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Inf Cbt Sp - Which Capability is MOST needed again (split from CASW)

daftandbarmy said:
Who needs battle drills when you've got a bunch of smart and networked kids around that can rapidly develop and act on an effective COA without having to resort to automatically trying to bludgeon something to death by frontal first (my natural tendency) which may be the wrong COA.

So, regardless of what weapons they'll use, IMHO they'll be more inclined to work across silos to employ them to their best effect, which may mean that fewer numbers won't be as much of an issue. Kind of like the German Blitzkrieg of 1940: fewer troops, some inferior kit, but better teamwork, flexibility and initiative.

Hmm.  This organic networked approach would require a number of substantial changes to military culture.  First off, a hierarchical structure would stunt this kind of thinking / decision making.  Secondly, we would have to move away from being command-centric and staff -enabled (not that we have uniformly achieved that yet).  Thirdly, we would have to accept both dramatic decentralization of decision-making and reinvent our current thirst for "SA".

Not saying that it is not possible - indeed your proposal sounds like swarm-thinking, but we are a looong way from being ready for this kind of a cultural shift.  We still haven't mastered mission command, and it has been twenty years....
 
What's wrong with bludgeoning something to death?

Define "a bunch of smart and networked kids...that can rapidly develop and act on an effective COA"?  What does that mean - in real terms - for the 24-year old platoon commander sitting in an irrigation ditch in Afghanistan getting shot at who has everyone looking at him to do something.

Buzzwords sound nice, but we've got a system that has worked since about 1915-ish and still works today.
 
Ideally that 24 year old PL can instantly access up to date aerial imagery of the battlespace.  Request and direct IDF and other enablers through an intuitive interface that leverages GPS and geomatic support vice estimating the enemy grid and then push out some simple orders via overlay to disparate elements in the form of a quick sketch on the image of where he needs the sections etc to be and what effects to achieve.

To the section commander this should mean rapid and clear communication of commander's intent without having to move in for orders as well as an idea of where the other sections are for his own analysis of battlefield geometry,

For the soldier it means guaranteed voice comms with his section and the ability to access more detailed information in those cases when he is required to act independently.


Conceptually in any case...
 
Well, there is nothing wrong with that, provided you can furnish said capability without:

1.  Turning the soldier into a walking battery carrier; and

2.  Distract the soldier from shoot, move and communicate and the leader from find, fix and destroy.  If they can't do this because the PDA is loading up, then they're better off without it.

And, in the end, there is still a need to bludgeon something to death here.
 
Infanteer said:
And, in the end, there is still a need to bludgeon something to death here.
I thought we were supposed to be building bicycle repair shops?  >:D
 
Infanteer said:
Well, there is nothing wrong with that, provided you can furnish said capability without:

1.  Turning the soldier into a walking battery carrier; and

2.  Distract the soldier from shoot, move and communicate and the leader from find, fix and destroy.  If they can't do this because the PDA is loading up, then they're better off without it.

And, in the end, there is still a need to bludgeon something to death here.

I agree unequivocally.  The interface for ISSP combined with power management are going to be key and that's not even getting into the comms backbone and COMSEC issues.
 
Some of what Spinaker proposes can be applied easily if the platoon has powerful weapons systems right at platoon level. Currently you can get a massive amount of supressive fire, including limited bunker busting and light anti armour fire from the LAVs. A near to mid future platoon could attack or neutralize enemy fortifications and AFV's with advanced anti armour weapons (ones like Gill/Spike can keep the man in the loop and utilize the missile's flight characteristics and operator's ability to access sensor data to deliver plunging fire against defiladed targets). A heavily modified company TO&E might allow weapons like the C-16 to be brought into the fight as well. If everything is already at hand, then the "shoot communicate and move" as well as the "find, fix and destroy" can be done "in house".

The promise of the military RMA was to shorten the sensor/shooter loop, and provide everyone hooked up with the ability to "see" the battlefield, although everyone seems determined to get in the loop and add/modify content before the soldier on the ground can use it. The GARMIN RINO is still conceptually the best model of what a hand held communication unit should be; cheap, simple and easy to use. You have the map on your screen at all times; your location via GPS and "Blue SA" whenever anyone on your net comes on the air; a symbol appears at their location on the map. (When you say "Contact; Wait out" everyone will know where you were when the contact started, and can start looking to their planning and COAs based on that). Small, smart devices like that *may* allieviate the battery situation somewhat, and there are also alternatives to conventional batteries that can be investigated (such as miniature fuel cells or even engines that take advantge of the high energy density of hydrocarbon fuels. Super capacitors might also have advantages over batteries in terms of energy storage).

The more I look at this the more it seems the changes need to come from the bottom and work up rather than be imposed from the top down.
 
Something as simple that I can double tap a map grid and tap contact on a PDA around my wrist would be perfect.  If I can use a draw tool to rip off a scheme of maneuver that can be sent quickly would be a bonus.  FOO/JTAC getting all of this into their PDAs and we're golden.
 
Or we acknowledge that fighting a second tier enemy in an unforgiving land (no, I'm not talking AStan - 4th tier and unforgiving) with no tactical infrastructure, air superiority vice supremacy, and a credible (if all you have is Carl Gs) armour threat is on our horizon, and we all run out to buy china graph markers....
 
PPCLI Guy said:
Or we acknowledge that fighting a second tier enemy in an unforgiving land (no, I'm not talking AStan - 4th tier and unforgiving) with no tactical infrastructure, air superiority vice supremacy, and a credible (if all you have is Carl Gs) armour threat is on our horizon, and we all run out to buy china graph markers....

:o 

But that's not transformation - that's sooooo 20th century!!!
 
