Electoral Reform (Senate, Commons, & Gov Gen)

[vonGarvin]

There's the small obstacle of winning an election.

Pfffft!  Details!  Details!

;D

 

[a_majoor]

Mathematical proof there will never be a "fair" voting system. A close reading of the article indicates any system can be manipulated to get the outcome "you" want, which suggests that the best thing to do is limit the amount of damage by limiting the amount of power and reward winning an election gets.

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20627581.400-electoral-dysfunction-why-democracy-is-always-unfair.html?page=1

Electoral dysfunction: Why democracy is always unfair
• 28 April 2010 by Ian Stewart

IN AN ideal world, elections should be two things: free and fair. Every adult, with a few sensible exceptions, should be able to vote for a candidate of their choice, and each single vote should be worth the same.

Ensuring a free vote is a matter for the law. Making elections fair is more a matter for mathematicians. They have been studying voting systems for hundreds of years, looking for sources of bias that distort the value of individual votes, and ways to avoid them. Along the way, they have turned up many paradoxes and surprises. What they have not done is come up with the answer. With good reason: it probably doesn't exist.

The many democratic electoral systems in use around the world attempt to strike a balance between mathematical fairness and political considerations such as accountability and the need for strong, stable government. Take first-past-the-post or "plurality" voting, which used for national elections in the US, Canada, India - and the UK, which goes to the polls next week. Its principle is simple: each electoral division elects one representative, the candidate who gained the most votes.
This system scores well on stability and accountability, but in terms of mathematical fairness it is a dud. Votes for anyone other than the winning candidate are disregarded. If more than two parties with substantial support contest a constituency, as is typical in Canada, India and the UK, a candidate does not have to get anything like 50 per cent of the votes to win, so a majority of votes are "lost".

Dividing a nation or city into bite-sized chunks for an election is itself a fraught business (see "Borderline case") that invites other distortions, too. A party can win outright by being only marginally ahead of its competitors in most electoral divisions. In the UK general election in 2005, the ruling Labour party won 55 per cent of the seats on just 35 per cent of the total votes. If a candidate or party is slightly ahead in a bare majority of electoral divisions but a long way behind in others, they can win even if a competitor gets more votes overall - as happened most notoriously in recent history in the US presidential election of 2000, when George W. Bush narrowly defeated Al Gore.

The anomalies of a plurality voting system can be more subtle, though, as mathematician Donald Saari at the University of California, Irvine, showed. Suppose 15 people are asked to rank their liking for milk (M), beer (B), or wine (W). Six rank them M-W-B, five B-W-M, and four W-B-M. In a plurality system where only first preferences count, the outcome is simple: milk wins with 40 per cent of the vote, followed by beer, with wine trailing in last.

So do voters actually prefer milk? Not a bit of it. Nine voters prefer beer to milk, and nine prefer wine to milk - clear majorities in both cases. Meanwhile, 10 people prefer wine to beer. By pairing off all these preferences, we see the truly preferred order to be W-B-M - the exact reverse of what the voting system produced. In fact Saari showed that given a set of voter preferences you can design a system that produces any result you desire.

In the example above, simple plurality voting produced an anomalous outcome because the alcohol drinkers stuck together: wine and beer drinkers both nominated the other as their second preference and gave milk a big thumbs-down. Similar things happen in politics when two parties appeal to the same kind of voters, splitting their votes between them and allowing a third party unpopular with the majority to win the election.

Can we avoid that kind of unfairness while keeping the advantages of a first-past-the-post system? Only to an extent. One possibility is a second "run-off" election between the two top-ranked candidates, as happens in France and in many presidential elections elsewhere. But there is no guarantee that the two candidates with the widest potential support even make the run-off. In the 2002 French presidential election, for example, so many left-wing candidates stood in the first round that all of them were eliminated, leaving two right-wing candidates, Jacques Chirac and Jean-Marie Le Pen, to contest the run-off.

