Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

Question. Most of the discussions around force structure have revolved around the types and quantities of Brigades we should have (Light/Medium/Heavy) and how those Brigades should be equipped.

I think it's generally agreed that there are important roles to be played by both Light and Heavy Brigades (the suitability of Medium forces in a peer conflict is in question). If realistically we only have the capability to deploy and maintain a single Brigade in a full-scale peer conflict (possibly along with a Divisional HQ to lead a multi-national Division) then we're left with a choice of which Brigade type to deploy - Light or Heavy.

However, if a key political objective in any major force deployment is to maintain at least a certain amount of autonomy for our national forces, and since both Light and Heavy forces have important roles to play even in the same battle space, then should we maybe consider deploying hybrid Brigades rather then pure Light or Heavy Brigades?

Maybe we've already got the basic structure right for Canada with one Light Battalion and two Mech Battalions per Brigade. The Light Battalion can evolve into the type of dispersed screening force to cover the open terrain and the Mech Battalions evolve into Heavy Combined Arms Battalions with tanks and tracked IFVs for the fight in the urban spaces.

 

[Kirkhill]

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Here's a question.

Given the state of play and current technology are these vehicles ready for the manoeuvre arms or are they artillery pieces?

I can easily see these vehicles trailing in convoy without drivers. Carrying explosive payloads.

I can also easily see them moving into battery for firing and withdrawing from battery for relocating and/or reloading.

I can also easily see them being connected, by tether or freespace, to a central FDC, after the fashion of the NASAMs Air Defence and Coastal Defence systems.

With those capabilities I can easily see them as valuable artillery assets, fire support assets, to be employed en masse in support of sub-units, units and formations. They could mount anything from 30mm cannon to PrSMs and CAMMs. They certainly can be ammunition limbers and refuellers.

I could also see them as engineering assets, with different systems on board, useful for breaching operations. Dozers and Hoes and IED-C kit.

I am not sure I see them as ready to act independently as tanks. As "wingmen" proper.

 

[McG]

There are roles and requirements for both mech and light forces, but mech and light forces are not complementary capabilities when shoe-horned into a single minor formation.

 

[Infanteer]

Maybe we've already got the basic structure right for Canada with one Light Battalion and two Mech Battalions per Brigade. The Light Battalion can evolve into the type of dispersed screening force to cover the open terrain and the Mech Battalions evolve into Heavy Combined Arms Battalions with tanks and tracked IFVs for the fight in the urban spaces.

I'll just echo the comment above.

We need to be careful about the lessons we infer from Ukraine, because we are seeing a distorted picture through curated twitter releases. The image of the plucky little tank hunting team stopping the Russians short of Kyiv was more a product of a flawed Russian operational concept than of the staying power of light elements in the face of a mechanized one. What's more, it ignores the fact that the biggest killer was artillery.

I have little faith in a Light Battalion acting as a "dispersed screening force to cover" much of anything. Dispersion detracts from the ability of forces to really fight, and the lack of any form of protected mobility would make withdrawal under pressure a difficult proposition. As well, the Light Infantry possession of an anti-systems weapon like an ATGM does not give it the ability to fight mobile nor conduct any of the three security tasks (screen, guard, cover) against a mechanized adversary.

Generally, when a CMBG fights a simulated battle with a Light Battalion, it gets put in a sector that is "out of the way" (and, in one instance I saw, that out of the way sector was targeted by the enemy and the Bn run over) or gets put in the rear. An Army would be far better off to consolidate this capability in its own brigade to focus on its own distinct missions and tasks.

 

[Kirkhill]

Question. Most of the discussions around force structure have revolved around the types and quantities of Brigades we should have (Light/Medium/Heavy) and how those Brigades should be equipped.

I think it's generally agreed that there are important roles to be played by both Light and Heavy Brigades (the suitability of Medium forces in a peer conflict is in question). If realistically we only have the capability to deploy and maintain a single Brigade in a full-scale peer conflict (possibly along with a Divisional HQ to lead a multi-national Division) then we're left with a choice of which Brigade type to deploy - Light or Heavy.

