Future Armour

[Lance Wiebe]

Back to the mortar idea.

Yup, they've been around for a few years.  What is new is the fact that they can be placed in turrets and used in the direct fire role, which is not something mortars are supposed to be good at.  Also new, is the ammunition and FCS that make all of this possible.  The fact that mortars launch their pumpkins at something slower than the slowest direct fire gun out there makes life just a tad difficult for the designers. but almost all of the problems have been solved, apparently.  Direct fire out to 1,000 meters or so, then indirect out to 10,000 meter or so.  Combine this with a direct fire tank, and you have the makings of a lethal fire team.

Now to guns jamming.  There are solutions out there, and you guys know it.  The Brits, and others, use a 7.62 chain gun, just to get away from the stoppage issue.  Jams still do happen, I know, but very rarely.  An autoloader has been developed for the L55 120 mm that unloads as well as loads.  I don't know how fast it is, though.

Tracks and such have also drastically improved since the days of the Sherman.

Having said all that, there is maintenance that has to be done that cannot be done by two men.  Heck, if security is required, a troop of four tanks and eight men will get nothing done.  That was one of the concerns we had when we were working on the ALFCS project.  I think we had them convinced to stay with a three man crew, but when your talking to engineers who have never had to change a flat tire, let alone do any maintenance on their cars, then it's tough to convince anyone.

I truly believe that the next generation tank will have, at most, a three man crew, and France or someone else will develop one with a two man crew.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

You question about why a crew commander could not do it all on his own if pilots can is indeed a good one.  I was pondering it myself before posting in the first place.  Not being a pilot it is hard for me to compare the two.  I'll leave aside maintenance and hide security measurses for now.

At the risk of swimming well outside my lane and depth, I would venture that in a fighter jet the pilot:

  a.  does not have to describe the "route" to someone driving the plane (he is doing it himself so the decision/action cycle is instant)

  b.  he has highly automated weapons (most are "guided"), and in the past had fairly straight forward weapons that blasted straight ahead (I suppose at a converged point).

I'd be interested in some pilot perspectives here!  I could certainly be out to lunch.

A crew commander has to navigate for the driver.  I suppose you could have nav aids for the driver (we do with TACNAV), but at the same I've been unimpressed watching LAVs obviously driving on TACNAV bearings and not using the ground.  Could the crew commander and the driver be the same person in a tank?  My gut says no, but when we do get hover tanks ( ) it may be a necessity.

A tank's weapons do not have the same level of automation and I would argue that detection of the enemy is harder.  "Radar" is not as effective down in the weeds against ground targets (especially stationary ones).

Fratricide is also a big issue down in the weeds, since IFF technology is harder to apply.  This also makes automated weapons a little riskier to employ (I still hate the idea of those Netfires missiles trolling around up there looking for hard targets to blow up).

In simple terms we have the driver manoeuvring the tank while the gunner acquires and engages targets.  The commander assists/oversees with both tasks while ensuring that one helps the other.  I'll risk a tangent and say that Canadian gunnery doctrine unnecessarily minimized the role of the gunner until quite late in the game.  It was also only with the C2 that we finally trusted the gunner to correct sabot, thus freeing up the commander look for the next target.  We also introducted gunner-initiated fire orders.

You could try to have a crew of two (driver and a gunner), and this would be kind of like an AH 64 I suppose.  You could even try to have the "driver" be the commander if you gave him some extra sights etc.  I guess the default would be to have the gunner as the commander.

Having commanded and gunned on one live fire attack I was not happy.  My gunner had broken his arm the day before and we did not have a replacement.  As a commander you need to stay back a little and not get focused-in (that leads to fratricide/tunnel vision and other problems).  My gunner was highly skilled and I usually let him find targets and conduct the shoot (I would still give the executive).  This let me do my job as BC or Tp Ldr as well as crew commander. If the guys in labcoats can make a system that lets me touch a spot on the screen and then kills that spot then perhaps it could work. 

A two man crew might work for a vehicle that is not expected to maneouvre and engages targets in a predetermined area from an appointed position.  I don't see it working in fluid situations.

