Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

That's one of the reason that made me suggest a brigade with 1 tank regiment of 2 (19 tanks) sqn and 2 inf bn with 2 x (4 x pl) coys. Same principle but bigger.

How about Bde with 1 Tank Reg't of 4 (19) tank Sqn, and 3 IFV equipped Inf Bn with 3 x 3 Rifle Platoon Coy's

You can made 3 Inf Heavy Cbt Teams - and have a Spare Tank Sqn and 3 Spare Rifle Coy

 

[Brad Sallows]

why not organize some portion, (1/3? 1/4? 1/2?) of the standing army in permanent teams.

Because as with everything else, a unit that can detach parts is preferable to cobbling a unit together from smaller elements when the larger element is needed.

 

[WLSC]

How about Bde with 1 Tank Reg't of 4 (19) tank Sqn, and 3 IFV equipped Inf Bn with 3 x 3 Rifle Platoon Coy's

You can made 3 Inf Heavy Cbt Teams - and have a Spare Tank Sqn and 3 Spare Rifle Coy

I knooow! But hey, while it might not be practical, it exercise the brain. A bit like defending bases against zombies.

Seriously, we have a good system right now and every body know’s how it work. So we have really 2 options, 1 keep what we have and built them back or do something else. All there rest is just brain gymnastics.

 

[Kirkhill]

I knooow! But hey, while it might not be practical, it exercise the brain. A bit like defending bases against zombies.

Seriously, we have a good system right now and every body know’s how it work. So we have really 2 options, 1 keep what we have and built them back or do something else. All there rest is just brain gymnastics.

OR

More dollars for training to allow young field commanders to figure out how to manage situations where the book response isn't available to them.

 

[WLSC]

OR

More dollars for training to allow young field commanders to figure out how to manage situations where the book response isn't available to them.

Before being imagiative, you need to be solid on the basics principles of the receipts. When you know we’ll your tools, imagination will come if they are encourage to do it.

 

[Kirkhill]

Before being imagiative, you need to be solid on the basics principles of the receipts. When you know we’ll your tools, imagination will come if they are encourage to do it.

I don't disagree with ensuring there is a solid base from which to work. However at some point you need to let people free and give them the opportunity to experiment. Other wise everything becomes rote and ritual. Dare I say, Russian.

 

[FJAG]

On the other hand, if the Square Combat Team is the common form of use then why not organize some portion, (1/3? 1/4? 1/2?) of the standing army in permanent teams. If we created organized 1/4 of the force in Permanent Combat Team (3 Battle Groups?) then you would still have 9 Battle Groups worth of General Duties units that could be employed in other tasks or converted to Combat Teams based on Lessons Learned.

I don't favour standing combat teams. Too rigid. The only reason the square combat team is common is because Canada doesn't think well at battalion level but it can think well at coy/cbt team level. Its a scale and limited scope thing. We need battalion commanders that can fight battalions rather than managing the company commanders to fight.

1 regt of 2, plus 2 bn of 2, equals 6 sub-units. For anyone worried about fragility, that's a pretty fragile brigade.

I instinctively favour triangular as a minimum, so 3 of 3 for total 9 sub-units. "Square" (increase) some of it, maybe, but don't shrink below that.

I too think three by three is the key simply from the point of view that it provides a two frontage and a depth/reserve element. That's always critical. One can always play with the concept if the situation demands it but from a doctrinal point of view one shouldn't amend the establishment from that.

Consider:
a one-armd-regt (square, 1x4x19 + 2 = 78 gun tanks), three-inf-bn (triangular) mixed brigade (13 sub-units)
a two-armed-regt (triangular, 14 per sub-unit, 2x3x14=84 + 2 =86 gun tanks), two-inf-bn (triangular) mixed brigade (12 sub-units)

Play them off against each other or through same set of tactical problems; see how they do. But note that the second choice adds only 8 gun tanks and leaves an entire infantry bn left over, including a huge PY difference.

