Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

Both of you are touching on the same problem. F2025 was underwhelming at best. It's been clear since 2014 that the Army is poorly structured and inadequately equipped for all the wrong reasons.

F2025 never seemed to have sufficient buy-in within the Army for the radical change agenda needed. What's required are some serious champions with enough weight behind them, a clear vision and a sense of urgency.

 

[Kirkhill]

On the contrary, I am glad to see it's being rewritten.

The final part of any mission analysis is "Has the situation changed? If yes, start over."

Our strategic vision for the CA most definitely should change if the geopolitical conditions have changed.

Yes, but the start point of F2025 was that the CA was not structured properly for the expected threat and major large scale combat. Even the Russian invasion of Ukraine has not changed that, if anything its reinforced that. I would accept an acceleration of F2025 timelines as being a relevant change etc.
Throwing the entire thing out though indicates to me that our planning was seriously deficient if that is indeed what we are doing.

We were working on the assumption we had time to implement change. That in and of itself is a significant factor to consider if the plan is still viable.

And there is the big problem.

Time.

Not the lack of time but the amount of time it takes the Canadian Army to complete an iteration. There will always be too little time. So decisions need to be made faster. And the problem gets worse if you only prepare for one Course of Action in your organization and training. The odds are you will always be 100% ready for the wrong thing and 0% ready for the right thing.

 

[Dale Denton]

Both of you are touching on the same problem. F2025 was underwhelming at best. It's been clear since 2014 that the Army is poorly structured and inadequately equipped for all the wrong reasons.

F2025 never seemed to have sufficient buy-in within the Army for the radical change agenda needed. What's required are some serious champions with enough weight behind them, a clear vision and a sense of urgency.

I find it increasingly difficult to disagree with you.

Makes sense seeing how few people have ever even heard of Force 2025 speaks to this. If someone were to articulate a gradual plan to enact policy change in 5 year increments, it would be very easy for civilians to understand where over $20B of their GDP is going towards.

 

[KevinB]

I find it increasingly difficult to disagree with you.

Makes sense seeing how few people have ever even heard of Force 2025 speaks to this. If someone were to articulate a gradual plan to enact policy change in 5 year increments, it would be very easy for civilians to understand where over $20B of their GDP is going towards.

Civilians generally aren’t interested.

People expect their Military are ready. Most don’t believe horror stories of rust out etc until something terrible happens, then they blame the Military for allowing that to occur.

 

[markppcli]

Seems like F2025 has experienced a still birth. Non rumor rumor is that F2025 is now dead and the Army is going to develop a new plan. No disbandment of the Light Battalions is apparently going to be part of the new plan.
Glad to see our planning and follow through continues to be world class.

At this point I would like to just see a plan seen through to its end.

Oh good so we can continue to expect half manned Bns to back fill half filled schools and wonder why our training standards are dropping.

 

[quadrapiper]

Oh good so we can continue to expect half manned Bns to back fill half filled schools and wonder why our training standards are dropping.

At what point does it make more sense to close "the school" and instead deliver the training within the battalion(s)?

 

[markppcli]

At what point does it make more sense to close "the school" and instead deliver the training within the battalion(s)?

At no point should a Bn be trying to train for war while delivering base line DP 1 training.

 

[Dale Denton]

If the new SSE 2.0 is being rushed out, wouldn't it be easier to just meld F2025 to it? Or are they incompatible?

 

[Kirkhill]

When does the Canadian Army anticipate employing new technologies to reduce manning requirements?

Replacing/modifying the 1940s vintage 3 man turret on the tank.
Replacing/modifying the 1970s vintage 2 man Delco turret on all other vehicles
Downsizing crews to 2 people average
Keeping crews in the hull
Applying optionally manned technologies for front line vehicles
Applying follow the leader technologies for convoys

These are no longer revolutionary concepts. They are being fielded.

 

[markppcli]

When does the Canadian Army anticipate employing new technologies to reduce manning requirements?