However, if a key political objective in any major force deployment is to maintain at least a certain amount of autonomy for our national forces, and since both Light and Heavy forces have important roles to play even in the same battle space, then should we maybe consider deploying hybrid Brigades rather then pure Light or Heavy Brigades?

Maybe we've already got the basic structure right for Canada with one Light Battalion and two Mech Battalions per Brigade. The Light Battalion can evolve into the type of dispersed screening force to cover the open terrain and the Mech Battalions evolve into Heavy Combined Arms Battalions with tanks and tracked IFVs for the fight in the urban spaces.

You mean NDHQ might have known what they were doing all along?

If we accept your theory - radical though it is - what do we really have? If we deployed a Division HQ with support and a single Field Brigade Group.

A Divisional HQ?
A Support Element?
A General Support Aviation Element?

A Brigade HQ?
A Service Support Element?
An Engineering Support Element?
A Fire Support Element?

4x Manoeuver Unit HQs

2x LRSS Sub Units
1x MBT Sub Unit
6x LAV Sub Units
3x Lt Inf Sub Units
1x Lt Inf CS Sub Unit.

Can the problems be resolved by some discrete, well targeted, equipment programmes?

If we started by equipping the existing elements with new kit to expand their scope of capabilities - Anti-Tank, Air Defence, Engineering, Comms and UAS, without adding numbers or HQs, how far down the road would that get the Army?

Then look at upgrading kit (Towed to SP eg) and adding new capabilities (Brigade/Div GBAD, UAS and new Vertical Lift).

 

[Kirkhill]

There are roles and requirements for both mech and light forces, but mech and light forces are not complementary capabilities when shoe-horned into a single minor formation.

I'll just echo the comment above.

We need to be careful about the lessons we infer from Ukraine, because we are seeing a distorted picture through curated twitter releases. The image of the plucky little tank hunting team stopping the Russians short of Kyiv was more a product of a flawed Russian operational concept than of the staying power of light elements in the face of a mechanized one. What's more, it ignores the fact that the biggest killer was artillery.

I have little faith in a Light Battalion acting as a "dispersed screening force to cover" much of anything. Dispersion detracts from the ability of forces to really fight, and the lack of any form of protected mobility would make withdrawal under pressure a difficult proposition. As well, the Light Infantry possession of an anti-systems weapon like an ATGM does not give it the ability to fight mobile nor conduct any of the three security tasks (screen, guard, cover) against a mechanized adversary.

Generally, when a CMBG fights a simulated battle with a Light Battalion, it gets put in a sector that is "out of the way" (and, in one instance I saw, that out of the way sector was targeted by the enemy and the Bn run over) or gets put in the rear. An Army would be far better off to consolidate this capability in its own brigade to focus on its own distinct missions and tasks.

But...

Could it be the right configuration for a flexible response brigade?

Not a brigade prepped for a particular fight (Ukraine Today) but a brigade prepped for a transitional, exploratory fight (Ukraine Feb 24th). One that is not yet sure of the enemy, the enemy's intents or capabilities, one that is trying to survive and figure out the enemy. One that can lead new troops into the field once the enemy is sussed.

Consider deploying the Bde HQ and the Lt Bn up front in a hurry, along with GBAD and Lt Artillery Assets and a strong ISTAR capability in the first 72 hours.

Start drawing in the heavier forces to be completed in 7 days.

Once the battlespace is clarified then it can be decided if this is a light or a heavy battle and the Brigade can be reshaped with reinforcements from Canada to suit the need.

It could end up being a grouping of all three 3rd battalions or a grouping of all three Armoured Regiments. The LAV Coys in Canada with the other two Brigades could end up deployed overseas in an Armd Bde, even an Armd Div (1 Armd Bde of 3 CA Battalions and a LAV Bde), or they could find themselves converted to Light Bns for deployment.

How do you build that level of flexibility into the system? Can you?

 

[McG]

Could it be the right configuration for a flexible response brigade?

