Kirkhill said:
What he said.
There is no benefit whatsoever in buying two small fleets to do essentially the same jobs, with one doing those jobs not quite so well.
And why do you consider "stealth" to be a bad thing?
What he said.
There is no benefit whatsoever in buying two small fleets to do essentially the same jobs, with one doing those jobs not quite so well.
And why do you consider "stealth" to be a bad thing?
YZT580 said:
See, I think the misunderstanding here is that the F-35 is better option for both domestic and foreign operations at a lower cost too. The only option might be less expensive is F/A-18E, however that is not clear at this time (it would really depend on how the operational costs play out after 2030 for the Super Hornet). Capability-wise its really not much of a contest between it and the other options.
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The problem is that the F35 is not operational. It's still in test mode. Software is incomplete - and much of the functionality that makes the F35 stand out is heavily reliant on sofware.
Thus, other AC are known quantities; the F35 is "Trust is, it'll be great".
With the ongoing problems with the Cyclone, one would hope that we've learned not to trust aircraft manufacturers when they're selling something that doesn't exist.
Thus, other AC are known quantities; the F35 is "Trust is, it'll be great".
With the ongoing problems with the Cyclone, one would hope that we've learned not to trust aircraft manufacturers when they're selling something that doesn't exist.
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Loachman said:
Indeed they do - and yet they're years behind the original schedule, and software is lagging badly behind hardware development.
So, the question is whether we believe it will be ready in time to replace our current fleet; if not, what is our mitigation strategy? Blindly hoping it will be ready is certainly one potential COA...
dapaterson said:
Certainly its a development program, but stating that all we have to rely upon is the word of LM is a gross simplification of the situation. This is a US government/multinational program, which is closely scrutinized to ensure that it meets its KPP. It probably has more oversight than any other program undertaken since the moon program. And these personnel have the expertise to make predictions on its future performance and cost. They set the specifications collaboratively with the manufacturer and then work to implement them in the design.
Moreover, this isn't a blind process; government officials are in the factories and drafting rooms working side by side with the designers. This is also why we have OT&E evaluations, GAO reports and the PEO reports. Certainly there have been reductions in the aircraft's capability, however for the most part it is meeting its goals. Since 2010 it has not seen serious cost growth, and design stability. So Canada can have reasonable confidence in obtaining a final product that is pretty close to the specifications it wants.
What frankly annoys me is that people (many of whom have never seen another procurement program) seem to now nitpick every single problem in the F-35 program as if it is some sort of gross failure. That recent T-star article really exemplifies that to me. Looking back over the past few decades, most other fighter programs encountered significantly worse issues during their development program. Had the US Navy listened to the GAO in 1996, it wouldn't have purchased any Super Hornets:
F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost
NSIAD-96-98, Jun 18, 1996
That study basically recommended the Navy buy legacy hornets instead. There was barely a whisper back then about it. Just imagine what sort of outcry would emerge now if that was the F-35?
Also, the real problem with the "alternatives" is that they are all 20+ year old designs that are showing their age. Buying them now will leave us with a serious gap later on, or not accrue the benefits we could receive if we waited.
I'll give an example: engines. With the exception of the F-22's PW -119, almost all engines on fighters are derivatives of twenty to thirty year old designs (PW F100, GE 404/414, Eurojet 200). Yet there have been significant advances in engine technology due to civil investment since 1990. Those technologies can significantly improve engine reliability and maintenance burden on crews. In practical terms the F135 will allow for almost no scheduled engine removals between overhauls. No borescopes or phases. That's a huge improvement over any previous system. Certainly we can just make due with the alternatives currently available, but that to me would be a true waste of Canadian taxpayers dollars over the long term. That's why I suggest that we should stay with the current path, rather than make a bad decision now.
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I have no dog in this fight whatsoever, however I find it amusing those that state with 100% certainty, and wish to convince everyone else, that a plane that hasn't flown a single true mission is far superior to any aircraft that has............every one of your arguments should be starting with "hypothetically".....
