Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[MilEME09]

Secondly do tanks not reduce the strategic mobility of the CMBG as everything else is wheeled. Does that combined with the LAV armour improvements make a CMBG a heavier formation than a SBCT or is that dependant on all the other effectors an SBCT has that we don't?

That would depend how we employ our tanks?, given our small tank force I'd see them as a solar head formation to open up the enemy lines for the LAV forces to exploit.

 

[Underway]

In the CAF context, tanks will not significantly affect the strategically mobility of a CMBG as a CMBG is not inherently strategically mobile. We don't have the capacity in our air transport fleet to move a significant land force element. If I recall correctly (a loadie can sort me out) you can get 1x MBT on a C-17, and 2x LAVs on a C-17, so you ain't getting much forward deployed very fast. The most effective way is to move by ship, but when it comes to a large transport ship, the difference between an MBT and LAV is negligible.

Now the argument has been shifted to arguing for the LAV/Strykers "operational mobility." This is viewed as the ability of a force to move around once in theatre. The common "inflection point" that is often cited is Kosovo in 1999, where heavy tracked NATO forces were busy offloading and plodding towards Pristina only to find that the wheeled BTRs of the Russians had beat them to the city. A Stryker Brigade was supposed to offer a double whammy of strategic and operational mobility; it could get to the theatre fast and move around quickly. It only is able to live up to the latter (for good examples of this, see the actions of US 2 Cavalry Regiment, a SBCT, moving about Europe in the last few years as part of NATO deterrence).

A CMBG with tanks will lose that inherent mobility as tanks can't move far on their own before suffering maintenance issues. This is why transporters are usually used to operational transport MBTs.

So is the addition of tanks to a CMBG worth losing that operational mobility then? Or is this a case of best/worst of both worlds.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed. Even the USMC, or many in it, see the big ships that compose the ARG as "exquisite capability."

Something like you said is on the money. Stick a box with missiles on it, and add the capability to dispatch self-guided floating platforms for landing reusable rockets (a la SpaceX) that can be launched and recovered from around the world, and you have a real 21st-century interconnected naval platform.

It's an entirely new hull, suspension, and powerpack. All that adds up.



"Strategic mobility" is generally used to refer to the ability of a force to be deployed in and out of theatre. A frigate possess a high degree of strategic mobility as it can sail into the South China Sea, sail right back out, and be in the Gulf fairly quickly, with a limited cost in terms of resources (essentially, the gas it burns to get there).

The Stryker Brigade was originally envisioned as a strategically mobile formation. Something that could be fit on C-17s and C-130s and be flown into a theatre for quick effect - the stated goal was 96 hours. Vision never really made it to reality though. The Strykers are too large and heavy. RAND did a study and found that the deployment time was generally 2-3 weeks, and that this would consume a lot of C-17s (not C-130s) to make it happen.

In the CAF context, tanks will not significantly affect the strategically mobility of a CMBG as a CMBG is not inherently strategically mobile. We don't have the capacity in our air transport fleet to move a significant land force element. If I recall correctly (a loadie can sort me out) you can get 1x MBT on a C-17, and 2x LAVs on a C-17, so you ain't getting much forward deployed very fast. The most effective way is to move by ship, but when it comes to a large transport ship, the difference between an MBT and LAV is negligible.

Now the argument has been shifted to arguing for the LAV/Strykers "operational mobility." This is viewed as the ability of a force to move around once in theatre. The common "inflection point" that is often cited is Kosovo in 1999, where heavy tracked NATO forces were busy offloading and plodding towards Pristina only to find that the wheeled BTRs of the Russians had beat them to the city. A Stryker Brigade was supposed to offer a double whammy of strategic and operational mobility; it could get to the theatre fast and move around quickly. It only is able to live up to the latter (for good examples of this, see the actions of US 2 Cavalry Regiment, a SBCT, moving about Europe in the last few years as part of NATO deterrence).

A CMBG with tanks will lose that inherent mobility as tanks can't move far on their own before suffering maintenance issues. This is why transporters are usually used to operational transport MBTs.

