[17] The asserted governmental interest at issue in the Act
is to prevent “fraudulent claims” about receipt of military
honors, such claims causing “damage the reputation and
meaning of such decorations and medals.” Stolen Valor Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2(1), 120 Stat. at 3266; see
also 151 Cong. Rec. S12684-01, S12688-99 (2005) (statement
of Sen. Conrad). The government argues that the referenced
interest is important to motivating our military. Especially at
a time in which our nation is engaged in the longest war in its
history, Congress certainly has an interest, even a compelling
interest, in preserving the integrity of its system of honoring
our military men and women for their service and, at times,
their sacrifice.
[18] However, the government has not proven here that the
speech restriction is a narrowly tailored means of achieving
that noble interest. In Brown v. Hartlage, the Supreme Court
explained, . . .
[20] In sum, honoring and motivating our troops are doubtless
important governmental interests, but we fail to see how
the Act is necessary to achieving either aim. Accordingly, we
hold that the Act is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. As presently drafted, the Act is
facially invalid under the First Amendment, and was unconstitutionally
applied to make a criminal out of a man who was
proven to be nothing more than a liar, without more.15
We have no doubt that society would be better off if Alvarez
would stop spreading worthless, ridiculous, and offensive
untruths. But, given our historical skepticism of permitting the
government to police the line between truth and falsity, and
between valuable speech and drivel, we presumptively protect
all speech, including false statements, in order that clearly
protected speech may flower in the shelter of the First
Amendment. The government has not rebutted that presumption
here because the Act is not sufficiently analogous to traditional
permissible restrictions on false speech.
CONCLUSION
In order to advance Congress’s praiseworthy efforts to stop
fraudulent claims about having received Congressionally
authorized military honors, the government would have us
extend inapposite case law to create an unprecedented exception
to First Amendment guarantees. We decline to follow
such a course, and hold that the Act lacks the elements that
would make it analogous to the other restrictions on false
speech previously held to be proscribable without constitutional
problem. Accordingly, we hold that the Act is not narrowly
drawn to achieve a compelling governmental interest,
and is unconstitutional.
REVERSED. The case is REMANDED to the district court
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.