Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

I’m of the opinion that 1 CMBG should be changed into an ABCT - and ‘twinned’ to a US Corps ( III or V) playing with them as much as possible.

2 CMBG should become a Light Bde and work with XVIII Airborne Corps.

5 ideally would become a SBCT or probably more practically setup along a USMC Organization (that would require a significant RCAF and RCN buy in however).

That's my thought in essence but I think it falls into what I call the "Canadian Trap" in that it doesn't call for a plan to grow the Army.

I'm a firm follower of this:

Even more important, Canada’s military has neither a real plan nor an ability to expand its standing forces into something larger in a crisis. As J.L Granatstein and LGen (ret’d) Charles Belzile stated when discussing mobilization (or “activation”) of the reserves in their ten year review of the Special Commission of the Restructuring of the Reserves 1995:

... Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war.

This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.

The Canadian Forces needs a plan.[1]

---

[1] J.L. Granatstein and LGen (retd) Charles Belzile, The Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Calgary, 2005 p. 12
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.n...cturing_The_Reserves_-_English.pdf?1413661138

There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that we need to form heavy, medium and light forces, preferably at the brigade group level. Canada should make a plan which concentrates on a peacetime light to medium force and a wartime heavy force with the former being dominated by the full-time Army and the later by a hybrid full/part-time Army. What could be reduced to one or two full-time brigades should be complemented by an additional four to six hybrid full/part-time brigades (enabler formations included) which could be mobilized for major emergencies including war.

IMHO, those who believe that there will never be a need for a large fighting force are still drinking the 2000-2005 Kool-Aid of the all singing and dancing medium force and have not learned the lessons of how true deterrence operates in a modern world.

Once the decision is made to have a core full-time element and an expandable hybrid full/part-time force then all the decisions respecting infrastructure, organization, equipment, terms of service, training, career paths, etc etc can fall into place.

 

[daftandbarmy]

And here's the dilemma in which the Canadian Army finds itself:

Logical Structure:

• Full-time, rapidly deployable Light Forces
• Largely Part-time, wartime deployable Heavy Forces

Current Structure:

• Full-time Heavy AND Light Forces.
• Part-time force that lacks the HIGH QUALITY LEADERSHIP equipment, technical support, training structure/capability, geographic concentration of training areas and support bases to generate wartime Heavy forces without major fundamental changes to the Reserve (and Reg Force) systems, but can potentially generate Light forces (with less radical changes) but don't have the ability to rapidly deploy by their nature of being Part-time.

I think you accidentally left one out....

... I believe that if we fix this issue first, which is pretty much fully within our control right now, many others might be addressed in due course as a result.

 

[KevinB]

That's my thought in essence but I think it falls into what I call the "Canadian Trap" in that it doesn't call for a plan to grow the Army.

I'm a firm follower of this:



There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that we need to form heavy, medium and light forces, preferably at the brigade group level. Canada should make a plan which concentrates on a peacetime light to medium force and a wartime heavy force with the former being dominated by the full-time Army and the later by a hybrid full/part-time Army. What could be reduced to one or two full-time brigades should be complemented by an additional four to six hybrid full/part-time brigades (enabler formations included) which could be mobilized for major emergencies including war.

IMHO, those who believe that there will never be a need for a large fighting force are still drinking the 2000-2005 Kool-Aid of the all singing and dancing medium force and have not learned the lessons of how true deterrence operates in a modern world.

Once the decision is made to have a core full-time element and an expandable hybrid full/part-time force then all the decisions respecting infrastructure, organization, equipment, terms of service, training, career paths, etc etc can fall into place.

I would mirror the Bdes with the PRes.
Ideally some would be total force and future force able to generate DIV’s of Light, Shmedium, and Heavy.
I’d start by rolling the non US ABCT equipment to the reserve Heavy Force - and backfill as new items come on line.

I’m of the opinion Canada needs to change its employment model - and ensure that Reg force personnel can be recalled for 10years after (and PRes at least 5) as well as some mandatory training annually for those SRR type personnel.

The US Mil does this, and it makes this NG and Res system a lot more robust.

 

[McG]

SRR

The Sup Ready Res no longer exists. Both halves of the Sup Res were fused into a single thing about 17 years ago.

 

[FJAG]

I don't think that there are really any easy solutions to the situation unfortunately. A couple possible courses of action are:

• Status Quo. Tinker with the Reg Force structure (asymmetric Brigades) to make them more efficient. Reserves remain primarily a source of individual augmentees and troops for domestic aid to civil powers efforts.

This option hasn't worked for over a half of a century. It needs to be utterly abandoned.

• Undertake a fundamental restructuring of the Reserve system to create a part-time force that is capable of generating Heavy forces and enablers during wartime. Would have to include legislative and structural changes, equipment investment, possibly new training areas and Reg Force support facilities closer to Reserve unit concentrations, etc.

