Fighting & Winning The Global War on Terror (WW IV)

[mdh]

If it blows up buses and subways, it must be a terrorist
by George Jonas
CanWest Publications
July 21, 2005

Talk about coincidence. Just as I started writing this column, someone on CBC-TV called this month's bombing of the London public transport system "a terrorist attack." By the time I shifted my glance from the computer to the television screen, the station cut to a commercial, so I can't identify the offender.

If he was an employee, he took a chance. An internal memo warns that calling terrorist attacks "terrorist attacks" is against CBC policy.

The word should be "attack," pure and simple, or rather neither simple nor pure, but Pharisaically correct. Contemporary disciples of the ancient Pharisee sect -- whose name has become a synonym for self-righteous hypocrisy -- have long infested public broadcasters such as the CBC and the BBC. Now they're proclaiming that reporters should use only "neutral language." Describing terrorist attacks as plain-vanilla "attacks," say the latter-day Pharisees, permits viewers and listeners "to form their own conclusions" about just what kind of attacks they were.

Needless to say, the CBC's reluctance to influence the audience's deliberations doesn't extend to all issues. The same news organizations that won't call terrorists terrorists --- CBC, BBC, Reuters, and others of their ilk -- have no qualms about tainting the audience's opinion in relation to things that seem morally clear to them. The CBC doesn't insist that reporters describe a company's act of dumping toxic waste in "neutral language" and leave the word "pollution" to the viewers. Nor does Mother Corp demand attribution for such as emotionally loaded word as "murder." CBC reporters can say: "A witness described the murder" rather than: "A witness described the accused throttling the victim in an act the police characterized as 'murder.'" They can say: "A man was charged with molesting a child" rather than: "After a child was fondled, a crown attorney called a man a "child molester.'"

But reporters can't call a suicide bomber blowing up a London bus a terrorist attack. Let viewers "make their own judgment" about what to call it. The CBC won't make judgments for them. Perish the thought. We tell people what happened; we don't tell them what to think. We're pure as the driven snow.

Such concern for purity is unnecessary, of course, when it comes to self-evident evils like pollution. It's reserved for acts about which CBC bosses feel ambivalent themselves, such as Arab/Muslim terrorists blowing up commuter trains or flying airliners into skyscrapers. The CBC's top brass seems to regard such acts as morally ambiguous, as "controversial," as being below the threshold of society's moral consensus, as acts about which opinions are divided.

This may come as a surprise to Canadians who think there's considerable moral consensus about blowing up bus or subway riders. Most people believe (to put it mildly) that it's wrong. Most people also think that if news of this consensus hasn't yet reached the CBC, it's the public broadcaster that's out of society's moral loop.

There's nothing more distasteful than the sight of cowardice, intellectual muddle, and a fascination with violence masquerading as journalistic objectivity. There's nothing more ridiculous than the confused belief that the moral high ground lies in some no-man's land between good and evil. It's unnecessary to decide whether this moral confusion is combined with a hidden political agenda. While it's possible that some news organizations have been infiltrated by agents or supporters of al-Qaeda or Islamofascsim, I'd hesitate to ascribe to malice anything that can be explained by stupidity.

Some well-meaning members of the chattering classes open their minds so wide (as the saying goes) that their brains fall out. They persuade themselves that it's narrow-minded prejudice to call Dracula a vampire: Just describe what he does and let the readers or viewers decide what he is. But a refusal to call something by its proper and customary name is inaccurate reporting no less than it would be to attach a false, arbitrary or tendentious label to something. If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck it's likely to be a duck -- and not calling a duck a duck makes it a canard.

Not calling terrorism terrorism is a canard (the French word meaning duck as well as false news.) I think the CBC's deliberate practice of canard-journalism is a disgrace. My old employer (I spent 23 years on CBC staff) would do better to emulate Arab and Muslim commentators, like Abdel Rahman al-Rashed on Al-Arabiya, who have since the London bombings come out to call and condemn terrorists as terrorists.

Here's another interesting take on this from George Jonas - a former CBC type himself, cheers, mdh

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

.....and France surprisingly steps up to take the lead.

Bravo,


Matthew. 

P.S.  To Brittany, I consider myself in the Neo-Con camp in that I think intervention is necessary in order to avoid a larger clash of civilizations, am not a nitwit, and don't consider all muslims to be the same.  Bottom Line:  It's hypocritical for you to brand a group (neo-cons, inaccurately I might add) for supposedly branding another (muslims), and as such would request you reconsider your tactic, specifically because your behaviour is exactly the same as the behaviour would chastise others for....

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/displayPrintable.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/30/ncleric30.xml&site=5

France ejects 12 Islamic 'preachers of hate'
By Colin Randall in Paris
(Filed: 30/07/2005)

The gulf between British and French treatment of preachers of hatred and violence was thrown sharply into focus yesterday when France announced the summary expulsion of a dozen Islamists between now and the end of August.

A tough new anti-terrorism package was unveiled by Nicolas Sarkozy, the interior minister and a popular centre-Right politician.

 
Nicolas Sarkozy: 'We have to act against radical preachers'
His proposals reflect French determination to act swiftly against extremists in defiance of the human rights lobby, which is noticeably less vocal in France than in Britain.

Imams and their followers who fuel anti-western feeling among impressionable young French Muslims will be rounded up and returned to their countries of origin, most commonly in France's case to its former north African colonies.

Mr Sarkozy also revealed that as many as 12 French mosques associated with provocative anti-western preaching were under surveillance. Imams indulging in inflammatory rhetoric will be expelled even if their religious status is recognised by mainstream Muslim bodies.

Those who have assumed French citizenship will not be protected from deportation. Mr Sarkozy said he will reactivate measures, "already available in our penal code but simply not used", to strip undesirables of their adopted nationality. "We have to act against radical preachers capable of influencing the youngest and most weak-minded," Mr Sarkozy told the French daily Le Parisien.

The first to be caught in the new round of expulsions is an Algerian, Rena Ameuroud, whose brother Abderraham was jailed in France earlier this year for his part in a jihadist training exercise in the Fontainebleau forest south of Paris. He faces immediate deportation for allegedly urging fellow-worshippers at a Parisian mosque to engage in "holy war".

At least seven French nationals are now known to have been killed while fighting with anti-coalition insurgents in Iraq, in some cases as suicide bombers, the minister said. A further 10 are believed still to be there. France, which has Europe's largest Muslim population with estimates varying from five to nine million out of a population of 60 million, has long prided itself on its stern approach to terrorism.

Mr Sarkozy's crackdown on those "promoting radical Islamist polemic" was disclosed at the end of a week that began with French anger at Britain's failure to extradite the alleged financier of Islamist bombings in Paris in the mid-1990s. Rachid Ramda, 35, an Algerian, has been held for 10 years while fighting attempts to return him to stand trial. Survivors and victims' relatives who gathered this week at the St Michel station in the heart of Paris to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the worst attack, which killed eight, called on Britain to "stop protecting" Ramda.

They are unimpressed by his supporters' claims that he is a "gentle and peaceful" man who devotes his time in the Belmarsh top-security jail in south-east London to learning the Koran by heart, studying English literature and comforting other Muslim prisoners. Charles Clarke, the Home Secretary, has approved Ramda's extradition - as did his predecessor David Blunkett - but his removal depends on High Court proceedings.

French ministers and commentators have long expressed exasperation at British handling of individuals who support terrorism, arguing that greater emphasis is being placed on their human rights rather than on security interests.

colin.randall@telegraph.co.uk

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[McG]

To win the war on terrorism we must break cycle of violence
Canada's new security action plan should be guided by Gandhi
The Edmonton Journal
Thursday, July 21, 2005
Re: "Can the war on terror be won?" by Andy Knight, Opinion, July 11.

I want to compliment Knight for his insightful article on terrorism. I believe we should analyse the mindset of terrorists to try to determine what drives them into such destructive violence.

Unfortunately, one could easily conclude from Knight's article that there is no hope, when he suggests that the entire international community must co-operate to deny funding to terrorism. However, some members of this community actually fund the terrorists to reduce the influence of the hegemonic nations who dominate the world.

The war on terrorism will certainly be difficult to win, but there is, I believe, another approach. I agree with Knight that the London bombings were probably the result of dissatisfaction in other countries with the war on Iraq. Undoubtedly, many also believe that they must stop, by any means available, the western nations gaining complete control of world oil supplies.

Our government is designing a Canadian Security Action Plan. I hope it will consider this plan. The danger of attacks to Canada will, in my opinion, be in direct proportion to our government's support of the use of armed force in the world. Our hope lies in exploring how we can solve our problems without recourse to lethal violence. We must give peace a chance.

As long as we accept the premise that our only security lies in more powerful weapons than our presumed enemies, we are eliminating any hope future generations may have, for this presupposes that violence and lawlessness will continue to characterize international relations. Prime Minister Paul Martin's doubling of our military budget in the next five years is a retrograde step and increases our danger.

