Inf Cbt Sp - Which Capability is MOST needed again (split from CASW)

[McG]

... “Hy DFS Pl” ...

... an anti-tank platoon could also be "re-named" as an "anti-material" platoon, or something.

How about "Expeditionary Broad-spectrum effects platoon" ??

I like "Destroyer Platoon" but that might sound too much like one of the mission verbs.

 

[ArmyRick]

I am liking this thread as a former Mortarman and TOW gunner, I figured i would throw in my 2.4567 cents.

For TOW, yes we (Oops we could get Javelin) but TOW still has longer range (current HEAT rounds reach 4 KM) and there is also a bunker buster round, which the yanks have used very well (Could have come in handy for destroying grape huts?)

I think there is a limited mind set amongst our top officer corps (regardless of where they came from). That mindset being if you need a direct fire support assett with HE or HEAT capability, the default thinking is Tank. But, a LAV TUA can fire a bunker buster with nasty effect.

We think indirect fire and the default thought is M777 155mm Gun, where as 81mm is handy and fast. It may not have the devasting effect of 155mm but man, the speed of it is awesome and you can get aot of rounds on target quickly with a good crew. i watched a youtube video of british infantry breaking up a taliban attack quickly using 81mm mortars. Nuff said? Oh on another note, in very steep mountainous terrain, mortars with a very high angle of fire are very effective!

Pioneers and Combat Engineers. I don't have as much first hand expirience because I am not a pioneer. However, if the battalions had their pioneer platoons i beleive we could reduce the burden on sappers.

So My thoughts are, if we bring back the old combat support capabilities, it is in this priority
1. Anti-Armour (TOW or javelin). If our infantry fight tanks (even old ones) in some dingy future mission, man we are going to need those weapons.
2. Mortar. Their simple, effective and right at the BN comd fingertips. Not sitting around for local defence of medium Guns.
3. Pioneers. I list this as the lowest priority simply because I feel Anti-Armour or mortars are more important.

Does anybody know if the british or australians still have Pioneers?

 

[Loachman]

How about "Expeditionary Broad-spectrum effects platoon" ??

You left out "Net-Centric".

 

[SeaKingTacco]

For TOW, yes we have Javelin but TOW still has longer range (current HEAT rounds reach 4 KM) and there is also a bunker buster round, which the yanks have used very well (Could have come in handy for destroying grape huts?)

When did we buy Javelin?

 

[Towards_the_gap]

The brits do still have pioneer platoons, at least as of 2007 they did, as well as having RLC Pioneers (think GD's and local security for service battalions). The pioneers are/were trained at the Royal School of Military Engineering by RE instructors and therefore did take some of the burden off the sappers, and could when necessary boost the sapper troop numbers when required.

 

[OldSolduer]

The brits do still have pioneer platoons, at least as of 2007 they did, as well as having RLC Pioneers (think GD's and local security for service battalions). The pioneers are/were trained at the Royal School of Military Engineering by RE instructors and therefore did take some of the burden off the sappers, and could when necessary boost the sapper troop numbers when required.

As I recall our Pioneers used to attend Bridge Camp and the Mortars would attend Gun Camp with the guns. The FOOs apparently liked Mortars because of the quick response time when a Fire Mission was ordered.

 

[ArmyRick]

Oops. I didn't proof read again. I know we don't have javelin (although it was a contender in the ALAWS project years ago). I meant to say we have TOW and maybe someday we could get Javelin or a similar system.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

As I recall our Pioneers used to attend Bridge Camp and the Mortars would attend Gun Camp with the guns. The FOOs apparently liked Mortars because of the quick response time when a Fire Mission was ordered.

My old Pl 2IC was a mortar guy with 1 RCR when they still had them... went over to Somalia with them as well.  He told me inf mortar pl had a different procedure then the guns did.

 

[Journeyman]

... inf mortar pl had a different procedure then the guns did.

Accurate and timely response?  :stirpot:                            ;D

 

[Old Sweat]

As I recall, the mortar line used different procedures than the guns, but the calls for fire and all the rest of the fire orders were standardized. FOOs and FCs were able to fire both successfully, and that is all that counts.