Order, order

Another strategy allows voters to place candidates in order of preference, with a 1, 2, 3 and so on. After the first-preference votes have been counted, the candidate with the lowest score is eliminated and the votes reapportioned to the next-choice candidates on those ballot papers. This process goes on until one candidate has the support of over 50 per cent of the voters. This system, called the instant run-off or alternative or preferential vote, is used in elections to the Australian House of Representatives, as well as in several US cities. It has also been suggested for the UK.
Preferential voting comes closer to being fair than plurality voting, but it does not eliminate ordering paradoxes. The Marquis de Condorcet, a French mathematician, noted this as early as 1785. Suppose we have three candidates, A, B and C, and three voters who rank them A-B-C, B-C-A and C-A-B. Voters prefer A to B by 2 to 1. But B is preferred to C and C preferred to A by the same margin of 2 to 1. To quote the Dodo in Alice in Wonderland: "Everybody has won and all must have prizes."

One type of voting system avoids such circular paradoxes entirely: proportional representation. Here a party is awarded a number of parliamentary seats in direct proportion to the number of people who voted for it. Such a system is undoubtedly fairer in a mathematical sense than either plurality or preferential voting, but it has political drawbacks. It implies large, multi-representative constituencies; the best shot at truly proportional representation comes with just one constituency, the system used in Israel. But large constituencies weaken the link between voters and their representatives. Candidates are often chosen from a centrally determined list, so voters have little or no control over who represents them. What's more, proportional systems tend to produce coalitions of two or more parties, potentially leading to unstable and ineffectual government - although plurality systems are not immune to such problems, either (see "Power in the balance").
Proportional representation has its own mathematical wrinkles. There is no way, for example, to allocate a whole number of seats in exact proportion to a larger population. This can lead to an odd situation in which increasing the total number of seats available reduces the representation of an individual constituency, even if its population stays the same (see "Proportional paradox").
Such imperfections led the American economist Kenneth Arrow to list in 1963 the general attributes of an idealised fair voting system. He suggested that voters should be able to express a complete set of their preferences; no single voter should be allowed to dictate the outcome of the election; if every voter prefers one candidate to another, the final ranking should reflect that; and if a voter prefers one candidate to a second, introducing a third candidate should not reverse that preference.

All very sensible. There's just one problem: Arrow and others went on to prove that no conceivable voting system could satisfy all four conditions. In particular, there will always be the possibility that one voter, simply by changing their vote, can change the overall preference of the whole electorate.
So we are left to make the best of a bad job. Some less fair systems produce governments with enough power to actually do things, though most voters may disapprove; some fairer systems spread power so thinly that any attempt at government descends into partisan infighting. Crunching the numbers can help, but deciding which is the lesser of the two evils is ultimately a matter not for mathematics, but for human judgement.

 

[a_majoor]

A look at MMP. Note the other changes needed to make something like that work:

http://freedomnation.blogspot.com/2010/04/revisiting-mixed-member-proportional.html

Revisiting the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system

In 2007 Ontario voted to keep the traditional ‘first-past-the post’ electoral system and rejected the Mixed Member Proportional system. At the time I campaigned hard against MMP. I felt that it would lead to small parties controlling the agenda and other unpredictable outcomes. The proponents of MMP held up New Zealand as an example of why I was wrong. And New Zealand is indeed a fair case study for how the system works. New Zealand has similar cultural and institutional roots as Canada (as much as any two countries share such roots). The problem was that the proponents of MMP drew the wrong lesson from New Zealand.

New Zealanders are set to make a verdict on their electoral experiment in a referendum to be held at the same time as the New Zealand election. Those who are interested in electoral reform should keep a close eye on the debate and results that will be coming out of New Zealand. Australian Policy Online provides a taste of how that debate will likely take form:

The new world of politics and equitable representation, however, never quite materialised. In fact, MMP created many perverse incentives and largely unforeseen consequences, such as increasing the power of political parties, the cessation of MPs being legitimised by their local electorate, and a reduction of political accountability for laws passed. The compromises that MMP encourages have led to a more consensual style of government, but it has also contributed to ad hoc lawmaking, an inability of government to take proper charge of a legislative programme, and pork barrel politics and ‘back room deals.’