That's key. Equipment investment would have to come in stages as capabilities grow. Easily phased.

• Maintain a full-time Heavy Brigade capability and focus the Reserves on expansion of our Light forces from a Brigade perhaps to a Division during wartime. May require less dramatic structural changes and equipment purchases than restructuring for a Heavy force focused Reserves but would still require significant work to make it happen (including dealing with training/support facility issues).

Maintaining a full-time heavy brigade is counter-productive to putting full-time forces into places that are used day-to-day in peacetime. There definitely have to be enough full-time personnel involved to become subject matter experts, trainers and leaders, maintainers, and be able to generate an small quick reaction element to support peace-time deployments (if any). The main intend of having reserves in a heavy force is to leverage the cost benefit (roughly 1/3) of annual recurring costs of the brigade due to the fact that it is the least likely force to be deployed during peacetime.

• Do a complete rethink on what kind of forces we can offer to our allies during a major conflict. Does our contribution have to be a Heavy/Medium/Light Brigade Group? Could we instead focus on generating more specialized units (Artillery or SHORAD Brigades, etc.) instead which may possibly be easier to generate with our current Reserve structure?

That is a possibility and open to debate. My view is that in order to fully understand army operations you need the ability to both study and practice the principles and processes. There is also a political angle which is to be seen by others to be contributing. A Canadian flag representing a Canadian heavy brigade in an American armoured division has much more political impact then several small markers for an artillery or a SHORAD battalion. That's an impact for both our allies and our potential enemies in a deterrence structure. It's for this reason as well that I favour a flyover brigade commitment.

Anything other than Option 1 (status quo with tinkering) will require much more imagination, effort and money than the Army is likely willing to spend.

I'm not so sure money is an issue. One can phase this initially so that only existing forces and equipment is involved. (Call that riding with training wheels). As the organization matures (and supposing you used the time) you can move to phase 2 where new equipment comes on board. Basically we have the heavy equipment already for two relatively fully equipped medium brigade groups. We can use it to form the core of a heavy brigade and a medium brigade in phase 1. As we acquire equipment for a heavy brigade its existing medium equipment transitions to form a second medium brigade for phase 2. We also already have much of the equipment for a light brigade whether we need another light brigade or not needs to be examined. If yes, its relatively inexpensive. We can probably repurpose much existing equipment to create CSS units but would need some additional CS equipment. The main point is that if there is a logical plan then the equipment acquisition can flow from it over time.

Imagination and effort is definitely needed. I'll add something else. A Champion with a vision. The last one of those we had , IMHO, destroyed the Army and made it what it is today because he was too narrow in interpreting the challenges facing the world.

I would mirror the Bdes with the PRes.
Ideally some would be total force and future force able to generate DIV’s of Light, Shmedium, and Heavy.

I'd make them all total force with day-to-day peacetime elements being 70-100% Reg F and war-time deterrent forces being roughly 30% Reg F.

As to divisions; I'd focus on one deployable divisional HQ targeted on Europe and heavy forces and being the core of a multinational division. It should have one Canadian heavy brigade, an option for a Canadian medium brigade and other nation's brigades as available (preferably a heavy one). We should also provide the requisite divisional enablers by way of a CS and a CSS brigade. I do not see a need or opportunity to deploy any additional divisional headquarters.

I’d start by rolling the non US ABCT equipment to the reserve Heavy Force - and backfill as new items come on line.

That's my thought. If one starts with one Leo armoured regiment, a cavalry/reconnaissance regiment, and two LAV battalions then that's good enough for a starter for manoeuvre forces. Once we backfill with proper IFVs (which for me is priority 2; proper arty and AD is priority 1 and replacing Leos is far down the list until other kit is in place), the LAVs can move to a second medium brigade.

I’m of the opinion Canada needs to change its employment model - and ensure that Reg force personnel can be recalled for 10years after (and PRes at least 5) as well as some mandatory training annually for those SRR type personnel.

Agreed on changing the employment model. I also think that the SRR concept is needed considering we always seem to be short people. Not so sure about the 5 and 10 year and mandatory training elements. First there is skill fade - especially as new equipment comes on line - and second, if one doesn't have equipment for them to man then they are useless. (I'm assuming personnel casualties and equipment casualties will run at roughly the same rate) I would need to see some actual numbers run in order to determine how large the SRR needs to be, how long service should be and if there is a need for refresher training. My gut tells me that if we had a three-year SRR period with no training requirement then we would probably fill our needs adequately with no additional costs other than keeping the pers info current.

The US Mil does this, and it makes this NG and Res system a lot more robust.

