Good2Golf said:2) I think the way you phrased the first bullet of your takeaways from the speech doesn't give full justice to the capability of a fully-integrated, high-level network-enabled sensor-strike element in the cyber/physical battle space. It's not simply that F-35 receives C2 and ISR information to help build SA -- the F-35 is an integral part of the collection/dissemination/action-space. It's multi-directional - receive, transmit, share, extend, enhance. The other fighters are not nearly as deeply integrated into the 5th Gen battlespace.
JASDF releases images of first F-35
Gareth Jennings, London -
Source:IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
15 August 2016
The first F-35 for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) is seen at the Fort Worth production
facility ahead of the commencement of flight trials and delivery. Source: Japan Air Self-Defense Force
America's F-22 and F-35 Stealth Fighters vs. Russia's S-300, S-400 and S-500: Who Wins?
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-f-22-f-35-stealth-fighters-vs-russias-s-300-s-400-s-17394
New U.S. Naval Aircraft Integrating for Longer Range Operations
https://news.usni.org/2016/08/19/new-u-s-naval-aircraft-integrating-longer-range-operations
MarkOttawa said:Lots of radar stuff:
Mark
Ottawa
Computing the Value of Stealth: It’s Not That Simple
http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/computing-the-value-of-stealth-its-not-that-simple/
F-35 Follow-On Plan Takes Shape
...
The Pentagon is already looking ahead at what’s next for the fifth-generation fighter jet. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO), along with the three U.S. military services and eight international partners, is well on its way to establishing a modernization effort for the JSF, dubbed Block 4. The incremental Block 4 updates are expected to follow a recurring cycle: a software update every two years and a hardware update every four. This approach will allow the F-35 to keep up with technology improvements while managing the hardware retrofits on a realistic schedule, says Diane Wathen, the JPO’s director of follow-on modernization.
The stakeholders earlier this year settled on a wish list of capabilities to be included in the first two increments of Block 4, planned for 2020 and 2022. That list is moving through the formal requirements process, with approval by the Pentagon’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council expected this fall, says Wathen. The improvements are intended to focus on enhancing mission areas, including close air support, electronic warfare and adding or upgrading weapons capabilities, according to Wathen.
Key to the modernization effort is the addition of new and improved weapons, which will enable the F-35 fleet to keep pace with the threat to the end of the century. Additions in Block 4.1 are planned to include an advanced AIM-9X variant, the dual-mode GBU-54 laser-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition and the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) C-1, which will allow the Navy to strike moving maritime targets. Initial integration of Small-Diameter Bomb II (SDBII), which adds a tri-mode seeker, will be in 4.1, with full integration in 4.2.
As the program moves to follow-on modernization, the international partners will start incorporating their own weapon systems, Wathen says. Norway will integrate the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), the U.K. will add the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (Asraam), and Turkey wants its precision-guided Stand-off Missile (SOM-J) [have to see about those Turks]...
A crucial change coming in Block 4 will be the JPO’s effort to wrest control of the program from contractor Lockheed Martin. The government needs to own the technical baseline for the program, explains Wathen, adding that the office is looking at “the appropriate places to ensure we obtain government-purposed rights.” The Pentagon also wants to take the reins for the test program: Right now, Lockheed has greater responsibility for the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) effort...
http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-35-follow-plan-takes-shape
Why America Shouldn’t Build Sixth-Generation Manned Fighters
...
Brig Gen Raymond Franck (USAF Ret) is Professor Emeritus at the Air Force Academy. He has also served at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has written and published multiple works on defense acquisition and military innovation.
Professor Bernard Udis (Professor Emeritus, Colorado University at Boulder) has a wide reputation for expertise on international defense affairs and defense acquisition. His published work includes three books and numerous articles in scholarly journals on defense industries, defense management practices, and military power.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-america-shouldnt-build-sixth-generation-manned-fighters-17444
MarkOttawa said:As the F-35 matures there's still pesky LockMart:
Mark
Ottawa
Lockheed F-35's Cybersecurity Flaws Cited by Pentagon Tester
...
Cybersecurity weaknesses in Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 are among “many unresolved deficiencies” hobbling the costliest U.S. weapons program as production of the fighter jet ramps up, the Pentagon’s top tester said.
“The limited and incomplete F-35 cybersecurity testing accomplished to date has nonetheless revealed deficiencies that cannot be ignored,” Michael Gilmore, the director of combat testing, said in a prepared statement for a House Armed Services panel hearing Wednesday [Aug. 24].
Gilmore’s analysis that the F-35 program “is at a critical time” expands on previous reports on the risks inherent in building the planes even as they’re still being developed. A more optimistic assessment of the fighter’s progress will be offered to the House panel by Air Force Lieutenant General Christopher Bogdan, who heads the Defense Department’s F-35 program office. Bogdan, like Defense Secretary Ash Carter, has said that the F-35 is on the right path after surmounting earlier obstacles.
The F-35 program “is executing well across the entire spectrum of acquisition, to include development and design, flight test, production, fielding and base stand-up, sustainment of fielded aircraft, and building a global sustainment enterprise,” Bogdan said in prepared testimony.
Mission Software
“Our most significant technical concern is the development and integration of mission systems software,” as each aircraft has about 8 million lines of code, Bogdan said.