Bruce Monkhouse said:
I assume that comment was largely aimed at my comment above so let me give a sense of my perspective. First, I'm not 100% certain about anything. I frequently struggle with various aspects of the project and my own assumptions. On the whole, I try to provide the best advice possible based on the information available.
Second, I agree, its somewhat of a hypothetical. However everything in a procurement program is a hypothetical. The mere fact we're talking about 40 year lifecycle cost is probably the biggest hypothetical possible, yet that "hypothetical" $46 billion dollar price tag become the biggest criticism of the F-35. Without talking about the hypotheticals, there would be no point to even have a discussion or hold a competition. Furthermore, even after purchase, a capability can also be considered hypothetical. Going into the Second World War, the US Navy thought their Wildcats were excellent fighter aircraft. Then they faced IJN Zeros. I agree with you there is quite a bit that is still uncertain, but there is quite a bit that is known that can be used to evaluate the program
Nevertheless, judgements based on hypotheticals are required. The whole conception of a development program is to judge how a potential capability will operate in the future... otherwise what is the point to plan anything? We can make predictions, some with high certainty, to assist in our decisions.
A more precise way to discuss this topic is risk. There are aspects to this program that are less risky than others... capabilities that have been tested and proven. For example due to early testing the F-35's range estimates were refined. The last few months have seen some key areas of the flight envelope explored and the estimates refined. Finally, for your purposes, we're probably two years away from seeing the first USMC operational squadron deployed to Iwakuni Japan... which should offer the mission experience that you seek.
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Dan Ross sais (in the above article):
"National Defence had all the information — but the Harper government’s wouldn’t let officials go public with it.
For seven and a half years, whenever a journalist asked to do an interview, it was denied,
The Defence Department doesn’t communicate and it asks the (Prime Minister’s Office) for permission and they say no, and no one ever communicates.
If we’d had a tech brief bi-weekly that had the good news and the bad news, the facts, went through costing in great detail, I don’t think you’d be in the same place,”
And while that is all (probably) true it is also irrelevant. DND MUST communicate with e.g. the Auditor General and the Parliamentary Budget Officer and if the PMO is getting in the way then the problem is a weak, timid DM at DND. The Clerk of the PCO can put the PMO in its (second) place with ease if he knows that it is interfering with the machinery of government.
But the media has no particular right to information, and using it to communicate, rather than simply making data public through the AG and PBO, is wrong. There is far, far too much Washington in Ottawa and it is Constitutionally bad news.
"National Defence had all the information — but the Harper government’s wouldn’t let officials go public with it.
For seven and a half years, whenever a journalist asked to do an interview, it was denied,
The Defence Department doesn’t communicate and it asks the (Prime Minister’s Office) for permission and they say no, and no one ever communicates.
If we’d had a tech brief bi-weekly that had the good news and the bad news, the facts, went through costing in great detail, I don’t think you’d be in the same place,”
And while that is all (probably) true it is also irrelevant. DND MUST communicate with e.g. the Auditor General and the Parliamentary Budget Officer and if the PMO is getting in the way then the problem is a weak, timid DM at DND. The Clerk of the PCO can put the PMO in its (second) place with ease if he knows that it is interfering with the machinery of government.
But the media has no particular right to information, and using it to communicate, rather than simply making data public through the AG and PBO, is wrong. There is far, far too much Washington in Ottawa and it is Constitutionally bad news.
GR66
Army.ca Veteran
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Asking a couple of uninformed questions for my own education...
What would be the consequences/problems/benefits of the following course of action?
1) Getting the F-35 but reducing the number purchased fairly significantly (perhaps to the 35-45 aircraft range?).
- Would that still be enough aircraft to both respond to incursions in the North and send a meaningful number of aircraft for deployment overseas if required?
- Does reducing the number we have result in any significant support/training/maintenance issues beyond the obvious fact that we'd have less aircraft available overall?
- Would a lower purchase quantity affect our unit price or the potential for industrial benefits?
2) Purchasing a quantity of armed variants of our existing CT-156 Harvard II (the AT-6) and/or CT-155 Hawk (Hawk 200) training aircraft.