I believe there are more possibilities than are indicated in Knight's article. These will be difficult to implement, but they have a far better chance of success. They follow in the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi and his successful campaign to remove the British from India after they had ruled there for more than 200 years. More recently, Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu used these same approaches to overcome apartheid in South Africa.

We must show the peoples of the world that violence of one person or nation against another only results in reciprocal violence. This sets up a self-perpetuating cycle of violence. We must break this cycle of violence if we are to bequeath to our children a world that is not headed for self-destruction.

With the weapons of mass destruction available today on the one hand, and the willingness of fanatics to become suicide bombers on the other, it is clear that we must try other paradigms to ensure personal and international security. Killing has become an industrialized science, and is leading increasingly to the depersonalization and demonization of the other, and the dehumanization of ourselves.

This self-destructive competition must stop. Mikhail Gorbachev realized this when he opted out of the Cold-War competition which was destroying both the Soviets and the West and threatening the entire world with a nuclear holocaust. His peacemaking efforts should be studied and replicated.

Canada is the most logical nation to demonstrate a new security paradigm because most of us feel relatively safe at this time. We Canadians should start by telling our governments to stop giving people of other nations reasons to fear and hate us by:

- eliminating the production of guns and other weapons designed solely to kill other human beings. Thousands of guns produced in Canada are still being used to kill people in other parts of the world;

- assertively leading a campaign of other middle powers for a more democratic United Nations, free from domination of the great powers. A truly democratic UN is our most hopeful path to peace;

- providing troops only for UN peacekeeping and ensuring that our troops are trained to make peace instead of war;

We must leave our children and grandchildren a sustainable and peaceful world. The prospects of this occurring by using current paradigms are bleak. We must, and can, do better.

Rhyl Stollery, Edmonton

Rebutal:

Pacifism won't win the war on terror
The Edmonton Journal
July 25, 2005

Re: "To win the war on terrorism we must break cycle of violence: Canada's new security action plan should be guided by Gandhi," by Rhyl Stollery, Letters, July 21.

While I appreciate that many people are philosophically committed to pacificism, Rhyl Stollery speciously appeals to the tradition of non-violence advocated by Gandhi in India and Mandela and Tutu in South Africa as successful paradigms for our present problems with terrorism.

In doing so, he fails to appreciate that the "enemy" in all these cases was governed by the rule of law and ideologically committed to ideals of democracy and freedom or, at least, had strong roots in these traditions. As such, their acts of oppression were fundamentally at odds with their own ideological commitments; an inconsistency that ultimately resulted in a reform from within.

Terrorists, on the other hand, are committed to an ideology of hate, fuelled by religious fanaticism and a world view in which there are only two kinds of people: those who submit and those who must die. Their actions are largely consistent with their ideology and so they will not reform.

The terrorists have no respect for the rule of law, democracy or freedom. If the world that respects these ideals does nothing, these terrorists will wage war against all the governments of Muslim lands in an effort to institute a radical form of Islam as seen in prewar Afghanistan. They will continue their jihad against Israel, Europe, and the rest of the world.

These are their stated goals. You will not and cannot reason with them.

Contrary to Stollery's claims, history has shown that the rule of law, democracy, and freedom are preserved, perhaps paradoxically, by a strong military and security policy. The Second World War and the Cold War are obvious cases in point.

Indeed, it is ironic that Stollery should invoke Gorbachev as a model statesman for non-proliferation without acknowledging that American militarization prevented the expansion of Soviet domination and ultimately forced the Soviet-American detente.

Rather than non-violence or pacificism, the world needs to stand in unity, prepared to wage war when necessary to end tyranny. Humanity is endowed with an inalienable right to basic freedom and equality. In Europe and North America, our ancestors fought for those rights, attained them, and protected them. Should we not fight to see those rights realized throughout the world?

If we did, perhaps then we could even start talking about some forms of demilitarization. But as long as we tolerate even one tyrannical government, the world will remain a place of violence and lawlessness and I will be thankful for the American and British militaries.

Ken Ristau, Edmonton

 

[paracowboy]

good rebuttal. Fly poop: Mandela does not belong with the Mahatma. Mandela murdered people.

 

[amcd]

MDH wrote:
Not all Islamic militants are terrorists - but there is no doubt that the London bombers used terror as a tactic - and they were all Islamic militants. Is that a meaningful distinction? Or mere tautology.

When you ask whether it's a meaningful distinction or a tautology you've hit directly into the heart of the matter. That's precisely the question to ask. The rest of my post was laying out my evidence for the 'meaningful distinction' side and, in order to do that, I had to wade tangentially through a mass of supporting arguments which can all be reduced to one simple question: what, exactly, is going on here?  

Looking over my argument and your objections, I can see that I wasn't forceful on one major point, but which once I say it, you will probably agree that I meant it â “ I don't think we are fighting 'terrorists' at all. I think this is something new, something that we maybe don't even have a word for yet.

It's a revolutionary social/religious movement spearheaded by a vanguard of militants networked into a global guerrilla force. The movement has massive public support, something simple terrorists don't have. (I have mucho evidence for this last assertion, but it's a bit dry.)

â Å“The size of bin Laden's organization, its political goals, and its enduring relationship with a fundamentalist Islamic social movement provide strong evidence that Al-Qaeda is not a terrorist group but an insurgency,â ? writes Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris in 'Al-Qaeda as Insurgency,' a paper written for the U.S. Army War College strategic research project. â Å“The disparate nature of the threat â “ in essence a global, but somewhat leisurely-paced guerrilla war â “ makes it difficult to focus an effective strategic response.â ?

Calling them terrorists, who are really just politically minded criminals, undermines the danger this situation represents. In your post you said the enemy doesn't deserve legitimacy, well, I wish it were that easy. I would submit that they are in fact a very legitimate enemy, and that if they keep their little struggle going for 50 years or so, we're going to be looking at whole new world.

My defense of the non-use of 'terrorist' in the media is based on this understanding of the situation. The word is at once sensational and vague, threatening and confusing â “ and it simply doesn't help. Our ethical/moral outrage over their tactics doesn't give us strength; it just makes it easier for them to achieve their goals. The longer we fail to recognize what's happening, the harder it'll be to defuse the situation.

Now, I'm not saying the CBC shares my position, I don't really know or care what their rationale is, but by insisting on precision I think they are actually doing the right thing.

On the other hand, this:

We need to be firm in our conviction that we are better then they are because we live in a liberal democratic society -- and they are opposed to it. Otherwise, why bother?

is very tricky. What do you mean by 'better?' Do you mean that our 'liberal democracy' gives us more right to exist? I'm truly not being coy, I just don't know the substantive meaning of the term 'better' in this usage.

(As a side note, I definitely do not agree with Hitchens' statement (terrorists=swarthy opponents). I wouldn't claim that Hitchens' statement was true, directly or indirectly, but I do appreciate a good straw man when I see one.)

You made some very good points (emancipation of women, relativism=nihilism) and I would respond to them all, except for that I can't because the capital region liberal relativists debating club is meeting down at the gun range for our weekly shoot. We have these adorable little Hitchens pictures we put up as targets. It's excellent fun. Until we get too hammered, then we start quoting German philosophers and talking earnestly about futility and the death of meaning. It's very 19th century.

Regards.

 

[mdh]

I had to wade tangentially through a mass of supporting arguments which can all be reduced to one simple question: what, exactly, is going on here? 

amcd,

Don't get me wrong. I'm not suggesting that you be like David Jansen in the Green Berets, and head down to the nearest recruiting station to sign up and fight the GWOT. (Although if you're interested there are some excellent reserve units in the capital region  )

I don't think we are really all that far apart. Journos need to ask tough questions and find out what's really going on. The Army is like another other institution - it makes mistakes, and in this present instance - with our troops heading to Kandahar - we have to get it right.

Certainly the public derseves nothing less - and we need accurate and sustained debate about these issues. (If you're interested there are have been several threads under the politics section on what constitutes the nature of this threat.)

But we will have agree to disagree on the utility of the term terrorist and its use in the media. (George Jonas' piece -posted above - sums up the argument far more eloquently that I can.)

WRT to the CF and the media, I don't have much to offer as a counter-argument.  The CF needs to do a better job working with the media.  They are better now then they used to be - and there are a lot of very good PAFFOs out there.  However, as you noted, I suspect the chain of command (especially within NDHQ) often mitigates against their counsel.

Cheers, mdh

 

[amcd]

mdh,

jonas wrote:

If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck it's likely to be a duck -- and not calling a duck a duck makes it a canard.

I'd note:

The longer we persist in believing that because it quacks, it's a duck, the harder it'll be to pry its teeth off our head when we finally realize it's actually an alligator that's evolved a quacking call to fool its prey. It's not a duck at all, much less a canard.

Of course, I might be ringing the 'ice berg dead ahead' warning bell a little vigorously, but I just spent two months working on this general story (gwot) and I've talked to a lot of smart dudes who are growing more than a little concerned.

I have enjoyed the debate though.