Replacing/modifying the 1940s vintage 3 man turret on the tank.
Replacing/modifying the 1970s vintage 2 man Delco turret on all other vehicles
Downsizing crews to 2 people average
Keeping crews in the hull
Applying optionally manned technologies for front line vehicles
Applying follow the leader technologies for convoys

These are no longer revolutionary concepts. They are being fielded.

Plenty of modern vehicles with 2 man turrets; it’s a pro / con and everyone but the French sees the pro. Aside from you that is. I’d be curious to see a list you have of IFV / AFVs operating with a double hatted CC / Gunner ?

 

[Kirkhill]

Plenty of modern vehicles with 2 man turrets; it’s a pro / con and everyone but the French sees the pro. Aside from you that is. I’d be curious to see a list you have of IFV / AFVs operating with a double hatted CC / Gunner ?

Mark, the Canadian Forces generally suffer from a lack of manpower. You have said so yourself. Equally they have lots of vehicles that they can't man the way they want to. Something has to give.

 

[Kirkhill]

BTW

M1296 Dragoon Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com

The M1296 Dragoon is an upgraded version of the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle with significantly improved lethality. It is fitted with unmanned turret armed with a 30 mm cannon. Its official designation is Infantry Carrier Vehicle - Dragoon, or ICVD.

www.military-today.com

Which I note, while very similar to the LAV is referred to as an Armoured Personnel Carrier and not an Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

 

[markppcli]

BTW

M1296 Dragoon Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com

The M1296 Dragoon is an upgraded version of the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle with significantly improved lethality. It is fitted with unmanned turret armed with a 30 mm cannon. Its official designation is Infantry Carrier Vehicle - Dragoon, or ICVD.

www.military-today.com

Which I note, while very similar to the LAV is referred to as an Armoured Personnel Carrier and not an Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

Well far be it for me to use a legal definition from the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe as opposed to military-today.com. Additionally yes, you absolutely could have a one man show, it is possible, but that is a massive cognitive load to play on the guy in that turret. Given the authority from which you speak I’m sure your familiar which crew commanding a vehicle while engaging targets. Frankly the Dragoon arrives at a two man crew because that is what strykers, which are armed for self defence much like an m113, already have and this is a stop gap. It is not a purpose built platform. Finally the 2 man crew is disingenuous at best, while mounted the Squad Leader is the crew commander, has his own special seat and everything, he gets out and the gunner becomes the CC.

What has to give is simply the number of units we have; we aren’t gaining anything from pinch a man out of each turret. The doctrinal size of a section, plus or minus a soldier is frankly irrelevant when we’re institutionally limited to filling the Bn to less than full. And frankly I’d rather pull out the weapons dets from mechanized platoons and manning the support companies. What Force 2025 addressed, and we can argue how well it did that, was that we are mandated to X number of soldiers and yet have an establishment of X+, that’s simply not sustainable.

 

[Kirkhill]

Well far be it for me to use a legal definition from the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe as opposed to military-today.com. Additionally yes, you absolutely could have a one man show, it is possible, but that is a massive cognitive load to play on the guy in that turret. Given the authority from which you speak I’m sure your familiar which crew commanding a vehicle while engaging targets. Frankly the Dragoon arrives at a two man crew because that is what strykers, which are armed for self defence much like an m113, already have and this is a stop gap. It is not a purpose built platform. Finally the 2 man crew is disingenuous at best, while mounted the Squad Leader is the crew commander, has his own special seat and everything, he gets out and the gunner becomes the CC.

What has to give is simply the number of units we have; we aren’t gaining anything from pinch a man out of each turret. The doctrinal size of a section, plus or minus a soldier is frankly irrelevant when we’re institutionally limited to filling the Bn to less than full. And frankly I’d rather pull out the weapons dets from mechanized platoons and manning the support companies. What Force 2025 addressed, and we can argue how well it did that, was that we are mandated to X number of soldiers and yet have an establishment of X+, that’s simply not sustainable.