I didn't think that the various ready reserve categories had any training requirement. I do think there is a lot to be said for some of the requirements and benefits of the various ready reserve components that Canada should look at. Our problem is that we have had very, very little use out of the SupRes and as a result no one considers it even worth the paperwork involved. I personally think that a graduated career that lets a person transition easily between RegF, PRes and SupRes and all subject to one overarching personnel management system that takes Gunner Bloggins from recruiting through DP1 training to eventual retirement is the only way to go.

 

[KevinB]

I didn't think that the various ready reserve categories had any training requirement.

They do, I'm not 100% on all of it, but I know several who ETS'd and had to do Active segments in the Reserves.
Some where very weird - as a buddy of mine ended up as USMC SSG Infantryman in an Armored Unit due to location and ended up becoming a Qualified Crew Commander.
It seems to have something to do with Active Time in Service, as to what ones commitment to Reserve active dates are required after regular service, pensionable time as it where.

 

[Kirkhill]

I would mirror the Bdes with the PRes.
Ideally some would be total force and future force able to generate DIV’s of Light, Shmedium, and Heavy.
I’d start by rolling the non US ABCT equipment to the reserve Heavy Force - and backfill as new items come on line.

I’m of the opinion Canada needs to change its employment model - and ensure that Reg force personnel can be recalled for 10years after (and PRes at least 5) as well as some mandatory training annually for those SRR type personnel.

The US Mil does this, and it makes this NG and Res system a lot more robust.

British Army Reforms at the time they buggered off back to Blighty and left John A's mob to figure it out on their own.

The Act of 1870 allowed a soldier to choose to spend time in the reserves rather than the regulars and be paid fourpence a day, in return for a short period of training each year and an obligation to serve when called up. Men now enlisted for a maximum term of twelve years. The minimum length of actual service required varied according to branch: six years for infantry,[15][16][17] eight years for line cavalry and artillery, twelve years for the Household Cavalry, three years for the Army Service Corps.[18][19] On discharge, a soldier in any corps would now remain with the reserves for the remainder of his twelve-year term, under the umbrella of the First Class Army Reserve. (In subsequent years, soldiers entering the reserve to serve the remainder of their time would be classified as either Section A or Section B Army Reserve.[20]) As to the proportion of time spent on active service with the colours versus the balance in the reserve, this was to be laid down from time to time by the Secretary of State for War.[15][21][22] In 1881, short service for the infantry was increased to seven years with the colours, and five with the reserve, of the twelve-year enlistment period.[23][24][25]

There was opposition to short-term enlistment both in Parliament and among the Army's senior officers. The Queen is said to have signed the Act into Law "most reluctantly",[26] but the system worked, producing an immediate increase in the army's strength. While a number of long-service NCOs still chose to remain with the colours for the maximum service permitted of twenty-one years, the great majority of soldiers passed into the reserve at the end of their initial enlistments. By 1900 the reservists numbered about 80,000 trained men, still relatively young and available to be recalled to their units at short notice in the event of general mobilisation.[27]

Cardwell Reforms - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Before 1825 a regiment consisted of eight Companies, of which one skeleton Company was left at home during war, to recruit men and furnish reliefs. In that year, Palmerston raised the number of Companies to ten, to be treated as one battalion at home, but during war, six were to go abroad as a service battalion, and four to remain at home as a Depot. Thus Cardwell's reform was nearly anticipated....

....Now the Infantry Private's pay was still 1/- a day, apart from 1d. beer money, from this was deducted the actual cost of the ration up to 6d. (the ration was fixed in 1813 at 1lb. of bread and 12 oz. of(meat). But as the actual cost was always in excess of 6d, the deduction remained stable at 6d. A further 3½d. was deducted to cover a miscellany of items - washing, barrack damages, and the renewal of jacket, cap, shirts, brushes, soap, sponge, haversack, razor and mittens. The balance of 2½d. was paid daily. There was not much left here for suppers and coffee or tobacco or spirits. Yet in 1834 William Cobbett actually advocated the reduction of the soldier's pay from which fate he was saved by the Poor Law Commission reporting that the soldier was worse paid than any other class, and comparing his standard of comfort unfavourably with that of both paupers and convicts.

Twenty years later the terms of service were altered with the idea of building up a Reserve. Though service had been unlimited in theory, it was found that the great majority of soldiers took their discharge after 15 years, one fourth of them every year buying their discharge, one fourth retiring on pension, and one half deserting or otherwise getting away. It was sensibly decided to face these facts; and the period of service in the infantry was limited to 10 years and in the cavalry to 12, after which, with the C.O's approval, the soldier could re-enlist for a further 11 or 12 respectively.