Thanks,
amcd

 

[mdh]

I have enjoyed the debate though.

Ditto,

cheers, mdh

 

[a_majoor]

A look at some of the enemy "foot soldiers".

The Notting Hill Gang
A signal event's lessons.

British police had surrounded the flat in Notting Hill where two of the suspects from the July 21 bombing had holed up. Negotiations had commenced, but promised to be short and sharp. Snipers took up positions and police demanded the suspects come out unclothed and with their hands up.

"I have rights!" Ramzi Mohammed wailed from inside.

How ironic. Yes, you do have rights Ramzi â ” all the rights guaranteed you by the liberal democracy you have pledged to destroy. Rights enshrined in some of the oldest laws of their kind in the world. The same rights enjoyed by the innocent commuters you sought to maim and kill. Rights worth commending; and worth defending.

Moments later the two emerged, as instructed, nearly naked, hands high, in what is certain to be another iconic photo from the global struggle against violent extremism. This is the way it ends sometimes, stripped on a balcony http://www.flickr.com/photos/finkangel/29706707/in/pool-bomb/, dragged from a spider hole http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:SaddamSpiderHole.jpg, or rousted from a safe house in dirty underwear http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/38901000/jpg/_38901107_khalid_ap_203body.jpg.

"I have rights!" Mohammed repeated to the police. What rights would he enjoy in his ideal society, the utopia promised by his version of sharia? We saw it in the rules the Afghans suffered under during the Taliban tyranny, or the ukases Khomeini bestowed on Iran and under which Iranians largely still suffer today. Imagine Mohammed's due-process guarantees in the system he was fighting for â ” torture, ritual readings of some Koranic verses, followed by beheading, or perhaps hanging from a construction crane http://www.iranian.com/BTW/2004/September/Hanging/Images/photo.jpg or soccer goal, or a bullet in the head if he was lucky.

But tell us, Ramzi, why did they take you alive? Why didn't you go out in a blaze of gunfire and glory, seeking what you would call martyrdom, paradise, perhaps taking a few infidels with you? Oh, but that was never in the game plan. Investigators say that after their attack fizzled the bombers scattered to their homes and began a round of cell-phone recriminations. They apparently had not made contingency plans for total equipment failure, so they sat around complaining to each other. With the moment passed and lacking adequate training to adapt creatively, the prospective jihadist warriors played phone tag until they were captured.

One of the plotters, Osman Hussain, was picked up in Italy sitting on his brother's sofa. He admitted he was involved in the attacks, but denied he is a terrorist. "We didn't want to kill, just sow terror," he allegedly claimed (yes, in the same breath that he denied being a terrorist â ” something must be lost in the translation). It is not much of a defense; the captured nail-bombs and other explosive devices demonstrate a desire to wreak devastation on people, to kill and cripple. Hussain, through a public defender, is now seeking to invoke rights under Italian law to fight extradition. If it were Saudi Arabia he would be dead already.

This is typical of the people we are fighting in this war. It is true that they are dangerous characters; the trail of casualties they have left attests to that. But there is a tendency to overstate their abilities, their motivation, their devotion to the cause. They are portrayed as patient, long-term planners, guileful, dedicated, inspired, pursuing their objectives with a cold and terrible intensity. However, frequently they are none of these things; in this case, the bombers were a clutch of pathetic wretches living on the public dole who could not accomplish their own mass suicide. The contemporary term of art for a terrorist is a "super-empowered individual," which is a pretty extravagant expression for violent misfits acting out an anti-social pathology.

Generally speaking, terrorists are cowards. They hide behind masks, make surprise attacks on the innocent and helpless, and take pride and apparently pleasure in ritually beheading unarmed, bound men. However, when cornered they do not fight to the death or scream oaths to justify their cause; they lie about their involvement and demand their rights to due process. And this is not limited to the foot soldiers; even Osama bin Laden took over a year to admit complicity in the 9/11 attacks.

Capturing an entire terrorist cell intact is a signal event. Usually there are few left alive after an attack of this nature. The authorities now have the bombers, their weapons, and numerous documents and computer hard drives. They will learn a great deal. And the lesson for the rest of us is that there is no moral relativism in this conflict. Those of us who uphold the principles of the free society are better than the radical Islamic terrorists, and we should not be afraid to declare it. Western society and its ideal of human liberty is superior to the despotic social order they want to force on the world, so much so that they seek to use the guarantees promised citizens of the liberal states to preserve their miserable lives. And we so venerate our principles that we will give them the chance.

â ” James S. Robbins is senior fellow in national-security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council, a trustee for the Leaders for Liberty Foundation, and an NRO contributor.
 
http://www.nationalreview.com/robbins/robbins200508010812.asp

 

[Infanteer]

Interesting, but the end of the article undermines it by turning into moralistic preaching (which is kind of irrelevent if we are analyzing the enemy).   His generalizing of the enemy as "cowards" and "typical of the people we are fighting in this war" smells of broad-brush blustering from the arm-chair - indeed, his opinions certainly don't jibe with the analysis of the enemy structure in an excellent Statfor discussed over at Lightfighter.

As well, the statement that "the contemporary term of art for a terrorist is a "super-empowered individual," which is a pretty extravagant expression for violent misfits acting out an anti-social pathology." also sucks, as it falls into the "depraved psycho" trap and really gives no credence to the varied groups that are partaking in the Islamic Insurgency, as highlighted with the Long Tail Theory.

These sods were definately bottom tier members of the AQ network and I'm willing to bet that they were cowardly amateurs (as the article linked above suggests).   They certainly weren't hardened like the guys down in Spain who immolated themselves and the apartment block when they realized they were done for.

All in all, I give the article two thumbs down for utility....

 

[a_majoor]

One of the problems is fighting WW IV is the difficulty in articulating what exactly needs to be done, and getting support to doing it.

Torn Apart Over Iraq
Why do we keep fighting each other over Iraq?

Isolationists
Most paleocons did not support either the attack on Afghanistan or Iraq - and did not in the sincere belief it was not in the interest of the United States. From the Right they believed both were a waste of precious American resources overseas, and would only prompt another dangerous increase in the powers of the federal government here at home. Their worry was not so much in the use of violence against radical Islamicists, but rather the cost to the United States, both in the short-term in lives and treasure, and the long-term implications of "imperialismâ ? on the fabric of the republic.

Many agreed on the Left that Afghanistan and especially Iraq were bad ideas. Their much different complaint was no so much it weakened American interests here or abroad (otherwise they would support the war), but that America is by nature suspect in its use of power and oppresses third-world poor abroad. The lexicon of left-wing anti-Americanism is multifaceted: colonialist, hegemonic, imperialist, racist, or capitalist. Take your pick: We were attacking indigenous peoples either for profit (e.g, Halliburton, the mythical Afghanistan pipeline, the transnational oil companies, private contractors, etc.), or out of racism and ethnocentric chauvinism.

Punitivists
Liberals, moderates, and conservatives could all fall into this second group, who supported the removal of the Taliban and to a lesser degree Saddam Hussein. Although some realists of both parties thought the Iraqi war, unlike Afghanistan, was a mistake, perhaps slightly more supported it nonetheless - with the proviso that we summarily leave on completion, our mission being to weaken the nexus of Baathism, petrol-dollars, and terrorism, not the impractical notion of prompting democracy.

To the Punitivists, the no-fly-zones, Operation Desert Fox, and the Oil-for-Food embargo of the last decade (keeping Saddam in his "boxâ ?) was the right template, as was the earlier bombing of Milosevic's forces from the air. There is a limited logic of sorts to their vision: Do not let the terrorist enemies of the United States close enough to our conventional military, and do not squander our assets in theaters far from our real worries in Korea, China, or Europe. If a Mullah Omar or Saddam pops up, smack them down, and don't get involved in the larger existential questions of why or how they are there in the first place. In their view, a 9/11 was not so much a refutation of their strategy of chronic reprisals with cruise missiles and bombs to pay back each terrorist incident, but a simple tactical lapse on the part of our home defenses - and thus correctable in the future.

Democratizers
Sometimes called neoconservatives, neo-Wilsonians, idealists - and far worse - this group also, at least originally, was made up of moderate Democrats and Republicans. They felt a long-term solution to the quarter-century pathology of the Middle East after September 11 (at least dating back to the Iranian hostage-taking of 1979) was possible only by staying on after the removal of the Taliban and Saddam and changing the political landscape to give the Arab street a third choice beyond radical Islam and either leftwing or rightwing dictatorship.

While it is common to say that the removal of Saddam was on the pre-September 11 presidential agenda - thus the now much quoted January 26, 1998, Project for a New American Century letter to President Clinton of 1998 calling for Saddam's removal - it probably was not. Neither President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell nor National Security Advisor Rice signed the request for preemption. George W. Bush campaigned against nation-building of the type Clinton had engaged in the Balkans, and was worried about dispersing our military in peace-keeping theaters where they were asked to do things other than just fight.

September 11 changed all that.

The Brawl
Three facts stand out about the current political infighting.