No. Because we don't resource the CS and CSS to support light and mech, and we cannot afford to resource the CS and CSS to support light and mech in every brigade.

 

[Kirkhill]

No. Because we don't resource the CS and CSS to support light and mech, and we cannot afford to resource the CS and CSS to support light and mech in every brigade.

Understood.

What would it take to make it right?

 

[FJAG]

Can the problems be resolved by some discrete, well targeted, equipment programmes?

If we started by equipping the existing elements with new kit to expand their scope of capabilities - Anti-Tank, Air Defence, Engineering, Comms and UAS, without adding numbers or HQs, how far down the road would that get the Army?

Then look at upgrading kit (Towed to SP eg) and adding new capabilities (Brigade/Div GBAD, UAS and new Vertical Lift).

I know you're throwing this out for discussion purposes, but a mere equipment program doesn't solve the fundamental problem.

1 CMBG is already trending heavyish and assuming it ever does have a proper tank regiment and two mech battalions it's already a long way to being there. A brigade can function quite adequately with three manoeuvre units. It doesn't matter so much if they are organized as combined arms battalions or in "pure" battalions capable of regrouping on the fly.

The problem it has (aside from all the CS and CSS stuff) is that it has a light battalion that has minimal use and it does not have what we've been describing as a cavalry regiment capable of doing the screen, guard, cover functions that @Infanteer describes. In the past that has always been extracted from the main body (usually assigned to the battlegroup that would eventually form the reserve)

In order to "bring balance to the force" (TM), what is really necessary is to re-equip and reorganize and retrain the light battalion as whatever we want a cavalry regiment to be. I tend to think that a properly constructed cavalry regiment (or battalion) would provide more utility and versatility for a brigade, both in high intensity combat and for the numerous lessor roles it might be required for, than a pure light infantry battalion as currently configured or even re-equipped.

 

[McG]

Understood.

What would it take to make it right?

The answer is already given.

An Army would be far better off to consolidate this capability in its own brigade to focus on its own distinct missions and tasks.

 

[Infanteer]

But...

Could it be the right configuration for a flexible response brigade?

Not a brigade prepped for a particular fight (Ukraine Today) but a brigade prepped for a transitional, exploratory fight (Ukraine Feb 24th). One that is not yet sure of the enemy, the enemy's intents or capabilities, one that is trying to survive and figure out the enemy. One that can lead new troops into the field once the enemy is sussed.

Consider deploying the Bde HQ and the Lt Bn up front in a hurry, along with GBAD and Lt Artillery Assets and a strong ISTAR capability in the first 72 hours.

What is a "flexible response brigade" and what does it do when "exploratory" transitions to "the close fight" in an instant?

February 24th wasn't an exploratory fight, it was a poorly executed conventional invasion. It is highly likely that if the plan wouldn't have rested on faulty Russian assumptions, that it could have resulted a lot differently for the Ukrainians.

The problem with what your speaking to is that units do not fight in isolation, especially when it comes to CS and CSS. There is a second line backbone that requires different capabilities and capacities in terms of planning and sustainment. Establishing a comms backbone and a sustainment footprint for a rapid reaction element and a mechanized element committed to decisive operations are two different things, along with the formation HQ capacity to coordinate the affair. It's difficult to ask the formation units charged with those duties to be able to do both - they'll try, but probably not do them well.

The brigade, in my view, is where all-arms integration rubber meets the road because it is the brigade where proficiency in combined arms manoeuvre is mixed with second line combat support (signals, intelligence, fires, engineering) and combat service support (maintenance, supply, and personnel/medical support). Trying to pile multiple mission sets and tasks onto a brigade means you water down its capability.

 

[Kirkhill]

I know you're throwing this out for discussion purposes, but a mere equipment program doesn't solve the fundamental problem.

1 CMBG is already trending heavyish and assuming it ever does have a proper tank regiment and two mech battalions it's already a long way to being there. A brigade can function quite adequately with three manoeuvre units. It doesn't matter so much if they are organized as combined arms battalions or in "pure" battalions capable of regrouping on the fly.

