F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

[dapaterson]

It's not as simple as hours; it's landings, it's types of flight profiles and other factors that determine the lifespan.

Besides, it can be difficult to attribute hours to one specific activity; good planning can mean a single sortie can perform multiple roles, so an hour spent supporting CAF joint training, for example, can also be training for the pilot (maintaining proficiency), plus a NORAD presence mission plus...

 

[suffolkowner]

Anybody know where to find useful data on how the fleet flying hours of the Hornets have been utilized to date:

ie

In 1983 there were 138 aircraft with a planned life of 7000 flying hours each (which, if I understand correctly, required an upgrade programme to enable the aircraft to reach that original objective).

138 aircraft with 7000 hours resulted in fleet capable of supplying just about 1,000,000 flying hours (966,000).

Since they were introduced into service how many of the consumed hours to day have been used for:

Training
Supporting CF Training
Support of OGDs
Norad
NATO
UN
Active sorties engaging targets with live ammunition.

How many flying hours are left?

the number of hours per airframe were published by he who must not be named. I've seen them somewhere else though, i'll look

 

[tomahawk6]

This article compares the F-35 to the F-105.Different era's but the same problems, air to air deficiencies.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-f-105-thunderchief-fighter-the-f-35-the-vietnam-war-16839

The U.S. military’s new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter can’t turn fast enough to defeat a much older F-16 in mock air combat, according to an official test pilot report that War Is Boring obtained.

So how will F-35s — on track to be the U.S. Air Force’s most numerous fighter — survive in battle against foes flying much more nimble Russian and Chinese jets?

 

[SupersonicMax]

Air-to-Air is far more than 1v1 dogfights, especially today.  The F-35 may be lacking in some areas.  I do not believe Air-to-Air is one of then.

Some 1981 perspective:

http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/114371.pdf

 

[AlexanderM]

Just before it came out I remember reading that the Abrams tanks would be an unmitigated disaster. When I was going through Cornwallis the life expectancy of a crewman in battle was something like 20 minutes, but then the Abrams completely changed the game. Every new program has someone writing about what a disaster it will be.

 

[Loachman]

This article compares the F-35 to the F-105.Different era's but the same problems, air to air deficiencies.

"The similarities between the F-35 and F-105 are striking ... Carlo Kopp, an Australian aerospace analyst, wrote in 2004".

It's just somewhat possible that an article written twelve years ago may not be the best one to use as a comparison today.

 

[CBH99]

Ouch.

In all fairness, sometimes an article will pop up on my news feed that catches my eye.  I've learned recently to look at the date it was written, because - for some reason - some of those articles that pop up today were written 5+ years ago.  :dunno:

 

[tomahawk6]

The F-35 detractors are many but as it hasnt really entered service so its too early to bash the air frame.The article I quoted was 3 July but the author found a source from 2004 to try and make his case.The comparison was unfair.However,IMO the deference once deployed will be its sensors and bvr AA missiles.That certainly doesnt compare to an F-105.

 

[PuckChaser]

Lot 9 production contract almost finished (roughly 160 aircraft).

http://www.wsj.com/articles/lockheed-martin-says-new-f-35-contract-talks-in-final-stages-1467897390

Lockheed Martin Says New F-35 Contract Talks in Final Stages
Talks with Pentagon over second lot of stealthy fighter jets have run behind schedule

By Robert Wall
Updated July 7, 2016 11:50 a.m. ET

FAIRFORD, England— Lockheed Martin Corp. is in the final stages of negotiations with the Pentagon to conclude a multibillion-dollar contract for the next batch of stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets after months of protracted talks, a senior company official said Thursday.

“We are confident we will be on contract soon,” said company program manager Jeff Babione. The 160-aircraft deal would be for two years of F-35 production, Mr. Babione said. Lockheed Martin is slated to deliver the first of these jets after September.

The talks, originally expected to be completed months ago, have dragged on amid haggling over costs between the Pentagon and its contractors.

“It takes a while because it is very complex,” Mr. Babione said. One of the complexities is estimating what the costs of building future planes will be, he said.

This is the second time the Pentagon is negotiating for two years of F-35 production. The previous contract also took longer than expected to complete.

Mr. Babione said the next batch of production, called Lot 9, would be for 63 F-35s, with another 97 to be bought the subsequent year under the combined contract. The price for the F-35A, the most popular and least expensive model of the combat jet, would be less than $100 million for each aircraft, including its engine, he said. The final price will depend on what contractual terms are completed.

The F-35, the Pentagon’s most expensive weapons program, has been struggling to reduce costs. Lockheed and its two largest partners—Northrop Grumman Corp.and BAE Systems PLC—pledged to invest $170 million during the past three years on reducing the cost of the plane.

Mr. Babione said the cost-cutting effort has reaped rewards with lower-than-anticipated investment of around $140 million. That has cut $1.1 million from the anticipated cost of building a plane in Lot 9 and $1.7 million the year after.

The companies are now in talks with the Pentagon for another $60 million to $100 million investment programs to cut costs further in subsequent years, Mr. Babione said. The Pentagon has to sign off so the companies can reap a return on their investment if cost targets are met.

F-35 officials have set a target price of eventually bringing the costs of an F-35A to $85 million in fiscal year 2019. “There is room for us to get lower than that,” Mr. Babione said.

Note cost reductions likely down to below $100M USD including engine. For comparison sake, FY2016 order for Super Hornets is $67.2M USD flyaway, up to $69.75M USD including the FMS surcharge.

 

[HB_Pencil]

Lot 9 production contract almost finished (roughly 160 aircraft).

http://www.wsj.com/articles/lockheed-martin-says-new-f-35-contract-talks-in-final-stages-1467897390

Note cost reductions likely down to below $100M USD including engine. For comparison sake, FY2016 order for Super Hornets is $67.2M USD flyaway, up to $69.75M USD including the FMS surcharge.