MMP is a system concerned with process rather than outcomes. Although MMP has brought proportionality to parliamentary representation, it has produced political results that can hardly claim to be representative. This is because minor parties have a greater say in contentious legislation than their vote warrants. MMP was also designed to give women and ethnic groups more representation in Parliament. Maori and women’s representation has somewhat improved under MMP, but there is little or no evidence that it was MMP itself that led to this improvement.

Another case worth studying is how MMP has worked in Scotland, another country with a historic cultural and institutional relationship with Canada. There is little evidence that the same adverse effects have taken place in the Scottish Parliament, at least not to the extent that there should be concern. Scottish politics are dominated by four major political parties: Scottish National Party, Labour Party, Conservative Party, and the Liberal-Democrat Party. There was an upsurge of small parties in earlier elections, but they have all but disappeared in the 2007 election. MMP has even worked to provide representation that otherwise wouldn’t have existed; the Conservative Party would have barely gotten any seats in the traditional Westminster system even though they get more votes than the Liberal-Democrats. The MMP system has allowed the Conservatives to be a real political force in the Scottish Parliament.

So why does it work in Scotland and not in New Zealand? The answer is pretty simple; the Scottish Parliament did not move from ‘first-past-the post,’ it started off with MMP when it was established in 1999. The whole institution of the Scottish Parliament is built with MMP at the core. This meant that the Scots did away with some traditional aspects of a Westminster Parliament, including confidence votes for budgets and a stronger committee system.

The lesson for electoral reformers and democratic reformers in general is that you can’t just change one part of an institution. You have to make the various bits fit together. They fit together well in Scotland but they don’t fit in New Zealand, this is why MMP is dysfunctional in New Zealand. A lot of reform can be advantageous but a little reform can be a disaster.

 

[Edward Campbell]

The Liberals ride to the rescue, according to this article reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/liberal-party-favours-more-federal-seats-for-quebec/article1570822/

Liberal Party favours more federal seats for Quebec
Liberals’ stance at odds with Conservative legislation, which provides 30 extra Commons seats but none in Quebec

Daniel Leblanc

Ottawa — Monday, May. 17, 2010

The Liberal Party wants Quebec to get two or three extra seats if the House of Commons passes legislation to increase representation in three other provinces.
The Liberal plan could trigger a clash with the Conservative Party, which is proposing to add 30 new House seats in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia, but none in Quebec.

The Liberals’ Quebec caucus is pushing to increase seats in their province, and are gaining traction within the party. Their goal is to ensure that Quebec’s share of the seats in the House reflects the fact that the province has 23.1 per cent of the Canadian population. Quebec would be left with 75 seats under the Conservative plan.

“The file is a clear priority for the Quebec caucus,” said Liberal MP Pablo Rodriguez, who has been making representations to the national caucus and the Office of Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff.

Earlier this year, the Liberals voted against a Bloc Québécois motion that would have locked in Quebec’s representation at its current level of 24.4 per cent of the seats, by adding another 10 seats in the province. To the Bloc, maintaining its overall percentage of House seats compared to the rest of Canada is crucial.

A senior Liberal official confirmed the party will conduct a close study of the bill when it goes to committee, and find the best possible formula to ensure that all provinces, including Quebec, get adequate representation in the House.

“The principle for us is that it can’t be below the province’s share of the population,” the official said of the party’s position on Quebec.

He added the party is in favour of adding seats in other provinces, too.

“There is the Quebec element that is obviously important for the Leader and the party, but we also recognize that there are other provinces that are under-represented,” the official said.

As it stands, there are 308 seats in the House.

The Conservative government’s Bill C-12 would make major changes to the legislative chamber, adding new seats in Ontario (18), British-Columbia (7) and Alberta (5).

Matthew Mendelsohn, director of the Mowat Centre think-tank, said that there is a rationale for increasing the representation of Quebec, as long as the provinces that are currently under-represented get their additional seats.