I've thought about it for a long time and I've become a believer in the US combined arms battalion concept. You can still form coy cbt teams if you need to but organizationally you start with the concept that the battalion itself is designed from square one to have its own organic armour and mech infantry elements capable at being fought as a battalion without the need to regroup anything.

The differences between a 2armour/1Inf and 2Inf/1armour combined arms battalion in the brigade also gives some flexibility for deploying armour heavy or infantry heavy battalions to suit the situation or, alternatively if required, still regrouping companies. Effectively though that shouldn't be necessary often.

My own view is that our CMBGs need regrouping for 2025 with one brigade becoming heavy with the armoured regiment having two tank sqns/one LAV company/1 sp coy; two mech battalions each having 2 LAV coys/1 tank squadron/ 1sp coy and the light inf bn being converted together with the brigade's armoured recce sqn into a cavalry bn. Essentially no change in PYs, very little change in equipment (other than some TAPVs and other gear for the cavalry) but a big change in attitude. I'll accept the fourteen-tank company because we have the numbers to arm a brigade with those.

As I've previously stated many times, the two remaining brigades should reshuffle their LAVs to make a 3 LAV bn a medium brigade with its armoured regiment being pure cavalry and the second a light brigade with its armoured regt also becoming cavalry.

Just as importantly, the Managed readiness system requires either elimination or adjustment. If adjusted it should be so that the three cycles occur within each brigade so that each brigade has one high ready battalion at all times.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't favour standing combat teams. Too rigid. The only reason the square combat team is common is because Canada doesn't think well at battalion level but it can think well at coy/cbt team level. Its a scale and limited scope thing. We need battalion commanders that can fight battalions rather than managing the company commanders to fight.

I too think three by three is the key simply from the point of view that it provides a two frontage and a depth/reserve element. That's always critical. One can always play with the concept if the situation demands it but from a doctrinal point of view one shouldn't amend the establishment from that.

I've thought about it for a long time and I've become a believer in the US combined arms battalion concept. You can still form coy cbt teams if you need to but organizationally you start with the concept that the battalion itself is designed from square one to have its own organic armour and mech infantry elements capable at being fought as a battalion without the need to regroup anything.

The differences between a 2armour/1Inf and 2Inf/1armour combined arms battalion in the brigade also gives some flexibility for deploying armour heavy or infantry heavy battalions to suit the situation or, alternatively if required, still regrouping companies. Effectively though that shouldn't be necessary often.

My own view is that our CMBGs need regrouping for 2025 with one brigade becoming heavy with the armoured regiment having two tank sqns/one LAV company/1 sp coy; two mech battalions each having 2 LAV coys/1 tank squadron/ 1sp coy and the light inf bn being converted together with the brigade's armoured recce sqn into a cavalry bn. Essentially no change in PYs, very little change in equipment (other than some TAPVs and other gear for the cavalry) but a big change in attitude. I'll accept the fourteen-tank company because we have the numbers to arm a brigade with those.

As I've previously stated many times, the two remaining brigades should reshuffle their LAVs to make a 3 LAV bn a medium brigade with its armoured regiment being pure cavalry and the second a light brigade with its armoured regt also becoming cavalry.

Just as importantly, the Managed readiness system requires either elimination or adjustment. If adjusted it should be so that the three cycles occur within each brigade so that each brigade has one high ready battalion at all times.

The difference between a Permanent Square Combat Team with 19 MBT and 15 LAV and a Combined Arms Battalion with 14 MBT and 28 LAV is how much?

I am agreeing with you FJAG.

What I am saying is that with our 12 Manoeuvre Units we could easily make at least 3 of them permanent Combined Arms establishments and leave the rest of the force as unitary elements that could adapt to the situation, including making additional PSCTs or CABs.

 

[markppcli]

I don't disagree with ensuring there is a solid base from which to work. However at some point you need to let people free and give them the opportunity to experiment. Other wise everything becomes rote and ritual. Dare I say, Russian.

Have to learn the play book before you can call an audible.

 

[Kirkhill]

Have to learn the play book before you can call an audible.

Just need lots of scrimmaging.