I'm pretty sure that the 13th century felt (and smelled) an awful lot like the 8th.

Wait til you have been around long enough to take the long view....like say Journeyman.
 
Journeyman - an evolution in military affairs....
 
While all those networked sensors and enablers are all good, I think some are glossing over the manner of "intuitiveness" that must exist throughout the networked entities within the battle pace to make this work. Not that today's young energetic combat arms and combat support officers don't have initiative and vigor, but the formulation of all the info the exists in that vey battlespace into a workable plan (of course, they skipped over the COA development step because they're so good and intuitive) is a major undertaking. I have not seen as a matter of course (and I've seen a fair number of this youth in the very planning environment) spontaneously develop the eyewatering plan.  Yes, there is some benefit of today's young officer's familiarity with networked social and technical systems, those are but tools, not the heart of the one's ability to quickly and appropriately deduce the best way to attack a problem and achieve success.  That takes two sides: mentoring by the more experienced, and the "absorptive" protégé-like mind set to learn lessons at an optimal rate.

A few more cents.
G2G
 
Spinaker said:
Ideally....
[edit]
Conceptually in any case...
I think that about covers it.


In reality, yes, the young troops are more net-centric, but primarily in that they spend an inordinate amount of time online texting and blogging. From what I've seen, this has not produced a generation -- or even a sprinkling -- of intuitive Clausewitzes, (or even a Miyamoto Musashi, if you prefer).

To go further with what PPCLI Guy said about mission command, if anything this wonderful enabling technology has set mission command back, in that it potentially facilitates micro-management from on-high. Sadly, human nature causes us to be comfortable with our previous rank/position because of the time spent developing those competencies. While certainly not denigrating all leadership here, I have witnessed "tinkering" by Pred-fed leadership telling a platoon not to bunch up, as but one example. ::) 
I don't believe that our military culture is ready to scrap ATOC and AOC in favour of networked intuition.

One doesn't have to take a long view of military history and technological development to be skeptical of this Star Wars solution. Drop by any military school that's using JCATS, and you'll see that even with a program predisposed to let us win (eg - in most conventional scenarios you have to practically beg the T-72s to open fire on us), young officers with a god-like view of the battlespace still produce flawed plans.*
If this is what our best and brightest can do, then networked intuition will remain a masturbatory fantasy of the Tech Staff DS for the foreseeable future.


Curmudgeonly enough?  :)



* If I were cynical, instead of JCATS, I'd point to the birthing pains of the C-16 and the wizards who believe it's man-portable to cast doubt upon miraculous technical solutions. Just as well I'm not cynical  ;) 
 
Infanteer said:
Well, there is nothing wrong with that, provided you can furnish said capability without:

1.  Turning the soldier into a walking battery carrier; and

2.  Distract the soldier from shoot, move and communicate and the leader from find, fix and destroy.  If they can't do this because the PDA is loading up, then they're better off without it.

And, in the end, there is still a need to bludgeon something to death here.

Like I tell my soldiers at the Armouries:

Technology is wonderful. We can program a GPS and it will get us to the door of our objective....but YOU have to kick then f**kini door in and do the business....not the GPS. Bludgeoning works well.
 
So, back to capabilities, what would work best for helping soldiers to bludgeon the enemy?


I hate to sound like a dinosaur, but the idea of a battalion with integral combat support assets is probably the answer.  The question remains: what capability?

If we think of "shoot - move - communicate" as the essence of what infantrymen need to do, let's have a look at the gaps.

For communicate, we have a signal platoon.  They help with the technical pieces required: radios, etc, without taking away the need to grab someone by the collar and say "follow me!"

For move, we have a transport platoon, along with integral vehicles in the mechanised battalions.  Yes, they help with the long moves, but in the end, you have to get out, ruck up and walk.  If we encounter obstacles, however, we currently need engineers.  We used to have pioneers, but they are gone.  I argue that the engineers have better things to do than to be parceled out to us infantry for such things as basic search, breaching, etc.

For shoot, we have a variety of weapons, but with some stark limitations.  We have no integral indirect fire (aka "Mortar Platoon") and we have virtually no means to take on any enemy armour of any kind.  We used to be able to outrange armoured foes (aka "Anti-Armour Platoon"), but since we aren't facing the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany anymore, I suppose that someone decided we didn't need them anymore.

(Oddly enough, TOW missiles were used against the hideaway of Saddam Hussien's sons when they nailed them).

So, which is most needed?  I guess it depends on whom you ask.  If you ask me, we need them all equally: pioneers, anti-armour (which is flexible enough to provide long range heavy direct fire support) and mortars.  Of course, there is a price in PYs, but, I do have a solution in working.  (I'm still polishing it, and it'll be a while)

:salute:

 
Of course, we could always chop an engineer troop, a LEO squadron, and a FOO with his own battery to the battalion...
 
PPCLI Guy said:
Of course, we could always chop an engineer troop, a LEO squadron, and a FOO with his own battery to the battalion...

1.  What happens if the Brigade Commander needs that elsewhere?  "ConPlan Afghanistan" may not always be available.

2.  A Leo Sqn isn't always the best option for an anti-tank capability.
 
You either equip yourself for the fight, or fight the fight you are equipped for....
 
Infanteer said:
1.  What happens if the Brigade Commander needs that elsewhere?  "ConPlan Afghanistan" may not always be available.

2.  A Leo Sqn isn't always the best option for an anti-tank capability.

Canadian Leo Squadron 19 MBT - US Tank Company 14 MBT - US Cavalry Troop 9 MBT and 13 Bradleys

Could you not chop a half squadron to a CCV company?  Or split the Battery into a pair of Troops?  Or the Brigade Commander does less because he has fewer assets?

Or what PPCLI Guy said....
 
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