 

[a_majoor]

I am seeing WWI analogies that apply in various threads (the CASW one too); people might start believing I served then as well....

In this case the WWI analogy would have to go to Brigadier General Brutinel (Quoted in the The Rise, Fall, & Rebirth of The 'Emma Gees' (Part 2))

"In 1917 the British Army in France was seriously considering reducing the size of the machine gun companies to provide more troops for the infantry battalions. Brutinel was asked to express his views to a meeting of corps and divisional commanders. He said:

'of course this proposal is tantamount to loosing firepower of a great many men so as to add men to do the fatigue work. What would you think of a manufacturer who, being short of hands to clean windows decided to stop his great machines so as to relieve men for that purpose? The policy of reducing machine guns would not remedy the shortage of men in infantry brigades, but would undoubtedly lower their firepower. Instead the number of machine guns should be increased proportionately to maintain, if not improve, their firepower.'

So the real answer is to reduce the size of the Rifle Companies and divert the manpower in the Combat Support Company (or whatever the evolved name becomes). The idea of a Heavy Weapons platoon or company in the Light Battalions should also be taken seriously, and manning sent there as a first priority. This also tracks with some modern ideas which put firepower as the first priority; Infanteer posted some articles from Australia a while back which suggested 2/3 to 3/4 of the attacking force acts as the firebase while the remainder is the actual assaulting element. I believe the USMC has similar views of how to conduct a deliberate assault. Stacking the deck with integral DF and IF firepower supports this notion, and pioneer troops will be needed to ensure the integral weapons can get to and from the battlezone and provide cover and concealment for the deployed systems.

Reserve augmentees are the primary means of filling the files in a rifle company, and accelerating courses out of the schools can also provide a "surge" of manpower if needed. Eliminating large numbers of Headquarters positions would free up PYs to increase the numbers of riflemen, but that's just crazy talk....

 

[GnyHwy]

Firstly,  I am not opposed to the Inf getting the 81s back and can appreciate the need for the Btln Comd to have his organic assets.  Although I also believe each Arty Regt is quite capable of standing up 8 tubes in the close support role.  Air mobile for sure.  Airborne remains to be seen.

Trying not to get off topic but, I feel the need to re butt and clarify a few points since my last post.  In sequence.

Why give the UAV to the arty? Why not Armour?

I never understood the though process behind this line of thinking, anyways this is just a quick question before heading to work. More to follow later.

The simple answer is keeping the sensor to shooter link short.  The UAVs are searching in depth and in defilade and the Arty has the resources, training and liason with the shooters capable of prosecuting those targets quickly.  As always, UAV information, at whatever level (there is an Arty guy at each and every level), is being processed by Ops and Int and is sent out in Contact Reports, Sitreps, Intsums and Intreps to those who need them.

The arty has enough career paths with survey, tech, Met, AV (remote planes), driver, comms, advance tech, advanced survey, master gnr, and they had heavy track.[/

Really have to clarify this one and is coloured coded accordingly.  These are hardly career paths.  They are more like jobs and can be grouped as such. Same job and no longer exists.. Same path.. This is an Airforce trade..You can add sound ranging and counter mortar to this area although each are specialized.. These are just Jr jobs. No longer exists.. This has been available to all Army trades since about 2000 I believe, and is now called the Army Technical Warrent Officer Program (ATWOP).

Lastly, you forgot the FOO/FAC path which is argueably the most extensive.

3 streams total.  Guns, STA and FOO/FAC/FSCC.

The FOOs apparently liked Mortars because of the quick response time when a Fire Mission was ordered.

I think this is somewhat of a myth.  I would welcome a race with anyone.  I'll take 105s or even 155s and race them against 81s at a range of 3000m.  Race criteria, time from target ID to effective rounds on target.  Time of flight and first round accuracy will greatly influence this. If I lost, I think the time would be negligible and my effects would certainly be greater.