The problem it has (aside from all the CS and CSS stuff) is that it has a light battalion that has minimal use and it does not have what we've been describing as a cavalry regiment capable of doing the screen, guard, cover functions that @Infanteer describes. In the past that has always been extracted from the main body (usually assigned to the battlegroup that would eventually form the reserve)

In order to "bring balance to the force" (TM), what is really necessary is to re-equip and reorganize and retrain the light battalion as whatever we want a cavalry regiment to be. I tend to think that a properly constructed cavalry regiment (or battalion) would provide more utility and versatility for a brigade, both in high intensity combat and for the numerous lessor roles it might be required for, than a pure light infantry battalion as currently configured or even re-equipped.

If I remember the evolution of 4 CMBG it started with the Recce "Sqn" being separately established from the Armd "Rgt". The Sqn was a Brigade asset, not a regimental one. It was only latterly that the same regiment was tasked with finding both the Armd squadrons and the Recce squadron.

We have a sense of what an Armoured or Tank squadron looks like, and is supposed to do.
Equally we have a sense of what an Infantry company (abn, lt, motor, mech or armd) looks like and is supposed to do.
We have a sense of the Artillery battery, the Engineer squadron and the Transport company.

The bits we seem to be struggling with are covered by the wonderful confabulation C5ISTAR (I think I got that right - or is there a Q++ at the end?).

It we were to take the Swedish Combined Arms Battalion and multiply it by three before dividing it into its components we would end up with

3 manoeuvre unit HQs - Avaialable
3 manoeuvre unit service support sub-units - Available
14 manoeuvre sub-unit HQs - Available

3 Recce platoons with 12 IFVs - Available
3 Air Defence platoons with 12 AD variants of the IFVs
6 120mm Mortar platoons with 24 double barreled mortar variants of the IFVs
12 FOO variants of the IFVs - Available
3 Pioneer platoons with 9 IFVs and 3 AVBLs - IFVs, or Alternately AEVs, Available

18 Infantry platoons with 54 IFVs plus 15 more for the Inf Coy HQs and 6 more for the Tank Coy HQs for a total of 75 IFVs - Avaialable
18 Tank platoons with 54 MBTs plus 12 more for the Coy HQs for a total of 66 MBTs - Available

18 Ground Combat Elements with 19 soldiers each in 3 sections of 6 for a total of 342 infantry. - Available

I have checked off what we have available

What is missing is

3 Air Defence platoons with 12 AD variants of the IFVs
6 120mm Mortar platoons with 24 double barreled mortar variants of the IFVs
3 AVBLs

We can find and convert, or even add, 36 IFVs with minimal effort.

Beyond that the IFVs need ATGMs (or the Platoons or Coys or Bns or all of the above do)
And the 364 infantry need ATGMs, ASMs and SAMs, all man-portable.


We can create the core of one Heavy Brigade with minimal effort.
We can even add a reasonable Armoured Engineer element to the mix

The places we get hung up are

C5ISTAR
Army-Air Co-Operation
GBAD
Arty

In my opinion on of the biggest questions concerns the Recce Platoons, Troops, Squadrons and Regiments.

Are they primarily intelligence gathering assets?
Or are they primarily tactical assets for screening and guarding?
Should they be armed and protected for fighting with intelligence assets for developing their own situational awareness - and just reporting their situation.
Or should they equipped with all the high tech gear necessary for the Brigade to fully understand their Area of Interest? The Area of Operations?

Or could screening and guarding be better accomplished by adding a fourth manoeuvre element to the Swedish developed Combined Arms model above?

That would then leave the Recce Squadron/ISTAR Bn/UAS Bty-Coy-Sqn/Int/Cyber complex as a separate standalone SA entity.

Similar questions revolve around all other tactical units once they are equipped with UAS systems.

