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Infantry of Tomorrow

Andy365 said:
This post started off about infantry of tommorrow and discussing tactics and doctrine changes that could possibly be made and has gone into talking about pers loads and equipment.   I think fundamentally this whole post is repeating the errors of command due to the fact that posters seem to be basing their ideas on the assumption that we are still fighting WW2 tactics.

I believe that before we re-write infantry tactics and doctrine we have to seriously look at what   type of war we are likely to be fighting.   Is the section/platoon/company/battalion attack (or advance to contact) even keeping with what we are seeing on the battlefields of the world?  

Well IMO, your about half right.

Yes, 80% of the infantry concepts you see on this board are still stuck in 1944, and some even in 1918. The Falklands war was fought using 1944 tactical doctrine, and assumptions.

For those who doubt me on this look at the rave reviews Gudmundsson's "Storm Troop Tactics" got. The book was about a tactical doctrine that was wholwhollyelevant, except in the broadest terms to modern operations. Yet to those wedded to 1944, it was "insightful".

The real problem is that not much real thinking is ever applied to the art and science of infantry. What there is very variable and mostly poor.
Those officers who have produced real insights into the current lack of thinking are generally not advanced and leave the army early.It's worth noting that Special Forces are not constrained by a similar lack of thought, but generally progress their thought inprivate and don't suffer interference from those senior but usually less intellectually able.

It doesn't matter who the next set of enemies are, as long as we can defeat them. The next question is can "infantry" usefully contribute to doing that and if so how.

No one in 1944 harked back to 1870.

 
Hello 48Highlander,

48Highlander said:
Erm, either you've been getting all your news from the CBC and Al-Jazeera, or you've seriously misinterpreted what's going on in Iraq.   Either way, I'd love to see you try and substantiate that claim.

In terms of substantiating this I don't have one nice package I can hand you.  However, the majority of American casualties in Iraq have been while driving (mines and remote IED's).  There have been roughly 1900 fatalities and an estimated 15,000 - 40,000 wounded (It's hard to find information on the wounded - the Americans don't appear to be releasing entirely correct information - the last official tally from about 6 months ago was around 14000 - also they don't get specific on wound types).  From the official sources approximately 70% of these casualties are from IED's and mines during troop movement.

So I hope we can agree that driving around in Iraq appears to be a very hazardous occupation.  For the past year I have been reading the 'military blog sites' that a lot of servicemen and women serving in Iraq have been posting.  The common thread among those from the infantry and other ground forces is that they are aware of the hazards of moving around so they try to minimize it.  The heavy casualties suffered in mobility operations have led to a mentality of 'never leave the camp'unless necessary.  Check out sites like the Mudville Times for blogs written by serving and returned American servicemen.  The common thread is that they stay safe by minimizing convoy and driving operations iincluding combat and reconnaissance patrols.  What I infer from this is that a guerrilla (or terrorist) army has severely reduced mobility of the combat arms in Iraq by very simple means.  They inflict casualties on Americans looking for them without ever exposing themselves.

This type of information doesn't seem to be released by the official sources.  I don't use CBC or 'Al-Jazeera' for this information, however I do read them for another point of view.  Would you suggest we should believe CNN or Fox news for official information?  They like to release the success stories and shy away from anything else.  I think for this best information on what is going on you have to look at multiple sources and try to read between all the extremes to try and get a glimmer of the true nature of what is going on.  Possibly I am misinterpreting some of this but there is too much information that points to the Americans still attempting to operate their ground forces in manner more suitable to defeating another army rather then breaking a 'guerrilla army'

Anyway, back to this thread.  My point was that the Americans attempting to use their mechanized and mobile infantry concepts have run into serious problems in the war in Iraq.  If a small, poorly equipped force can reduce your mobility and instill this much fear into your ground troops then what you are doing should be seriously reconsidered.  What I was trying to suggest was that if we want to form a more effective infantry we have to look at what is going on in the world and try to ascertain what type of battle we are going to possible be fighting and look at ways to accomplish this.

Now excluding all the political factors involved in Iraq for a moment it would seem that the Americans need to do something drastic to create an effective 'Infantry of today', let alone an 'infantry of tomorrow'.  If warfare against guerrillas is to be the fight of today then what is required is serious mobility (i.e. heliborne) and outstanding iintelligencegathering sources so the enemy can actually be hit.  I think the American have proven both in Iraq and Vietnam that they don't really understand or are prepared for this type of war (not pretending that I do either, but I do see a problem).