- I understand that we currently lease these training aircraft. Does the CF already handle maintenance for them or is that contracted out?
- Would there be enough commonality between the armed and unarmed variants to make adding them to our fleet less of a support problem than say adding a completely new aircraft type (like the F-15 for example?)
- Would these attack aircraft have an actual useful role in deployments (of course understanding that they would require a much more permissive anti-air environment than an F-35)?
- Could something like a Hawk 200 be a more cost efficient way to defend our major population centres against 911-like air threats?
- Would adding new types of operational aircraft have any positive/negative effects on pilot training and career progression?
- What impact might having a less "advanced" aircraft in service have on the Air Force Reserve (in terms of expanded roles, retention of skills, etc)?
There might be some additional benefits to having these low(er) tech aircraft in our fleet. These are the types of aircraft that many of the countries we are working on rebuilding might be able to afford and support. Canada could take a lead role in training the airforces of these countries in the use of these aircraft as part of our coalition rebuilding efforts (maybe in some ways a more politically supportable way of contributing than having combat troops on the ground). Also being able to fulfill a different role than our allies might make our contributions stand out a bit more from the rest of the crowd earning us a little more political capital with our allies.
Lastly, perhaps by having a smaller F-35 fleet and not having all of our eggs in one proverbial basket it will give us more flexibility in the future when it comes time to either replace the F-35's with the NEW latest technology or if the F-35 doesn't turn out to be as effective as hoped in the long term. A smaller fleet means less cost to replace it when the time comes.
What would be the consequences/problems/benefits of the following course of action?
1) Getting the F-35 but reducing the number purchased fairly significantly (perhaps to the 35-45 aircraft range?).
- Would that still be enough aircraft to both respond to incursions in the North and send a meaningful number of aircraft for deployment overseas if required?
- Does reducing the number we have result in any significant support/training/maintenance issues beyond the obvious fact that we'd have less aircraft available overall?
- Would a lower purchase quantity affect our unit price or the potential for industrial benefits?
2) Purchasing a quantity of armed variants of our existing CT-156 Harvard II (the AT-6) and/or CT-155 Hawk (Hawk 200) training aircraft.
- I understand that we currently lease these training aircraft. Does the CF already handle maintenance for them or is that contracted out?
- Would there be enough commonality between the armed and unarmed variants to make adding them to our fleet less of a support problem than say adding a completely new aircraft type (like the F-15 for example?)
- Would these attack aircraft have an actual useful role in deployments (of course understanding that they would require a much more permissive anti-air environment than an F-35)?
- Could something like a Hawk 200 be a more cost efficient way to defend our major population centres against 911-like air threats?
- Would adding new types of operational aircraft have any positive/negative effects on pilot training and career progression?
- What impact might having a less "advanced" aircraft in service have on the Air Force Reserve (in terms of expanded roles, retention of skills, etc)?
There might be some additional benefits to having these low(er) tech aircraft in our fleet. These are the types of aircraft that many of the countries we are working on rebuilding might be able to afford and support. Canada could take a lead role in training the airforces of these countries in the use of these aircraft as part of our coalition rebuilding efforts (maybe in some ways a more politically supportable way of contributing than having combat troops on the ground). Also being able to fulfill a different role than our allies might make our contributions stand out a bit more from the rest of the crowd earning us a little more political capital with our allies.
Lastly, perhaps by having a smaller F-35 fleet and not having all of our eggs in one proverbial basket it will give us more flexibility in the future when it comes time to either replace the F-35's with the NEW latest technology or if the F-35 doesn't turn out to be as effective as hoped in the long term. A smaller fleet means less cost to replace it when the time comes.
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Interesting suggestions, but before we can answer "what?", a clearly-articulated "why?" from the government* would be nice - as folks way smarter than me have said....GR66 said:
E.R. Campbell said:
PPCLI Guy said:
* - No, that doesn't include columnists, commentators, airplane manufacturers (including comms folks working for or or industry organizations speaking for said airplane makers) or former government workers saying what they think Canada needs - interesting, but not the same as The Government saying, "here's how we see the threats, and here's why plane x is the best option to deal with those threats within our means"
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milnews.ca said:
Same problem with other programs as well, CCV comes to mind for me. A solid PR program to rationally explain why these items are being procured BEFORE the media and opposition try to spin costs into "extravagance".