How about a 'light formation' with airportable tanks/ MPF?

Light tank prototypes arrive at Fort Bragg for soldier evaluation​

BAE’s MPF prototype can be transported via a C-130 aircraft. Three can fit on a C-17 aircraft. The Army is requiring the vehicle be C-17 transportable.

Light tank prototypes arrive at Fort Bragg for soldier evaluation

Mobile Protected Firepower prototypes will be put through the paces with the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, at the start of the new year.

www.defensenews.com

 

[Infanteer]

How about a 'light formation' with airportable tanks/ MPF?

That's been a mirage for decades now. The US has tried multiple iterations of a light armour deployable formation in many different iterations. The 9th ID (Test) was stood up in Fort Lewis in the 1980s as a concept formation for such a force.

The French seemed to have some success in getting a wheeled force into Mali for Op SERVAL, but these were older lighter vehicles that are all being phased out for newer, heavier platforms so I'm not sure they could repeat this.

 

[McG]

A good chunk of SERVAL was deployed by ship and then drove for several days to catch-up to the fight.

 

[Infanteer]

So is the addition of tanks to a CMBG worth losing that operational mobility then? Or is this a case of best/worst of both worlds.

Main battle tanks offer an unparalleled level of tactical mobility (moving around the battlefield) combined with firepower and protection. Despite sensationalist claims by "analysts" that the tank is dead and the UAV will rule the world, the proof of the enduring value of the MBT is evident in a review of conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), Gaza (2008), Syria (2011), and Ukraine (2014).

So, the question for all the budding Force Developers here is "do I need unparalleled tactical mobility, firepower, and protection in the face of a regular adversary" or "does the nature of the adversary permit me to forego this capability to enhance my operational mobility and reduce (somewhat) my logistical trail?"

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The Russians were also moving through friendly territory - allowed for a certain risk acceptance.

 

[Infanteer]

The Russians were also moving through friendly territory - allowed for a certain risk acceptance.

Shhh....don't spoil a good narrative.

....and let's not talk about Grozny....

 

[Weinie]

Main battle tanks offer an unparalleled level of tactical mobility (moving around the battlefield) combined with firepower and protection. Despite sensationalist claims by "analysts" that the tank is dead and the UAV will rule the world, the proof of the enduring value of the MBT is evident in a review of conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), Gaza (2008), Syria (2011), and Ukraine (2014).

So, the question for all the budding Force Developers here is "do I need unparalleled tactical mobility, firepower, and protection in the face of a regular adversary" or "does the nature of the adversary permit me to forego this capability to enhance my operational mobility and reduce (somewhat) my logistical trail?"

Yup. But does the fact that our MBT's, as capable as they are, will likely not arrive in time to make a difference, necessitate a re-think of where the CAF can push capability?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Yup. But does the fact that our MBT's, as capable as they are, will likely not arrive in time to make a difference, necessitate a re-think of where the CAF can push capability?

What is “in time?” How do you think that LAVs are getting to the theatre of operations?

 

[Kirkhill]

What is “in time?” How do you think that LAVs are getting to the theatre of operations?

Judging from current efforts "in time" is more than four years before engagement. The ePF stood up in Latvia in 2017. An earlier force was deployed in Poland in 2014.

 

[Weinie]

What is “in time?” How do you think that LAVs are getting to the theatre of operations?

And you just added another "failure" in our COA. What do we bring, legitimately, and more importantly, expeditiously, to the fight?

 

[Infanteer]

What is “in time?” How do you think that LAVs are getting to the theatre of operations?

This.

A tank and a LAV will take the same amount of time to project from Canada. There are factors that differentiate the value proposition of each of the two platforms, but deployability ain't one of them.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Judging from current efforts "in time" is more than four years before engagement. The ePF stood up in Latvia in 2017. An earlier force was deployed in Poland in 2014.

When was the decision made on the EFP? When was the multinational structure hammered out? I am asking rhetorically of course. The weight of the vehicles had nothing to do with it. Moving a BG with Leopards to Europe is the same time as a BG with LAVs.

Yes - we can put an infantry company without equipment into Europe quite quickly as was done. So?