First, the American people were not so much ideological as prone to align themselves with the group that seemed to best ensure their own security at the least cost. Right before the March 2003 war, there was an overwhelming consensus to remove Saddam. But the messy occupation eroded that margin substantially. Perhaps only 40 percent still support the notion of taking Saddam out and staying on to create a democracy. Another 60 percent are probably evenly divided in thinking post facto that we should never have gone in, or left as soon as his statue fell.

Someone could write an interesting article on the changing attitudes of our elites, especially U.S. senators and pundits - with then and now quotes - whose views reflected the changing pulse of the battlefield. Reading the transcripts of what over 70 senators (especially Senators Kerry and Clinton) said about the October 2002 Senate resolution authorizing the use of force to remove Saddam seems surreal these days.

But the flavor is perhaps best summed up in a comprehensive January 2003 speech, less than four months before the war that Sen. Kerry gave at Georgetown University:

    "Without question, we need to disarm Saddam Hussein. He is a brutal, murderous dictator, leading an oppressive regime. He presents a particularly grievous threat because he is so consistently prone to miscalculation. He miscalculated an eight-year war with Iran. He miscalculated the invasion of Kuwait. He miscalculated America's response to that act of naked aggression. He miscalculated the result of setting oilrigs on fire. He miscalculated the impact of sending scuds into Israel and trying to assassinate an American President. He miscalculated his own military strength. He miscalculated the Arab world's response to his misconduct. And now he is miscalculating America's response to his continued deceit and his consistent grasp for weapons of mass destruction."

When the war looked like it would be over in three weeks, most supported it. When it seemed like the terrorist insurrection would go on indefinitely most did not. If it looks today like a democracy will stabilize, and spread to adjoining countries, all will be for it even still.

Second, strange alliances have emerged. The American Conservative and The Nation always agreed that we had no business in Iraq - and perhaps Afghanistan as well. The Council on Foreign Relations Establishment luminaries on both Left and Right, from veterans in the Carter administration to the Bush I Cabinet, voiced realist worries that transcended their own past political differences over the Cold War, the Balkans, and Central America. Just as there was no telling a far-Left from a far-Right pundit in condemning Iraq, so too it was just as impossible to determine whether a realist critic had once worked for Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George Bush I, or Bill Clinton.

Third, morality and ethics were adduced by all parties, as the American people couldn't quite sort out whether intervening or keeping out in the end cost or took more lives. The isolationists thought that they had the moral high ground by ensuring that at least none would be lost in an American war. To them we "stirred upâ ? terrorists abroad rather than were "fighting them over there rather than here.â ?

The neo-Wilsonians countered that there was already constant death in Saddam's Iraq and intervention would prove the least costly course - and eventually prevent more September 11-like attacks, and thus save far more people than were lost in the war proper.

Realists who valued stability over idealism seemed to think that more would die in the new Middle East democratic conundrum than under Saddam's police state or the Syrian reign over Lebanon.

The Ironies
A number of other strange phenomena framed the debate. Critics allege Iraq was all about "getting oil.â ? But after the invasion, the price of America's imported petroleum skyrocketed. And far from stealing Iraq's national resources, for the first time in memory its oil reserves were in the hands of a constitutional government, beyond the control of both the Hussein kleptocracy and French and Russian concessions.

In some sense, George W. Bush tried to address the perceived failure of the 1991 war of not removing Saddam after ejecting him from Kuwait - which invariably was a sort of critique of his own father's policy. In turn, George H. W. Bush insisted that his limited objective was the right decision - and thus implicitly cast doubt on the present course of his son. When one compares the prior and present roles of both Bush I and Bush II advisers, you can draw any conclusion you like: "We are correcting our prior error,â ? "We didn't learn from our prior wisdom of not intervening,â ? or "We are still arguing with each other.â ?

Another oddity is the much-quoted "Iraqi people.â ? Criticism of the war from the Left claimed that we killed civilians and were only imperial in our computations. But polls continued to reveal that the majority in Iraq favors Americans staying until stability is assured, and assumes things are still better than under Saddam.

The Arab world claimed America was unpopular for its past support for dictators - and even more so for its present effort to rectify that by either removing or ostracizing strongmen.

Iraq was alleged as the font for Islamic terrorism, but the terrorists in London equally blamed Afghanistan; bin Laden connected his war to U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and the U.N. Oil-for-Food program; while Australians were killed in Bali for things like East Timor - and on and on.

Those who worried that we were making Iraq a mess also claimed our reconstruction of that mess was a waste of precious American dollars better spent at home.

Some who cried, "We needed more troopsâ ? were often the same who said there should never have been any troops in Iraq at all.

Those who agitated that the U.N. should have approved the war did not say the same in 1999 - when we neither had the U.N. or even the U.S. Senate on record sanctioning our bombers.

Freeing Iraq may strengthen Iran if Baghdad goes theocratic - or may speed its fall if Iraq's new democracy energizes the Persian masses.

What Does it All Mean?
So why this growing angry divide at home about Iraq? First, the war crystallized preexisting but fundamental philosophical differences among segments of the American people.

Consider all the conflicting refrains:

We are a republic, not an empire and should husband our resources for ourselves;

No, we are a pathological presence abroad and should husband and redistribute our resources for our own poor;

No, we are a constabulatory force that should not take sides per se, but rather enforce order and stability in a global commercial system of free markets and trade;

No, morally we cannot enjoy democracy at home while allowing it to die abroad;

No, realistically our ultimate security rests with as many democracies overseas as possible.

These same fault lines were emerging in 1999 with the bombing of Serbia, but were arrested by the capitulation of Milosevic and the quick conclusion to the war.

Second, we had two national elections of 2002 and 2004. In both cases, it was natural that it was in the interest of the opposition party (the Democrats) to prove that the present policy (since the war was never presented as one requiring abject sacrifice to ensure our very survival) was not working - and, contrarily, the current group in power (the Republicans) to assure that it was.

Had the so-called war on terror that started on September 11, 2001 ended by September 2002, before the congressional elections of autumn 2002, then, like Bill Clinton's Balkan war, it would not have become as polarizing.

Third and most important, is the battlefield, the final adjudicator of political disagreement. War more often creates political reality, rather than politics determining the course of the war. If the United States winds down its presence, curtails its losses while Iraqis beat the terrorists and ensure a democratic government, then the victory, to paraphrase John F. Kennedy, will still have a thousand fathers. WMD controversies will be a distant memory.

But if the insurrection increases, topples the government, and we withdraw from a new Lebanon, then the Iraqi defeat will be an orphan.

My own view remains absolutely unchanged - that we were right, in both a practical and a moral sense, in removing Saddam, that despite depressing lows and giddy highs, the democratic reconstruction of Iraq will work out, that an emerging constitutional government will make both Americans safer and the Middle East in general more stable, that preexisting jihadists are flocking to Iraq and being defeated rather than being created ex nihilo, that anti-Americanism will gradually subside in the Muslim world as millions see that we are consistent in our support of democratic reform, that the United States military has proved itself the preeminent fighting force in the world today and is on the offensive in Iraq and winning a difficult asymmetrical campaign, and that old allies in Europe and Japan and new ones from India to Russia will slowly come to appreciate American constancy and leadership as never before.

But I am not naïve enough to think that most Americans at this moment would agree with all - or any - of that.

- Victor Davis Hanson is a military historian and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His website is victorhanson.com.
 
http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson200508080827.asp

 

[a_majoor]

The next theater for WWIV

Iran the Model
Iran moves, we don't.

Iranian President Ahmadi Nezhad has been busy putting together a cabinet for the Islamic republic, and while all real power remains firmly in the clammy hands of Supreme Leader Khamenei, it's worth taking a look at some of the new ministers, if only because it tells us two important things: (1) The face the regime wishes to show to the world at large, and (2) the policies the regime intends to unleash on the long-suffering Iranian people.

Who's Who
Let's start with the interior minister, Hojatoll-Islam Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi. He was formerly the number-two man in the ministry of intelligence and security â ” where he was directly in charge of the foreign section (and thus the sorts of foreign operations now running full bore in Iraq and Afghanistan) â ” and, even more significantly, the man in charge of those matters in the office of the supreme leader.

Pour-Mohammadi comes from a sartorially celebrated family; his father and brother are tailors for leading clergy. Indeed, they prepared the raiments for both bin Laden and Zawahiri in their recent videos, in which their clothing was distinctively Iranian.

The minister for intelligence and security is Hojjatol-Islam Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ezhei, from Isfahan, where he acquired a reputation as a particularly vicious and barbaric head of the Islamic tribunals which regularly issued brutal sentences. He has been special prosecutor in the intelligence ministry, where he was also in charge of key personnel decisions, and at present he is judge and prosecutor for the special tribunal of the clergy.

To Mohammed-Hossein Saffar-Harandi of Tehran goes the ironically named ministry of culture and Islamic guidance. In reality, that ministry's key role is to provide cover for external intelligence operations. For a decade, Saffar-Harandi was the director of the political bureau of the Revolutionary Guards, in which he holds the rank of brigadier general, and for which he was the commander of southern Iran.