The attempt was made to tack on to this a scheme by which men who retired after, the first period should, if they enrolled for 22 years, and do 12 days training annual1y, get a deferred pension of 6d. a day;

In 1867 a Royal Commission on Recruiting made many recommendations, some of which were adopted. Thus enlistment was to be for general service and not for special Regiments. The rate of pay was increased by 2d. a day (in lieu of the recommendation to issue a supply of necessaries free and to increase the meat ration). Re-engagement was to give an extra 1d. a day, but the first period of service was lengthened from 10 to 12 years. The Commission considered the enlistment of men for 12 years, of which part would be with the Colours and part with the Reserve, but rejected it on the grounds that soldiers would not easily find employment after, say, seven years with the Colours, and, thereafter, would not readily be found if called up . It was left for Cardwell to adopt this in 1870, whereby the question of a Reserve was solved.

Notes on Army Pay 4

rapc-association.org.uk

The Act of 1870 allowed a soldier to choose to spend time in the reserves rather than the regulars and be paid fourpence a day, in return for a short period of training each year and an obligation to serve when called up.

The problem isn't new. The solution was found in Britain as well as Kevin's America.

In Britain the soldiers weren't paid off on release. They were, effectively treated like officers who had traditionally been kept available to the Crown by putting them on Half-Pay. Other ranks being other ranks were retained on One Third Pay for the remainder of their 12 year combined Regular and Reserve engagement.

In Canadian Service a First Class Reserve Soldier would be a fully trained and experienced soldier with 5 to 7 years more service to the Crown drawing an annual pay of $23,412 assuming quitting the colours as a Standard 5B Corporal Pay Increment 4. For that $23,412 the Corporal was required to show up for a short period of training each year and an obligation to serve when called up, at which point he would revert to full pay for the duration.

 

[GR66]

Maintaining a full-time heavy brigade is counter-productive to putting full-time forces into places that are used day-to-day in peacetime. There definitely have to be enough full-time personnel involved to become subject matter experts, trainers and leaders, maintainers, and be able to generate an small quick reaction element to support peace-time deployments (if any). The main intend of having reserves in a heavy force is to leverage the cost benefit (roughly 1/3) of annual recurring costs of the brigade due to the fact that it is the least likely force to be deployed during peacetime.

I'm not so sure money is an issue. One can phase this initially so that only existing forces and equipment is involved. (Call that riding with training wheels). As the organization matures (and supposing you used the time) you can move to phase 2 where new equipment comes on board. Basically we have the heavy equipment already for two relatively fully equipped medium brigade groups. We can use it to form the core of a heavy brigade and a medium brigade in phase 1. As we acquire equipment for a heavy brigade its existing medium equipment transitions to form a second medium brigade for phase 2. We also already have much of the equipment for a light brigade whether we need another light brigade or not needs to be examined. If yes, its relatively inexpensive. We can probably repurpose much existing equipment to create CSS units but would need some additional CS equipment. The main point is that if there is a logical plan then the equipment acquisition can flow from it over time.

I'm going to push back a little on these. What you are saying makes sense if you make the assumption that we are going to use the Reserves to expand our Heavy forces during wartime. While I agree with the goal I am simply not convinced that the very substantial changes required to the Army, the Reserves and the equipment budget will be there to make it a reality. There are so many other major military procurement items (ships, fighters, MPA's, NORAD upgrades, SP Artillery, SHORAD, ATGMs, etc.) pending that will take priority over new money for IFVs, a forward deployed Brigade (or prepositioned equipment) in Europe or the major structural changes that would be required to make the Army/Reserves match your vision that I simply don't see it happening. If the CF leadership is giving no indication that such a change is in the cards, then what is the point of acting like it's going to happen?

That being said, if for example expanding the number of tank Regiments beyond one is not in the cards, what is the minimum Reg Force cadre that you need to maintain to sustain the capability? I bet it's likely not much less than a full Regiment. Could you sustain expertise in tank operations with a single Reg Force Squadron? With two Squadrons? Do you need a full Regiment in order to maintain the Brigade-level combined arms expertise as well as the required leadership skills progression?

As for the LAV-based Mechanized infantry component of a Canadianized Heavy(ish) Brigade, I'd argue that in fact they are probably the MOST likely type of unit that we would be likely to deploy during peacetime. Risk aversion would likely limit the willingness of the government to deploy Light infantry on a peacekeeping or counter-insurgency operation due to the potentially greater risk of casualties to a force in unarmoured vehicles.

We're in agreement however that there is a role for a Reg Force Light Brigade as a rapid reaction force. In fact, the reactivation of the 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as well as the addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO I think are perfect opportunities for Canada to establish a clear role for a Light Brigade. I think that expansion of a Light Brigade (possibly even up to Division size) could be within the capability of the Army Reserves more or less as already structured.

Keeping in mind that our existing Brigades are force generators as opposed to force employers, you could potentially have:

Mechanized Forces:

• 12 RBC as a Armoured Recce Regiment
• LdSH as a Tank Regiment (with SALH, KOCR & Sask D providing Reserve Squadrons if additional tanks available)
• 1 PPCLI & 3 PPCLI (Edmonton), 2 PPCLI (Shilo), 1 R22eR (Valcartier) and 2 RCR (Gagetown) as LAV Battalions
• 1 RCHA (Shilo) and 5e RALC (Valcartier) as SP Artillery
• 1 CER (Edmonton) and 5 CER (Valcartier)
• 1 Svc (Edmonton) and 5 Svc (Valcartier)

These units would be able to force generate either a Heavy(ish) ABCT or a Medium SBCT equivalent.

