• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Informing the Army’s Future Structure

You're confusing me slightly with @Infanteer here but yes and yes - 28 dismounts for the platoon.

The collective "you".

You can argue that but I'd disagree - the same way that I'd disagree that the LAV crew or the ISV driver are "in addition" to the platoon. They are part of it. I suggested that specialty vehicles (such as BVs) should come with their own drivers and maintainers because they are a brigade resource and can be parcelled out to varying units and require special skills to operate and maintain.

If you expect the GIBS that have spent 2 years working with their own transport and heavy supporting fire to suddenly become Light Infantry, working without that LAV and its fire power and needing to learn how to work with different support then you had better train them to operate with and without the LAVs. And while they are operating without the LAVs, what are the LAV crews doing? Are they suddenly converted to the skills necessary to man the weapons of a Support Company?

If you can subtract the LAVs from the GIBs then shouldn't you be able to add new GIBs to the LAVs?

Sure they can but IMHO its an unnecessary debate. One only changes things when there is a clear advantage. I don't even see a minor advantage.

I agree it is an unnecessary debate. So why is it reprised so often?

Not sure what a war with logistics limitations and poor terrain has to do with anything. Falklands was a unique situation and an interesting case study but not a pro forma example for general force (even light force) structures.

🍻

Many wars have logistics limitations and poor terrain. The combatants then have to fight with what they managed to get to the fight with them.

Maybe the LAV Battalion can only manage to get its GIBs and a half company of LAVs to the fight.
 
If you expect the GIBS that have spent 2 years working with their own transport and heavy supporting fire to suddenly become Light Infantry, working without that LAV and its fire power and needing to learn how to work with different support then you had better train them to operate with and without the LAVs. And while they are operating without the LAVs, what are the LAV crews doing? Are they suddenly converted to the skills necessary to man the weapons of a Support Company?

Mechanized Bns have Support Companies, and are trained in the same weapons as it stands now. They also qualify as light infantry and it is very normal for us to conduct light exercises. The crews, being infantry, are just a nice addition to us. Besides they’re only in that role for a period of time, not unlike being the C6 gunner or Pl Sig.
If you can subtract the LAVs from the GIBs then shouldn't you be able to add new GIBs to the LAVs?

Not as easy, those GIBs are also the back up gunners and drivers who have intimate knowledge of their ride. They have conducted and trained on RRPs, can be expected to pull turret watch, are used to assisting in driver maintenance. There’s a reason why 3 vp leaves work 2 hours before 1 vp.

I agree it is an unnecessary debate. So why is it reprised so often?

Why indeed.
 
Those light AFVs were also specifically picked out for their effectiveness in the Falklands. I’d imagine the Brits would have preferred more not less, the Arggies too.

A question for @Kirkill what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of a separate carrier unit vice organic? I’m interested primarily because I can only think of two military organizations that have “carrier” units, and both have a very specific mission set.

I think that Organic LAVs result in a highly efficient force optimized to work as a team. If the team can be deployed as a team with all its equipment then that is the optimum solution. The unit will do as well as any unit can.

My comment was specifically in reference to GR66's comments about a Light Infantry Division and FJAG's expressed concerns about maintaining LAV crew skills. In that context I was suggesting that the LAV unit could be a non-organic asset that was available to work with the Light Infantry. It might not be as proficient a combination as the Organic team. But perhaps, even in small doses, such as the troop of Scorpions and Scimitars, it is enough to swing a battle.

The Household Cavalry Regiment supplied those Lt Tanks. And yes all parties would probably have been happier to have more of them. Just like they would have been happier to have more Harriers, more Lt Guns, more mortars, transport and Chinooks. But they didn't have them. They had to work with what they had. Britain had more Lt Tanks, more Chinooks and it had MBTs. But it couldn't get them to the fight.

Integral LAVs build proficiency in those skills. I would go farther and suggest that if the Square Combat Team is your standard operational element them the Square Combat Team might as well become a permanent structure. It too would gain proficiency from constant practice.



On the other hand, in the context of a light battalion, there might be a 70% solution available by adding a Reserve Force or RCAC or RCIC Carrier Squadron to change the capabilities of a unit that is proficient in the skills of working independently of LAVs.



As to my interest in smaller vehicles - that is simple. Smaller vehicles are easier to pack and thus easier to get into the field than big vehicles. Also, their primary value is they can bring heavier fire support to the fight than a dismounted force. If they can move people that is a bonus.


To sum up. I like the Organic LAV Unit. I would like it better if we had better transport available to deploy it overseas where it can be useful. It has, in my opinion, little utility domestically.