I think if we took the Swedish model as a base but added a LAV Battalion to the 3 CA Battalions to create a 4 Unit Brigade, and also added an All Arms C5ISTAR unit (an enlarged HQ and Sigs Sqn/Rgt?) we wouldn't be far off a working model for the heavy force.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

If I remember the evolution of 4 CMBG it started with the Recce "Sqn" being separately established from the Armd "Rgt". The Sqn was a Brigade asset, not a regimental one. It was only latterly that the same regiment was tasked with finding both the Armd squadrons and the Recce squadron.

We have a sense of what an Armoured or Tank squadron looks like, and is supposed to do.
Equally we have a sense of what an Infantry company (abn, lt, motor, mech or armd) looks like and is supposed to do.
We have a sense of the Artillery battery, the Engineer squadron and the Transport company.

The bits we seem to be struggling with are covered by the wonderful confabulation C5ISTAR (I think I got that right - or is there a Q++ at the end?).

It we were to take the Swedish Combined Arms Battalion and multiply it by three before dividing it into its components we would end up with

3 manoeuvre unit HQs - Avaialable
3 manoeuvre unit service support sub-units - Available
14 manoeuvre sub-unit HQs - Available

3 Recce platoons with 12 IFVs - Available
3 Air Defence platoons with 12 AD variants of the IFVs
6 120mm Mortar platoons with 24 double barreled mortar variants of the IFVs
12 FOO variants of the IFVs - Available
3 Pioneer platoons with 9 IFVs and 3 AVBLs - IFVs, or Alternately AEVs, Available

18 Infantry platoons with 54 IFVs plus 15 more for the Inf Coy HQs and 6 more for the Tank Coy HQs for a total of 75 IFVs - Avaialable
18 Tank platoons with 54 MBTs plus 12 more for the Coy HQs for a total of 66 MBTs - Available

18 Ground Combat Elements with 19 soldiers each in 3 sections of 6 for a total of 342 infantry. - Available

I have checked off what we have available

What is missing is

3 Air Defence platoons with 12 AD variants of the IFVs
6 120mm Mortar platoons with 24 double barreled mortar variants of the IFVs
3 AVBLs

We can find and convert, or even add, 36 IFVs with minimal effort.

Beyond that the IFVs need ATGMs (or the Platoons or Coys or Bns or all of the above do)
And the 364 infantry need ATGMs, ASMs and SAMs, all man-portable.


We can create the core of one Heavy Brigade with minimal effort.
We can even add a reasonable Armoured Engineer element to the mix

The places we get hung up are

C5ISTAR
Army-Air Co-Operation
GBAD
Arty

In my opinion on of the biggest questions concerns the Recce Platoons, Troops, Squadrons and Regiments.

Are they primarily intelligence gathering assets?
Or are they primarily tactical assets for screening and guarding?
Should they be armed and protected for fighting with intelligence assets for developing their own situational awareness - and just reporting their situation.
Or should they equipped with all the high tech gear necessary for the Brigade to fully understand their Area of Interest? The Area of Operations?

Or could screening and guarding be better accomplished by adding a fourth manoeuvre element to the Swedish developed Combined Arms model above?

That would then leave the Recce Squadron/ISTAR Bn/UAS Bty-Coy-Sqn/Int/Cyber complex as a separate standalone SA entity.

Similar questions revolve around all other tactical units once they are equipped with UAS systems.

I think if we took the Swedish model as a base but added a LAV Battalion to the 3 CA Battalions to create a 4 Unit Brigade, and also added an All Arms C5ISTAR unit (an enlarged HQ and Sigs Sqn/Rgt?) we wouldn't be far off a working model for the heavy force.

The Bde Recce Sqn, since at least the 70s, been housed by the Armoured Regiment in the CMBG but operates directly for the Bde Comd on operations/ in the field. It has its own callsign on the Bde Net, the OC attends the Bde O Gp and its A2 echelon is serviced by the Svc Bn or by whatever BG is closest/makes the most sense.