Light Forces:

• RCD (Petawawa) as a Light Recce (Air Mobile) Regiment
• 1 RCR & 3 RCR (Petawawa) and 3 R22eR (Quebec) as Light Battalions
• 2 RCHA (Petawawa) as towed/light vehicle SP Artillery
• 2 CER (Petawawa)
• 2 Svc (Petawawa)
• 3 x Infantry Companies from 2 R22eR would be used (1 x Company Each) as basis for 3 x 30/70 Reserve Light Battalions
• 3 x 10/90 Reserve Light Battalions

These units could force generate our Rapid Response Brigade.

This structure would give us a total of 15 x maneuver units. 6 x Mechanized units (1 x Tank and 5 x LAV) and 9 x Light units (3 x Reg Force, 3 x 30/70 Reserve and 3 x 10/90 Reserve). Together with 3 each Reg Force Artillery Regiments, Combat Engineer Regiments, Service Battalions plus the Canadian Combat Support Brigade and Reserve Artillery units, this should give us the ability to force generate a Division.

 

[KevinB]

@GR66 while I think it is interesting that you have found some manners of ways to employ various units if you look abjectly at that force layout you are still missing some major pieces - and have a number of questionable entities.

1) Armored Recce - It really is a fools errand for a LAV based entity -- it is neither very mobile off road, nor does it have firepower to conduct any sort of screening. I don't get how the RCAC thinks they can continue that shell game, look at how a US ABCT is organized - and you see how badly that Canada is equipped in that respect.
2) Tanks, unless you are getting more, and a whole lot more - reserve incorporation in the Armored makes zero sense.
3) Artillery - right now you don't have SP Arty -- so you need to have a program for that.
4) Light Recce is an Infantry task -- simply disband the RCD - as that role is better filled by Light Infantryman
5) Lack of Anti-Tank (in any meaningful way) and lack of Air defense means the Army is out for any high intensity conflict for some time without just attaching a BG to a US/UK Coalition.

Right now Canada has an Army that is neither fish nor fowl - it isn't Heavy - it isn't Light, and quite frankly, I am not sure what it wants to be when it grows up.
It isn't even truly Medium, as it is missing an awful lot of Medium assets.

The best thing Force 2025 could probably do is chop 1 Regular Force Infantry BN from each Reg, and one of the "Armoured" units.
One needs to harvest those PY for GBAD and rebuilding the Air Defense Trade in Canada, and burn down a few HQ's too.
Several other trades on the back end are hurting for bodies -- in this day and age your Army functions digitally or doesn't function, which means the Sig's trade is in huge demand - in additional to the the massive gaps in Logistics, Maintenance and Supply Support that need to be filled.

I think Force 2040 would be a more realistic look for significant changes in Canada's Army - simply because I don't see Canada interested in major capital programs for more Tanks, a true tracked HIFV, Proper Armored Engineer Assets, Tracked SPA, etc.


What you can do now is simply create 1 Medish Bed with Tanks and Towed Arty, and 1 Light Bde, plus the CSSB, give up any hope of a 3rd Bde outside the Reserves.
Without having the willpower to deal with the Regimental System all one is doing at this point is rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic while it is sinking --

 

[GR66]

I made mention in the Ukraine thread about a War on the Rocks podcast featuring Michael Kofman which discussed the implications of Russian force structure decisions and in particular peacetime manning levels on their performance in that conflict.

I see now that War on the Rocks has a related article on the subject which I think is worth a read in relation to our own force design instructions. Obviously we don't have the same issues as the Russian in relation to conscript service personnel, but it does raise important questions about partial peacetime manning of units.

 

[GR66]

@GR66 while I think it is interesting that you have found some manners of ways to employ various units if you look abjectly at that force layout you are still missing some major pieces - and have a number of questionable entities.

1) Armored Recce - It really is a fools errand for a LAV based entity -- it is neither very mobile off road, nor does it have firepower to conduct any sort of screening. I don't get how the RCAC thinks they can continue that shell game, look at how a US ABCT is organized - and you see how badly that Canada is equipped in that respect.