Thats not an accurate price for the F/A-18E: you're missing a whole whack of costing, including the non-recurring research fee, ancillary equipment (Tgt/Nav pods, Fuel tanks, pylons, adapters), and possible cost for twin seaters (and this doesn't even get into initial spares purchases). The FY2017 USN budget has two replacement F/A-18Es funded through OCO that give a pretty clean view of the unit cost, which is 70.7 million per. Non-recurring research fee is roughly $5 million per aircraft. Ancillary equipment is about $7.5 mil if you average out the USN' accounts over the past decade. (as a note, ancillary equipment is about 2~3 mil for the F-35) At this stage you can add the FMS transaction fee of 3.5%. So the average cost of a Super Hornet is about $85 million, or 87 mil for the few twin seater F models.

One other point: the costing for the two OCO aircraft do not reflect the likely reduction aircraft production rates, especially with the continual delay in Kuwait authorization. This will increase unit cost significantly.

As a note on the F-35 costs, Lot 9 I believe is next years' delivery, and its lot 10 where the big cost savings will be apparent, especially if a Multi year procurement effort is instituted.  Thats' where PEO Bogdan and initial indications out of Long lead items discussions suggest a lower than $85 million dollar a year unit cost.

 

[PuckChaser]

I went with basic pricing vs basic pricing, as I didn't have the costing for F-35 with similar non-recurring costs.

I think what the numbers are starting to show, is the gap in price between SH and F-35 is rapidly closing, with SH trending up, and F-35 trending down.

 

[HB_Pencil]

I went with basic pricing vs basic pricing, as I didn't have the costing for F-35 with similar non-recurring costs.

I totally understand that and I agree with your second point. My point is that direct URF comparisons (which the media is fond of) a false impression to lay Canadians, because that price isn't available for us and a "basic" Super Hornet is a lot further (in cost terms) from a Canadian IOC than an F-35. It doesn't really get at the massive advantage we receive being a part of the JSF program, where stuff like the FMS and Non-recurring research fee, are waived for the F-35. I've said this a number of times: when an accurate accounting is applied, the F-35 is a significantly cheaper option for Canada in the Acquisition side. That would be true if Canada made a decision today to purchase the F-35, or F/A-18, because our aircraft would be delivered in 2019.

 

[PuckChaser]

Concur, but the problem with any Canadian purchase is the ridiculous model for costing (full life cycle). We also need to look at mid-life upgrades for SH, which is desperately going to need them 10-15 years from now to stay relevant. That's big bucks that F-35 won't require.

Another big point is if the SH line stays open for us. Its on life support right now, staying open based on USN orders as they wait for F-35C to be ready. Can't buy an aircraft that's not in production, and ASH was a last ditch effort by Boeing to keep the line open, and no one is biting.

 

[CougarKing]

By year's end, as some sources say.

Defense News

Air Combat Command Head Suggests F-35A Approaching IOC Soon
Valerie Insinna, Defense News 6:37 a.m. EDT July 8, 2016


RAF FAIRFORD, England — The head of US Air Combat Command said Thursday the Air Force would likely declare the F-35A combat-ready within the “leading edge” of the August through December window for initial operational capability (IOC).

Gen. Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle stressed that the service can declare IOC without aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin having delivered the version of its logistics system originally intended for the milestone. Company officials have said the 2.0.2 version of its Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) has been delayed until about October or November.

Nonetheless, the service can press on with an IOC declaration if its leaders believe an earlier version of ALIS would be adequate during an operational deployment, said Carlisle, who would make the decision in consultation with Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James and new Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[dapaterson]

So, in other words "Lockheed still hasn't delivered software for ALIS that meets the defined performance, so we'll just remove that condition and declare IOC anyways".

 

[PuckChaser]

So, in other words "Lockheed still hasn't delivered software for ALIS that meets the defined performance, so we'll just remove that condition and declare IOC anyways".

What current fighter/combat aircraft has ALIS, or something even remotely as capable? That's what I thought.

Its not a critical component to operational effectiveness, it's simply a workload reduction aide. If the reduced effectiveness of ALIS ver 2.0.1 is sufficient for deployed operations, and does not have an effect on bombs on target, why would they delay declaring IOC?

 

[dapaterson]

Because they defined IOC as including that ALIS functionality.  Redefining success to avoid the hard things only pushes problems down the pipe.

 

[PuckChaser]

It has functionality. Not full functionality. Hence its IOC, not FOC.

"Redefining success" is more like "acceptable risk/risk management", AKA the USAF can take the risk to accept the ALIS in its current state, and still meet its operational goals. If they waited until 2.0.2, maybe IOC is Feb 2017 instead of Oct 2016, but since they don't need those functions right away, they can accept the risk in the ALIS delay and call IOC prior to 2.0.2 release.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Because they defined IOC as including that ALIS functionality.  Redefining success to avoid the hard things only pushes problems down the pipe.

You can't let definitions and specifications, especially the ones related to purely support, define capabilities.  If it can do the job the it has reached IOC. 

 

[dapaterson]

Doing the job includes support functionality.  And trained aircrew.  And trained maintenance crew.  And adequate facilities for operations.  It's not merely "The a/c meets the specification", but "The a/c can provide a sustained operational capability, with the enablers as enumerated in the definition of IOC".

Saying "This isn't what we committed to, but we'll say it's good enough and deal with the problems later" is often a recipe for further problems down the road; it's a way of handing off the really hard things to your successor to address, instead of dealing with it yourself.  It also tends to create additional complexity down the road, as all the really hard things then have to be addressed at the same time late in the process.