The aircraft is proving its capabilities, Bogdan said, reaching 50,000 hours of flight last month. He said that included about 26,000 hours for the Air Force’s model, 18,000 for the Marine Corps version and almost 6,000 for the Navy’s, he said.
While the Marine Corps declared last July that its version of the F-35 had an initial operational capability and the Air Force plans to do so by December, Gilmore said in his statement that the F-35 “remains immature and provides limited combat capability.”
Gilmore said “the program is working to resolve the many issues it confronts, but my assessment is that the F-35 program will not be ready for” combat testing until mid-2018 at the earliest, about a year later than planned [emphasis added]. He said in his annual report on major weapons in January that more than 500 planes would be built before the tests are completed in 2019...
The Air Force, which is buying the biggest share of F-35s, has insisted that the program office and Lockheed fix five of the most severe software deficiencies inherited from the Marine version before it declares an initial operational capability.
The latest software delivered last month “was so unstable that productive flight testing could not be accomplished” so “the extent to which the significant outstanding deficiencies are being addressed thus far is still to be determined,” Gilmore said.
Once combat testing of the F-35 begins, Gilmore said, it will be compared against the F-16 for destroying enemy radar and the F/A-18 for other surface attacks. It’s comparison with the aging A-10 Warthog for close-air support was previously disclosed.
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-03-23/lockheed-f-35-s-cybersecurity-flaws-cited-by-pentagon-s-tester-im4y5nwk
Korea F-35A Program Coming Together
By: Wendell Minnick, August 25, 2016
TAIPEI, Taiwan – Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $7 million contract for providing the multispectral database for the upcoming delivery to South Korea of 40 F-35A Lightening II stealth fighters with conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) capability.
The contract was awarded Aug. 23 by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the Foreign Military Sales program. The US Naval Air Systems Command in Maryland will handle the contract.
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Here's when an F-15 is better than an F-22 or an F-35
Alex Lockie
In a recent interview with Business Insider, Justin Bronk, a research fellow specializing in combat airpower at the Royal United Services Institute, revealed why the F-15, originally introduced four decades ago, is still more useful than either the F-22 or the F-35 in certain situations.
The F-15 is a traditional air-superiority fighter of the fourth generation. It's big, fast, agile, and carriers lots of weapons under the wing where everyone can see them. For that last reason, it's terrible at stealth, but the other side of the coin is that it's perfect for intercepting enemy aircraft.
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AlexanderM said:Someone is not happy.
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/26/politics/f-35-fighter-jet-problems-gilmore-memo/index.html
The detachment equipped with RQ-21A is not effective in supporting the ground commander’s mission because of an inability to have an unmanned aircraft arrive on station at the designated time and remain on station for the duration of the tasked period. During the IOT&E, the RQ-21A-equipped unit provided coverage during 68 percent of the tasked on-station hours (83.8 of 122.7 hours).
The electro-optical/infrared sensor provides accurate target locations. While the Capabilities Production Document does not specify a threshold value for sensor point of interest accuracy, Marine Corps guidance indicates that 100 meter accuracy is sufficient to support tactical operations. RQ-21A provides a 90-percent circular error probable target location error of 43.8 meters. Such accuracy is sufficient to support targeting in a conventional linear battlefield, but does not support targeting in a dense urban environment that requires more accurate target locations.
The RQ-21A sensor does not meet one of the two target classification Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) established in the Capabilities Production Document. The electro-optical sensor does not provide a 50 percent probability of correct classification for 1-meter linear objects (weapons or tools). The infrared sensor does meet the 50 percent threshold probability for correctly classifying 3-meter objects (vehicle chassis type) by demonstrating 100 percent correct classification.
The communications relay payload limits the commanders’ tactical flexibility and mission accomplishment. It is constrained to a single frequency in each of the two radios that are set before launch. Once airborne, operators cannot change frequencies. …
The recessed, nose-mounted electro-optical/infrared payload requires circular orbits over the top of the target to maintain continuous coverage and positive target identification. The use of offset orbits results in the fuselage blocking the payload field of view for significant periods of time. These offset orbits resulted in auto-track break locks and loss of positive identification of high-value targets. There are orbit shapes that would allow RQ-21A operators to maintain continuous coverage of a target, but the current RQ-21A operating system limits operators to circular orbits.
The RQ-21A is not operationally suitable. The RQ-21A demonstrated a Mean Flight Hour Between Abort for the System of 15.2 hours versus the 50-hour requirement. Because of aircraft reliability, overall system availability did not meet the 80 percent KPP threshold (demonstrated value equals 66.9 percent). [Emphasis added]
The average time between overhaul of the propulsion modules was 48.9 hours, which does not meet the manufacturer’s stated 100-hour capability.
The RQ-21A Naval Air Training and Operations Standardization manual is missing important information regarding mission computer logic. This lack of information is especially critical during emergencies where operators are unaware of which conditions enable/disable various aspects of aircraft functionality. This lack of system operations information contributed to the loss of an aircraft during the first IOT&E flight.
Extended logistics delay times and production quality control issues contributed to the system’s poor reliability and availability. In six instances, aircraft spent time in a non-mission capable status while awaiting spare parts. Incorrectly assembled/configured components received from the manufacturer increase the maintenance time to repair or replace components, resulting in reduced mission availability.
The system has exploitable cybersecurity vulnerabilities.