The foreign minister is Manoucher Mottaki, whose long diplomatic career (he has been ambassador to both Japan and Turkey, and deputy foreign minister) has included the sensitive role as liaison between the foreign ministry and the revolutionary guards. While he was ambassador to Ankara, numerous Iranian dissidents were murdered and others kidnapped.

And then there is the defense minister, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, another brigadier general in the revolutionary Guards, where he has been since its official formation in 1979. As several commentators have pointed out, he was the commander of the RG forces in Lebanon in 1983, when the Marine barracks were blown up by the Guards and Hezbollah. So we owe him one.

The mullahs have torn off their conciliatory mask in order to bare their fangs to us, the Europeans, and the Iranian people. If we had an Iran strategy worthy of the name, our confused leaders would have pointed out the remarkable interview with the chief nuclear affairs negotiator, Hossein Musavian. It was broadcast on Iranian television August 4th, and made it quite clear that the Iranians deliberately tricked the Europeans into giving the mullahs an extra year to complete a vital part of their nuclear program in Isfahan.

"Thanks to the negotiations with Europe," he bragged, "we gained another year, in which we completed...Isfahan." This was quite a coup, at least in Musavian's humble opinion: "We suspended (the enrichment program) in Isfahan in October 2004, although we were required to do so in October 2003...Today we are in a position of power: (the program) in Isfahan is complete and UF4 and UF6 gases are being produced. We have a stockpile of products, and...we have managed to convert 36 tons of yellow cake into gas and store it..."

President Chirac? Chancellor Schroeder? Prime Minister Blair? How do you all intend to answer your parliamentary inquiries? You were all gulled by the mullahs (or, to put the darkest light on the matter, willing accomplices).

Meanwhile, the mullahs are killing us. Time published a long report from Baghdad on August 14, entitled "Inside Iran's Secret War for Iraq," which lays out chapter and verse of the mullahs' longstanding efforts â ” often coordinated with Assad's Syria â ” to drive us out of Iraq. It is the first time I've seen a major publication confirm what I reported months before Operation Iraqi Freedom: planning for the terror war against Coalition forces in Iraq "began before the U.S. invaded." And Time quotes a "British military intelligence officer about the relative inattention paid to the murderous Iranian activities. 'It's as though we are sleepwalking'."

Got Iran Policy?
Instead of devoting hours of prime time coverage to the ravings of a broken mother, our media would do better to ask this administration why, four years after 9/11, it still has no Iran policy.

Perhaps, although one cannot say more than that, we are paying more attention. First came the announcement that American forces in Iraq found a cache of Iranian weapons, and had also captured a truck with shaped explosives entering Iraq from Iran. Then, talking to journalists on his plane during a South American swing on August 17, Rumsfeld said that U.S. forces have found Iranian weapons in Iraq "on more than one occasion over the past couple of months."

And so? These are straws in a very strong wind, and they will be blown away unless President Bush, Secretaries Rice and Rumsfeld, and Security Adviser Hadley at long last craft a serious policy to bring the terror war to bear on Tehran, as the president should have demanded on 9/12. The list of proven Iranian actions in the terror war against us is a very long one. To take just a few: In July, Assistant Secretary of State David Welch testified to the House International Relations Committee that "Iranian cadre were training Hizballah fighters in Lebanon," which Representative Tom Lantos quite reasonably found "profoundly disturbing." Hezbollah is operating in Iraq, and its infamous operational chieftain, Imad Mughniyah, remains at large even though the US Government has put a very high price on his head for decades. U.S. special forces in Hilla last fall captured documents and photographs of known Iraqi terrorists meeting with Syrian and Iranian intelligence officers in Syria. The celebrated Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzon publicly stated that, after the liberation of Afghanistan, al Qaeda reconstituted its leadership in Iran, where they convened a strategic summit in November, 2002. One of the participants was a Syrian named Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, who is now suspected by British authorities of being one of the masterminds of the lethal terrorist attack in London. According to Spanish newspapers, "Intelligence reports from foreign agencies last year placed Nasar in Iran."

The seemingly inescapable fact is that Iran is waging war on us, we are well aware of it, and we are not responding, even though most Iranians are dreaming of the day that the United States supports them against the mullahs. Hardly a day goes by without anti-regime demonstrations in one Iranian city or another, involving students, workers, intellectuals, and even some very important clergymen. The number of Iranian dissidents on hunger strike is growing. Akbar Ganji hovers between life and death in a hospital in Tehran. Yet, aside from occasional statements of compassion, there is no hint of action from the Bush administration.

This inaction has recently been buttressed by two fanciful "estimates" from the intelligence community. The first reassuringly forecast that Iran is a good ten years away from nuclear weapons; the second insisted that no revolution is in the Iranian works. To which the only proper response is a belly laugh. I'm personally willing to bet the farm against any intel-type willing to take the wager that Iran will have atomic bombs in a period closer to ten days than to ten years. And the "no revolution in the works" prediction comes, as Eli Lake of the splendid New York Sun wrote yesterday, from the same people who made the same prediction just before the fall of the Shah and who confidently told Ronald Reagan that the Soviet Empire was here to stay. Somebody should ask the deep thinkers to name three revolutions that occurred without outside support, and when they fail, they should then be asked how they could make such an assessment without discussing the key variable: our support or lack thereof.

As if that were not enough, our expert community, in and out of government, incessantly warns that if we were to support the democratic opposition in Iran, it would actually hurt the chances of revolution, because the Iranians would be so angry they would rally around the mullahs in a blind nationalistic spasm. The deep thinkers should take a look at the mullahs' reaction to the ongoing revolt in Awaz, in Khuzistan province. The regime has blamed the whole thing on the British Government. This produced a memorable response from the British Ahwazi friendship society:

    Protestors are armed with rocks, tyres and anything else they can use in acts of civil disobedience. They do not have guns. Is Asefi afraid the British are smuggling rocks into Iran to overthrow the Revolutionary Guards? Does he think Ahwazis need special training from the British in order to throw rocks?

The mullahs always blame their troubles on foreigners, and yet the Iranian people remain opposed to the regime, and many of the most popular dissidents openly ask the West, and particularly the United States, to help them.

Well, Mr. President? To use the language of one of your favorite games, it's time to call or fold. Indeed, if you're planning to stay at the table, you might even raise: President Ahmadi Nezhad was not in the American embassy in Tehran in 1979, but he was hard at work in Evin Prison, where some of the hostages were interrogated. You've got every good reason to tell him to forget about coming to New York this fall to pose at the U.N. That would send a ripple of hope through the Iranian populace, now interpreting our willingness to let him come here as a sign of acquiescence. And while you're at it, why don't you ask the Europeans to show at least some symbolic courage. They've failed to stem the Iranian nuclear program. It's obviously a wasted effort to ask the U.N. to apply sanctions, since China and/or Russia will quash it (and in fact, sanctions are the last thing we should want, since they would punish the Iranian people, not the beturbaned tyrants in power). Put the mark of Cain on the mullahs: propose that the Europeans to join with you in asking for a ban of Iran from all international athletic competition. And ask the international trade union organizations to support their brothers and sisters in Iran, many of whom have not been paid for months, despite the cascade of petrodollars.

Enough already. Let's roll.

â ” Michael Ledeen, an NRO contributing editor, is most recently the author of The War Against the Terror Masters. He is resident scholar in the Freedom Chair at the American Enterprise Institute.
 
http://www.nationalreview.com/ledeen/ledeen200508191008.asp

 

[a_majoor]

The roots of WW IV are quite complex, this article describes the process which created the phenomina known as "IslamoFascism". As has been pointed out in other posts/threads, this is a simple term to describe a complex phenomina, but it is illustrative and helps guide our thinking:

http://victorhanson.com/articles/ibrahim090405.html

From Nationalism to Fascism to Terror
Parallels between Germany and the Arab World
by Ray Ibrahim
Private Papers

On occasion, one finds a historical pattern that provides a paradigm useful for interpreting contemporary world events.  One such paradigm is the almost eerie parallel between Germany's history - its progress from Nationalism to Fascism and ultimately Terror - and the recent history of the Arab world.

Nationalism, of course, originated in Europe. But what nationalism came to mean or embody to any particular people varied over time and place, and its articulation had much to do with specific historical circumstances.  As a result, two highly antithetical forms of nationalism eventually emerged: the one, rooted in the Enlightenment, was aligned with liberal and "rationalist" thinking; the other, child of Romanticism, came to embody everything primordial: race, "blood," language, culture, and religion. Consider, for example, the different sorts of nationalisms espoused by France and Germany. In France, nationalism was connected with concepts of individual liberty, rational cosmopolitanism, and citizenship. Germany's later nationalism was built almost purely on a sentimental regard for the supposedly heroic past and the mystic blood-ties of the volk.