I still want a loader because I am skeptical of auto-loaders and it is good to have an extra set of eyes looking around.  Heck, lets give him a good sight and MG of his own to help acquire targets.  A good crew could have three MGs blasting at the same time if the situation warranted it.  A loader could also help manage the situational awareness systems being pushed into tanks.  Perhaps there is also the morale support of having a "crew" in the tank.

Back to hatches, I admit that there is an emotional attachment to being able to survey the world and have the wind blowing in my face and dust in my goggles.  Being "hatches down" is always a pain.  I lived this on Ex ROYAL FIST where we conducted three weeks of night operations (dry and live).  Most of my time was spent looking through the sight, although for maneouvring I still went up top.  What I really needed was some NVGs with high zoom.  I suppose we could have "virtual hatch" using cameras and a screen (FCS tech nightmare).  If my hatch is the weak point in the top armour then perhaps this can be something that we live with.

Back to mortars, I got a tour of the LAV-120mm mortar back in Knox.  Neat system.  I see it as a "super-Cougar."

Cheers,

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

Actually the best argument that you, George and Lance bring out, IMHO, is the complexity of the third dimension.  It seems to me that a pilot in an aircraft can feel a lot more secure relying on radar, either his/her own or that of AWACS or Ground Stations to give a useful degree of Situational Awareness out to a fairly long horizon.  It appears as if it is actually quite difficult to sneak up on a modern aircraft operating in a well monitored environment. - Again I am well outside my lane here, but I am in most things anyway.

By contrast it seems relatively" easier for  a helicopter, vehicle or infanteer to get within range of a tank simply by virtue of being able to use ground effectively.

Having said that I still think it is a mistake to rely assume that "human sensors" (Mk1 Eyes, Ears and Noses) often degraded by environment or by dwindling "power supply" is always a better compromise than a good suite of electronic sensors.

Think what is possible - admittedly in the realm of the hover tank but perhaps not so far off.

360 degree, spherical field of view, presented on 2 to 3 screens vs 90 to 120 degree by 15 to 30  degree field of view presented on 1 "screen"
Multi-spectral vision that can see at night, through sand, fog and smoke and potentially through walls (already in advanced development) - all integratable into a unified image - vs Day vision only
The ability to "see" heat at long range vs "feel" heat only at close range
The ability to hear and localize sounds precisely and rapidly and filter out unnecessary and interfering sounds vs range limited and degraded hearing that is often over ridden by extraneous sounds like engine noise.

Finally, your comment about "automatic" weapons is exceptionally well taken.  I have made a career out of pointing out to people that it is much harder to train people to operate manual plants well than it is to train operators of automated plants.  There are, without doubt, those operators that can operate many plants or pieces of kit better than an automated system.  Such people are worth their weight in gold and are a godsend to an engineer trying to figure out how to automate a plant.  However the combination of innate talent, training, experience (ie a large number of expensive mistakes committed in the past) and the ability to learn makes those people an exceedingly expensive and rare proposition.

Automation shifts the costs from operations to capital.  It also increases the need for skilled maintenance people, but even that can be mitigated by modularity and self-diagnostics.  While iautomation may even in some circumstances degrade top-end performance in the hands of a skilled operator, it generally raises overall performance in the hands of "average" operators and also (generally) results in more consistent performance easing planning considerations.  That is to say that a commander or supervisor has a more realistic appreciation of what the kit and crew can do (not the standard of the best tank in the unit but the average tank in the unit) but also that there is less difference between the performance of the average crew and the worst crew.

All of this is expensive right enough and it means fewer vehicles (platforms) and fewer crew for other duties but these are exactly the gordian knots being cut by the Air Force and the Navy.  Ships and aircraft, including helicopters, like vehicles, are actually quite cheap.  Its all the kit inside that makes them expensive.  On the other hand people are more expensive.

In 1982 a barebones Grizzly cost about 300,000 CAD.  In 2002 a LAV/Stryker cost more like 3,000,000 CAD
A large container ship costs 80,000,000 USD to build currently while a small Frigate is approaching 500,000,000 CAD to build
A simple helicopterr like the Griffon costs 5,000,000 USD while an Apache or Cormorant are more like 30,000,000 USD

Scale and inflation are not the big factors here - bigger does not necessarily mean more expensive.  Automation and capability is the difference.  As you appreciate.