So what are your sources for what is going on in Iraq?  I would actually like to know if you have something good.

Andy
 
Joint Service Guy said:
For those who doubt me on this look at the rave reviews Gudmundsson's "Storm Troop Tactics" got. The book was about a tactical doctrine that was wholwhollyelevant, except in the broadest terms to modern operations. Yet to those wedded to 1944, it was "insightful".

I liked it for the fact that it explained how tactical evolution and initiative was forced down to lower and lower levels and how combined arms at lower levels would succeed - readings of the Canadian Corps seems to indicate the same.  Besides, some authors have concluded that today's combat is not much different than 1944 or even 1917 - you are facing guys with mortars, machineguns, and bombs who are liable to entrench themselves (whether it be in a trench, a cave, or a mosque) to avoid your mortars, machineguns, and bombs.  The variables between 1917 and now seem to be dispersion and lethality (which are tied together).  Sound plausible?

Anyways, from what you've posted, I assume that you've got a substantial background in the subject matter, so I'm curious as to where we are missing out (at least 80% of the time) on the true art and science of the Infantry.  If you are unable to go into detail here, can you at least point us to some literature (online or otherwise) that you would consider worth looking at?

Cheers,
Infanteer
 
Infanteer said:
I liked it for the fact that it explained how tactical evolution and initiative was forced down to lower and lower levels and how combined arms at lower levels would succeed - readings of the Canadian Corps seems to indicate the same.   Besides, some authors have concluded that today's combat is not much different than 1944 or even 1917 - you are facing guys with mortars, machineguns, and bombs who are liable to entrench themselves (whether it be in a trench, a cave, or a mosque) to avoid your mortars, machineguns, and bombs.   The variables between 1917 and now seem to be dispersion and lethality (which are tied together).   Sound plausible?

Anyways, from what you've posted, I assume that you've got a substantial background in the subject matter, so I'm curious as to where we are missing out (at least 80% of the time) on the true art and science of the Infantry.   If you are unable to go into detail here, can you at least point us to some literature (online or otherwise) that you would consider worth looking at?

Cheers,
Infanteer

Many thanks for the book link. I have a budget of about $1,000 a year to spend on books and am having considerable difficulty spending it, so this was a very welcome find.

Well I wouldn't call myself an expert, but I do seem to have asked questions that a lot of serving officers and force developers seem not to want to ask, and I have collected a great deal of subject matter data and material - and read it, and where possible questioned the authors.

I can't share my professional work at this stage, for obvious reasons, but I am more than happy to share some very simple insights, that some may find useful, and already be aware of.

1. A lot of core assumptions about infantry are wrong, misunderstood or illogical. Budgets and politics have had more impact on infantry than what we know works on operations.

2. Infantry are those who fight on foot. This is relevant to the tactical level of combat and infantry are part of the combined arms team. The capabilities of combined arms have a direct impact on how useful infantry can be.
EG:
If supporting fires can deliver a 200lb warhead to an accuracy of >10m CEP, when requested and cued, then usefulness of infantry, is vastly increased - or - had they been available, a small number of Apache attack helicopters would have negated the need for the majority of infantry attacks conducted in the Falklands in 1982. AH-64 did in fact enter service in 1984, so not that far fetched.

3. Sensors and communications impact far more than weapons technology, on current infantry capabilities.

4. Infantry are far more constrained by human psychological factors than we realise. There is simply no substitute for getting the right men.

I'm sure most of this is not new to most of you, but I never claimed to be that smart. :)
 
Catching up on this long and informitative thread. I have some questions that expand on indeas already briefly touched on.


Infanteer said:
Just looking at that soldier reminds me of an article on a USMC high-technology exercise in an Urban environment - the article was titled "They died looking at their monitors".  Apparently, there was a high amount of soldiers being picked off while they were dicking around with whatever input device they had.