Domestically, for a variety of reasons, I thing the air transportable light infantry unit is the better solution. How to support them when they are on the surface becomes the next issue - and that will require some form of air transportable vehicle and there are a bunch of them to choose from. But the LAV isn't one of them. Nor is the CV90 or the Bradley. In some instances the Scorpion and Scimitar might be useful but if the Bv206 is bogging down in central Canada then they probably will as well.

The Light Infantry has to stay vehicle independent because we can't afford to have specialist infantry for every environment and season. But maybe we can afford to keep an array of useful vehicles on hand with knowledgeable crews to be able to boost the variety of missions the light force can undertake.

In addition to having a committed, deployable, expeditionary medium - or heavy - force.
 
Separately

Philips P O'Brien in the Telegraph.

Ukraine is showing the future of modern warfare​

Ben Wallace should pay close attention to events that may be a turning point in how we win wars
PHILLIPS O'BRIEN22 May 2022 • 12:00pm

In an address to the National Army Museum earlier this month, the Defence Secretary Ben Wallace gave a fascinating view of the present state, and possible future, of military power. Though he focused on Ukraine, he also gave some tantalising hints about where the UK might be moving next.

Wallace painted a picture of a Russian army that was “rotten” from top to bottom; with demoralised rank-and-file troops and a class of “failing” generals, whose planning, if that word could even be used, left their men helpless against fierce Ukrainian resistance. Corruption and inefficiency were ubiquitous, from soldiers selling their vehicles’ fuel for extra cash, to expensive and vital logistics vehicles being poorly maintained. All of this contributed to an enormous strategic failure at the Battle of Kyiv.

Such basic lessons should hopefully be irrelevant to UK armed forces, but the Defence Secretary also discussed weapons and technology, and it is here that things get interesting. He spoke of the Russian army as a fighting force rooted in heavy, almost unthinking, firepower. Instead of using the high-tech weaponry many anticipated, Russia revealed itself to be a Second World War force - and a primitive one at that. Unable to deploy their heavy armour and artillery properly, they resorted to “indiscriminate barrages” that failed to convert their greater numbers into a victorious situation.

Wallace’s praise for the Ukrainians was also noteworthy. Alongside their moral superiority, he singled out their success in using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to observe and attack the unprepared Russians. The Defence Secretary also seemed to reiterate this preference for UAVs and against traditional heavy forces at another conference this month. Asked whether the UK should use the lessons of Ukraine to rebuild a large British land army (ours has suffered major reductions in personnel, equipment and funding over the last decade) he demurred. When asked what he would do with the promised greater defence funding he exclaimed: “Would I triple the size of the Army? No.” Instead he reiterated the value of UAVs.

The Defence Secretary’s instincts not to recreate a large land army may prove controversial, but they are eminently reasonable in light of recent events. Many initially believed that the Ukraine war had reinforced the tank’s value on the battlefield, severe Russian heavy vehicle losses have undermined this assumption. Instead, we are seeing the value of range attack. As the Russians, with their heavy but ultimately short-range force, have shown, it is very difficult to move forward into the face of a modern army with a system of different ranged defences at its disposal.

All of this means that if the UK military does receive significant new funding, focusing on soldier numbers and heavy land vehicles could be the riskier, retrograde choice. It would be far better to take some time to try and understand what has happened in Ukraine before investing. Poor spending choices will merely entrench the vested interests defending armed forces that Britain no longer needs, which will ultimately make her a less influential Nato and European partner.

Other militaries, including the Chinese government, are thought to be setting time aside to learn the lessons of this war to evaluate their own strategy. Events in Ukraine might well be a turning point in modern warfare, the moment it became clear just how difficult it is for all but the most dominant military powers to suppress defensive firepower. Taking stock might be a risky political move for Ben Wallace, but in the long run it would be far more shrewd.
 
Domestically, for a variety of reasons, I thing the air transportable light infantry unit is the better solution. How to support them when they are on the surface becomes the next issue - and that will require some form of air transportable vehicle and there are a bunch of them to choose from. But the LAV isn't one of them. Nor is the CV90 or the Bradley. In some instances the Scorpion and Scimitar might be useful but if the Bv206 is bogging down in central Canada then they probably will as well.
Let me just address the issue of domestic use of the LAV. The thing is ground deployable and at 70kms in the hour, a LAV element, driving in shifts can cover 1,500 kms in a 24 hour period. With LAV units in Gagetown, Valcartier, Petawawa, Shilo and Edmonton, there is no place in Southern Canada that can't be reached by a LAV element within 24 hours. It's not the travel time that's the issue, its the readiness and mounting time that's the issue. Preparing for and conducting an air move in Southern Canada would probably take far longer then simply driving there. Air v ground deployment is not an overriding factor in the South and we do not need an air component capability to move large LAV formations domestically. The LAV will do just fine here.