Having said that I don't like plants that can't be run without the automation - I like to plan for the day that the computer craps out (usually at 02:00 my time or Friday at 17:00 just before a long weekend).  Having a hand crankable turret and autoloader seem to make eminent sense for the day the power dies.

Anyway, random thoughts.

Cheers

 

[DG-41]

Having said that I still think it is a mistake to rely assume that "human sensors" (Mk1 Eyes, Ears and Noses) often degraded by environment or by dwindling "power supply" is always a better compromise than a good suite of electronic sensors.

Ever notice that modern fighters have protruding "bubble" canopies that provide maximum exterior vision? Even with all the fancy electronic sensoria, fighter pilots still rely heavily on the ol Mk I eyeball.

You've hit on something when you mention that aircraft have engagement limits out to the horizon (and beyond) - when you are operating clear of the ground, you have no terrain (aside from perhaps cloud) to impede vision/sensors/weapons fire. It makes target aquistion/determination a much easier job.

Tanks don't have that luxury. They are connected to mother earth. They *might* have vision out to the horizon if the terrain is right, but the typical engagement distance is more like 1000m or less.

But perhaps the biggest difference between tanks and aircraft (given that helicopters start to blur the distiction between being connected to terrain and not) is that aircraft can usually (and in fact are required to) disengage from the enemy at will. If the situation gets too hot, or is otherwise made untenable, an aircraft can open the throttles and run for home. Tanks cannot, as they are required to hold ground for the large part, and may prove unable to disengage for the small part (too slow, got stuck, etc)

So a tank needs to carry some of its supply and maintainence crew with it, where an aircraft (which MUST return to base after every sortie) can leave those behind.

DG 

 

[Kirkhill]

The comment about bubble canopies is fair. They have been in service since the P-51 Mustang came off the assembly line.  Concurrent with the Sherman.

Interestingly the FB-117 and B-2 don't have the same all round visuals - compromised due to stealth requirements no doubt, and unlike the B-52 they have no one in the back to "Check Six".  How do they maintain "Situational Awareness"?

I don't like these vehicle designs that are being promulgated that use "Virtual Reality" helmets where the human is completely isolated from the external environment.  Ability to "see" and influence the real world directly is always necessary.  Thus I agree with the bubble canopy - if it doesn't compromise other design elements like speed, stealth or protection.  As I said, even in an auto-turret I would want to keep the ability to fight the system manually - if it doesn't entail making design choices that would degrade performance under optimum conditions.

As to the comment about running for home versus holding ground.  Surely that is a doctrinal issue?  Troops on the ground that lose air cover are every bit as vulnerable as troops on the ground that lose armoured support.  But are they any better served by an aircraft that flies but can't engage the enemy than a tank that can still move but whose turret is non-functional?  Can't it be argued that having an NS tank in the area, particularly one that could move out of the area under its own power, actually increases the burden on the troops being supported as they now have to concentrate some effort on defending the tank and its crew?

As to being unable to disengage.  Point taken.  But then you are not much use to the supported force or your mates either, are you?  This all assumes a weapon's system failure of course.

If you can still fire, but not manoeuvre, then you can effectively hold ground until your pill box runs out of ammunition or is penetrated.

 

[DG-41]

Interestingly the FB-117 and B-2 don't have the same all round visuals - compromised due to stealth requirements no doubt, and unlike the B-52 they have no one in the back to "Check Six".  How do they maintain "Situational Awareness"?

They don't have to - different mission requirements (they are all bombers) Fly to target as quickly as possible, drop bomb, fuck off. They have little to no defensive armament, and rely on speed/stealth/altitude (low or high)/friendly air cover for self protection.

Any aircraft whose mission requires it to fight in place (usually) has a bubble canopy to give the pilot maximum visibility. Even in an arena where electronic sensors are highly effective and where target acquisition and identification are (relatively) easy, the design of the vehicle is purposely adapted to the needs of the eyeball.

As I said, even in an auto-turret I would want to keep the ability to fight the system manually - if it doesn't entail making design choices that would degrade performance under optimum conditions.