To get back on topic.  I agree and also  think the Infantry needs all of the above as well but, for each and every Btln to have it all seems very unrealistic.  I think the answer is the ability to detach/attach sub-units.  Just a simple ex. from my tiny little brain.  1st Btln, heavier and more static systems, 2nd Btln medium and the 3rd a truly light Btln with only man portable weapons.  When the Bde is tasked to provide a BG they will mix and match accordingly. 

 

[Infanteer]

Good discussion; although I know we've hashed over it before and I've heard the CLS say we won't see this anytime soon, it is still good to talk things out once in a while for the sake of our napkin armies.

I've linked William Owen's Universal Soldier article before, and I'll do it again here:

http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/Owen_Universal_Infantry.pdf

The argument for getting rid of specialist platoons because we don't use their capabilities all the time is silly.  I think back to my tour of Afghanistan where my battalion deployed 10 platoons (9 Rifle and Recce) - it would have been great to have the old Cbt Spt Coy platoons, even if they left the heavy stuff at home, to take jobs like BG QRF, escort, etc, etc to free up the Rifle Platoons.

It doesn't help to get myopically focused on what should be Universal Infantry - Cbt Spt Coy should have 3 Infantry Platoons that do "recce", "direct fire spt" and "indirect fire spt" if required, but are Infantry Platoons as well (I'd venture that we can place Pioneering skillsets into the Coys vice dedicating a platoon).

The real crux is the point PPCLI Guy pointed out earlier and others have alluded to with the bureaucratic management of PYs.  Part of this is pure small-p politics ("we need to shuffle this or that, so you give me some") while some is a hangover of Kandahar-itis, where we saw the huge growth of "enablers" whose growth may not have matched their value.  What's more, Kandahar-itis got us conditioned to a third-rate insurgent who couldn't really interfere with our operations, allowing us to have big, static bases and a relatively routine operational tempo (patrol, patrol, TIC, patrol, IED, patrol, patrol, TIC).  I sure hope all these ASICs and network-enabled headquarters with fully-JIMP integrated J35-2s can man the trenches when we fight a real enemy....

For a perfect example, take the PRT, an organization who's role and contribution needs to be seriously assessed.  When, in 2010, it coughed up its rifle company to the Battle Group (giving it 4), the ability of the Battle Group to aggressively patrol some seriously contested AOs was dramatically improved.  The loss - the ability to get out and look at some pumps that would likely have never been replaced.  My opinion, and others are free to agree or disagree, but we put ourselves in a serious conundrum when we cough up core PYs for fancy add ons.

PS.  I'll conclude that giving up PYs for CSS Revitalization is, in my opinion, a far more serious undertaking - I'd rather have enough truckers and storeman to keep me fed than Pioneer platoon.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

PS.  I'll conclude that giving up PYs for CSS Revitalization is, in my opinion, a far more serious undertaking - I'd rather have enough truckers and storeman to keep me fed than Pioneer platoon.

On this point we agree, despite my unabashed love of Pioneers.  Even with the inject of 700 odd PYs, we will still not have a sustainable sustainment base.  Mind you, the move from 4+1=5 to 2+1=3 as the basis of our Managed Readiness calculus will help somewhat.

In the rest of your post, you hit the nail on the head - we are investing in enablers without any critical analysis on their utility beyond the very narrow and specific campaign in the AStan theatre.

Our force packaging and performance in the next theatre of ops will be telling.  I have a sinking feeling that we will immediately dust off "Conplan AStan", irrespective of the mission, roles, tasks, or, dare I say it, the enemy.  If we find ourselves on a Chapter 7 mission in the Sudan(s), or in a "stability op" in the Congo, or even  COIN in Yemen, we will be tied to TI and unable to have the sort of effect that will be required - but at least we can console ourselves with the fact that we will have the Mother of all ASICs...

 

[Journeyman]

....we will have the Mother of all ASICs

Notwithstanding OC ASIC's main effort being outflanking the J2 in order to get face time with c/s 9, and six month rotos/HLTA precluding the development of any great competence, especially amongst the HUMINT people and analysts in general....but those are separate rants discussions.