Thus nations like Germany put more emphasis on the volk than on the citizen, and on the geist, the unique, defining "spirit" of the people, than on civic rights or political structures. According to the 18th-century German philosopher Herder, "Nature produces families; the most natural state therefore is one people [volk] with a natural character. . . .  Nothing seems more obviously opposed to the purpose of government than the unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixing together of different human species and nations under one scepter."

As to why German nationalism developed along these lines, two considerations are important.  First, when threatened, a people often find solace by withdrawing into solidarity with others who share a same common background - racially, linguistically, culturally, theologically, and historically-while viewing all who do not share in these common primordial bonds as the dreaded "Others."  Conveniently enough, during the birth of German nationalism, there was in fact another hostile Other - the French.

Secondly, prior to 1871, the "German nation" was in fact composed of many petty kingdoms and principalities.  After the Napoleonic invasions, it became urgent for Germans to define and assert themselves through unification.  What better way to find cohesion than falling back on common traditions and values?  It is around this time that German history - or better, Teutonic myth - came to play a leading role in shaping the national consciousness: Wagnerian operas, based on the heroic Teutonic past, became popular. Historical characters like Arminius, who vanquished the Roman legions in the Teutoburg Forest in 9A.D., became objects of veneration, if not emulation.

Similarly, Arab nationalism developed along "romantic" lines. After nearly five centuries of foreign rule - from Ottomans to the Western colonial powers, primarily French and British - the Arab peoples, in order to find cohesion and identity in the rising world of nation-states, fell back on primordial bonds of kin, religion, shared history, and culture.  And just as in Germany, the liberal principles of Enlightenment nationalism came to be inextricably linked with the Arab peoples' oppressors (the French and British), giving the Arabs even more reason to shun "Western" liberal-democratic nationalism as a foreign import, a product of the oppressive Other.

Moreover, again similar to Germany, the so-called "Arab world" was - and still is - in reality made up of some 20 different states that needed some ready-made ideology in order to unify quickly.  Arab political scientist Bassam Tibi sums this phenomenon well:

Arab nationalism in the colonial period, which persists until the present time, is intellectually related to Italian and German nationalisms, which have been defined by C.J. Hayes as 'counternationalism'. . . .  Arab nationalism, once francophile and partly anglophile, changed with the British and French colonisation of the area and became anti-British and anti-French, and germanophile. . . .  It [germanophilia] was closely connected with the historical circumstances which influenced Arab nationalism.  Furthermore, the germanophilia was narrow and one sided.  The German ideology absorbed by the Arab intellectuals at this time was confined to a set of nationalist ideas which had gained particular currency during the period of the Napoleonic Wars [i.e., when the Germans were most threatened by the Other].  These ideas carried notions of romantic irrationalism and a hatred of the French to extremes.  They excluded from consideration the philosophers influenced by the Enlightenment . . . on the grounds of what was considered to be their universalism.  They were particularly attracted by the notion of the 'People,' [Volk] as defined by German Romanticism, which they proceeded to apply to the Arab nation [emphases added].

Like Herder before them, Arab thinkers came to make similar assertions regarding the concept of the nation.  For instance, Sati al-Husri (1882-1968), a very influential political figure, would "praise German Romanticism for having brought about the idea of the nation as distinct from the state, well before the French or British ever did.  He then fused the German concept of the nation with the Arabic concept of 'group solidarity' (asabiyya), which he derived from Ibn Khaldun." For al-Husri, Unity was more than mere blood; there was a spiritual quality as well. Husri did not specify the form of government that could best effect the regeneration of the Arab nation he favored. He did not rule out political dictatorship, was certainly aware of the totalitarian aspects of his thinking, and, like many of his Arab contemporaries, expressed some admiration for fascism. For Husri, freedom did not mean democracy or constitutionalism; it meant national unity. For him, nation (umma) denoted a group of people bound together by mutually recognized ties of language and history. This was distinct in his mind from state (dawla), a sovereign and independent people living on common land within fixed borders. It should be emphasized that umma for Husri was a purely secular entity, not a religious one [emphasis added].

More to the point, many concepts that were embodied in German words and that were central to Germany's nationalism - Geist and Volk - had their exact counterparts in Arabic words which also held important connotations for Arab nationalists, e.g.., Ruh (spirit) and Umma.  Even today, these concepts are still prevalent in much of Arab political writings.  Political scientist Hamid Rabi (d. 1989) "finds the German national school worthy of consideration . . . and admires the way the German thinkers, when faced with the humiliation of the French conquest, delved into their own Teutonic heritage in search of cultural and civilisational roots that raised the Germans' awareness of their national distinctiveness and 'authenticity.'"

Even though Germany and the Arab world have faced similar circumstances, thereby generating similar responses, there is one final element that helped increase radicalization: war, defeat, and humiliation, as experienced by Germany in WWI and the Arab debacle at the hands of the Israelis in 1967, the culmination of Islam's long decline before the rising power of Europe.  As a result, both Germany and the Arab world, after experiencing these defeats to their arch-enemies - their most despised Other - proceeded to fall into a stricter, more radical mode of primordial nationalist thinking.

Far from abating, German nationalism, after Germany's defeat in 1918 in WWI would become more ossified; race, and all "authentically German" aspects (e.g., culture, history) came to have an even more exaggerated importance to many Germans in defining themselves (again, vis-à-vis the Other).  This is when that ever so tenuous line separating nationalism from fascism was crossed.  With the rise of the Nazi party, German nationalism went to the extreme: the supposed superiority of the Aryan race (while quite popular during the turn of the century already) became the starting point for the ensuing (and megalomaniacal) German world view.  All "non-Aryans" - gypsies, Slavs, and of course the Jews - were ostracized or slaughtered; "deviants" (i.e., obviously non true-blooded Germans, such as homosexuals and liberals in general) were also persecuted.  All things became black or white, good or bad, right or wrong.  A "right" form of "German" conduct was expected from the people. Democracy was nonsense.  Women were expected to lead traditional lives, keeping their husbands and families their first priority.    Medieval German symbols and even pagan cults dedicated to the dark gods of the Teutoburg Wald (such as Wotan) became commonplace.  Indeed, that the Nazi party itself was greatly associated with the swastika - a historic, Teutonic symbol - demonstrates the importance that perceived attachments with the past had for the Germans.

An ideal example of the radicalization that Germany experienced is well demonstrated by the life of an average German man who fought in WWI and underwent a profound change - that is, the Fuhrer himself, Adolf Hitler.  The evidence indicates that Hitler had little personal bitterness towards Jews (not withstanding his purported vow of vengeance on the art academy that rejected him and was possibly headed by Jews).  Yet after the German defeat of WWI, increasingly to both Hitler and other Germans the Jews became even more singled out as traitors to the Fatherland - after all, they were not "true" Germans.  As for Germanic history/legend, Hitler was a zealous fan: his favorite books were about Teutonic gods and pure German lineages; Wagner's wildly passionate dramas of the heroic and romantic held a special place in his heart.  Hitler himself would proclaim, "Any who wish to understand me must first understand Wagner."  Thus on the eve of WWII, Germany, once defeated and humiliated a mere two decades ago, stood taller and prouder than ever, with a form of uncompromising and ruthless nationalism.

Based on this brief outline of Germany's overall transformation after their major defeat, many parallels with Arab responses vis-à-vis the continuous Arab defeats to Israel (not to mention recent American humiliations) can be discerned.  Again, an enemy Other - the Jews - helped shape a people's nationalism.  With one disastrous defeat after another - 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 (accompanied with extreme humiliation and indignation) - at the hands of the Jews, many Arabs, far from forfeiting their primordial form of nationalism, have delved deeper into their roots, seeking for elements that are glorious and heroic, and most importantly, that are authentically "Arab" - and what can be more "authentically" Arab than Islam itself, founded by an Arabian Prophet, revealed in the Arabian tongue, and preaching victory in face of oppression?

In many respects, it is precisely for this reason that there has been an Islamic resurgence in parts of the Arab world: seen by some as the Ruh of the "true" Arab Umma, many Arabs, trying to rationalize why they have fallen from once proud heights, have found the answer in Islam.  In their frantic search for identity and cohesion vis-à-vis the Jewish menace, many Arabs find in Islamic fundamentalism the logical conclusion of nationalism, for it provides a divinely sanctioned identity - and a war commanded by God Himself. Thus out of an already romantic (i.e., fascist) though disaffected nationalism, Islamic Fundamentalism was born.