Well that's just the point - that the typical 3-man turret provides a very good balance between weapon systems reliability, situational awareness, and fighting power. The value-add from eliminating the loader and making the turret smaller is questionable at best.

As to the comment about running for home versus holding ground.  Surely that is a doctrinal issue?

No amount of doctrine will keep an aircraft aloft if it has run out of fuel.....

But an unfueled tank is not entirely out of action, and can be brought fully back into action by refueling it in situ.

Troops on the ground that lose air cover are every bit as vulnerable as troops on the ground that lose armoured support.

Yes, but it is the nature of aircraft that they MUST return to base periodically - and with a short period. Any given aircraft only has a couple of hours of loiter capability, and then it MUST go home - where it can be refueled, rearmed, and repaired. Maintaining air cover is a function more of ensuring continuous, overlapping sorties, rather than the endurance of aircraft as a whole.

But tanks don't have the ability to constantly return to base for refuel/rearm/repair, which means they need to have some level of that capability with them. The echelon can drive by, fling the jerrycans and ammo crates at the tank, and the crew can refuel/rearm without leaving the position. The more crew, the faster this process is (up to a point, at least)

The 4-man crew appears to be an ideal compromise between vehicle size, provisions consumption/stowage, and on-site manpower levels. I wouldn't want to tamper with success.

DG

 

[Kirkhill]

Aircraft can be refuelled in flight (forward).  Tanks are not usually refuelled on the battlefield are they?  I thought that they retired to a refuelling an rearming point?

Having said that, and again at risk of being accused of yanking chains, I am quite willing to accept that the tank has reached its ultimate design, its ultimate balance of compromises.  It has happened with other systems in the past.

Cheers.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I'm going waaaay out of my lane here once again, but I was thinking about aircraft canopies earlier and will chime in.  I believe that fighter design in the 50s/early 60s figured that supersonic speed, missiles and radar were the big deal.  Guns disappeared from some fighters and they had rather small canopies (early marks of the F4 etc).  Canopies were small, I am told, because it made the fighter more aerodynamic and that they assumed that radar would pick everything up.

I have also read that due to Vietnam and Middle East aerial combat lessons it was realized that guns and all-around canopies were still important.  The F4 had the gun put back in, and future designs had them built in along with more open canopies (F16, F15, F18 as examples).  Now, tanks aren't airplanes and this is 2005 and not 1965.  Nevertheless, it is an interesting case to reflect on.

Most engagements are probably still by missile and radar is probably the key acquisition source.  Having that back-up, however, looks to be important.

Back to tanks, I was a Tp Ldr on one of the first field trials for the SAS (Situational Awareness System) in 1999.  I had a tiny laptop in my tank that was linked to a GPS and could "talk" on the radios.  As long as everyone was hooked up and working I could look at a map of Gagetown and see my own tank and the others around.  If a contact was typed in it would then appear on everyone's screen.

This was pretty cool, but it did have the problem of drawing my attention inside the turret and away from the world.  Since we had long cables I tried handing it to my loader to monitor, thus allowing me command.  This worked fairly well, although with live fire it could be a little impractical.  Typing-in contact reports was also a major pain and nobody tried it again after the first attempt.  The lab coat guys looked hurt when I brought this up at the AAR.

Imagine instead that both I and the "operator" have these screens with input abilities.  The operator, who also looks after the radios, would manage the information systems in the tank.  This would allow me to fight the tank while also reaping the benefits of improved information technology.  He would also have a machine gun or grenade launcher mounted on his hatch to repel boarders.  As a bonus, he could put shells in the breech...Even with an auto-loader this "operator" could still be essential for the info systems.

Back to hatches, before the commander's extension on the C2 was available I was always hatches up and used binos.  Once we got TI, however, I was looking through the sight a lot more.  For one ex I never touched my binos.  Even in daytime I would scan in TI with the gunner.  I would have used it even more if I had my own independent TI sight (like the M1A2).  AARs from Iraq have lead to the ability to fire the MGs on the tank from the inside, so I recognize that there are times when you need to button up.  Still, I want to be hatches up to maneouvre the tank.