“The goal is to pass legislation that is broadly acceptable in Ontario, B.C. and Alberta,” Mr. Mendelsohn said.

“If you find legislation that does some small fix for Quebec, which makes it more acceptable in Quebec and more likely to pass the legislation, then that is something you should be willing to look at,” he said.

But the Conservative government has shown no signs of budging on the bill, and is expected to defend its proposed distribution of new seats.

Ontario will be an important battleground in the next election, and Conservative officials are insisting that the province would remain under-represented in comparison to Quebec, even with the influx of 18 new seats. In that context, the Conservative Party can be expected to oppose the Liberal proposal, which would dilute Ontario’s representation in Ottawa.

The Bloc Québécois has been waging the most vigorous fight against Bill C-12, saying the Parliament’s recognition of the Québécois as a nation entails the province’s stable presence in Ottawa. In addition, the Bloc points out that there will never be proportional representation in the House, given that Prince Edward Island benefits from the constitutional promise of four seats.

The new law would only come into effect in 2014, and would not be expected to apply in the next election.

Some time back I presented a “model” based on New Brunswick, with 10 seats, being “fairly and properly, represented. I allowed that the three territories and PEI would remain grossly overrepresented and that no province should have a ‘variance’ from the ‘national average’ of more than about 10%. That produced a 451 seat legislature. I amended that to produce a 351 seat legislature - one with greater and, according to the anonymous Liberal official, unacceptable variances.

I have refined it further. A model which meets the Liberals goal of (very nearly) 100% equality of representation for all provinces except PEI (and the territories) requires about 500 seats in the HoC – more, I think, than Canadians will accept. There is another model that has 399 seats – something we could achieve in, say, three steps, on every five years, with about 30 new seats in each step. That model has a variance of about +15% (for Newfoundland and Labrador, on the plus side) (PEI and the Territories are still excluded but their overrepresentation “falls” to around only 250%.) and -3% (Ontario) which, I think, ought to be acceptable.

Here is the HoC using that model:

NV .......    1
NW .......    1
YK .......      1
BC .......    51
AB .......    42
SK .......    14
MB .......  15
ON ....... 150
QC .......  92
NB ........  10
NS .......    11
PE .........    4
NF .........    7
Canada  399

(I hope the numbers add up, i.e. that there are no transcription errors.)

 

[Journeyman]

Instead of simply adding more and more politicians, I suppose it would be heretical to suggest that any reform include making current ridings larger to take in more constituents.

 

[Old Sweat]

Instead of simply adding more and more politicians, I suppose it would be heretical to suggest that any reform include making current ridings larger to take in more constituents.

It seems to me that that would only exacerbate the PEI advantage.

 

[Greymatters]

Mathematical proof there will never be a "fair" voting system. A close reading of the article indicates any system can be manipulated to get the outcome "you" want, which suggests that the best thing to do is limit the amount of damage by limiting the amount of power and reward winning an election gets.

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20627581.400-electoral-dysfunction-why-democracy-is-always-unfair.html?page=1

Good article, even if the calculations and conclusions are almost depressing...

 

[Journeyman]

Instead of simply adding more and more politicians, I suppose it would be heretical to suggest that any reform include making current ridings larger to take in more constituents.

It seems to me that that would only exacerbate the PEI advantage.

Only if the Hon Member from Borden-Carleton also assumes responsibility for some NS constituents based on the bridge's abutments 'ashore.' 

If anything, PEI would lose, so this amendment would only refer to constituencies with populations (southern BC, central Alberta, southern Ontario and Quebec)

 

[armyvern]

It seems to me that that would only exacerbate the PEI advantage.Only if the Hon Member from Borden-Carleton also assumes responsibility for some NS constituents based on the bridge's abutments 'ashore.' 
...

Those would then have to be New Brunswick abutment constituents ... but I know what you mean. 

 

[Journeyman]

Those would then have to be New Brunswick abutment constituents ... but I know what you mean. 