So even though Islam is a religion, the historic rise of Islamic fundamentalism betrays certain commonalities with the German response of Nazism.  And that it is also a religion, gives it more import and legitimacy, as God himself is at the heart of it.  The Jew becomes a more pronounced and hence more despised Other: for now he is no longer just a foreign invader; he is also an impious infidel defiling God's holy lands.  And just as was the case in Nazi Germany, a greater intolerance for others takes place: non-Muslims are condemned and often persecuted.  Right and wrong ossify; conformity to "correct" Islamic conduct is stressed.  Deviants such as homosexuals are rooted out.  Jihad takes on renewed and urgent importance; talk of the crusades and heroes like Saladin (compare with Arminius) become commonplace.  Osama bin Laden et. al. are very fond of musing on and evoking the prowess, dignity, and piety of Islam's forbears - such as 7th century Khalid, "the Sword of Allah."  Women are to return to traditional roles - husbands and family are prioritized.  And, just as symbols of Germany's historic past (e.g., the swastika) played an important role in keeping the link with the glorious and "authentic" past alive, so too do Arab symbols become prominent: beards, turbans, and veils - back by popular demand - are to an extent symbolic, evidencing this link to the past.

And so, in certain respects, Islamic fundamentalism is an old phenomenon in a different form. Just as for Germany, wars and wounded egos have produced a vicious backlash in many parts of the Arab world.  But these commonalities and shared histories are not only instructive regarding the causes of Nazism and Islamic fundamentalism; perhaps they can also shed some light on how to handle the latter.

Certainly, we cannot undo history, and appeasment never works for long ("pay the Danegeld and you never get rid of the Dane"). Germany and Imperial Japan needed to have their societies destroyed and their ruling ideologies humiliated in order to end the threat of National Socialism and State Shinto, perhaps we need to steel ourselves to do the same to the Arab world to achieve victory.

 

[Infanteer]

Although the plea to romanticism is apt (in a basic, human sense), that is about all I will give this article.   To me, it is typical Western misunderstanding; want to understand Militant Islam?   Let's write 3/4 of the article on German history....

In my opinion, any article which attempts to discuss Global Salafi thought and doesn't mention Qutb, Tammiyah, or the Ikhwan is off the mark.   In my understanding, much of militant Islamic thought came to the fore as a movement against pan-Arab nationalism, not as a complementary evolution with it.   Certainly, this is what Qutb's works say (I've got it sitting right in front of me) - the fact that he wrote it while imprisoned by the quintessential pan-Arab nationalists, the Nasirists in Egypt, seems to further that notion.   The failure of the Arab states to deal with a tiny Israel certainly plays a role, but I think Qutb's notion of jahiliyyah and its view towards the internal workings of the Arab states needs to be accounted for when considering it.   The militant Islam we are dealing with today finds its roots in Egypt, not Germany, and its incubation in Afghanistan, not Israel.

 

[mdh]

Qutb has been one of the most influential theorists of modern Islam in the 20th century. But I think it's more accurate to say he rejected secular nationalism - (mostly of the Baathist variety) - and advocated for a kind of theocratic nationalism or pan-nationalism in its place   - or if you prefer the Caliphate - or in the more modern sense - the Koran, the Imam, plus electricity and a police force.

Moreover I wouldn't underestimate the amount of western influence on Qutb - he was educated in the US afterall - even if he dismissed America as decadent. He was very aware of western material progress.

I don't know what a Qutb state would have looked like - but wouldn't Iran and Taliban Afghanistan have been close contenders? Are they not - to borrow the Marxist term - the islamic praxis?

But it seems to me that analysing modern islam (as necessary as it is) is akin to analysing socialism - the nuances and sectarianism are so numerous that it can easily paralyze the analyst so that one cannot make any useful generalizations that help the layperson understand what they're up against. (I never had much patience for the "on the one hand, but on the other hand", school of analyses - at least not if it become a variety of reductio ad absurdum).

The "roots" of modern fundamentalism appear so multitudinous that they defy easy categorization.

But isn't it the raw and simple idea that really inspires so many disparate (ethnic and national) groups to embrace jihad - the raw and simple idea that the west is wicked and decadent and materialist? If you look at the London bombers in profile - I'm willing to bet they wouldn't have known Qutb from Harry Potter - at least in any sophisticated sense. I'm sure Qutb was just a series of bowdlerized slogans for these boys.

What really mattered was a twisted fealty to an islamic god and the necessity of making the infidel pay a price.

cheers, mdh

Here is a profile on Qutb in the Guardian:
 

Qutb, regarded as the father of modern fundamentalism and described by his (Arab) biographer as "the most famous personality of the Muslim world in the second half of the 20th century", is being increasingly cited as the figure who has most influenced the al-Qaida leader. Yet outside the Muslim world, he remains virtually unknown.
Qutb was the most influential advocate in modern times of jihad, or Islamic holy war, and the chief developer of doctrines that legitimise violent Muslim resistance to regimes that claim to be Muslim, but whose implementation of Islamic precepts is judged to be imperfect. Although Qutb is particularly popular in Saudi Arabia, his copious writings have been translated into most of the languages of the Islamic world. In the 1960s and 70s, when many Afghan religious scholars came under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb's ideas attracted particular interest in the faculty of religious law in Kabul, and the scholar Burhanuddin Rabbani translated him into the Afghan language of Dari. However, though Qutb is studied everywhere from Malaysia to Morocco, there are many versions of fundamentalism and his writings have been read and interpreted in many ways (and some Islamic fundamentalists have actually written polemics against Qutb's version of Islam).

Qutb was born in 1906, in Mush, a small village in Upper Egypt. Later he was to look back on the superstition and backwardness of village life. He was mostly educated at Dar al-'Ulum, a secular secondary college, and subsequently worked for the Egyptian ministry of education as an inspector of schools. In the 1930s and 40s he led a second life as a literary man about town. He haunted cafes, published literary criticism as well as a not particularly successful novel.

Everything changed in 1948 when he was sent to study education in the US. It was a fateful decision. Perhaps those who sent him thought that it would broaden his horizons. What happened was that on the voyage out he decided that his only salvation lay in an unswerving allegiance to Islam. Almost immediately his newfound resolve was tested on the liner, as a drunken American woman attempted to seduce him. Qutb did not succumb, nor was he later won over by the charms of the American way of life. He was repelled by prejudice against Arabs and shocked by the freedom that American men allowed their women. He described the churches as "entertainment centres and sexual playgrounds". After two and a half years of exposure to western civilisation he knew that he hated it and, on his return to Egypt in 1951, he joined the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood.

In the early 1950s the Muslim Brotherhood was in transition, as many of its members abandoned faith in gradualism and education as the way to bring about an Islamic revolution in Egypt and came to espouse violence instead. Qutb followed a similar trajectory. In 1954, he and many other Muslim Brothers were rounded up by Nasser's regime. He was to spend 10 years in prison. Though conditions were harsh, Qutb was not prevented from writing. He was released in 1964, then rearrested in 1965 after members of the Muslim Brotherhood had attempted to assassinate Nasser. He was routinely tortured before being brought to trial and then hanged on August 29 1966.

What Qutb wrote is of more significance than his somewhat shadowy life. His major work is Fi Zalal al-Koran (In the Shadow of the Koran), a commentary on the Koran in 30 volumes which began to appear in 1952 and was completed in prison. Apart from its length, two things are striking about the commentary: first, Qutb's unfailing sensitivity to the Koran's literary qualities; secondly, Qutb's relentless insistence on the unconditional demands made upon those believers. From his reading of the Koran, he deduced that the Christians are all destined for heck and in other, shorter, later works he polemicised against Christians, Jews and the western way of life.

Orientalism was another engine of the Jewish conspiracy: "It would be extremely short-sighted of us to fall into the illusion that when the Jews and Christians discuss Islamic beliefs or Islamic history or when they make proposals concerning Muslim society or Muslim politics or economics, they will be doing it with good intentions."

However, Qutb's fiercest polemics were reserved for those who were Muslims - or rather, those who claimed that they were Muslims. Neither Egypt under Nasser's dictatorship nor Arabia under the Saudi monarchy had made any serious attempt to implement the Shari'a, or religious law. More generally, the territories of Islam were governed by corrupt, westernised dictators and princes whose spiritually heedless and ignorant ways could only be compared to those of the Jahili Arabs - that is to say, to the pagan ways of the Arabs prior to the coming of Mohammed and the revelation of the Koran.

The corrupt regimes had to be resisted and overthrown. In order to find a hallowed precedent and legitimisation for such resistance Qutb had to go back to the era of the Mameluke Sultans of Egypt and to the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328). Taymiyya, a somewhat curmudgeonly Islamic purist, had been outspoken in his opposition to almost everything that was not explicitly sanctioned by the Koran and the Prophet and his intransigence several times led him into conflict with the Mamelukes and, consequently, imprisonment.

However, when they found themselves at war with the Muslim Mongol Ilkhans of Iran, the Mamelukes asked him for a judgment sanctioning the holiness of their cause and, surprisingly, he obliged. He declared that, though the Mongols might have professed Islam, they did not follow absolutely all the prescriptions of the religion and that therefore they were Jahili pagans against whom jihad had to be waged. Taymiyya's verdict has underwritten Islamic resistance movements from the 1950s onwards. It was cited by the assassins of Sadat in 1981 and it is also used to justify the struggle against the Saudi monarchy.