Fine

Actually the Stryker was purpose built. As an APC. For carting a full infantry section. The Crew Commander got an RWS with a fifty as an upgrade from the pintle mount he used to have on the Bison. The 30mm is an upgrade on the 50. And so the APC approaches the IFV from the other direction.

 

[Kirkhill]

 

[markppcli]

I said the dragoon, which you specified, wasn’t purpose built. And like I said, it crews three when it’s advancing, 2 once they kick the squad out. I’m asking a NG mechanized infantry officer if that has changed with the dragoon, no doctrine for it as of yet. Don’t know why you’re tracing a line from Bison to Stryker unless you mean in their general development? No one ever used the Bison as a section carrier, Grizzly yes. Well I suppose maybe at some point they were.

 

[markppcli]

View attachment 69955

Yes thank you I’m familiar with what they look like, I walk by them at work everyday.

 

[Kirkhill]

I said the dragoon, which you specified, wasn’t purpose built. And like I said, it crews three when it’s advancing, 2 once they kick the squad out. I’m asking a NG mechanized infantry officer if that has changed with the dragoon, no doctrine for it as of yet. Don’t know why you’re tracing a line from Bison to Stryker unless you mean in their general development? No one ever used the Bison as a section carrier, Grizzly yes. Well I suppose maybe at some point they were.

Mark, the Bison was bought as a section carrier for the Militia.

Then you lot scavenged the lot and turned them into other things.

The Bison was a WAPC - a wheeled armoured personnel carrier. It was a wheeled version of the M113 APC which also had a pintle mount for the section commander to mount his section MG on when in transit to defend the column on the move.

The AVGP Grizzly was an APC with a penetrating one man turret for self-defence that kind of looked like it might be an IFV if you looked at it cock-eyed.

 

[markppcli]

Mark, the Bison was bought as a section carrier for the Militia.

Then you lot scavenged the lot and turned them into other things.

The Bison was a WAPC - a wheeled armoured personnel carrier. It was a wheeled version of the M113 APC which also had a pintle mount for the section commander to mount his section MG on when in transit to defend the column on the move.

The AVGP Grizzly was an APC with a penetrating one man turret for self-defence that kind of looked like it might be an IFV if you looked at it cock-eyed.

Well I’m not going to argue in favour of the Grizzly, or frankly the entire AVGP family, at any point in time. I’m aware of the pintle mounts on m113s and Bisons, I’m struggling to see where you’re going here.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Well I’m not going to argue in favour of the Grizzly, or frankly the entire AVGP family, at any point in time. I’m aware of the pintle mounts on m113s and Bisons, I’m struggling to see where you’re going here.

I might be wrong, but I think the point he's making is that you can argue (regardless of gun size) that conceptually the LAV/stryker is a battle taxi with a self defense weapon (that if big enough do double duty as direct fire support) and therefore could be crewed and thought of as such rather than as IFV with the increased demands for the mobile fight.

Edit- I disagree with this. While it may be functionally irrelevant in the present, it's very relevant to mapping out a plan that works to add the capacities needed.
Ex. Say you align that X and X+ into Y, and recruitment delivers. All battalions filled with 4 vehicle 40 man platoons. But still no organic SP mortars or ATGM under armour. So back to the drawing board, to fully man the battalions we need Y+, force needs to expand, budget needs to change, more recruitment needs to happen. But, if you plan to "pinch a man out of each turret" from the outset (12 per company), that man's 4x each M1129 and M1134 at the battalion level, so that the capabilities are feasible when you reach establishment numbers

What has to give is simply the number of units we have; we aren’t gaining anything from pinch a man out of each turret. The doctrinal size of a section, plus or minus a soldier is frankly irrelevant when we’re institutionally limited to filling the Bn to less than full. And frankly I’d rather pull out the weapons dets from mechanized platoons and manning the support companies. What Force 2025 addressed, and we can argue how well it did that, was that we are mandated to X number of soldiers and yet have an establishment of X+, that’s simply not sustainable.