Canadian Armoured Recce Regiments as currently configured may not be fit for task, but every US BCT has a Cavalry Squadron. There is a role to be filled. While I don't expect to see additional tanks (or even Mobile Protected Firepower vehicles) procured by Canada I believe there are things within our grasp that could make our Armoured Recce Regiments much more effective. For example, you could evolve to a structure something like:

• 1 x Surveillance Troop (LAV LRSS)
• 1 x UAV Troop (LAV w/tube-launched UAV launcher)
• 1 x Ground Recce Troop (LAV designed to carry/deploy/operate a Recce UGV and equipped with a RWS (quad Hellfire?) to strike targets illuminated by the UGV or the UAVs? Maybe even a pair of electric motorcycles for a dismounted Recce team?

2) Tanks, unless you are getting more, and a whole lot more - reserve incorporation in the Armored makes zero sense.

Agreed. As I suggested IF additional tanks were to become available we could establish Reserve Squadrons.

3) Artillery - right now you don't have SP Arty -- so you need to have a program for that.

Advancing with Purpose has an "Indirect Fire Modernization" program. Hopefully that will result in us getting a SP Artillery platform.

4) Light Recce is an Infantry task -- simply disband the RCD - as that role is better filled by Light Infantryman

The US IBCT still has a Cavalry Squadron (2 x Mounted Troops and 1 x Dismounted Troop). Regardless of the colour of the beret, there is a role to fill. Figuring out the structure and equipment for that role is something that can be debated.

5) Lack of Anti-Tank (in any meaningful way) and lack of Air defense means the Army is out for any high intensity conflict for some time without just attaching a BG to a US/UK Coalition.

Advancing with Purpose also has a "Ground Based Air Defence" and an "Anti-Tank Guided Missile" program, so again presumably these deficiencies will (eventually) be resolved.

Right now Canada has an Army that is neither fish nor fowl - it isn't Heavy - it isn't Light, and quite frankly, I am not sure what it wants to be when it grows up.
It isn't even truly Medium, as it is missing an awful lot of Medium assets.

The best thing Force 2025 could probably do is chop 1 Regular Force Infantry BN from each Reg, and one of the "Armoured" units.
One needs to harvest those PY for GBAD and rebuilding the Air Defense Trade in Canada, and burn down a few HQ's too.
Several other trades on the back end are hurting for bodies -- in this day and age your Army functions digitally or doesn't function, which means the Sig's trade is in huge demand - in additional to the the massive gaps in Logistics, Maintenance and Supply Support that need to be filled.

I think Force 2040 would be a more realistic look for significant changes in Canada's Army - simply because I don't see Canada interested in major capital programs for more Tanks, a true tracked HIFV, Proper Armored Engineer Assets, Tracked SPA, etc.


What you can do now is simply create 1 Medish Bed with Tanks and Towed Arty, and 1 Light Bde, plus the CSSB, give up any hope of a 3rd Bde outside the Reserves.
Without having the willpower to deal with the Regimental System all one is doing at this point is rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic while it is sinking --

I agree that probably the best course of action would be to cut units and HQ in order to properly man the units remaining and fill out the missing capability.

An alternative solution would be 1 x Heavy(ish) Brigade with a Tank Regiment, and two LAV Battalions out West. 1 x Medium Brigade with three LAV Battalions (Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown). And a single Light Battalion (Petawawa) as the Rapid Response force and the anchor for a Reserve Light Infantry Brigade.

Makes the most use of the LAVs we already have (and are probably the type of unit we are most likely to deploy in peacetime). Maintains a Light RRF but still frees up PYs for the capabilities we need to add. Artillery, CER and Service Battalions can focus their PYs on providing support to two instead of three Brigades (but be able to provide a Reg Force core for the Reserve Brigade supporting units).

 

[KevinB]

Canadian Armoured Recce Regiments as currently configured may not be fit for task, but every US BCT has a Cavalry Squadron. There is a role to be filled. While I don't expect to see additional tanks (or even Mobile Protected Firepower vehicles) procured by Canada I believe there are things within our grasp that could make our Armoured Recce Regiments much more effective. For example, you could evolve to a structure something like:

• 1 x Surveillance Troop (LAV LRSS)
• 1 x UAV Troop (LAV w/tube-launched UAV launcher)
• 1 x Ground Recce Troop (LAV designed to carry/deploy/operate a Recce UGV and equipped with a RWS (quad Hellfire?) to strike targets illuminated by the UGV or the UAVs? Maybe even a pair of electric motorcycles for a dismounted Recce team?

Look at our CAV Squadrons - they have these wonderful things called TOW and Javelin - as well as a plethora of support enablers.

The Cavalry Squadron of 2025

www.benning.army.mil

From the Screen Line: Cavalry Scouts in the Army of 2020

I think that honestly the Armored Recce Squadron needs to be a combined Arms formation - there are roles needed to be filled by a lot more than Armor -- probably should be called the Brigade Recce Squadron IMHO

Agreed. As I suggested IF additional tanks were to become available we could establish Reserve Squadrons.

Advancing with Purpose has an "Indirect Fire Modernization" program. Hopefully that will result in us getting a SP Artillery platform.