 

[Underway]

Main battle tanks offer an unparalleled level of tactical mobility (moving around the battlefield) combined with firepower and protection. Despite sensationalist claims by "analysts" that the tank is dead and the UAV will rule the world, the proof of the enduring value of the MBT is evident in a review of conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), Gaza (2008), Syria (2011), and Ukraine (2014).

So, the question for all the budding Force Developers here is "do I need unparalleled tactical mobility, firepower, and protection in the face of a regular adversary" or "does the nature of the adversary permit me to forego this capability to enhance my operational mobility and reduce (somewhat) my logistical trail?"

So basically this article here covers much of what you are getting at.

No, Drones Haven’t Made Tanks Obsolete

So as a budding "Force Developer" (land side... I got naval stuff cased, I'm sure I'll be promoted in no time... )the balance given the threat is off.

Proper air defence to keep UAV's at range and shield your force from easy artillery wins or flying IED's for the enemy may be the critical component here.

 

[Kirkhill]

Main battle tanks offer an unparalleled level of tactical mobility (moving around the battlefield) combined with firepower and protection. Despite sensationalist claims by "analysts" that the tank is dead and the UAV will rule the world, the proof of the enduring value of the MBT is evident in a review of conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), Gaza (2008), Syria (2011), and Ukraine (2014).

So, the question for all the budding Force Developers here is "do I need unparalleled tactical mobility, firepower, and protection in the face of a regular adversary" or "does the nature of the adversary permit me to forego this capability to enhance my operational mobility and reduce (somewhat) my logistical trail?"

Where we used to count tanks in the thousands we now count them in the 10s and 100s. The only country that can honestly talk about having thousands of tanks on hand is the US.

Russia has:

20x T14 Armata (2016)
350x T90 (1992)
450x T80 (1976)
2000x T72 (1973)

To be fair it has many more in storage. How many runners?

The world's armies aren't building Tank Armies anymore. They are deploying squadrons and regiments. 20 to 100.

Certainly tanks have their tactical uses. But does anyone see tanks dominating the way they did in WW2? Or even Gulf War 1?

And before anyone says "Israel" - the country is small and benefits from interior lines of communication. The tanks effectively shuttle around inside Fortress Israel. They are not part of an expeditionary army.

 

[Kirkhill]

So basically this article here covers much of what you are getting at.

No, Drones Haven’t Made Tanks Obsolete

So as a budding "Force Developer" (land side... I got naval stuff cased, I'm sure I'll be promoted in no time... )the balance given the threat is off.

Proper air defence to keep UAV's at range and shield your force from easy artillery wins or flying IED's for the enemy may be the critical component here.

I'll give the author of the Drone article the bad training. But not the terrain. The terrain was open country. The very country that tank commanders used to dream about. Now they seem to be arguing for the Ardennes and the Bocage as ideal tank terrain. True if in defence.

 

[Infanteer]

And you just added another "failure" in our COA. What do we bring, legitimately, and more importantly, expeditiously, to the fight?

And this gets to the heart of what I feel is a fundamental weakness of capability-based planning. Asking "how might we be threatened" can deliver a capability that can never realistically be used. A threat based planning model that asks "who is threatening us and where" forces us to realistically consider how we could fight and win with tools and structures being proposed.

Fighting it out in fake land-locked countries on a mythical continent may cut it for staff college, but it doesn't cut the mustard when considering real problems for force design.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

And you just added another "failure" in our COA. What do we bring, legitimately, and more importantly, expeditiously, to the fight?

Not tracking. Which failure?

The transit time to a theatre will simply be a planning factor. It will take the time it will take.

 

[Weinie]

When was the decision made on the EFP? When was the multinational structure hammered out? I am asking rhetorically of course. The weight of the vehicles had nothing to do with it. Moving a BG with Leopards to Europe is the same time as a BG with LAVs.

Yes - we can put an infantry company without equipment into Europe quite quickly as was done. So?

Attach files
Not tracking. Which failure?

The transit time to a theatre will simply be a planning factor. It will take the time it will take.

See Infanteer's response above. He got it