Cheers,

2B

p.s. In response to Kirkhill's post while I was posting, we refuel tanks in a tactically sound area out of contact.  This is usually done at a running replen en-route to a hide, although it could also be at the end of a road move.  That being said, jerry cans can also be dropped off just behind positions if things are truly desperate! 

Is the M1A2 (along with its other Western cousins) the ultimate expression in tank design?  Perhaps.  The march of technology will bring changes, and a true RMA will also bring changes to the platform.  Perhaps the current RMA with its focus on IT would lead to the replacement of the loader with an infomation systems operator. 

Visual "stealth" technology might bring some changes as well.

 

[Kirkhill]

2B:

Is that an "operator" you need on board? Or a secretary?

Very interesting idea though -  same crew as the Coyote.

 

[a_majoor]

Wandering in with some random thoughts 

1.Earlier on I had posted a quote from Ralph Peters:

The Future of Armored Warfare, Ralph Peters, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/peters.htm

"Flying tanks" have long been objects of speculation, but it is likely that fuel-logic and the psycho-physical dynamics of battle will demand grounded systems for many years to come. While attack helicopters already incorporate many of the characteristics previously imagined for flying tanks, we have found them a complement to, not yet a substitute for, armored vehicles. If we do work toward flying tanks--in the interests of systems economy--the more successful approach would probably be to ask how helicopters could change so that they can move, shoot, and survive on the ground. Aircraft are conceptually more mutable than ground systems, and, if the flying tank proponents are right, this might become the back-door means to change the parameters of armored warfare. A very real danger, however, is asking any system to do too many things, resulting in a system that does nothing especially well. Striking a proper balance between specificity of purpose and flexibility of application is a fundamental systems-design problem.

Perhaps the merger of Helicopter gunships and tanks is closer than we think. The flight system would not be rotors, but perhaps ducted fans and thrust vectoring from the turbine engine. The machine would "fly" at ground level like a hovercraft, or spool up the engines and really fly like a plane. The pilot and gunner (two man crew) would need to be in an armoured canopy well forward, not to engage with the main weapons (which would be guided missiles rather than a high velocity gun), but to look out for individuals, snipers or anti tank/anti aircraft gunners either to engage with a secondary weapon (MG or AGL), or make a run for it. Since they would be flying Nape of the Earth (NOE) for tactical advantage and protection, they would be hooked into a larger situational awareness system to track and engage high value targets. Something like a FOG-M would alow the gunner engage long range targets and stay in the loop to look for high value targets or break off an attack if required.

2. WRT fuelling and arming, magazine and modular systems were under investigation during the late 80s as planners considered high intensity operations in Europe (late cold war). Operating in a chemical/nuclear battlefield called for ways to service the AFVs without exposing the crews. One could imagine the tank traversing full left or right, opening the back of the bustle, ejecting the empties and receiving a full magazine of rounds from the SQ's crane equipped truck. The system would have to feed into an autoloader simply to reduce the potential amount of contamination introduced into the vehicle. (In fact, the bustle could be the magazine, with all the mechanisms built in). You could extend this idea to fuel as well; the rear fuel tanks of an M-113 would serve as an example, the fuel truck uses a crane arm to slide the "empties" off their rails and inserts a full tank in its place. When the tank slides home an index mark is met allowing the fuel to flow into the vehicle (think of how water bottles are changed at the office water cooler.) Even withoutn the chemical nuclear threat, automated systems would offer protection in an urban environment against exposig the crew to snipers, or staying in place too long while doing refuelling/rearming and so on.

3.One issue of Armor magazine discussed autoloaders, and I remember the author suggesting the fourth crewman be retained, just given different duties like monitoring the SAS. We need a very user friendly interface, though.

4. Perhaps we need to sit down and really look at the role of the Tank/AFV. Is it to defeat other tanks? Escort Infantry across fire swept ground? Shock action and firepower? Fully deconsructing the role of future armour might allow us to look a bit farther out of the box (With 2Bravo to keep our feet firmly planted on the ground!). This might reveal a design solution somewhat different from the traditional turreted design which still keeps many of the advantages 2Bravo wants to retain.

