seems hollow is a defining trait across the board, the CA no longer has a monopoly.

 

[Kirkhill]

The state of military recruitment and retention: Shortages are everywhere - ToTalent

The US Army recently boosted military recruitment sign-on bonuses to a maximum of $50,000 to compete for talent on a ‘tight’ labour market. But what is the state of military recruitment in Europe?

totalent.eu

With Few Able and Fewer Willing, U.S. Military Can’t Find Recruits

Fighting headwinds from the pandemic, the tight labor market and demographic shifts, the armed forces may fall further short of enlistment quotas this year than they have in decades.

www.nytimes.com

Military dealing with more than 10,000 unfilled positions amid growing pressures

OTTAWA — New figures show the Canadian Armed Forces are struggling with a growing shortage of personnel even as the military faces more and more demands at…

nationalpost.com

According to a Bloomberg report, a staggering 71% of people ages 17 to 24 are unable to join the military due to a variety of reasons. Those reasons include obesity, a lack of high school diploma or a criminal record. “That means the remaining age cohort is the prime attraction for all recruiting from not just the military, but also colleges and employers”

It seems that Ukraine may be one of the few forces that has no trouble recruiting. Ukraine and the Eastern Europeans.

Uncrewed, Optionally Crewed and Reduced Crew vehicles, regardless of domain, together with Artificial Intelligence, seem likely to be the future for most militaries. Physically fit specimens suitable for infantry and Special Ops are likely to be as scarce as Olympic athletes.

 

[Kirkhill]

Looking a bit closer at @KevinB 's latest Napkin proposal.

2x Lt
1x Hvy
1x Med/LAV

If we adopt the 2nd BCT - 11th Abn Div structure then we need 12 Infantry Coys (2x2x3)
If we adopt the ABCT structure then we need 4 more Infantry Coys (2x1 +1x2)
That is 16 Coys out of the nominal 27 Coys of the RCIC (3x3x3)

27-16=11 Coys to equip the LAV Brigade, or 2 more than currently.

Also, if we adopted the ABCT structure of 5 tank "Coys", each with 14 tanks for a total of 70, then we have enough tanks and crews (assuming full manning) to provide adequate RCAC resources.

It's a good starting point.

 

[KevinB]

@Kirkhill you need to add the tank Coy for the Cav Sqn in the ABCT too.