Agreed - but I would suggest that the Heavy Force needs a heavier tracked IFV, and the CA needs to come to grips with that.

The US IBCT still has a Cavalry Squadron (2 x Mounted Troops and 1 x Dismounted Troop). Regardless of the colour of the beret, there is a role to fill. Figuring out the structure and equipment for that role is something that can be debated.

IBCT's are a weird one - as they vastly differ on the CAV side if it is an Airborne, Airmobile or Light IBCT.

Advancing with Purpose also has a "Ground Based Air Defence" and an "Anti-Tank Guided Missile" program, so again presumably these deficiencies will (eventually) be resolved.

I agree that probably the best course of action would be to cut units and HQ in order to properly man the units remaining and fill out the missing capability.

An alternative solution would be 1 x Heavy(ish) Brigade with a Tank Regiment, and two LAV Battalions out West. 1 x Medium Brigade with three LAV Battalions (Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown). And a single Light Battalion (Petawawa) as the Rapid Response force and the anchor for a Reserve Light Infantry Brigade.

Makes the most use of the LAVs we already have (and are probably the type of unit we are most likely to deploy in peacetime). Maintains a Light RRF but still frees up PYs for the capabilities we need to add. Artillery, CER and Service Battalions can focus their PYs on providing support to two instead of three Brigades (but be able to provide a Reg Force core for the Reserve Brigade supporting units).

The issue I keep coming back to is the CAF has no way of deploying anything other than a Light Bde in any reasonable time frame.
So you probably have your IRU as a Reg Light Bde - and you can run 30-70 units for the others.
30-70 units will allow BG Deployments of Medish with Tank as fast as the ship can get material overseas - and for longer duration missions allows for heavier reserve integration.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The issue I keep coming back to is the CAF has no way of deploying anything other than a Light Bde in any reasonable time frame.
So you probably have your IRU as a Reg Light Bde - and you can run 30-70 units for the others.
30-70 units will allow BG Deployments of Medish with Tank as fast as the ship can get material overseas - and for longer duration missions allows for heavier reserve integration.

I wonder if anyone's 'done the math' on what we can fit into our strategic movement fleet, and what we can send to Europe on Day 1-30ish?

 

[dapaterson]

Is GTS Katie available?

 

[GR66]

Look at our CAV Squadrons - they have these wonderful things called TOW and Javelin - as well as a plethora of support enablers.

The Cavalry Squadron of 2025

www.benning.army.mil

From the Screen Line: Cavalry Scouts in the Army of 2020

I think that honestly the Armored Recce Squadron needs to be a combined Arms formation - there are roles needed to be filled by a lot more than Armor -- probably should be called the Brigade Recce Squadron IMHO

I think that Ukraine has shown that the entire concept of Recce on the modern battlefield has to be reviewed. Surveillance, UAVs, UGVs, TOW/Javelin/Hellfire, Loitering Munitions, Direct Fire, whatever are all likely on the table. In a Canadian context there are programs which address most of these capabilities but I highly doubt that any short/medium term solution will involve an entirely new vehicle platform. Until that changes the logical thing is to see what can be done using the platforms we do have.

Agreed - but I would suggest that the Heavy Force needs a heavier tracked IFV, and the CA needs to come to grips with that.

See my comment above. If we're not going to get a tracked IFV then we need to make the best of what we do have.

IBCT's are a weird one - as they vastly differ on the CAV side if it is an Airborne, Airmobile or Light IBCT.

Agreed. We'll have to figure out what it should look like once we determine the concept of operations for our Light forces.

The issue I keep coming back to is the CAF has no way of deploying anything other than a Light Bde in any reasonable time frame.
So you probably have your IRU as a Reg Light Bde - and you can run 30-70 units for the others.
30-70 units will allow BG Deployments of Medish with Tank as fast as the ship can get material overseas - and for longer duration missions allows for heavier reserve integration.

Two problems. Firstly, do we have enough airlift capability to deploy and sustain a full Light Brigade in a reasonable time frame? Keep in mind that if we go to war deploying and supplying an Army Brigade won't be the only demand made of our air transport assets. Secondly, our Reserve system isn't currently capable of generating units that can support a Medium/Heavy force structure. Do you honestly believe that the cost and effort to transform the Reserve system into a system similar the the US National Guard will get the required support to make it happen in the near term in the face of competing priorities like new equipment/capabilities, the F-35, the CSC and NORAD modernization? Better in my mind to start down the path based on a Light Infantry structure which is within our capabilities as a first step then transition to a Medium/Heavy structure once the cash/will is there in the future.

As to the question of maintaining a Light Brigade vs a Medium Brigade I'd argue that just like during the Cold War, smaller regional conflicts are going to be the most likely scenario we'll have to face rather than a direct invasion of NATO. Medium forces will be more in demand for those types of operations. The option of course exists if necessary to deploy our Medium Battalions without their vehicles if necessary. The opposite isn't necessarily true.