The north is a different situation entirely. Not only are we challenged by a road network to the north but also by a lack of airfields and a road network once there. Much of the North is heavily forested and/or boggy and/or frozen. But then, not every square metre of the North needs to be protected either. I think we are lacking a good analysis of just what the real potential threats are and what elements of a joint force is needed there. My guess is its heavily weighed towards air and naval forces with a better trained, organized and equipped Ranger component and small airborne strike components all supported by some hardened support bases and probably by ground based very-long range cruise or hypersonic missile batteries and anti-air and anti-ship defences. It's a whole different deal than defending the North with company sized airborne teams although they may have a small role to play within a more sophisticated defence scheme.

🍻
 
Let me just address the issue of domestic use of the LAV. The thing is ground deployable and at 70kms in the hour, a LAV element, driving in shifts can cover 1,500 kms in a 24 hour period. With LAV units in Gagetown, Valcartier, Petawawa, Shilo and Edmonton, there is no place in Southern Canada that can't be reached by a LAV element within 24 hours. It's not the travel time that's the issue, its the readiness and mounting time that's the issue. Preparing for and conducting an air move in Southern Canada would probably take far longer then simply driving there. Air v ground deployment is not an overriding factor in the South and we do not need an air component capability to move large LAV formations domestically. The LAV will do just fine here.

The north is a different situation entirely. Not only are we challenged by a road network to the north but also by a lack of airfields and a road network once there. Much of the North is heavily forested and/or boggy and/or frozen. But then, not every square metre of the North needs to be protected either. I think we are lacking a good analysis of just what the real potential threats are and what elements of a joint force is needed there. My guess is its heavily weighed towards air and naval forces with a better trained, organized and equipped Ranger component and small airborne strike components all supported by some hardened support bases and probably by ground based very-long range cruise or hypersonic missile batteries and anti-air and anti-ship defences. It's a whole different deal than defending the North with company sized airborne teams although they may have a small role to play within a more sophisticated defence scheme.

🍻

Heavy industry seems to operate large vehicles all across Canada quite successfully, including the Arctic, year round.

With the right planning/ preparation there shouldn't be an issue.
 
Let me just address the issue of domestic use of the LAV. The thing is ground deployable and at 70kms in the hour, a LAV element, driving in shifts can cover 1,500 kms in a 24 hour period. With LAV units in Gagetown, Valcartier, Petawawa, Shilo and Edmonton, there is no place in Southern Canada that can't be reached by a LAV element within 24 hours. It's not the travel time that's the issue, its the readiness and mounting time that's the issue. Preparing for and conducting an air move in Southern Canada would probably take far longer then simply driving there. Air v ground deployment is not an overriding factor in the South and we do not need an air component capability to move large LAV formations domestically. The LAV will do just fine here.

The north is a different situation entirely. Not only are we challenged by a road network to the north but also by a lack of airfields and a road network once there. Much of the North is heavily forested and/or boggy and/or frozen. But then, not every square metre of the North needs to be protected either. I think we are lacking a good analysis of just what the real potential threats are and what elements of a joint force is needed there. My guess is its heavily weighed towards air and naval forces with a better trained, organized and equipped Ranger component and small airborne strike components all supported by some hardened support bases and probably by ground based very-long range cruise or hypersonic missile batteries and anti-air and anti-ship defences. It's a whole different deal than defending the North with company sized airborne teams although they may have a small role to play within a more sophisticated defence scheme.

🍻

We are in 100% agreement.

Just see my comments about what a LIGHT Armoured Vehicle should be and who should be driving it.
 
@FJAG

How about this?

Would you go for

1 Panzer Brigade equipped with 2 Brigades worth of Vehicles (CV90s/Leos and SPHs) - one forward deployed in Europe

4 Light Brigades

3 of those Light Brigades with one Regular LAV 6.0 Battalion and 3 Reg/Res Infantry Battalions (Light/Rifle/General Duties)
1 of those Light Brigades with one Regular Airborne Battalion and 3 Reg/Res Infantry Battalions (Light/Rifle/General Duties)
All equipped wtih a well supplied Transport Battalion each - like the Artillery that too could be a Reserve heavy unit.


I too like the MRZR and the Dagor - but only as an alternative to the LAV II - Bv206 - Argo - Sherp equipment. And i would add some RHIBs to the transport mix as well. CB90s is a step too far. Maybe we could talk the Navy into manning them.
 
@FJAG

How about this?