 

[Infanteer]

4. Perhaps we need to sit down and really look at the role of the Tank/AFV. Is it to defeat other tanks? Escort Infantry across fire swept ground? Shock action and firepower? Fully deconsructing the role of future armour might allow us to look a bit farther out of the box (With 2Bravo to keep our feet firmly planted on the ground!). This might reveal a design solution somewhat different from the traditional turreted design which still keeps many of the advantages 2Bravo wants to retain.

Very true.  Since WWII, we discarded the "Infantry Tank", which was a dismal performer against the German principles of shock and mass.  However, on todays Complex battlefield, we seem to have reverted to that British principle, parcelling tanks out to infantry units to allow for small combined arms teams to sweep through complex terrain taking out small groups of insurgents.

As usual, what we do is defined by the pace the enemy sets.  Soviets demanded shock action and firepower to take out other tanks, while today's enemy demands protection and precision lethality to take out bad guys while limiting collateral damage.

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.moller.com/skycar/m400/

Here's something to ponder on - no armour, no payload, but.......

I wonder if he has applied the concept to a UAV yet?

 

[Lance Wiebe]

2B, I'm glad that the issue of the SAS came up.  I saw a prototype of ours while I was working on the C2 project.  (By the way, I was one of the ones fighting long and hard to give our gunners some more "legal" authority).

I saw a prototype of the Swedish SAS as well, when the Germans were having a look at it.  This is just after the first of the STVR 122's came off of the line.  Get this.......when the commander lased to a target, the SAS knew exactly where that contact was, it was tied in to the GPS and FCS.  The commander or loader then hit one of the programmable keys on the side of the monitor.  Where the target was, a re "?" would blink, hit the "APC" symbol, and magically, it would place the APC on everyone's SAS.  A marvellous and simple system.  The command variants of the SAS had a couple other features, you could find out the ammo/fuel remaining in tanks and so on, re-draw traces, a couple of other things.  The point is, it was fast and easy to use.  The only input required was a target indicator.  The laser could be replaced, suing the cursor, point to a place on the map, and hit the target type, but that was a bit slower.  Hot keys also existed for such things as "Moving south".  Time was automatically inputted as well.  It seemed like a huge improvement over the one we played with.....

I am still a huge believer of the Mk 1 eyeball.  I (we) have picked up more targets using peripheral vision than you can imagine.  Sensors can certainly aid the old Mk 1, a good example is the target detection and tracking system found on some modern tanks.  A good point was also raised, by Mr Majoor, just exactly do we want our tanks to do?  Once that is defined, then maybe we can sit down and design our tank.  This is something that I'll have to do some pondering on.

 

[Infanteer]

I saw a prototype of the Swedish SAS as well, when the Germans were having a look at it.   This is just after the first of the STVR 122's came off of the line.   Get this.......when the commander lased to a target, the SAS knew exactly where that contact was, it was tied in to the GPS and FCS.   The commander or loader then hit one of the programmable keys on the side of the monitor.   Where the target was, a re "?" would blink, hit the "APC" symbol, and magically, it would place the APC on everyone's SAS.   A marvellous and simple system.   The command variants of the SAS had a couple other features, you could find out the ammo/fuel remaining in tanks and so on, re-draw traces, a couple of other things.   The point is, it was fast and easy to use.   The only input required was a target indicator.   The laser could be replaced, suing the cursor, point to a place on the map, and hit the target type, but that was a bit slower.   Hot keys also existed for such things as "Moving south".   Time was automatically inputted as well.   It seemed like a huge improvement over the one we played with.....

Ooohhh, very Heinleinish.  Sounds interesting, and it fits my bottom-line requirement that tech has to be simple and keep the troops looking in the right direction.  Cadillac had the right idea by beaming the pertinent info onto the windshield for a nice HUD.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

2B:

Is that an "operator" you need on board? Or a secretary?

Very interesting idea though -   same crew as the Coyote.

Maybe I have a Capt Kirk complex!  I want a guy down in Engineering making the thing go, another working the comms, another firing the weapons and another working the sensors and making snide remarks to me. 

In all seriousness, it was during the SAS trials that I started thinking that we need an info systems guy on the tank.