 

[FJAG]

I've been threatening to do this for some time now so here goes with my revised Canadian Army for 2027 ('cause 2025 is almost here)

Here are the ground rules:

1. No new PYs and using existing ResF authorized strength; and

2. No new major equipment but place markers for future capabilities indicated; and

3. An assumption that organizational/legislative changes are made to enable an effective ResF element.

Major objectives:

1. Increase the number of brigade headquarters and manoeuvre battalion headquarters that are capable of deploying on peacetime rotations;

2. Increase the number of trained company level organizations that can deploy on rotations;

3. Decrease the number of PYs allocated to RegF capabilities that do not deploy frequently during peacetime;

4. Eliminating unnecessary and non deployable headquarters; and

5. Assigning RegF command authority and responsibility for ResF training and organization.


Notes:

1. All divisional headquarters and six of ten ResF headquarters have been elliminated and their RegF personnel reallocated. While 1 Cdn Div is not an Army resource, it should in name be elliminated and its staff integrated into CJOC to manage deployments. The only potential role for any divisional command elements for Canada are with one of the NATO Multinational corps. Accordingly a company size divisional HQ staff assigned to the MND-N has been included with 33 CSB in Kingston.

2. All RegF units have been broken up leaving appx 70% of the manpower with their original units/formations while the remaining 30% together with PYs from div HQs, Disbanded ResF brigades and all RSS positions have been reallocated across the entire force. so that all manoeuvre battalions have a minimum RegF strength of 30% to 70%. In total, deployabel brigade headquarters have increased for three to five and deployable manoeuvre battalion headquarters from 12 to 22. Each manoeuvre battalion (including cavalry) has at least one full-time RegF company which provides sufficient strength to train the unit's personnel. There are 31 full-time RegF deployable manoeuvre companies augmented by 37 Res F Manoeuvre companies.

3 RegF artillery and Engineer regiments generally do not deploy in peacetime and therefore have had their PYs redistributed but within their branch to support ResF regiments.

4. Company/squadron/battery structures have been reduced as follows: CS companies have been elliminated from combined arms ans LAV battalions (bn mortars and recce now fall under bn HQ); FOO batteries and STA batteries have been removed from CS artillery regiments (Fsccs/FOOs return to gun batteries, STA becomes a troop within RegtHQ. A GS medium UCAV anti-armour battery has been added to each CS regiment; Bde Engineer Regiments are reduced to two field sqns but have the brigade Sigs Sqn and a new MI compnay under command for administration. Sp/Adm coys are removed from the Bde Svc Bns - all support for the battalion comes from the remaining maintenace and supply and tpt coys. The Bde Fd Amb is attached to the Svc Bn for admin.

5. A cavalry regiment has been added to each manoeuvre brigade consisting of a recce sqn (with recce UAVs), an infantry company (with ATGMs) and a ground and light UCAV anti-armour squadron)

6. Every 100% RegF unit is fully equiped from current weapon allocations except (HIMARS and AD batteries are notional at this point)

7. All dividional support establishments are reassigned to the Cdn Army Support Group which is a non deployable, base support entity

8 Individual trg remains the primary responsibility of CADTC with much of it delivered through Depot Bns and companies located close to RegF and ResF units. Recruiting for Army personnel and all BMQ/BMOQ training shall also fall to the Depot Bns.

9. The current CSSB and two of the Res F brigades shall be restructured as two CCSBs and a Sustainment Brigade. to provide above brigade level deployable resources.

10. ResF battalions and regiments shall be reorganized as company sized entities which shall be assigned to one or another battalion within one of the various brigades. Each Bn/Regt HQ shall be responsible for sharing its existing equipment and collective training of their various RegF and ResF members albeit such training will be done at times most appropriate to the members concerned (eg. ResF training shall be primarily during summer months and on one weekend per month)

 

[GR66]

I've been threatening to do this for some time now so here goes with my revised Canadian Army for 2027 ('cause 2025 is almost here)

I look at these various ORBATS (and have posted several of my own) and more and more I'm beginning to wonder if we're missing what our politicians, public (and to some extent the war in Ukraine) are trying to tell us.