Our ground manouevre reconnaissance (GMR) doctrine provides guidance on the employment of infantry and armoured recce. Recce platoons that belong to infantry battalions perform close reconnaissance. Brigade Recce Sqns perform medium reconnaissance. Many things can contribute to the ISTAR process without being part of an ISTAR unit. I say this having been in ISTAR Company in Kabul. There is also a difference between the screening performed by ground manouevre reconnaissance and those assets that do not have their own battlespace or troops directly in contact.

We are experimenting with a Combat Support Group for the various other ISTAR assets that are not organic to manouevre units (EW, SUAS, Hostile Weapon Locating/ etc). I won't go too much into it here, but work is proceeding based on two iterations with a third upcoming.

While I do look at other nation's armies I do not worry about matching with what the Swedes have. We have theoretical structures. We even exercise them.

 

[Kirkhill]

What is a "flexible response brigade" and what does it do when "exploratory" transitions to "the close fight" in an instant?

February 24th wasn't an exploratory fight, it was a poorly executed conventional invasion. It is highly likely that if the plan wouldn't have rested on faulty Russian assumptions, that it could have resulted a lot differently for the Ukrainians.

The problem with what your speaking to is that units do not fight in isolation, especially when it comes to CS and CSS. There is a second line backbone that requires different capabilities and capacities in terms of planning and sustainment. Establishing a comms backbone and a sustainment footprint for a rapid reaction element and a mechanized element committed to decisive operations are two different things, along with the formation HQ capacity to coordinate the affair. It's difficult to ask the formation units charged with those duties to be able to do both - they'll try, but probably not do them well.

The brigade, in my view, is where all-arms integration rubber meets the road because it is the brigade where proficiency in combined arms manoeuvre is mixed with second line combat support (signals, intelligence, fires, engineering) and combat service support (maintenance, supply, and personnel/medical support). Trying to pile multiple mission sets and tasks onto a brigade means you water down its capability.

Discussion demands that I look at entities in isolation. I have to describe organizations in isolation. I can't describe all the combinations and permutations possible with whatever elements are available, or might be available. That is, apparently, the job of this site and the career of NDHQ. It is especially true after contact has been made.

I take it as a given that after the enemy has voted the force in the field will have to adapt and employ whatever resources the enemy has left the force to work with. It will then have to adapt its tactics and plans accordingly.

I don't think we can operate on the assumption that conventional planning assumptions would have worked if only the Russians hadn't screwed up. Equally I can agree that we can't assume that the Ukrainians were military geniuses in the early going. Are the Russians now geniuses and the Ukrainians dolts because circumstances are changing?

I love my fencing analogy. The fencer has to stay light on the feet, with the weight centred, ready to advance or retire, lunge or parry, instantaneously. And that is all done with one tool - one skinny pointy stick.

I accept that anybody that practices one series of movements with one set of tools will become expert in that employment. I also accept that trying to do everything results in a jack of all trades and master of none.

Can we afford to field a force that excels on one field of battle? Or do we need to accept that we need a force that is good enough on many fields?


I think we are close to a working structure right now. The only major difference I would suggest is that if we are going to stick with three symmetrical Brigade Groups then we commit to them and equip all three equally.

That would mean spreading the tanks uniformly and creating a Wainwright for each Brigade. Among other things.

It would mean two LAV Battalions, a Swedish Combined Arms Battalion (SCABs) and a Light Infantry Battalion.

It would also mean training the LIBs to operate under one command on a regular basis. Similarly with the SCABs.

We already play mix and match. You just don't seem to get the opportunity to practice it often enough to make it habitual.

Same problem with incorporating Artillery and Air Support.

Lack of practice resulting from lack of dollars.


Owning Canada costs money - lots of money.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Bde Recce Sqn, since at least the 70s, been housed by the Armoured Regiment in the CMBG but operates directly for the Bde Comd on operations/ in the field. It has its own callsign on the Bde Net, the OC attends the Bde O Gp and its A2 echelon is serviced by the Svc Bn or by whatever BG is closest/makes the most sense.

