Happy "Fall Gelb" day

[vonGarvin]

10 May, 1940, 70 years ago today (the date of posting this message), the German Armed Forces ended the so-called Sitzkrieg and invaded France, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg.  Less than six weeks later, France was knocked out of the war in what many erroneously attribute to failure on their part, vice success on the part of the Germans.


In spite of being outnumbered in the air and facing superior and more numerous tanks, the Germans were able to take their all-arms or combined-arms force and destroy their opponents.  Success in the end could be attributed to one man: Erich von Manstein.  He was the lead planner for this operation, and he sold it to Hitler.  In essence, the Germans opened the attack with that which they knew the Allies would be looking for: a grandiose attack up north, through Holland.  The allies countered by rushing forward their mobile striking forces in order to stop this invasion head on and eventually force the Germans back into their Fatherland. 

So, Army Group “B” attacked into Holland, looking much like the “hard, right hook” that was expected.  German paras landed all across Holland, and in a spectacular move, took out the Belgian fortress at Eben Emael.  Meanwhile, as Army Group “C” maintained contact with the Maginot Line (the fortress was too impressive for the Germans to attack, so they let it be), Army Group “B”, complete with several Panzer Divisions, including Rommel’s soon-to-be nicknamed “Ghost” Division, plowed through the Ardennes Forest, breaching it in less than six days.  This Army Group, consisting of five armies, was opposed by only one French Army (the ninth).  Army Group “B”, on the other hand, was opposed by the BEF, the Belgian Army and two French Armies. 

The situation was such that the German had, by the 11th day, reached the English Channel and effectively trapped the BEF, the Belgian Army and one of the two French Armies originally opposing Army Group “B”.  The French and British counter attacked both sides of the German thrust of Army Group “A”, but these were often poorly coordinated and had unrealistic ambitions.  In the end, the inertia of the German thrust was too much to stop, and soon the Germans had achieved success beyond even their most optimistic expectations.  By the 4th of June, Dunkirk had been evacuated in Operation DYNAMO, and the Wehrmacht was free to finish off France.  Though they still faced a powerful foe, the French were no longer in the fight, having seen the best of their army cut off and destroyed with their backs against the sea.

In the end, the Wehrmacht achieved in six short weeks, with less than 50,000 dead, what the millions of dead and four years of fighting had failed to achieve some 20 years previous: Armed Germans marching in Paris:

 

[Old Sweat]

One might argue, and it may be a difficult point to make, that the offensive in the West doomed the Germans to defeat. It certainly was not at all obvious at the time, and there were those in high places in the British government who were prepared to make peace after Dunkirk. However, the attacks resulted in the Germans occupying the Low Countries and much of France, thus taking considerable naval, land and air forces out of the running for the attack on the Soviet Union. And this attack, I suggest, was the real reason for the attack on Poland in the first place.

On a more parochial note, the campaign had unfortunately shown that the Royal Artillery's organizations and doctrine were hoplessly ineffective. (The organizations had been designed by a civilian "whiz kid" at the request of the Defence Minister, while the doctrine was left over from the Great War.) Post Dunkirk the RA went to an organization that worked out to a field battery per infantry battalion, and because each gun troop had an officer to be the FOO, and the gun end was well-organized, this left the battery commanders with little to do. Someone got the bright idea of sending them to liaise with the battalion commanders - this had not been done in the Great War and after - and the practice caught on. Now fire plans became closely tied to the tactical plans of the supported arms, and the rest, as they say, is history.

 

[vonGarvin]

One might argue, and it may be a difficult point to make, that the offensive in the West doomed the Germans to defeat. It certainly was not at all obvious at the time, and there were those in high places in the British government who were prepared to make peace after Dunkirk. However, the attacks resulted in the Germans occupying the Low Countries and much of France, thus taking considerable naval, land and air forces out of the running for the attack on the Soviet Union. And this attack, I suggest, was the real reason for the attack on Poland in the first place.

I would tend to agree.  After all, the Germans didn't want war in the West, but rather in the East.  Not only were troops tied down in Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and most of France, but also fighting the Brits in Crete and in Africa.  Had der Führer been able to get one more miracle out of the Allies by them not attacking for Poland ("next time, we mean it!"), I'm fairly certain that the attack on the USSR would have taken place in 1940, and the forces it would have faced would  have been even less prepared than they were in 1941.  So, yeah, I agree, unless the Germans decided to truly put their entire war effort into defeating the UK (which they never really did), then the conditions in July 1940, though looking favourable for Germany, were probably in the roots of its downfall.

 

[mariomike]

Interesting posts.
One has to wonder what if Germany had put Russia out of the war? I am sure no one one either side had forgotten the near-catastrophe that followed the Bolshevik's negotiated peace with Germany in 1917.

 

[OpieRWestmrR]

I am sure no one one either side had forgotten the near-catastrophe that followed the Bolshevik's negotiated peace with Germany in 1917.

Germany did indeed put Russia out of the war, on 24 August 1939, in the preparation for Fall Gelb. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact didn't just partition Poland, it allowed Nazi Germany to attack in the west with virtually its entire air and land strength - a much greater proportion than the Kaiser's army was able to field for its Schlieffen caper. The commercial elements of the pact fed Soviet petroleum and other essential strategic materials into German stockpiles in exchange for German manufacturing technology. Until Barbarossa German planes flew on (60%) Russian gas.

I agree with OS. Fall Gelb was a tactical triumph which bought Nazi Germany some time at great strategic cost. Gelb and Weserubung committed Nazi Germany to occupying four neutral nations and guarding their Atlantic coastlines. The armed forces of Nazi Germany didn't have the equipment or technique to invade or significantly subdue Great Britain and remove the Second Front threat completely.

I've always thought Operation Michael of 1918 bears a remarkable resemblance to the 'Battle of the Bulge'. Last minute accession of German strength, tension between British and French allies leaving a weak spot to exploit, and Germany seizing the opportunity out of sheer bloody-mindedness without an attainable objective. Then came 8 August and 100 days of hurt - another disaster in the long run. 

 

[vonGarvin]

70 years ago today, the order for Operation DYNAMO was issued.  The BEF was saved from continental Europe, allowing it to return four years later as GOLD and SWORD.


The fate of the British Empire, and indeed the fate of the Second World War was being decided, not in France or in Belgium, but in the UK itself, in the so-called
"War Cabinet Crisis".

In May 1940, the fate of the world, the future of an empire, and the destiny of a nation rested with two men; Winston S. Churchill, the newly appointed British Prime Minister and Edward Wood 3rd Viscount Halifax, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Both of these men passionately believed in saving Britain from the military nightmare they been placed in by Nazi Germany. However their approaches to achieving this were radically different. Halifax believed that it might be possible to secure a peace treaty with Germany that would safeguard British independence as well as its imperial interests. On the other hand, Churchill believed that German dictator Adolf Hitler would only honour such a treaty whilst it served his own interests. Instead Churchill favoured a continuation of the conflict at all costs until final victory was secured.

Interesting times, indeed!