With the ongoing reduction of the sizes of electronic devices* there are numerous possibilities that the Infantry of Tomorrow might carry. There is though little change in the amount of "task loading" that a human being can do. As Infanteer pointed out looking at a screen means not looking around. The question then is at what level do you consider that these electronic devices could be used? Each soldier, one per fireteam, by a sensor-scout team attached to a platoon or by a sensor-scout team attached to a company?

*: Devices being of a size that a sensor/visual enhancer/targetting could carried in one or two hands without a tripod or assembling parts that are carried by two more persons. Like something you could poke out of cover to get a view leaving yourself under cover.

 
You will enjoy the book - MOUNTAINS of qualitative and quantative data and evidence to support his assertion; plus, well written to boot.

As for your points, they do all make sense - I guess it is a matter of how you approach them.  I feel we have broached them (in some manner) on various threads in these forums (I know for a fact that I've discussed them with A Majoor).

Start a thread on a key concept you feel is lacking in the profession - none of us are really smart here, but I think we all have "heretic" written across our pack-order in some way.  ;)

Cheers,
Infanteer
 
Somebody more knowledgeable and with a better memory than me can possibly substantiate this.

I seem to recally reading an article in the past year or so, possibly in National Defence Magazine, where the US Marines, who have long  stuck with the triangle formation, 13 man squad an lots of integral support at pl, coy and bn levels, were looking at reorganizing themselves into 8 man sections with 2  4 man patrols.  The rationale was the dispersed nature of the battlefield, the ability to communicate, the prospect (not necessarily the reality) of effective supporting fire being available from distant systems (eg GMRLS with 200 lb unitary warhead, >70 km range and <5m CEP) and the relative scarcity of engageable targets.  It is now relatively easy to engage and defeat the types of formations envisaged when planning involved Kursk in the Fulda Gap.  Gulf War I proved that and Gulf War II's run to Baghdad confirmed it.  Net effect:  nobody's going to cluster together in mass formations ever again, any more than infantry is going to stand in brightly coloured coats with "shoot here" crossbelts acting as aiming points.

That goes to your point about dispersion and lethality Infanteer.

This is by way of supporting JSGs observation that the primary role of the section will be patrolling.

Its primary function, something that I have been hammering away at, is to supply a governmental, authoritarian, presence in a hostile environment where the principal enemy is thugs with guns and a plan.

In that environment stability is best served not by having a massive fortress outside the city, containing a brigade ready to destroy an army that is never likely to show up.  It is best served by a section of  troops billeted on each city block in a hardened apartment.

I also seem to recall reading that British Battalions in Kosovo split themselves into 3 elements - a Warrior based QRF located outside of town, an armoured landrover element that conducted regular patrols inside town - like a heavily armed police force in cruisers, and a dismounted element that was billeted in the community supplying a constant presence.  The billeted element was dispersed as individual bricks (4-man) located in high rise apartments  as I recall.

Soldiers rotated amongst the three types of duty.

The future looks likely to be Northern Ireland and the strategic corporal.  At least the foreseeable future.  Despite all the posturing over Taiwan I don't think even the Chinese want a stand-up fight with the Americans, even while they are engaged in Iraq.  Otherwise they would not have been threatening to bring out the nukes if the Americans use their PGMs against them.  And an invasion fleet is an even simpler prospect than an army - fewer targets, larger targets, higher value, greater losses.

As a_majoor has suggested - the CQ should have a large array of weapons in the company lock up with the troops trained to use them.  The soldier, the infanteer, may be lightly armed, possibly even "unarmed" except for 48th's MkI Eyeball and the PRR, and get the job done that the govenment requires.

Edit: Honest JSG - I was writing this at the same time that you were -  Maybe Shirley Maclean is channeling here ;D
 
Joint Service Guy said:
Many thanks for the book link. I have a budget of about $1,000 a year to spend on books and am having considerable difficulty spending it, so this was a very welcome find.
yeah, he's a litttle too good at that sort of thing. I've got a considerably smaller book budget, and he keeps doing this crap to me.

had they been available, a small number of Apache attack helicopters would have negated the need for the majority of infantry attacks conducted in the Falklands in 1982. AH-64 did in fact enter service in 1984, so not that far fetched.
this does cause some interesting thoughts, doesn't it?