 

[Kirkhill]

Can we resolve these issues by lumping the 12 Combat Arms Units into a single, common combined arms Corps?

Canadian Corps (The Royal Canadians)
Canadian Corps (Lord Strathcona's)
Canadian Corps (Princess Patricia's)
Canadian Corps (Royal 22nd)
Canadian Corps (Le 12e)

The Royal Canadians would encompass both the RCRs and the RCDs
Number of Units and Subunits to be determined.
Nomenclature according to regimental quiffs.
Role designators such as Dragoons, Horse, Light Infantry, Armoured would all be eliminated.

Tank
Light Armoured

Cavalry
Dragoons
Armoured Infantry
Mechanized Infantry
Motorized Infantry
Light Infantry

Heliborne Infantry
Airborne Infantry
Marine Infantry

Assault
Defence
Patrols
Recce
ISTAR
QRF

All cap badges would be eligible for all taskings (long term taskings - not tasked minute by minute but according to a 5 to 10 year schedule and the national threat assessment)

The RRCA, RCE, RCCS etc would all continue undisturbed

 

[Kirkhill]

The issue I keep coming back to is the CAF has no way of deploying anything other than a Light Bde in any reasonable time frame.
So you probably have your IRU as a Reg Light Bde - and you can run 30-70 units for the others.
30-70 units will allow BG Deployments of Medish with Tank as fast as the ship can get material overseas - and for longer duration missions allows for heavier reserve integration.

You mean a Light Bn in a week and the rest of the Brigade in a month or so?

The rest? Whatever, whenever.

 

[KevinB]

I think that Ukraine has shown that the entire concept of Recce on the modern battlefield has to be reviewed. Surveillance, UAVs, UGVs, TOW/Javelin/Hellfire, Loitering Munitions, Direct Fire, whatever are all likely on the table. In a Canadian context there are programs which address most of these capabilities but I highly doubt that any short/medium term solution will involve an entirely new vehicle platform. Until that changes the logical thing is to see what can be done using the platforms we do have.

I understand your point - but I feel remiss if I don't constantly ring the alarm bell on heavier assets for high intensity conflict.

See my comment above. If we're not going to get a tracked IFV then we need to make the best of what we do have.

See mine

Agreed. We'll have to figure out what it should look like once we determine the concept of operations for our Light forces.

Two problems. Firstly, do we have enough airlift capability to deploy and sustain a full Light Brigade in a reasonable time frame?

5 C-17 and 20 odd Herc's
I would say yes.

Keep in mind that if we go to war deploying and supplying an Army Brigade won't be the only demand made of our air transport assets.

There would need to be a lot of sealift as well -- which would probably also be bringing heavier forces.

Secondly, our Reserve system isn't currently capable of generating units that can support a Medium/Heavy force structure. Do you honestly believe that the cost and effort to transform the Reserve system into a system similar the the US National Guard will get the required support to make it happen in the near term in the face of competing priorities like new equipment/capabilities, the F-35, the CSC and NORAD modernization? Better in my mind to start down the path based on a Light Infantry structure which is within our capabilities as a first step then transition to a Medium/Heavy structure once the cash/will is there in the future.

The Res system needs to change regardless --
As @FJAG has pointed out the cost of units is fairly similar.
My point is IF one is an Expeditionary Army, then one needs equipment - or just cashier the PRes if you aren't going equip them.

As to the question of maintaining a Light Brigade vs a Medium Brigade I'd argue that just like during the Cold War, smaller regional conflicts are going to be the most likely scenario we'll have to face rather than a direct invasion of NATO. Medium forces will be more in demand for those types of operations. The option of course exists if necessary to deploy our Medium Battalions without their vehicles if necessary. The opposite isn't necessarily true.

Medium means too Heavy to Move easy - to Light to Fight
Properly Equipped Light Forces can do a lot - especially in the beginning stages - but when use comes to shove you need a true heavy force -- the Medium "gap" really is a Peace Enforcement Low Intensity role IMHO.
If you are going to those -- you can put LI folks in the back of Armor Driven LAV if you need more troops.


When you look at the response to the Ukrainian Invasion -- we (USA) moved XVIII Airborne into theatre first - then V (Heavy) Corps.

 

[KevinB]

You mean a Light Bn in a week and the rest of the Brigade in a month or so?

The rest? Whatever, whenever.

The CAF is more than capable of delivering a Light Bde anywhere in the world inside 72hrs based on their current capability.
Faster if we help

 

[Kirkhill]

The CAF is more than capable of delivering a Light Bde anywhere in the world inside 72hrs based on their current capability.

You're probably right - given the lack of need to pack ATGMs and SAMs or 120mm mortars or light utility vehicles. What would they be doing again? Once they got there?

Faster if we help