The real reason Canadian's (and by extension our politician's) support for the military is "a mile wide and an inch deep" is because realistically we face no (non-nuclear) military threat to our existence. Yes there are security threats, threats to elements of our sovereignty and threats to our national interests (both economic and political), but there are no "barbarians at our gates".

For that reason our involvement in military actions are by our choice as opposed to by need. So it's really not shocking that the appetite of Canadians for a large, expensive military in peacetime or for significant casualties in deployments is low. Canadians view the participation of the military as "providing assistance". Assisting those affected by a natural disaster/pandemic. Assisting the police with security. Assisting other countries develop their own capabilities. Assisting in securing/maintaining peace between warring parties. Assisting other countries to defend themselves against invasion. Assisting our allies to defeat an evil dictator/terrorist organization. That's not the kind of mindset the screams support for things like Armoured Brigades, Tanks, Attack Helicopters, Aircraft Carriers, Assault Ships, etc.

Something the Ukraine war seems to be telling us (and yes I'm wary of reading too much into a single conflict which has its own very particular context) is that modern war is not on the same scale as it was in WWII or was expected to be during the Cold War. Partially this is because nuclear weapons put limits on how far the major powers can be existentially threatened before reaching the threshold of nuclear war, but also because the cost of the technology of war has put limits on the size of military that a nation can afford to equip.

I think it's noteworthy that Ukraine has not asked for direct foreign military intervention in the war. They are saying they have the people they need to fight the Russians but what they need is the weapons. In particular they are looking for specific capabilities: Primarily Anti-Aircraft systems, Anti-Tank systems and Fighter aircraft to secure air superiority. They are more recently asking for tanks, AFVs and artillery. Typically unspoken is also the need for ISR assets to make all of the above more effective.

What can we take away from all of the above? By shuffling around various combinations of more or less traditional Battalions, Brigades and Divisions are we missing both what Canadians are saying they want (and are willing to pay) us to have? Are we also possibly missing what things could REALLY be of military value if we are ever directly involved in a major conflict again?

 

[KevinB]

ISR they don’t need as we have directly fed them everything they need on that front since before Day 0

All one needs to do is look carefully at the airspace over Europe.
Lots of ELINT, SIGINT, GeoSpacial, ISR etc items are providing Ukraine with more information that they can actually deal with at this time.

 

[GR66]

ISR they don’t need as we have directly fed them everything they need on that front since before Day 0

All one needs to do is look carefully at the airspace over Europe.
Lots of ELINT, SIGINT, GeoSpacial, ISR etc items are providing Ukraine with more information that they can actually deal with at this time.

That's exactly what I'm referring to. Supply of the end product of ISR assets...not necessarily the ISR assets themselves.

 

[Kirkhill]

I look at these various ORBATS (and have posted several of my own) and more and more I'm beginning to wonder if we're missing what our politicians, public (and to some extent the war in Ukraine) are trying to tell us.

The real reason Canadian's (and by extension our politician's) support for the military is "a mile wide and an inch deep" is because realistically we face no (non-nuclear) military threat to our existence. Yes there are security threats, threats to elements of our sovereignty and threats to our national interests (both economic and political), but there are no "barbarians at our gates".

For that reason our involvement in military actions are by our choice as opposed to by need. So it's really not shocking that the appetite of Canadians for a large, expensive military in peacetime or for significant casualties in deployments is low. Canadians view the participation of the military as "providing assistance". Assisting those affected by a natural disaster/pandemic. Assisting the police with security. Assisting other countries develop their own capabilities. Assisting in securing/maintaining peace between warring parties. Assisting other countries to defend themselves against invasion. Assisting our allies to defeat an evil dictator/terrorist organization. That's not the kind of mindset the screams support for things like Armoured Brigades, Tanks, Attack Helicopters, Aircraft Carriers, Assault Ships, etc.

Three thumbs up!