 

[Towards_the_gap]

Our force packaging and performance in the next theatre of ops will be telling.  I have a sinking feeling that we will immediately dust off "Conplan AStan", irrespective of the mission, roles, tasks, or, dare I say it, the enemy.  If we find ourselves on a Chapter 7 mission in the Sudan(s), or in a "stability op" in the Congo, or even  COIN in Yemen, we will be tied to TI and unable to have the sort of effect that will be required - but at least we can console ourselves with the fact that we will have the Mother of all ASICs...

Agree, and I find the whole idea that is pushed from above of 'Afghanistan is over, we need to be ready to do xxxxx' sounding dangerously like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Some very valuable and hard lessons have been learned over the last decade, lessons which we may need more than what some of the cold war warriors at the helm may think. Also, as you say, being tied to TI, FP is now seemingly as much as a priority as the mission itself.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

we may need more than what some of the cold war warriors at the helm may think.

I am curious about these cold war warriors - it is an expression I often hear. 

Are you referring to the CDS, with his experience as DComd of an American Corps in Iraq?  Comd CEFCOM, who has been on the AStan file for some 5 years?  Commander of the Army with his experience as a Bde Comd in AStan and a Deputy Corps Comd in Iraq?  The Assistant CLS, who has Afghanistan experience? The current crop of Area Comds or Brigade Comds, all of whom have AStan experience?  Surely it is not the COs, many of whom are decorated veterans of multiple AStan tours? Surely it is not the RSMs at all levels who have multiple tours in theatre?  Coy / Sqn Comds and their C/SSMs who mostly cut their teeth on ops?

Who exactly are the "cold war warriors at the helm"?

 

[Good2Golf]

Agree, and I find the whole idea that is pushed from above of 'Afghanistan is over, we need to be ready to do xxxxx' sounding dangerously like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Some very valuable and hard lessons have been learned over the last decade, lessons which we may need more than what some of the cold war warriors at the helm may think. Also, as you say, being tied to TI, FP is now seemingly as much as a priority as the mission itself.

I'm not seeing that attitude (i.e. moving on at the cost of failing to distil and capture the essence of lessons from AFG ops, if I have interpreted your quote above correctly) when CLS and other GOs talk with young junior officers.  I see the case made for acknowledgement of past efforts and in the future the need to strike a balance between core combat and enabling capabilities, the balance for which will vary from potential theatre/AO to theatre/AO.  I certainly don't see any "circle the horses, this is how best to protect the future Fulda Gap."

Regards
G2G

 

[Danjanou]

As I recall, the mortar line used different procedures than the guns, but the calls for fire and all the rest of the fire orders were standardized. FOOs and FCs were able to fire both successfully, and that is all that counts.

Yup which was why I remember during the work up training to REFORGER (back in those days when we were practicing to circle the wagons in the Fulda Gap….. sorry couldn't resist  8)) the Bde Mortar Platoons went up to Graf and trained with 1 RCHA rather than stay with the Bns in Hugey.

The resurrection of the Combat Support Company, Weapons Coy, Mission Effects Company…. whatever the frig some Crackberry Col in Disneyland on the Rideau decides to call it needs to happen. As noted one benefit is a career progression for all the 031's who for whatever reason are not going up in rank., want to remain in ther Bn but could use a break from the line rifle company.

More importantly as noted elsewhere by infanteer it also adds a 4th ( maybe a 5th if we ever get his camel's nose under the tent, next step is resurrecting the 4th rifle coy) to the Bn. They're still riflemen first, Mortar types, TOW operators, pioneers second.

In any future relatively low level COIN type op such as Afghanistan where the enemy doesn't have MBTs etc the CSS can operate as pure infantry. It's been done in the past by Infantry Bns in such places as Rhodesia, Indonesia and Northern Ireland where boots on the ground were needed more than big guns. Should the situation change and the airborne feces hit the rotary air circulation device, they'll have still brought their toys with thejm and can quickly and easily revert to their main role.

 

[vonGarvin]

Who exactly are the "cold war warriors at the helm"?

He could be talking about me:

Though the helm I know control is but a tiny fraction of the army's effort, I did join the army at the height of the Cold War, and within weeks of me transferring to the Regular Force, Gorbachev must have been informed, because he got Honecker to finally tear down that wall.  >