Qutb seems to have rejected all kinds of government, secular and theocratic, and, on one reading at least, he seems to advocate a kind of anarcho-Islam. On the one hand his writings have exercised a formative influence on the Taliban, who, under the leadership of the shy, rustic Mullah Omar seem to have been concentrating on implementating the Shari'a in one country under the governance of the Mullahs. On the other hand, Qutb's works have also influenced al-Qaida, which, under the leadership of the flamboyant and camera-loving Bin Laden, seems to aim at a global jihad that will end with all men under direct, unmediated rule of Allah.

In the context of that global programme, the destruction of the twin towers, spectacular atrocity though it was, is merely a by-blow in al-Qaida's current campaign. Neither the US nor Israel is Bin Laden's primary target - rather it is Bin Laden's homeland, Saudi Arabia. The corrupt and repressive royal house, like the Mongol Ilkhanate of the 14th century, is damned as a Jahili scandal. Therefore, al-Qaida's primary task is to liberate the holy cities of Mecca and Medina from their rule. Though the current policy of the princes of the Arabian peninsula seems to be to sit on their hands and hope that al-Qaida and its allies will pick on someone else first, it is unlikely that they will be so lucky.

· Robert Irwin is Middle East editor of the Times Literary Supplement

 

[Infanteer]

Terminal Debate

By BERNARD HAYKEL
Published: October 11, 2005

WHEN Iraq's most notorious terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, declared a "full-scale war" on Iraq's Shiites on Sept. 14, he appeared to be speaking for all or most jihadis. But Mr. Zarqawi's war on Shiites is deeply unpopular in some quarters of his own movement. In fact, growing splits among jihadis are beginning to undermine the theological and legal justifications for suicide bombing. And as that emerging schism takes its toll on the jihadi movement, it could well present an opportunity for Western governments to combat jihadism itself.

The simple fact is that many jihadis believe the war in Iraq is not going well. Too many Muslims are being killed. Images of that slaughter, conveyed by satellite television and the Internet throughout the Muslim world, are eroding global support for the jihadi cause. There are strong indications from jihadi Web sites and online journals, confirmed by conversations I have had while doing research among Salafis, or scriptural literalists, that the suicide attacks are turning many Muslims against the jihadis altogether.

The movement's leadership is sensitive to Muslim public opinion. Mr. Zarqawi's mentor, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, has denounced the campaign against Shiites as un-Islamic. Other prominent radical Islamists have advanced similar criticisms. And in a letter made public last week, Al Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, cautioned Mr. Zarqawi against particularly gruesome executions and attacks on Iraqi civilians for fear of their negative impact on the global jihadi cause.

To be sure, the alternatives these critics recommend are no less violent. Rather, many of the movement's dissidents suggest that jihadis diminish their efforts in Iraq and revert to spectacular attacks in the West, like those that took place on Sept. 11. These, such thinkers maintain, are singularly popular among Muslims and the only effective means of doing long-term damage to the West.

Still, Western governments should encourage the debate among jihadis because, if the promise of absolute salvation through suicide attacks is thrown into question by some within the jihadi movement, potential recruits may come to doubt the wisdom of engaging in such tactics.

The prevailing jihadi theoretical argument consists in saying that there is religious sanction for the killing of Muslim civilians, and that neither the innocent victims nor the bombers are doomed to suffer in heck. Jihadi claims about the certainty of salvation are the most important tools in their recruitment efforts. But they are also so fractious and unstable as to comprise the movement's Achilles' heel. In order to sustain these claims, theorists quote examples from the Prophet Muhammad's time that permit the targeting of Muslim civilians in war. They then draw tendentious analogies between these cases and today's political situation. For example, jihadis falsely claim that Iraqi civilians are being held as human shields by the occupying forces.

Furthermore, in Iraq, the jihadis bank on the fact that their attacks primarily kill Shiites. The fighters presume that their Sunni brethren, who consider Shiites to be heretics, will either approve or turn a blind eye. This policy is clearly failing, except among the radical Salafis in Saudi Arabia whose hatred for Shiites exceeds even that for the United States.

Not only are some jihadis queasy about targeting Shiites, but particularly following the London bombings, some jihadis have questioned the targeting of civilians more generally. One major jihadi ideologue, Abu Baseer al-Tartusi, has issued a fatwa arguing that all suicide bombing that targets Muslims, or innocent non-Muslims, is unlawful.

Abu Baseer, a Syrian who lives in Britain, no doubt fears that in Britain's changing legal climate, he might be extradited to his homeland, where he would face certain imprisonment and torture. Some jihadis have excoriated him on Internet message boards for placing self-preservation above religious conviction. But the important point is that real chinks are widening in the jihadi ideological armor, whether by the real consequences of suicide attacks or because the religious justifications that have underpinned them are becoming untenable.

Arguments can be built on Abu Baseer's position that suicide attacks inevitably involve the killing of innocent civilians, including Muslims living in the West, and that these are difficult to justify in Islamic law. Rather than expelling him from his asylum in Britain, concerned authorities ought to allow Abu Baseer to remain in Britain and make his case, which amounts to one of the first principled arguments by a jihadi thinker against suicide bombings since 9/11. Any would-be suicide bomber will have to weigh these arguments.

The West needs to understand that reasoned debates take place within jihadi circles and that such reasoning can change minds. Indeed, Al Qaeda's most recent statements, like that of Mr. Zawahiri, betray an anxiety about these splits within the movement and seek to reassert the legitimacy of suicide attacks both in Iraq and in the West.

THE West should refrain from interfering in this evolving debate. Western governments should not shut down jihadi Web sites or expel the movement's dissenters, many of whom reside in the West or write from prisons in the Middle East. Rather, they should allow this process to take its course. By employing extreme tactics, the jihadis have laid bare the contradictions within their own movement. Their internal debates about suicide tactics are a sign of weakness - and of the fraying of the consensus Al Qaeda so carefully built over the last decade.

Bernard Haykel, an associate professor of Islamic Studies at New York University and a 2005 Carnegie Scholar, is the author of "Revival and Reform in Islam."

(Source:   NYT)

Perhaps, as Kennan noted about Bolshevism, Militant Islam (especially of the Salafist variety) contains the seeds of its own collapse.   This is undoubtably something to exploit.

 

[Dare]

Perhaps, as Kennan noted about Bolshevism, Militant Islam (especially of the Salafist variety) contains the seeds of its own collapse.  This is undoubtably something to exploit.

I agree with that. This ties in with my previous motion about this war needing an increased effort on religious conversion. I think that this also should be a military objective, not just left to those of us on the internet, and private citizens. The code book to their "programming" is readily available. A teddy bear may turn children. Good deeds, like building schools,  may turn others. Appealing to the heart goes only so far, lasts only so long and is often easily reversed. Yet, only a reasonable and direct confrontation of ideas will turn the hardcore (the ones actually doing most of the damage), and ultimately win the day. Talk to them! Absolutely!! Just be aware, they're likely trying to convert you, as well. 

A policy of non-interference, on the other hand, I think is a poor idea. We should do whatever we can to advance the dialog forward and away. Suicide bombings are not an entirely new tactic in their essence. It is the reaction that we give which has triggered the response from moderation and put questions where there was unquestioning authority and timidity.

 

[paracowboy]

'conversion' is a bad idea. Why would they trade one form of spiritual extortion for another? We need to get them to realize that the extremists in their faith are leading them down a path of destruction. That is happening, at a grass-roots level. Start talking about 'conversion,' however, and you're going to rile up the moderates and even those who are openly friendly to us.

 

[Infanteer]

Conversion?  The enemy has been saying that we are out to supplant Islam with a Judeo-Christian crusade, so why would we want to play right to their tune?  Para is right, we need to convince mainstream Islam that extremism will get them nowhere - probably with a carrot and stick approach, but I start to feel we need more and more stick these days.

 

[Glorified Ape]

I agree with that. This ties in with my previous motion about this war needing an increased effort on religious conversion. I think that this also should be a military objective, not just left to those of us on the internet, and private citizens. The code book to their "programming" is readily available. A teddy bear may turn children. Good deeds, like building schools,   may turn others. Appealing to the heart goes only so far, lasts only so long and is often easily reversed. Yet, only a reasonable and direct confrontation of ideas will turn the hardcore (the ones actually doing most of the damage), and ultimately win the day.

Using a tool of violence (the military) to promote religious conversion? Sounds like a very very bad idea and one more characteristic of totalitarianism than democracy. The hardcore are likely to get more hardcore, and more support from the non-hardcore, if you have a military-led religious conversion campaign. Or any conversion campaign, for that matter. As soon as you start trying to promote a religion, you turn the conflict into an explicitly religious one where the stakes are the survival of the faith. I can't think of an easier way to completely polarize the situation (more than it is presently) and remove any semblance of legitimacy from Western involvement in the ME than to turn an attempted political conversion effort into a religious one.

As Infanteer said, any efforts at conversion would only validate the opposition's claim that the West is out to destroy/convert Islam and that's likely to turn a great number of existing and potential supporters into vehement opponents. That's to say nothing of the moral repugnancy of such a practice.