Hovertanks sure look neat, although power and weight will be huge obstacles to overcome.  My one brief flight in a panzer had an unpleasant finish. 

Turning to the purpose of tanks, I'll go back to the beginning.  I think that the first tanks were conceived as a way to cross the last murderous yards of the close battle and bring the firepower of artillery up to the front.  The Cavalry then saw them as a means of salvation.  As more tanks came out the issue of tank armament came to the fore, since tanks started bumping into enemy tanks.  Infantry Tanks and Cruiser tanks were an interesting dichotomy that, in the end, resulted in two classes of tanks that were both rather unsuitable.

I think tanks should be as general purpose as possible.  They should be able to shoot up anything in their battlespace with the execption of fast air.  Specialization can lead to problems like tanks that can shoot up bunkers but not other tanks and tanks that can kill other tanks but not shoot-up bunkers. 

The tank's firepower should be versatile and this can be achieved with ammo types as well as multiple systems. I'd rather stick with a main gun and machineguns but add some specialty rounds for the main gun to give the commander some options.  I'm reading good things about the MPAT round for the 120mm, and I think that specialty ammo is the way to go.

I would keep the tank's firepower focused on the direct firefight, with the mobility and protection survive in the close battle.  The tank should still be designed in the broadest terms to achieve what those guys in 1916 were trying to do: bring the fight to the enemy and kill him while surviving itself in the direct firefight.  While certainly able to defend a position, it should be focused on offensive (mobile) operations.  It should still be able to destroy any type of target it meets from helos to tanks to infantry in buildings to a sniper on a rooftop behind a crowd of civilians. 

That being said it still relies on the other arms to make up for vulnerabilities and would not be intended to work on its own. 

Lance,

I beleive that SAS is the way of the future, and the simpler system you described shows the promise.  As an aside I was very happy when the C2 drills came out.  On the C1 I found it frustrating that the gunner had his initiative and ability taken away.  What made it worse was hearing from some CAT guys saying that they did it all different for their CAT shoots!  When we were doing SIMNET in the 90s we found that gunners were finding most targets and we had weird results since we had no drills.


Cheers,

2B

 

[Lance Wiebe]

I used the CAT competition as my model for training the gunners on the C2.  I actually wanted to go that one step further, and allow the gunner to initiate his own fire order, but it didn't get approved.  We came close to what we wanted to achieve, though.  The reason I wanted the gunner to be able to initiate was because of night shoots.  If the commander was up in the hatch, navigating at night, especially if he had NVG's on, and the gunner reported a contact, the time to fire was something like 30 seconds.  By the time the commander removed his goggles, verified the target, and issued the fire order, well you understand.  It was my feeling that if the gunner was well briefed on the threat and friendly situations, and IF we had the tank 2 I/C as the gunner, then the gunner could initiate his own fire orders.  If the Americans can do it, why can't Canadians?  Are they smarter than us?  Oh well, I lost.

I'm starting to think that we need two types tanks on the battlefield again.  One with a high velocity gun suitable for LOS engagements against all known enemy threats, less fast air.  The other, using the same chassis, mounting a lower velocity gun for close support operations. 

I'm still fleshing out my random thoughts.  Anyone remember these?

 

[DG-41]

I believe that fighter design in the 50s/early 60s figured that supersonic speed, missiles and radar were the big deal.  Guns disappeared from some fighters and they had rather small canopies (early marks of the F4 etc).  Canopies were small, I am told, because it made the fighter more aerodynamic and that they assumed that radar would pick everything up.

I have also read that due to Vietnam and Middle East aerial combat lessons it was realized that guns and all-around canopies were still important.  The F4 had the gun put back in, and future designs had them built in along with more open canopies (F16, F15, F18 as examples).

You're exactly right.

Further adding to this is that the primary task envisioned for a lot of late 50's-60's fighter designs was high-speed, high-altitude intecepts of massed bomber formations. Most of the Century series fighters (F101, F102, F106) had an unguided NUCLEAR air-to-air rocket (the Genie) as their primary armament. Fly really really fast in a straight line, lob your rockets at the waves of Soviet bombers coming over the pole, and then turn tail and run like heck.

In this sort of environment, the demands of high speed aerodynamics took precidence over crew visibility.