Insert face-slap icon here.
All those places east of Lloydminster, Alberta baffle me

 

[armyvern]

Insert face-slap icon here.
All those places east of Lloydminster, Alberta baffle me

Considered yourself to have been struck with the white glove; pistols at dawn.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Now I know I haven't been home since Christmas but I didn't think they'd gone and moved the bridge...

8)

And, for the record, the MPs from PEI are a force to be reckoned with...fear them, ALL (3) of them!  :blotto:

 

[armyvern]

And, for the record, the MPs from PEI are a force to be reckoned with...fear them, ALL (3) of them!  :blotto:

True that.  ;D

 

[Edward Campbell]

Now I know I haven't been home since Christmas but I didn't think they'd gone and moved the bridge...

8)

And, for the record, the MPs from PEI are a force to be reckoned with...fear them, ALL (3) of them!  :blotto:

There are four (4) of them, actually: Easter, MacAulay, Murphy and Shea, making it (whatever it is) even worse!

 

[Journeyman]

Spud Island's escape route bridge goes to NS? NB? Three seats? Four?
It's just the maritimes; details are inconsequential  >

 

[SeanNewman]

I have always been dumbounded that with 300+ MPs and 32 million people, we don't do something like having 1 MP for every 100,000 people in a cluster.

Granted the population ebbs and flows and grows in some places and drops in others, but it would simply be a matter of shifting the boundaries on fixed dates every 10 years or so if required.

Yes there are going to be some obvious fudges like one area with 90,000 and another with 100,000 due to an obvious natural or political boundary, but it would still be far better than the disproportionate representation now.

 

[dapaterson]

Wow.  Have you ever read the BNA Act to understand where these questions come from?  Do you understand the process required for amendment of that document?

Or are you just randomly shooting off your ill-informed opinions?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

In a Parliamentary system such as ours, there is a democracy advantage to having a large number of constituencies, as you have in the U.K., if only you agree to party leader appointment process similar to that of the U.K.: The confidence of the party's members of parliament (i.e. appointment by the caucus).

With a large number, few M.P. can expect to accede to the Cabinet, and as a result, serving your constituency well, on the one hand, and making sure the PM doesn't do anything so as to cause you to lose the next election, on the other hand, become two important considerations in all your decisions. This creates a lot of back-room dealings within the backbenchers to keep the leader in check and makes the whips a little less powerful.

For instance, with the numbers suggested by  E.R. Campbell  (399), you would need 200 members to have a majority. Even with a large Cabinet of 50, that would still mean the average MP would have a 75% chance of not making it in and little prospect of getting there later. To maintain his chances of re-election, such MP would not be inclined to necessarily support the government in all votes that are not confidence vote, would likely be a lot more vocal in caucus, may ask questions of the government in the commons that are a lot more difficult to answer than the usual "set up" questions they now ask just to make ministers look good by publicizing achievements and would likely be a lot tougher on government ministers and officials in the house committees they are member of.

All this could only be good for democracy.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Wow.  Have you ever read the BNA Act to understand where these questions come from?  Do you understand the process required for amendment of that document?

Or are you just randomly shooting off your ill-informed opinions?

I know we aren't allowed to do this, but:

+1

Petawhatever: I believe you are an officer; you should know better enough to avoid appearing ignorant.

 

[SeanNewman]

Or are you just randomly shooting off your ill-informed opinions?

(And Mr Campbell).

I'm well versed in the reasons why things are the way they are, but thank you for the insult nonetheless.

However, amendments are made to every facet of everything legal or political that has ever been a good idea at one time of another, so there are no reasons things can't change.

What I brought up is the fairest possible way to do it.  Yes I would require a fundamental shift in the way we do things, but what could be more fair than equal representation by population?  Why should one riding that's 10 times the size of another have the same say?

Edit: Going back and reading my original post I see where the confusion may be coming from (if you thought I was suggesting that the boundaries weren't adjusted now).  Yes, it was specifically the PEI-types of scenario (senatorial clause) that I was talking about that I see was also covered already.

Another example is a seat being automatically given to each territory, regardless of population.

My apology for not mentioning PEI in my first post and not seeing it above anyway.