4. Infantry are far more constrained by human psychological factors than we realise. There is simply no substitute for getting the right men.
so true. Yet we are negating this as fast as possible in the continual watering-down of our training standards. We seem to have developed a mentality that technology will compensate for poor training. As case in point I offer the search to find ways to make soldiers shoot more accurately via gewgaws, gadgets, and gizmos, rather than by simply having soldiers shoot more often.
 
paracowboy said:
Yet we are negating this as fast as possible in the continual watering-down of our training standards. We seem to have developed a mentality that technology will compensate for poor training. As case in point I offer the search to find ways to make soldiers shoot more accurately via gewgaws, gadgets, and gizmos, rather than by simply having soldiers shoot more often.

I couldn't agree more.  I got out in 98 and even then they were starting all these silly 'range' simulators as opposed to live ammunition training.  Other then a fun 'game' I never understood or saw the usefulness of it (other then possibly fiscal savings).

I somehow doubt that the Iraqi 'insurgents' have a computer driven simulator to practice planting car bombs.

On the otherhand I think there is a strong argument for computers in terms of sensors, surveillance and communication (s mentioned previously)so long as they don't interfere or totally take up the focus of the troops involved.

I think in this day and age useful information or intelligence, available immediately and from multiple sources is key both on and off the battlefield - and methods of supplying this to the ground troops would be very useful.

Andy

 
Kirkhill said:
This is by way of supporting JSGs observation that the primary role of the section will be patrolling.


Edit: Honest JSG - I was writing this at the same time that you were -  Maybe Shirley Maclean is channeling here ;D

Oh good. You're as dumb as I am! ;)

yeah, you got it. Dismounted patrolling is it. If you take that on board, then it has profound implication for every aspect of current infantry training, equipment, organsiation and doctrine.

...stand by one! I hear the sacred heard approaching at speed. Contact! Wait out! :D
 
Infanteer said:
Start a thread on a key concept you feel is lacking in the profession - none of us are really smart here, but I think we all have "heretic" written across our pack-order in some way.   ;)


http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/33669.0.html
 
Andy365 said:
On the otherhand I think there is a strong argument for computers in terms of sensors, surveillance and communication (s mentioned previously)so long as they don't interfere or totally take up the focus of the troops involved.

I think in this day and age useful information or intelligence, available immediately and from multiple sources is key both on and off the battlefield - and methods of supplying this to the ground troops would be very useful.
abso-tively. Just seeing the way that Personal Role Radios, and Unmanned Air revolutionized how we played in Kabul made me a believer.

On the other hand: If you load a mudfoot down with a lot of gadgets he has to watch somebody a lot more simply equipped - say with a stone axe - will sneak up and bash his head in while he is trying to read a Vernier. - Robert Heinlein
 
Joint Service Guy said:
No one in 1944 harked back to 1870.

They would have if they had not learned the hard lessons in the Great War, and ran refresher courses at Dieppe, Sicily, and various points in Italy and Africa.
 
Andy365 said:
....they were starting all these silly 'range' simulators as opposed to live ammunition training.   Other then a fun 'game' I never understood or saw the usefulness of it (other then possibly fiscal savings).

I would argue that simulation is as effective as conventional ranges or what is usually scripted live fire unconventional ranges.  The figure 11 never resists much.

Col Grossman in "On Killing" also agrees with the value of computer simulation, and warns us of the folly of training our youth to be effective killers via 1st person shooter video games.  Psychologically speaking the brain makes little differentiation between live rounds, blank rounds, or flashes of pixels.[/quote]

I somehow doubt that the Iraqi 'insurgents' have a computer driven simulator to practice planting car bombs.

If they did, maybe they would stop having ND's on route. 

Simulation is about all we have for training.  The key is to do it lots, particularly at the soldier level.  There are many paths to the end result as long as in the infantry context we have a soldier in the end that can react and fight instinctively
 
I keep circling back to this post both here and in "Towards a true Light Infantry", because the concept is not only proven, but also works without the big helping of electronic and computerized tools that excite so many people (yes, even me.) http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/23394/post-152788.html#msg152788

Reviewing the posts in this thread, we have veered off from alternative ORBATS and tactics somewhat; and are trying to layer on new kit without seeing the changes needed to make this work to the maximum effect. Visualize Pickett's charge with the Confederate soldiers carrying AK-47s instead of muskets advancing into the teeth of Union soldiers armed with M-16s....