PuckChaser said:
I don't think it would help very much in this case. The opposition parties made this a political issue as far back as 2008 federal election, and thus it was going to be a target no matter what. The government just played into it... such as with the 2010 "selection" of the F-35. I think at various points what Ross suggests, DND being allowed to go back to the pre-2006 approach towards public relations, would have served them so much better overall. So much of the misinformation could have been dispelled by officials, rather than being centrally managed by the PMO.
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I understand the need for a PR programme, but:
FIRST ~ The CF, as a whole, has to decide, for itself, what it needs based on a militarily sound analysis of the strategic situation. That may be bloody hard but that doesn't really matter; ifwe you the defence staff cannot figure out what is needed and why then it is better to buy nothing at all, except for a new defence staff;
SECOND ~ The CF, the CDS and his minions, needs to convince the MND (through the DM and some ADMs) that the military operational requirement can be fit within the current fiscal planning framework or, if it cannot be fit, that the fiscal framework needs to be extended to give DND more (presumably at the expense of something else, like health and welfare). That will be bloody harder but it, too, must be done;
THIRD ~ The DM of DND needs to convince the Clerk of the Privy Council that DND's priorities and requirements must be afforded and satisfied and the MND must make, and win, the same argument at the cabinet table;
FOURTH ~ Even after the battle is won in PCO and at the cabinet table two more hurdles must be jumped: two cabinet committees must also agree ~
+ The Honourable The Treasury Board must agree, and its Secretariat is a powerful department of government that is charged to make sure that what DND says is justified in policy terms and sensible in expenditure terms;
+ The Planning and Priorities Committee must agree that it is politically/strategically necessary and politically affordable, too; and
FIFTH ~ Parliament must vote the money.
THEN ~ PWGSC and DND can buy and use whatever is, eventually, agreed upon.
There is no particular PR role in all of that except that the amount of political capital that ministers and the PM need to expend to provide for an adequate defence force can be minimized if the people and the media are "on side."
But, in my opinion, DND spends too much time and effort on PR and not anywhere near enough on good, solid, operational staff work. The CDS, personally, is responsible for that, just as all his predecessors were; too many, since, say, abut the time Ramsey Withers was CDS, have not done as good a job as they should have. Too much Pentagon has seeped into our system and the US DOD is a dreadful example to follow for, amongst many other things, military procurement.
FIRST ~ The CF, as a whole, has to decide, for itself, what it needs based on a militarily sound analysis of the strategic situation. That may be bloody hard but that doesn't really matter; if
SECOND ~ The CF, the CDS and his minions, needs to convince the MND (through the DM and some ADMs) that the military operational requirement can be fit within the current fiscal planning framework or, if it cannot be fit, that the fiscal framework needs to be extended to give DND more (presumably at the expense of something else, like health and welfare). That will be bloody harder but it, too, must be done;
THIRD ~ The DM of DND needs to convince the Clerk of the Privy Council that DND's priorities and requirements must be afforded and satisfied and the MND must make, and win, the same argument at the cabinet table;
FOURTH ~ Even after the battle is won in PCO and at the cabinet table two more hurdles must be jumped: two cabinet committees must also agree ~
+ The Honourable The Treasury Board must agree, and its Secretariat is a powerful department of government that is charged to make sure that what DND says is justified in policy terms and sensible in expenditure terms;
+ The Planning and Priorities Committee must agree that it is politically/strategically necessary and politically affordable, too; and
FIFTH ~ Parliament must vote the money.
THEN ~ PWGSC and DND can buy and use whatever is, eventually, agreed upon.
There is no particular PR role in all of that except that the amount of political capital that ministers and the PM need to expend to provide for an adequate defence force can be minimized if the people and the media are "on side."