Would you go for

1 Panzer Brigade equipped with 2 Brigades worth of Vehicles (CV90s/Leos and SPHs) - one forward deployed in Europe
I would go with a heavy brigade's worth of equipment in Europe with a maintainer and admin element.

A 70/30 heavy brigade and a 30/70 heavy brigade in Canada with the RegF components having in sum total a brigade's worth of equipment and with the RegF folks doing a fly-over brigade exercise in Europe in the late winter and the ResF folks doing a flyover exercise in Europe in the summer. While the RegF equipment in the summer is used for training the next generation of RegF and ResF folks.

That way you end up with two trained brigades of people to man two brigade's worth of equipment.

I like CV90s but insist that it comes with an ATGM system. The CV9035 NL MLU might fit the bill as long as it maintains 7-8 dismounts.
4 Light Brigades

3 of those Light Brigades with one Regular LAV 6.0 Battalion and 3 Reg/Res Infantry Battalions (Light/Rifle/General Duties)
1 of those Light Brigades with one Regular Airborne Battalion and 3 Reg/Res Infantry Battalions (Light/Rifle/General Duties)
All equipped wtih a well supplied Transport Battalion each - like the Artillery that too could be a Reserve heavy unit.
You know me by now. I don't like mixing capabilities within brigades it complicates life (mostly maintenance and training) unnecessarily and negatively impacts their employability as a complete formation. We have enough LAVs for six battalions which equates to two full brigades. I see that as one 70/30 brigade and one 30/70 brigade with current manpower levels.

If we could generate more people, I would expand that to an additional 30/70 brigade without adding any equipment.

In many ways, in that second scenario, my idea of a 30/70 brigade is similar to your idea of a "light brigade" with a RegF LAV battalion and 2 or more ResF light battalions except for the fact that I have each battalion identical with a RegF HQ and one RegF, fully equipped LAV company and two ResF underequipped but fully trained LAV companies.

I'd have just the one light brigade but with three RegF light battalions (and sure, make one airborne). I prefer organic battalion transport and the artillery can be 30/70.

🍻
 
@FJAG

We're getting there.

But you seem to be hung up on Order. One might almost suggest a Germanic influence in your background. Although that might be unfair to the non-Prussian Germans. :D

I don't think we can prepare a plan for every situation. I am quite comfortable knowing I have a variety of options available to me.

I can see your Heavy solution but I prefer my Light/Medium solution.
 
i&
If you scroll down to near the bottom of this online book selection, by Mark Adkins, you'll see a description of how 2 PARA was organized during the Falklands War, as were other Infantry units at the time.

2 x GPMGs per section was the norm, in 2 x 4 man teams. Those, the 66mm/M72 and No. 80 WP grenades are credited as the main battle winners...

One aspect to note was Argentinian forces on the island(s) when Britain attached to recapture then where light troops from the subtropical areas, and mostly conscripts.
No armor (save 12x 90mm cannon armed Panhard armored cars) and due to border issues with Chile, keep the vast majority of their regular forces on that border.

If the Argentinians had had the bulk of their Marines and Mountain troops available there there would been more vehicles and troops ready for the terrain.
Which would have vastly changed the British lessons learned.
 
I like CV90s but insist that it comes with an ATGM system. The CV9035 NL MLU might fit the bill as long as it maintains 7-8 dismounts.
CV90's aren't heavy. They prioritized mobility well above armour with those vehicles. They have equivalent armour protection to a LAV 6 and less vs mines. They are small and incorporate a lot of other survivability traits (smoke, multispectral gas, low signature, hard kill active protection). I would think they would be a really good cavalry or recce unit type. Also for dismounts you're likely looking at 6 for the CV90 maybe 7.

If you want heavy then Lynx is probably the biggest standout. Though unless you are going with an HAPC then nothing currently exists that can survive over 30mm autocannons right now.
 
The CV90 MkIV upper glacis plate on level ground can deflect or absorb pretty much most non dedicated Anti-Tank impacts, allegedly past 25mm and 30mm APFSDSDU rounds (call me a skeptic as the DU generally can front pen a T-72).
At 37 tonnes is it still very agile, I would however put it in the Heavy Category, but not like the 60t Namer which is basically a Merkava MBT without Gun (mind you they have an IFV version now with turret with what appears to be a 25mm M242 Bushmaster cannon).

Honestly I'm curious to the engine replacement/repair time with the Namer and Merkava, as with the amount of armor on the front glacis plate - it can't be easy to unlock and move.

The CV90 MkIV has claimed room for 8 dismounts - a little more cubic area than the LAV, and lower - so the troop area seems to have about an extra 1.5 feet, so I suspect you actually could get 8 troops with armor etc fairly decently.
Next AUSA I need to bring my tape measure ;)
 
Back
Top