Although there are some conceptual systems like "metalstorm" or the smart grenades of the OCIW project which could change the firepower equation of the infantryman, the biggest factor has to be getting enough boots on the ground to get an effective eyes on the AOR and either identify and eliminate the bad guys in person (like the unit described above), or vector in sufficient firepower to do the deed. Even with science fiction weaponry, you can't shoot what you can't see, and you certainly can't shoot around corners or through buildings on your own.

If we accept the organization and training of the 173rd Long Range Surveillance Detachment as a model for the Infantry, then we also have to make some adjustments for using them in mounted roles. APC or IFVs need to be large enough to take a full section, or many more smaller vehicles are needed to carry individual assault groups. Since the soldiers of the 173rd are not used in conventional shock assault tactics, maybe the fighting vehicle can also be radically changed. Rather than using it as a DF platform to shoot in the attack, it might be armed with a 60mm mortar that the crew fires on direction of the dismounted soldiers, or perhaps something like a scaled down FOG-M to blast bunkers that accurate rifle fire cannot reduce. Platoon or Company Zulu harbours could be formed to make "fire bases", or the vehicles could stay one or two bounds behind the infantry section to provide fire support, shelter from enemy heavy weapons or dart forward to pick up injured personnel and prisoners.

This model should also work to tie the Infantry back together, rather than continue the acramonious debate about Light Infantry vs Dragoons. Using the 173rd as the model, all infantry are "Light", and mechanized tactics are built around light TTPs instead of separate TTPs.

Some late night ramblings



 
Andy365 said:
Now excluding all the political factors involved in Iraq for a moment ....

Quite possibly the Americans are trying this too.  Speaking from a heavily biased infantry standpoint I would not be too quick to say that the infantry needs to be rethought due to results in Iraq.  I think it follows that unsound strategy will eventually trump sound tactics.  By definition (terrorist  "¢ noun a person who uses violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims. Oxford) terrorism is seeking political aims for example a change in government, and possibly as important, not necessarily military aims such as seizing or holding ground.  Excluding infantry factors for a moment we may want to consider 1944 again.  If anyone has the figure I would be interested to know how many casualties the Germans suffered in France between 1940 and 1944 as a result of the resistance.  We should be able to guess the number of allied casualties at the hands of French insurgents after the liberation.

My guess is that the infantry of tomorrow will look much like the infantry of today.  We should strive and expect to see farther, move faster and shoot better than we do now.  If we can carry less weight and more ammo than that would be a good thing. 



 
Using the 173rd as the model, all infantry are "Light", and mechanized tactics are built around light TTPs instead of separate TTPs.

No surprises I'm with a_majoor here.

Andy365 made a comment about mobility.  I agree with the mobility aspect.  I disagree with the heliborne aspect.  It seems to me that there have been a large number of helicopters downed.  I understood that helicopters survived by using terrain.  If you are working on flat land with no trees it seems likely difficult to find cover to exploit.  Even in urban areas there are seemingly problems flying Nap of the Earth.  Surely those are among some of the lessons of "Blackhawk Down"?

On the other hand the mobility that the Malaysian Wheeled APCs supplied, similar to but less capable than the Strykers, was more appropriate and more effective than the Blackhawks or the Hummers.

That suggests to me, as to others, that vehicles should be built around the section, not the other way about.  Vehicles can be built for specific environments - helos, APCs, Snowmobiles, Amphibs, boats even, but their primary purpose is to deliver infanteers with the kit they need.  They will continue to do their work on foot.

Vehicle mounted patrols and vehicle mounted fire support, where nobody gets out of the vehicles is surely the province of Cavalry - tanks, jeeps, LAVs, helicopters are all used by Cavalry - is it possible to envisage a boat mounted Cavalry?

Another characteristic of where we seem to be headed is permanent garrisons overseas.  However instead of friendly Germans the locals are likely to be less welcoming.  Such garrisons need to be defended and usually that means that a large proportion of the inhabitants end up watching walls and gates and potentially responding to intrusions.