Our ground manouevre reconnaissance (GMR) doctrine provides guidance on the employment of infantry and armoured recce. Recce platoons that belong to infantry battalions perform close reconnaissance. Brigade Recce Sqns perform medium reconnaissance. Many things can contribute to the ISTAR process without being part of an ISTAR unit. I say this having been in ISTAR Company in Kabul. There is also a difference between the screening performed by ground manouevre reconnaissance and those assets that do not have their own battlespace or troops directly in contact.

We are experimenting with a Combat Support Group for the various other ISTAR assets that are not organic to manouevre units (EW, SUAS, Hostile Weapon Locating/ etc). I won't go too much into it here, but work is proceeding based on two iterations with a third upcoming.

While I do look at other nation's armies I do not worry about matching with what the Swedes have. We have theoretical structures. We even exercise them.

Thanks for that.

I look at other nations' organizations for bench-marking, for a sense of what is possible and what is realistic. I am sure that many other solutions are possible. I just have to look at our own, and other nations' standards and how forces were deployed and employed on operations.

Every operation seems to be an opportunity to rewrite the book, or at least submit and addendum.

 

[FJAG]

If I remember the evolution of 4 CMBG it started with the Recce "Sqn" being separately established from the Armd "Rgt". The Sqn was a Brigade asset, not a regimental one. It was only latterly that the same regiment was tasked with finding both the Armd squadrons and the Recce squadron.

Digging back into the dark ages, I think that you were quite correct. Doctrinally there was a brigade recce squadron which consisted of three seven car recce troops and one support troop with five M113s. In addition to that, the armoured regiment had a recce troop which provided recce functions for the regiment.

I never actually saw the doctrinal model because in my time the recce resources were incorporated into a single squadron in the armoured regiment which provided the dual function but primarily brigade recce because by then we were routinely penny-packeting tanks out into combat teams where close recce came primarily from the infantry battalions.

In my opinion on of the biggest questions concerns the Recce Platoons, Troops, Squadrons and Regiments.

Are they primarily intelligence gathering assets?
Or are they primarily tactical assets for screening and guarding?
Should they be armed and protected for fighting with intelligence assets for developing their own situational awareness - and just reporting their situation.
Or should they equipped with all the high tech gear necessary for the Brigade to fully understand their Area of Interest? The Area of Operations?

I think the key to your question may be in better defining what is recce and surveillance and what is providing recce and security. When you take a look at ATP 3-20.96 Cavalry Squadron, you'll see quite a bit of discussion about that in Ch 3 Reconnaissance Task and Ch 4 Security Tasks with respect to the three different BCTs.

I think that this, however, is just scratching the surface of the issue as we go further along in analysing the change being brought to the engagements forward of the main line of defence by the proliferation of new, but relatively mature, weapon systems.

I think that since 2014 it should have been an exciting time to study and redefine the roles of the various arms in high intensity conflict. It's now gone beyond exciting to absolutely vital.

Let me close by saying that we do not have the equipment to create three symmetrical brigades that have any coherent establishment. With basically the equipment of one tank regiment, six mechanized battalions, three light battalions and the aggregate of an artillery regiment+ you are either forced into a light, medium and heavy brigade at most or concede that the brigades are merely organizations used solely to generate a variety of battlegroups as opposed to a functional fighting formation. Just as importantly, I think that there are mission sets that the Army will be expected to meet over the next five to ten years that would be best met by brigades that are oriented at specialty niches rather than being generalists.

 

[KevinB]

Thanks for that.

I look at other nations' organizations for bench-marking, for a sense of what is possible and what is realistic. I am sure that many other solutions are possible. I just have to look at our own, and other nations' standards and how forces were deployed and employed on operations.

Every operation seems to be an opportunity to rewrite the book, or at least submit and addendum.

The most important thing to do when looking at other Military forces is what is their role - and how does their nation envision their employment.

Local Ground Armies (Israel, Sweden etc) are vastly different than Expeditionary Armies.

Things that locally operating forces have inorganically often need to be organic for Expedition Forces.