But, in my opinion, DND spends too much time and effort on PR and not anywhere near enough on good, solid, operational staff work. The CDS, personally, is responsible for that, just as all his predecessors were; too many, since, say, abut the time Ramsey Withers was CDS, have not done as good a job as they should have. Too much Pentagon has seeped into our system and the US DOD is a dreadful example to follow for, amongst many other things, military procurement.
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E.R. Campbell said:
But... but... the decision brief was a powerpoint presentation. Seven whole slides! With animations!
Surely you're not suggesting detailed studies and analysis are required; which can in turn be summarized in a service paper; from which a sharp, clear, concise briefing note can be drafted to advise senior military leadership on the conclusions and recommended course of action. (And not to have COA 1: Fly CF18s until they fall out of the sky. COA 2: Buy other planes that we don't want so we won't study them. COA 3: Shiny!!!!)
E.R. Campbell said:
I think you're somewhat off the mark.
First, this change isn't really new... the politicization of the bureaucracy has been going on for several decades. Donald Savoie has some great works on it looking at Canada and the UK, there are several works that come to mind that are more specific to DND. The Weberian Bureaucracy model as it is known is changing. However the Conservative Government's approach has accelerated this shift significantly. This isn't a "weak" DM issue. You wouldn't get one month at the DM's position if you didn't submit to the government's pr system. And that's true for ALL departments, though I think the military has been the most effective at shielding its department from some of the worst effects of this system, but its still under its boot. In reality I think the installation of a certain ADM PA a few years ago really harmed the department's ability to communicate its message.
However, I don't think I have seen the suggestion they are interfering with the AG's work or not providing him (or her) with the information they sought; DND has cooperated with them whenever asked. I believe the military went out of its way to talk to the AG because it was an opportunity to prove their point without the encumbrance of the PA system. The PBO is another matter, but I think that is because they believe Page has overstepped his bounds in regards to his position's mandate. Then again I think that's also a PMO position that covered the entire government, not just the DND.
So I think the military is closer to what you want then you realize.
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HB_Pencil said:
I don't disagree with you about the politicization of the senior PS nor about the current, Conservative government's acceleration of the process, BUT, even after agreeing those points, I think most DMs, including DND's are timid and weak.
I just noted the sad passing last week of Gordon Robertson and wondered what he would have thought of the Casper Milqtoasts in the big offices in Ottawa these days. He (Robertson) was finally fired by Trudeau, so the legends/rumours say, for refusing the PM's direct orders to centralize power in the PCO and to cooperate with the PMO. (The late, and brilliant, albeit quirky, Michael Pitfield replaced Robertson in 1975 and did Trudeau's (really the Liberal Party's) bidding.) The Clerk, above all, still retains great power in Ottawa and he should use it more often to ensure that the machinery of government works in the national interest, not just in the interests of the government of the day.
E.R. Campbell said:
I think many of the later ones were quite good at their jobs by balancing the prerogatives of their department and politics. Judd certainly was effective in his role and willing to speak truth to power when required. I think the most effective in recent memory was Louise Frechetté; but then again her skills were exceptional.
You also have to remember that the DM's role also changed because of the 1997 reforms that concretely defined the relationship between them and the military, which had earlier been a major problem (aka "defence team"). You had the ability for the DM's office to have an outsized role in determining government policy, and even influence military decision-making (in the case of Robert Fowler). The Post-1997 leaders saw the military hold their role, and at times exceed them (in the case of Rick Hillier). This trend has also been affected by the Conservative government's efforts to centralize control. A lot of the policy functions have been subsumed into the PMO, or taken back by the military. In some way I think the DM must now fight just to keep its influence, not to mention advance a policy position.
E.R. Campbell said:
Really I think Robertson's period saw the start of the politicization trend. The restructuring of the PCO and Cabinet committees really began the long move towards curtaining the bureaucracy's ability to operate independently. In many ways there are a lot of parallels between Trudeau and Harper. I think they both entered office faced with a bureaucracy that had operated under a certain system and was unwilling to change to meet their demands. So they resorted to hard headed changes that ruffled feathers.
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