Is it possible that the Army might learn something from the Navy?  Could the Army apply the Combat Information Centre concept?  The FELEX programme being discussed on this board has posted drawings of what the revised Frigates are supposed to look like.  The CIC or Operations room only has seats for 13 people.  Those people, as I understand it, get information from 2 sonars, 4 radars, a helicopter, crew members, other ships in the area as well as aircraft and satellites.  They are capable of deploying torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, various calibres of guns, recce assets, and even boarding parties without leaving their chairs. 

Are garrisons likely to be more like the Frigate or even a modern office building, with a small number of duty personnel, a large number of screens and sensors and various fixed and mobile, unmanned weapons systems?

Why does this matter? Because if the fixed and wired garrison/fire base becomes a reality, and it can supply an umbrella of support and observation out 70 km? 100 km? from a CIC with 1 or 2 dozen people on duty then that frees up bodies from the walls to be out in the area doing foot patrols, small unit assaults and temporary OPs.  At the same time the Cavalry is responsible for roving patrols and hasty or expedient fire support.

One group that I would see greatly affected by this, more than any other combat arm, is the artillery.  The artillery used to be comprised of Garrison, Field (infantry support) and Horse (cavalry support).  There may be a move back towards that split but .... how many gunners will be needed in each specialty?  It doesn't look like many from where I sit.  Garrison Artillery is likely to get competition from the Engineers for that job if wired in autocannons, machine guns, mortars, missiles become the standard.  Horse artillery - is angle of elevation sufficient reason to separate fire support?  Even FOOs for infantry and cavalry seem endangered if everybody is netted in and capable of giving a GRIT via a Blackberry.  This effectively leaves the Artillerist as a specialist in Planning and Coordinating fire support.

Anywho - wandered a bit out of lane but I wanted to point out that all other specialties are functions of their technology.  The infanteer's job, regardless of technology, is essentially unchanged.

It is not "close with and destroy the enemy".  That is but one task for an infanteer.  The real task for the infanteer is to close with the population and exert authority.  Destroying the enemy may be part of that job.

If the populace, including the enemy, knows that a press of a button can result in grievous harm, then the individual with the finger on the button will be granted control of the situation, even if she is other wise unarmed.
 
Kirkhill said:
The soldier, the infanteer, may be lightly armed, possibly even "unarmed" except for 48th's MkI Eyeball and the PRR, and get the job done that the govenment requires.
This is effectively employing the infantry as observers along the lines of UNMOs.  I believe this should be seen as an army job (as a opposed to one shared by army, navy, and airforce), but I don't think it should be defined as an infantry job any more than it should become a CIMIC or MP job.  It is a unique job that requires an understanding of ground warfare, security consciousness, the ability to negotiate, and the ability to interact with and determine the pulse of the local community(ies).  Infantry should be able to do this job if given the training, but I see the small end of the infantry roll being the Pl houses and armed section to half-section presence patrols.
 
MCG said:
This is effectively employing the infantry as observers along the lines of UNMOs.   I believe this should be seen as an army job (as a opposed to one shared by army, navy, and airforce), but I don't think it should be defined as an infantry job any more than it should become a CIMIC or MP job.   It is a unique job that requires an understanding of ground warfare, security consciousness, the ability to negotiate, and the ability to interact with and determine the pulse of the local community(ies).   Infantry should be able to do this job if given the training, but I see the small end of the infantry roll being the Pl houses and armed section to half-section presence patrols.

Actually I don't disagree McG.  I was just characterizing the logical conclusion (some might say the logical absurdity) of the infanteers role as the threat level in a theatre decreases and technological capabilities increase.  We've worked our way down from Infantry Corps and Divisions to Infantry Sections and Half-Sections.  Actually by the time we get down to Unarmed Eyeballs and Radio, I'd go one step further and suggest that the theatre is ready, even past ready to hand off to local civvy police.    If she needs help she can call.

I guess I just don't see a "small end" to the infantry.  The infanteer is likely to get stuck doing just about anything, regardless of whether they are experts in the field.
 
Kirkhill said:
... Actually by the time we get down to Unarmed Eyeballs and Radio, I'd go one step further and suggest that the theatre is ready, even past ready to hand off to local civvy police.

That is pretty much what happened with Op Palladium, except due to specific requirements of Dayton NATO, and the EU, the mission was taken over by the EU.  Essentially, MK1, MK1A (corrective lenses) and MK2 (laser surgery) eyeballs are the wpn of choice.
 
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