But Vietnam taught the lession that the dogfight wasn't dead, that manoeverbility still counted, and that missiles alone weren't enough to get the job done. Plus, the ICBM superceded the massed bomber formation for the most part. So fighter design moved away from ultimate top speed in a straight line, and moved back towards turning performance, crew visibility, and flexibility in weapons loadouts.

Now those clever engineers in the US aero industry managed to come up with a design that merged the best of both worlds in the F15, which is really a spectacular fighter no matter how you look at it. The downside? Enormous unit costs, such that the Air Force was forced to go to cheaper designs (F16) to be able to field an appropriate number of aircraft. A similar thing happened in the Navy, where the super-specialized, super-expensive F14 was augmented by the cheaper, jack of all trades F18

This may suggest an analogue in the tank world....

The M1 and Leo2 are the tank versions of the F15. Ultra capable, super-heavy, long range MBT killers that still retain enough flexibility to do close infantry support tasks (although I wonder how good an anti-pers round the HEAT round is...) The downside: insane unit costs.

What the CF needs is the tank analogue to the F16 or F18 - cheaper than the ultimate, admittedly less capable in some areas, but still capable enough to get the job done and perhaps even a little superior in certain areas.

And as I said earlier, I think you get this by using as much off the shelf automotive technology as possible, bringing the weight down by sacrificing some of the all-aspect MBT protection capacity (keep the sexy super-dense APFSDS-resistant armour on the forward arc, but on sides/top/rear concentrate on HEAT protection instead) and use a gun that can fire HE and canister in addition to MBT killing rounds. Keep the dual independant TIS sighting of modern MBT killers, but put the commander's independant MG cupola back on.

If the resultant vehicle winds up being air-transportable in current CF aircraft, so much the better, but I think that requirment is subordinate to unit cost. Ideally, you should be able to buy 4 of these things for every 1 Abrams or Leo2. In fact, I can't help but wonder if this couldn't be made cheaper than Coyote+ESS...

DG

 

[ArmyRick]

Lance I like your idea of a high velocity gun MBT (for firing stuff like SABOT) and close support gun MBT (Firing HESH, HEAT, etc).

 

[George Wallace]

What the CF needs is the tank analogue to the F16 or F18 - cheaper than the ultimate, admittedly less capable in some areas, but still capable enough to get the job done and perhaps even a little superior in certain areas.

And as I said earlier, I think you get this by using as much off the shelf automotive technology as possible, bringing the weight down by sacrificing some of the all-aspect MBT protection capacity (keep the sexy super-dense APFSDS-resistant armour on the forward arc, but on sides/top/rear concentrate on HEAT protection instead) and use a gun that can fire HE and canister in addition to MBT killing rounds. Keep the dual independant TIS sighting of modern MBT killers, but put the commander's independant MG cupola back on.

If the resultant vehicle winds up being air-transportable in current CF aircraft, so much the better, but I think that requirment is subordinate to unit cost. Ideally, you should be able to buy 4 of these things for every 1 Abrams or Leo2. In fact, I can't help but wonder if this couldn't be made cheaper than Coyote+ESS...

DG

To me that sounds like the LEOPARD 1C2.  Fits to a "T".  Lighter than the M1, Leo 2, Challenger 2, etc.  Can fire a wide range of rounds (although the 105 is somewhat lacking in punch - it can be upgunned).  Good design.  Easy to maintain (in comparison to many other similar vehicles).  Keeps our skill sets current.  Has proven it's worth in places like Kosovo.  Has good FCS.  What else?......

 

[DG-41]

Sure does, doesn't it? Oh, irony....

I wonder though if we couldn't build an updated Leo1C2-alike that could perhaps fix any known issues with the Leo1 platform and further cost-reduce, so we wind up with a modern package with a lower unit cost than just buying more Leo1s

And there's always the political spin of "jobs for Canadians" if it is home built.

But I don't know enough about the engineering of the Leo1 platform to know where opportunities to cost-reduce might be. I *think* Leo1 has a bespoke powertrain; if that could be replaced with an off the shelf motor and trans maybe that could push unit price down?

Anybody here work for GM?

DG