Something the Ukraine war seems to be telling us (and yes I'm wary of reading too much into a single conflict which has its own very particular context) is that modern war is not on the same scale as it was in WWII or was expected to be during the Cold War. Partially this is because nuclear weapons put limits on how far the major powers can be existentially threatened before reaching the threshold of nuclear war, but also because the cost of the technology of war has put limits on the size of military that a nation can afford to equip.

Yes! And yes again!

With the added observation that people and weapons move farther and faster and more precisely so fewer weapons have greater effect.

And.

It is virtually impossible to do anything without it being observed.

I think it's noteworthy that Ukraine has not asked for direct foreign military intervention in the war. They are saying they have the people they need to fight the Russians but what they need is the weapons. In particular they are looking for specific capabilities: Primarily Anti-Aircraft systems, Anti-Tank systems and Fighter aircraft to secure air superiority. They are more recently asking for tanks, AFVs and artillery. Typically unspoken is also the need for ISR assets to make all of the above more effective.

What can we take away from all of the above? By shuffling around various combinations of more or less traditional Battalions, Brigades and Divisions are we missing both what Canadians are saying they want (and are willing to pay) us to have? Are we also possibly missing what things could REALLY be of military value if we are ever directly involved in a major conflict again?

 

[Brad Sallows]

the cost of the technology of war has put limits on the size of military that a nation can afford to equip

Is that true? More complex and advanced equipment is relatively more expensive, but economies have grown.

All figures approximate and nominal.
Upper bound cost of Sherman tank in 1945: $65000
US GDP in 1945: $228B
US GDP in 2021: $22996B

GDP has increased by roughly 100 times.
If the cost of a MBT increased 100 times, it would be $6.5M. That doesn't sound too far off. I'd guess if similar comparisons were made with respect to aircraft, ships, etc, we'd find that most things are, in fact, more expensive. But capability must also be compared, and if we could somehow reduce that to a quantity, I suspect we'd find several orders of magnitude of difference.

Capability differences can be hugely influential. (Just ask anyone who is lagging in the race to climb a tech tree...)

What can we take away from all of the above?

I suppose we'd find that it is vital to have the most capable equipment, otherwise we're just wasting money on targets.

 

[Infanteer]

I think it's noteworthy that Ukraine has not asked for direct foreign military intervention in the war.

That is untrue. The Ukrainian President and other government officials have repeatedly and publically chided NATO and the West for just leaving weapons at the door, and not taking more direct forms of participation such as aerial intervention.

https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-the-tuesday-edition-1.6385827/why-zelensky-won-t-stop-pushing-for-a-no-fly-zone-according-to-his-former-adviser-1.6385830

 

[Infanteer]

Is that true? More complex and advanced equipment is relatively more expensive, but economies have grown.

I wonder what the production line time of a Sherman is vs an Abrams?

 

[Brad Sallows]

I wonder what the production line time of a Sherman is vs an Abrams?

That, too. "Quantity has a quality...". But, also, "targets". Complex...

 

[suffolkowner]

Is that true? More complex and advanced equipment is relatively more expensive, but economies have grown.

All figures approximate and nominal.
Upper bound cost of Sherman tank in 1945: $65000
US GDP in 1945: $228B
US GDP in 2021: $22996B

GDP has increased by roughly 100 times.
If the cost of a MBT increased 100 times, it would be $6.5M. That doesn't sound too far off. I'd guess if similar comparisons were made with respect to aircraft, ships, etc, we'd find that most things are, in fact, more expensive. But capability must also be compared, and if we could somehow reduce that to a quantity, I suspect we'd find several orders of magnitude of difference.

Capability differences can be hugely influential. (Just ask anyone who is lagging in the race to climb a tech tree...)



I suppose we'd find that it is vital to have the most capable equipment, otherwise we're just wasting money on targets.

The capability progress over time only matters if there is a capability difference between antagonists otherwise we are all just running as fast as we can to stay in the same place. This will be the strategic imperative going forward with respect to China especially. Can the US led west maintain its technological advantage as China and others continue to(?) grow economically?