Israel is often touted by many - but when you look at the AoR they have - you can see how some of their choices make sense for them - but are terrible for an Army that is expected to operate thousands of miles from its shores.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Let me close by saying that we do not have the equipment to create three symmetrical brigades that have any coherent establishment. With basically the equipment of one tank regiment, six mechanized battalions, three light battalions and the aggregate of an artillery regiment+

Not to make light of re-turreting, but if there was will and money to put these on LAV's into Infantry AT platoons and the armoured regiments (2:1 with LRSS) how far off would we be from having one tank regiment, three cavalry regiments, six mechanized battalions, three light battalions, and the aggregate of an artillery regiment+? Could it be done with the existing LAV fleet (hulls)?

If so, we'd have the basis of 3 symmetrical Medium+ Brigades (each with 2x Mech Battalion+ Cavalry Regiment) and a Light Brigade. Could a pooled total force tank regiment be used as needed, whether that be penny packeted with half squadrons added to battlegroups or the whole regiment added to any of the three brigades to turn it heavy(ish)? Could the artillery (guns) be similarly pooled?

 

[Underway]

I have little faith in a Light Battalion acting as a "dispersed screening force to cover" much of anything. Dispersion detracts from the ability of forces to really fight, and the lack of any form of protected mobility would make withdrawal under pressure a difficult proposition. As well, the Light Infantry possession of an anti-systems weapon like an ATGM does not give it the ability to fight mobile nor conduct any of the three security tasks (screen, guard, cover) against a mechanized adversary.

Generally, when a CMBG fights a simulated battle with a Light Battalion, it gets put in a sector that is "out of the way" (and, in one instance I saw, that out of the way sector was targeted by the enemy and the Bn run over) or gets put in the rear. An Army would be far better off to consolidate this capability in its own brigade to focus on its own distinct missions and tasks.

So what's the point of a Light Battalion then?

Seems like it just needs to be jettisoned or combined into a light brigade with air mobility to make it useful for specific tasks that only a light brigade can do. Or should we give all the light brigades new jobs and make them fully mechanized across the board? If you want to jump out of planes then join CSOR.

In order to "bring balance to the force" (TM), what is really necessary is to re-equip and reorganize and retrain the light battalion as whatever we want a cavalry regiment to be. I tend to think that a properly constructed cavalry regiment (or battalion) would provide more utility and versatility for a brigade, both in high intensity combat and for the numerous lessor roles it might be required for, than a pure light infantry battalion as currently configured or even re-equipped.

Why use the light battalion for this? This means you are losing an infantry battalion. Cavalry Squadrons are at their core Armoured Recce Squadrons and we have those existing already.

Or is this a case of we don't have enough Recce to go around and also have an Armoured Squadron (I think we use Regiment for this size of armoured formation?) formation attached to make up the CMBG. Are you using the ABCT as your template with only 2x Mech Companies and 2x Armor Companies per Combined Arms Battalion?

 

[Infanteer]

So what's the point of a Light Battalion then?

Seems like it just needs to be jettisoned or combined into a light brigade with air mobility to make it useful for specific tasks that only a light brigade can do. Or should we give all the light brigades new jobs and make them fully mechanized across the board? If you want to jump out of planes then join CSOR.

Let's go back to the definition of Light Forces in B-GL-300-001.

Light forces are defined as military forces rapidly deployable at all levels of command and optimized for terrain and conditions not suited to mechanized forces. They have significant strategic mobility, as they can be transported to any theatre by aircraft. They may be the only forces that can operate in complex environments characterized by close terrain.

So, same role (infantry - close with and destroy the enemy) but for different missions and tasks. The Light Battalion should be able to rapidly deploy, and should. There are plenty of examples of missions and tasks that suited light forces for a variety of reasons: UK in the Falklands, French in Mali, numerous smaller scale interventions (I'm thinking UK in Sierra Leone), specific missions within a larger conflict (101st in OIF), counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (RC-East), NEO in Kabul, etc, etc.

Again, a light battalion can't do this on its own, and needs a level of second line support external to the unit to be fully enabled (no different than any other type of unit).